Iran: this hot-headed US approach
By Ammar Ali Qureshi
IN January 1945, four and a half years before coming to power in China, Mao Zedong and Chou En-Lai expressed their desire to talk in person with President Franklin D. Roosevelt in Washington. The United States remained silent and ignored the offer.
Twenty-seven years later, with millions of lives lost in the wars in Korea and Vietnam, Richard Nixon travelled to Beijing to confer with the same two leaders whose offer Roosevelt had ignored.In 2003, Iran had offered the United States a detailed proposal, which had the blessings of all major players including the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, for comprehensive negotiations to resolve bilateral differences. Flush with its recent triumph in Iraq, Washington rejected the offer for a comprehensive deal in 2003.
The document, sent by the Iranian foreign ministry, acknowledged that Iran would have to address concerns about its nuclear programme and support for anti-Israeli extremist organisations.
Prior to this proposal in 2003, Iran had helped Washington in its invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, in the aftermath of 9/11 in which no Iranian was involved, and became the first country to recognise Hamid Karzai’s government in Kabul. Immediately after 9/11, Tehran was one capital of a Muslim country where thousands held spontaneous candlelight vigil with prayers and support for the victims of 9/11.
Mohammad Khatami, Iran’s scholarly and cultured president, in his message condemned 9/11 as an “act of nihilism” which has “no place in Islamic thinking”. United States responded to all these appeasement overtures by including Iran, in January 2002, in the “axis of evil” along with Iraq and North Korea.
Sensing that it would be the prime beneficiary of Saddam Hussein’s downfall and its subsequent replacement by a Shia-dominated government, Iran remained silent over the invasion of Iraq although it has opposed the occupation of Iraq by the American forces.
By the end of 2003, two of Iran’s worst enemies — Taliban and Saddam — had been overthrown by the American forces. However, Iran was seized by a siege mentality as American forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf surrounded it.
In addition, America has a military presence in or close military cooperation with all of Iran’s neighbours except Syria and Russia. Iran’s negotiations with the EU-3 (France, Germany and United Kingdom) were bound to fail, as it did not include the United States — the only country from which Iran faces a threat and, hence, which is in a position to underwrite security assurances to an insecure Iran in exchange for abandoning its nuclear programme.
Washington invaded Iraq calculating that it could do business with the Shias in Iraq, who were presumed to be different from Iranian Shias. In 1972, Richard Nixon had cut a deal with China, based on the assumption that Washington could manipulate the Sino-Soviet divide in communism to his advantage and contain the Soviets in Vietnam.
Three years after the invasion of Iraq, the American assumption about the Shias of Iraq has proved wrong as Iraq’s Shias and, most importantly, their top political leadership are quite close to Iran. For the first time since 1921, when Iraq became a republic, Baghdad has a government which is friendly towards Tehran.
At the request of Iraq’s Shia political leadership, Washington felt compelled to initiate a dialogue with Tehran on Iraq’s future — hence acknowledging the failure of its policy of isolating Iran by dealing with Iraq’s Shias.Both Tehran and Washington have common interest in the stability and integrity of Iraq and the war against Al Qaeda in the Middle East. The report by the Iraq Study Group — co-headed by former secretary of state, James Baker — has stressed the need for engagement with Iran and Syria to improve the situation in Iraq. The argument that an unstable Iraq (or an Iraq divided into three countries) is in Iran’s interest is not convincing at all.
From Iran’s viewpoint, a stable Iraq, dominated by Shias who are close to the Iranian leadership is what serves Iranian interests best. Last year’s elections in Iraq, which brought the Shias into power, has already achieved Iran’s objectives. Now, it is in Iran’s interest to see a stable Iraq, presided over by Nouri al-Maliki or Abdel Aziz al-Hakim — who is friendly towards Iran.
James Baker is right in saying that even during the Cold War, Washington never abandoned the policy of engagement/dialogue with Moscow. Engaging Iran in talks over Iraq can serve as a confidence building measure for further dialogue between Iran and the United States who have not had any formal contact since the hostage crisis following the 1979 revolution in Iran.
Washington’s policy of conducting diplomacy with Iran through proxies — the UN, the EU, China or Russia — has failed. The need of the hour is that both Washington and Tehran should hold direct talks on Iran’s nuclear programme and other issues such as the situation in the Middle East, support to extremist organisations, concerns over human rights record etc.
In the past, Washington, despite opposition to authoritarian regimes such as the Soviet Union or China, never closed the door of direct negotiations. The US continues to do business with countries whose human rights record is worse than Iran’s.In the last few years, Washington has been able to wean Libya away from the policy of acquiring nuclear weapons and supporting extremist organisations by offering security assurances to the Libyan regime.
By the same logic, Iran can also be persuaded to give up nuclear weapons and support to extremist organisations by being offered a comprehensive deal that underwrites security assurances, engages Iran in Iraq and the region, drops the objectives of regime change from Washington’s agenda and safeguards Iran’s energy and economic interests.
The US should understand that it has no good options, apart from direct talks, on Iran as none of the other options, sanctions — including the latest ones backed by the UN — or military strikes, will achieve the desired objective. Sanctions or the threat of a military strike or steps to isolate Iran from the regional scenario will force Iran to take the North Korean route instead of following Libya’s example.
Barbara Tuchman, a noted American historian, wrote during the Vietnam War in 1972: “Basic to the conduct of foreign policy is the problem basic to all policy: how to apply wisdom to government. If wisdom in government eludes us, perhaps courage could substitute — the moral courage to terminate mistakes.”
Inviting Iran and Syria to the conference in Iraq is a good first step. President Bush should discard the current flawed American foreign policy and pursue the path of direct dialogue/engagement with the ayatollahs in Tehran.
ammar.ali.qureshi@gmail.com

