Managing external competitiveness
By Shahid Kardar
IT IS now widely recognised that the cost of doing business in Pakistan is somewhat excessive. Other than the lack, and poor quality, of infrastructure and woefully inadequate availability, unreliable supply and feeble quality of energy/power, two factors — inflation and an overvalued exchange rate — have in recent times become key issues.
They keep the costs of doing business higher than in our competitor countries, thereby adversely impacting on the competitiveness of domestic exports.
Economic information suggests that monetary policy should focus on core (non-oil and non-food inflation), instead of the inflation rate. Unfortunately, however, despite the decline in core inflation by two percentage points (now down to 5.5 per cent) that is controlled by good monetary management, the domestic rate of inflation continues to be high, hovering around nine per cent. For the general public, especially the poor, knowledge that core inflation has fallen by almost two percentage points (welcome though this news) brings little comfort, since food inflation at double digit rates is much more pernicious in keeping their purchasing power weak.
Prices of some products like oil and food tend to be affected more by supply and demand conditions than by monetary policy and, considering they carry a large weight in the Consumer Price Index (of 40 per cent), impact more heavily on overall inflation and expectations regarding inflation, emphasising yet again that prices of food and other essential items are key factors in determining inflationary pressures. As any rate, monetary policy is not a major determinant of inflation in Pakistan.
For maintaining employment and economic growth, the stabilization of the rate of inflation is a key factor. However, this assumes that the State Bank should monitor the core (using it as the anchor) and not the headline Consumer Price Index. But the sources of inflation in Pakistan are, to a great extent, non-monetary such as changes in output and availability of food (the supply chain covering production, availability and distribution), the marketed surplus and expansionary fiscal policies of the government (reflected in the budget deficit and the large borrowings directly from the State Bank at relatively low interest rates).
This does not, however, mean that the Sate Bank should not be mindful and on the alert by ensuring that its monetary policy is not contributing to this pressure. Moreover, globalisation has also made the economy more sensitive to inflation and thereby what is happening to real interest rates. Negligence on the part of the State Bank in this area could affect capital flows in and out of the country, despite the positive impact on remittance flows as a result of greater scrutiny of deposits and money held abroad by Pakistanis.
The point here is to argue that the State Bank, while targeting inflation, will have to look at the headline and not the core inflation rate, a task not easy since this requires greater focus on non-monetary polices (matters beyond its mandate), with only limited attention on monetary policy, to keep inflationary pressures subdued and sustain growth in output.
The rupee today is overvalued. The standard, and hackneyed, argument of government functionaries is that gone are the days when the price of the rupee was determined by the government. It is now determined by the market and since capital inflows, most of which are non-debt creating in nature (foreign remittances, privatisation receipts, donor grants and direct foreign investment), are largely financing the deficit on the external trade account, the value of the rupee continues to be steady.
Even if their contention that the market is determining the value of the rupee were to be accepted, the question is whether allowing foreign exchange inflows to keep the value of the rupee artificially higher (while also requiring monetary management to be more stringent) than it would be otherwise, is a good strategy for the profitability of our exports, especially considering that our domestic rate of inflation is significantly higher than that of our trading partners and competitors.
The lowering of the profitability rates and levels in the export and modern sectors of the economy is acting as a disincentive to invest in these sectors. Hence the movement in other activities like real estate and the stock exchanges, and, to some extent, in manufacturing for the domestic market in the more protected industries.
If China were to follow this course the value of the yuan would be appreciating (since it has a huge trade surplus with the rest of the world and is also experiencing large capital inflows). China, by not choosing to sharply revalue its currency upwards and maintain a highly competitive currency, has not only made it exceedingly difficult for the competitiveness of our exports but has also kept profitability and investment high in its exporting industries. So, who is suffering on account of this reality? If, when we find our strategy unsustainable (especially when there are no privation proceeds to finance part of the trade deficit), we decide to adjust the value of the rupee, some of our export markets would have been lost, having been captured by others, our re-entry in these markets is bound to be difficult, if not impossible.
Admittedly, managing the exchange rate is certainly not an easy task under the circumstances that we face now. But then policymakers need to understand the critical role played by the exchange rate and how to maintain competitiveness of industry without capital inflows hampering efforts to ensure just that.
The purpose here is to highlight an issue acquiring greater significance for social harmony with each passing day -- the large and growing inequalities of income and wealth (with inflation worsening these imbalances), owing partially to the failure of the non-agriculture sectors to provide adequate employment opportunities and thereby narrowing these differences. If the agriculture sector can somehow maintain a growth of around four per cent per annum, which for this year appears to be a target not likely to be achieved, and the rest of the economy grows at, say nine per cent, then the gap between agricultural and non-agricultural incomes will widen unless employment increases by five per cent per annum in the non-agricultural sector, which is the repository of close to 50 per cent of the labour force.
In our case, we have instead witnessed a steady growth in self-employment. This is a fallout of the poverty push rather than demand pull, resulting in a two-tiered labour market, with high salary jobs for a rather small segment of the workforce that has skills, with the rest suffering from lack of economic opportunities that barely provide subsistence wages-earning, making Pakistan appear two different countries.
The writer is former finance minister, Punjab.

