FOR the past many months, Pakistan has been at the receiving end of intense pressure from the US, which has chosen to repeat, ad nauseam, the refrain for Islamabad to “do more”. Over this period of time, this cliché has acquired a life of its own, gaining strength and intensity with each passing day.

Every time this phrase is uttered in Washington, it causes a tremor in Islamabad, forcing government spokespersons to scurry around issuing clarifications that only serve to confuse the matter even more.

The current phase of this campaign appears to have been initiated with the testimony of former intelligence chief, John Negroponte, to the Senate select committee on intelligence early this year. Negroponte has since moved to the State Department, where he is likely to be a little more restrained in his utterances. But what he stated earlier remains this American administration’s view of Pakistan’s conduct in the war on terror.

Since then, other senior officials, too, have echoed similar sentiments, but possibly no action has been as dramatic and disturbing as Vice-President Dick Cheney’s unscheduled air dash to Islamabad. This four-hour visit, shorn of ceremony and protocol, had one unambiguous objective – that Islamabad should do more to fight militancy and terrorism.

In any case, Dick Cheney’s willingness to undertake this long journey, notwithstanding his uncertain state of health, was proof of the urgency and sensitivity of the mission. Though officials from both sides have been hesitant to divulge details of what transpired during Cheney’s exchanges with President Musharraf, little was left to the imagination when a New York Times story claimed that Cheney’s mission was to deliver “an unusually tough message” to the Pakistani leadership.

A few days later, the prestigious Washington-based think tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, claimed that while the US had provided more than 10 billion dollars in five years since the 9/11 attacks, there was little to account for how the money was spent, nor had it afforded Washington any leverage over Islamabad. The report issued the dire warning: “Washington’s alliance with President Musharraf may have run the course.”Cheney reportedly carried with him film clippings of alleged Taliban and Al Qaeda camps operating in even the settled areas of Pakistan. With CIA deputy chief Stephen Kappes to assist him, Cheney minced no words when he told the president that with the Democrats in control of both Houses of Congress, the Pakistan aid package was under serious threat, unless there was tangible evidence of action by Islamabad against the Taliban.

The clippings were used to warn that if this evidence was shared with Congress, it could jeopardise the nearly 800 million dollar aid package for the current year. While Cheney was in Islamabad, a senior Bush administration official was quoted by the New York Times as saying that the administration was getting increasingly frustrated with Musharraf’s promises, adding that after months of pleading with Islamabad, it had been decided to tell Musharraf that “the only thing that matters is results”.

The White House, of course, denied that Cheney had delivered a “tough message” to Pakistan, though the spokesperson refused to comment on “the tone or tenor or the precise language of the message to the president”. The situation got further muddled when in the following days, all kinds of mixed signals emanated from Washington.

Ranking members of the Senate urged the Bush administration to launch military strikes at alleged Al Qaeda targets inside Pakistan, though Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman General Peter Pace denied such a possibility. But senior Pentagon officials added to these concerns by claiming that the coalition troops had already targeted Taliban and Al Qaeda sites inside Pakistan and that they had an agreement with Pakistan that allowed them to undertake such missions.

Worse was to follow when General Douglas Lute, chief operations officer for the JCS, appeared to confirm that US soldiers could target terrorist sites inside Pakistan, if there was an eminent threat. General James Jones, former top Nato operational commander in Afghanistan, also told the panel that US forces could legally strike across the border.

Interestingly, during the entire session, no member of the Senate spoke up for Pakistan, nor was any effort made by US officials to stop their incessant criticism of it. Instead, defence officials sat unconcerned while the legislators unleashed their guns on Pakistan.

At one point, the under-secretary for defence, Eric Edelman, said with reference to Musharraf that “it means he (Musharraf) has to face some difficult political choices at home and we have to encourage him to face up to those.” Republican Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama was even more provocative when he suggested that the US could act against Pakistan on the same legal ground used to justify the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan.

Pakistan, of course, denied that there was any understanding with the coalition forces that allowed them to target alleged Taliban and Al Qaeda sites inside its territory. The ISPR stressed that “no foreign forces will be allowed to launch direct air strikes inside Pakistan territory”, and that there existed an institutional mechanism to discuss issues concerning law and order on border areas, that a tripartite commission comprising Pakistan, Afghanistan and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan was the forum to address such issues.

Vice-President Cheney’s visit was no act of friendship, nor was it an indication of US solidarity with Pakistan. Its objective was simply to demand that Musharraf take action against the Taliban camps in Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan and the US are close friends. They have been coordinating closely on many fronts. The US has also provided Pakistan with substantial amounts in economic assistance and military finances and the country has been designated as a major non-Nato ally.

The leadership of the two countries claims that Pakistan and the US have “a strategic relationship”. But either the word “strategic” has lost its meaning or has been severely devalued. In any case, cooperation on a single-item agenda does not denote a “strategic relationship”.

Whatever the merits of the US case against Pakistan and irrespective of the degree of Islamabad’s commitment to the war on terror, it is evident that a certain tension has crept into relations with the US. This is not a happy development for either country. Doubts and misgivings have been further reinforced because of the perception in Washington that the Taliban have succeeded in regrouping themselves and that they are likely to carry out bolder operations in the coming months.

The likelihood of the so-called spring offensive is causing genuine concern especially when the Bush administration is facing setbacks on multiple fronts. There is hardly any foreign policy initiative taken by it that can be considered a success, unless the compromise it made on the North Korean nuclear deal is considered a triumph. The situation in Iraq is bad and growing worse by the day, adding to the growing clamour for a speedy withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. The administration is being buffeted from all sides, with prominent Republicans joining the swelling ranks of disenchanted Democrats.

In such a situation, the Bush administration’s level of tolerance for any reversal on the Afghan front is minimal. No one in Washington is in a mood to concede a setback on the Afghan front and this explains the growing impatience with Pakistan. That things are coming to a head is clear from reports that the Nato and ISAF have launched a massive operation to counter the Taliban’s expected spring offensive as the two sides prepare for what is being billed as the first major large-scale confrontation between them.

In such a scenario, Pakistan is likely to see an intensification of pressure from Washington. This will take the form of the demand that Pakistan “do more”, but this mantra could also get transformed into punitive surgical strikes by the US or allied forces across our frontiers. Of course, this would be deeply embarrassing for the Musharraf regime, calling into question its relationship with the US and its ability to safeguard its frontiers. But such a situation is inevitable, given the fact that the US-led coalition has received fresh reinforcements while the Taliban claim to have gained new adherents and acquired new weapons.

If the Taliban are successful in inflicting even minimal damage on the US or ISAF forces, the backlash is likely to hurt us badly, especially if the US forces decide to strike in our territory at the fleeing Taliban.

What can Pakistan do in such a situation? Not much, and yet it cannot just sit back and let events control its destiny. Islamabad needs to be serious and, if need be, ruthless, in destroying Taliban camps, sanctuaries and training areas. It is better that Pakistan does this itself and now, rather than constrain the US forces to do so.

In any case, the Taliban have proven that they are no friends of Pakistan. Their ideology has been a cancer destroying much that was precious and attractive about the country. After having undertaken this unpleasant task, Islamabad has to be frank and tell the Americans that there is only so much that it can do and expecting it to compensate for the US’s own inability or incompetence is just not possible. But this can be done only after Pakistan has cleaned up its own stinking stables.

The writer is a former ambassador.

IT is an open secret that governments go to any extent to stay in office. But when they do so by trampling on the principles of morality, they look ugly and power-crazy. The Manmohan Singh coalition damaged its image when it told the Supreme Court a few days ago that the government did not favour moving against the tainted ministers because the coalition governments would get unstable.

In other words, the corrupt or the criminals are an integral part of the Indian system even though it is democratic and transparent. The government’s affidavit before the court did not spell out which of the coalitions the centre had in mind. But it was apparent that the Manmohan Singh government, a coalition of 20-odd parties, was the prime consideration.

Law Minister H.R. Bhardwaj is said to have sent the relevant file to the prime minister’s office which must have cleared it with the prime minister. The stand taken is too important to be approved without his knowledge. Both Manmohan Singh and the ruling Congress party may rue the day. They may have to live down the damage they have caused to their reputation. Including tainted MPs and MLAs in governments is bad enough. But defending their inclusion is the worst kind of political chicanery. Corrupt bureaucrats, cheaper by the dozen, will use the example of tainted ministers in defence.

Even the Supreme Court was reportedly amazed over the government’s affidavit. Reacting to a public interest litigation (PIL), the court had asked the government at the centre and in the states: one, whether a minister charged with a serious offence by a law court should resign; two, whether charge-sheeted persons could be appointed ministers; three, whether the president at the centre and the governor in the states could advise the prime minister or the chief minister to drop such ministers.

There was a commotion in the courtroom when the government defence was known. Strange, the centre’s reply was given out, but not that of the states. Maybe, they were waiting for the central government’s reaction before filing their own.

The legal position is that a legislator is disqualified if sentenced to more than two years. But he can stay on if his appeal is admitted in a high court. The PIL had prayed that the conviction was enough to disqualify a member, not the high court’s admission of his appeal. The PIL prayed to follow the election commission’s procedure, rejecting straightaway the nomination papers of a candidate convicted for two or more years even when the high court had admitted his appeal.

In its affidavit, the centre has argued that the removal of anomaly may rock the governments “surviving on slender majorities.” The Congress has probably in mind the governments it has managed to form in some states. Manipur must have been in the party’s reckoning because the Congress has just formed the government with a majority of one or two members.

Whatever its considerations, the Congress has preferred politics to principles. The fallout of its stand will help the opposition more than the Congress. The BJP has a precarious majority in several states, particularly Uttarakhand and Jharkhand. Understandably, the BJP, which reacts at the drop of a hat, has kept quiet. When it comes to violation of morals, there is no difference between the two main parties.

Not long ago, party top leader L.K. Advani was charge-sheeted over the demolition of the Babri Masjid. But he did not resign. In defence, he said it was not “that kind” of a charge. For many, it was the biggest crime he had committed. Apart from the demolition, there were communal riots and unseemly repercussions in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The case is still pending. Initially, Advani was discharged on technical grounds. The Central Bureau of Investigation did not appeal against the judgment because Advani was then the home minister. He rewarded the CBI director who let him off by appointing him as a member of the National Human Rights Commission.

The CBI, after Manmohan Singh government’s affidavit, may drag its feet in cases where parties in a coalition are involved. When the centre itself is opposed to disqualifying a tainted minister, why should the CBI, a government department which is politicised, stick its neck out? The Manmohan Singh cabinet has a few tainted ministers.

One of them has already been convicted and his appeal has been admitted by the court. The CBI might not pursue the case vigorously in the light of the government’s stand.

UP chief minister Mulayam Singh Yadav is justified in doubting the bona fides of the CBI. His preference for a judicial inquiry by a sitting high court judge makes sense. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court has asked the CBI to look into his assets. A similar PIL in the case of Railway Minister Laloo Prasad Yadav was rejected on the plea that a PIL could not be used in such cases.

The most charitable explanation in the case of Mulayam Singh Yadav is that the Supreme Court believes the CBI to be independent, as trustworthy as the court.

The same sort of confidence is required to pin hopes on the statement by Manmohan Singh that his government would not interfere with the CBI’s working in the case of Quattrocchi, an Italian who has made a mockery of the Indian agencies, whether the law minister, the CBI or the Intelligence Bureau. He, evading justice in the Bofors gun scandal, has been caught in Argentina in response to the red alert that New Delhi had issued during the non-Congress government’s tenure some years ago.

Even if one were to have faith in the assurance of Manmohan Singh whose integrity is beyond reproach, one would not trust most ministers in his cabinet. But then he does not constitute the entire government. There are so many hands and all of them are not under his control. The prime minister, for example, did not know when the frozen accounts of Quattrochhi were unfrozen and when he was allowed to go out of India despite instructions to the contrary.

Scams and scandals, no doubt, shock the nation. But what shocks it more is the government’s nonchalant attitude towards the corrupt or its defence of the tainted. People do not expect Manmohan Singh to take such a stance.The Congress, once led by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, should ask itself whether the two would have approved of what the Manmohan Singh-led government has said in its affidavit. Both of them said: “Wrong means will not lead to right results.” There is something called morality. That of all the parties, the Congress should forget this in the race for power is, indeed, sad.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.