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| December 13, 2006 | Wednesday | Ziqa'ad 21, 1427 |
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Lebanon at crossroads
Repatriation of Afghans
No exit, not much of a strategy
SIX years ago, James Baker rode to the rescue when it began to appear that the Republican presidential candidate might sink in Florida.
THE unanimous call given at a seminar in Islamabad on Monday by politicians belonging to the government as well as the opposition to settle the differences between the centre and the Baloch nationalists through a dialogue should be heeded immediately. This was augmented by further calls made on Islamabad by participants, arguing that the Baloch people be shown respect and given provincial autonomy by shortening the Federal and the Concurrent lists and taking other political measures enshrined in the 1973 Constitution. It was demanded that political prisoners being held after recent military actions taken against the dissidents should be set free, and further military action stopped. The setting up of nine more cantonments in the province already having 43 of them was also opposed. Participants argued that the Rs30 billion annual development package given to Balochistan would not address the political issues; only a dialogue based on sincerity would achieve that goal.
The Islamabad moot followed President Musharraf’s three-day visit to Balochistan last week. The general had grudgingly offered amnesty for dissident Baloch nationalists in return for surrendering arms. “Our doors are open to everyone willing to negotiate for peace and development,” he had said, but then hastened to add that as president he was not going to “beg” anyone for a dialogue. This was unnecessary; the arrogance inherent in the general’s tone would seem likely to be matched by the Baloch sardars’ refusal to talk things out; the latter have no less pride of their own. Besides, the solidarity — if not sympathy for the nationalists’ point of view — witnessed in Quetta’s predominantly Baloch areas which observed a complete shutdown during the president’s visit there showed that the people were distrustful of the military establishment. The Baloch sardars and their politics are no less facts of life than the militants operating in the Frontier’s tribal belt; if the federal government is willing to strike deals with the tribal militants, why deny the Baloch nationalists a similar chance of reconciliation? Not doing so will only hamper the pace of development that is underway in Balochistan. Without implementing the political reforms proposed earlier by the officially appointed committees on Balochistan headed by Senators Mushahid Hussain and Wasim Sajjad, the danger that the average, confused and poor Baloch will be left open to political and economic exploitation by the dissident sardars cannot be ruled out. If there is a lesson to learn from the late Nawab Akbar Bugti episode, it is that both the sardars and the military realise the need for a political dialogue based on mutual accommodation instead of confrontation.
On its part, the Balochistan government’s demand that Islamabad make it a 20-25 per cent stakeholder in the income from the oil, gas and other mineral reserves in the province makes good sense. Balochistan has had to rely on handouts from Islamabad to meet its financial needs, year after year, because it only receives a pittance of oil and gas royalties; a good portion of these was paid to the late Mr Bugti as the landowner. Making the provincial government a stakeholder in the exploration of oil, gas and other mineral reserves of Balochistan will help lessen the chronic sense of economic and political deprivation prevailing among the people. This should be done immediately — not as a favour but as a matter of right of the Baloch people, to be acknowledged and implemented through dialogue among all concerned.
LEBANON is at a crossroads, for the situation there today is in sharp contrast to what it was in July and August. At war and subjected to merciless bombings of civilian targets by Israel, the country then presented a picture of unity and defiance. If Hezbollah fighters were holding the Israeli troops and armour at bay, Mr Fouad Siniora’s government was fighting Lebanon’s diplomatic battles with skill and courage. He rebuffed US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice by asking her not to visit Beirut. The visit would have served no purpose, for the motive behind Ms Rice’s hop from one Middle Eastern capital to another was to delay a UN meeting to give Israel time to gain as much territory as possible before a ceasefire went into effect. In fact, President George Bush, Prime Minister Tony Blair and Ms Rice had made it clear that they were in no hurry for a ceasefire. Incensed by this callous disregard for human life, Mr Siniora asked Ms Rice to cancel her visit. The results of the war established two points beyond doubt: first, Israel was roundly defeated, its cities proved vulnerable to Hezbollah rockets, and many a general resigned; second, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah emerged as a hero of the Arab world.
Things have changed a great deal since then, and Lebanon looks like teetering on the brink of a second civil war. The old question of who is pro-Syria and who is not has surfaced again, and Mr Siniora is fighting to stay in power, as Hezbollah supporters and some Christian groups have taken to the streets to bring down what they consider to be a pro-western regime and establish a government of national unity. Fortunately, the Arab League is very much in the picture, and the initial proposals carried by AL envoy Ismail Mustafa have received a positive response from Hassan Nasrallah. Mr Siniora, too, says he is keen to find a negotiated settlement. Let us hope the AL’s mediation works, for the aim of all Lebanese irrespective of political affiliations should be to avoid taking any precipitate action that could unleash a new round of violence.
FOREIGN MINISTER Khurshid Kasuri’s call for the repatriation of some 2.5 million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan would be supported by several sections of Pakistanis. For many people, the refugees, a large number of whom arrived in the country more than 25 years ago, have overstayed their welcome. But it is not only for the security reasons cited by Mr Kasuri that the issue of repatriation has assumed a new urgency. Hosting one of the largest refugee populations in the world, the Pakistan government has for several years now been suffering from what one UN official described as “assistance fatigue”. Also, being made to share space, resources and jobs with the Afghans, has taken its toll on the local population, many members of which have grown to resent the presence of the refugee community on their soil. The case for their repatriation is then unquestionable.
However, the point of view of the refugees is equally valid. Many among them were born in Pakistan and see no reason to return to a country to which they have few emotional or other ties, and where insecurity, poor living conditions and the lack of jobs would mean hardship and suffering. To them, returning to Afghanistan would mean being uprooted from a country where they have employment and opportunities and where their children have a better future. The issue of repatriation must then allow for humanitarian considerations. While the Afghan community in Pakistan should be encouraged to examine the option of return, equal stress should be on the need for Kabul and the international community to create more habitable conditions for the refugees. The latter would be far more willing to return to their homeland if their basic rights to jobs, security and decent living conditions are reasonably guaranteed.
The lawyer in him persuaded the parties concerned that the electoral dispute must be referred to the supreme court — where, he was convinced, the conservative majority would deliver a positive result.
He was right. That is why Al Gore has the freedom today to travel the world, armed with a movie packed with graphic depictions of the dangers posed by climate change. It hasn’t been quite as successful at the box office as Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan, but it has earned broadly approbatory reviews from all serious critics. Which is more than can be said about the pet project of his 2000 rival, George W. Bush.
One can only wonder whether Bush and the neo-conservative clique he gathered around him would have dared to invade Iraq without the cover provided by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The cover was, of course, illusory. Bush himself has lately been willing to admit that 9/11 bore no relation to Baghdad. But deliberately misleading innuendo initially convinced the majority of Americans otherwise. However, given that each of the major reasons cited in defence of the invasion was an egregious falsehood, there is reason to strongly suspect that even if Al Qaeda had not done its bit to fan the flames of aggressive intent, the likes of Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld would have come up with some excuse or the other for going after Saddam Hussein.
The personal vendetta part of the mission will be accomplished when Saddam is executed. The regime in Baghdad says Iraqis are lining up by the dozen to play executioner, which may be no exaggeration. Saddam, after all, has a great deal to answer for. Yet he will be put to death amid circumstances that have evoked an element of nostalgia for his regime among a sizable proportion of his compatriots, including many of those who were anxious to be rid of his malign rule. A more damning indictment of the circumstances spawned by the US invasion would be hard to imagine.
In recognition of the unfolding disaster, a congressional initiative earlier this year led to the establishment of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group (ISG), co-chaired by Baker and Lee Hamilton. It did not receive much publicity until it became clear that the Republicans faced a monumental popular backlash in last month’s mid-term elections. All of a sudden, the ISG was transformed into the source of a panacea. Its recommendations, administration sources suggested, would effectively be written in stone.
A rattled Bush was evidently under the impression that Uncle Jim — Baker served his father as secretary of state and is considered a close family friend — would ride to the rescue once again. The problem is, Baker may be a pragmatist, but he’s no superman. The impossible is beyond his grasp, and a solution to the Iraq imbroglio falls in that category. In the given circumstances, he did the best he could. But he failed to prevent the ISG report from being viewed as the Bush administration’s second serious blow within a month, following the electoral verdict on November 7 that delivered both Houses of Congress to the Democrats.
The ideologues of the far right, who comprised the core of the cheer squad that propelled the Bush administration towards the Iraqi misadventure, are up in arms (metaphorically in this instance) against the ISG report, even though its 79 proposals contain hardly anything that could even vaguely be construed as radical. On the military front, its advice barely differs from the strategy that the US has already put into practice, with greater emphasis than before on training Iraqi troops and getting them to do the dirty work, with US forces playing a supportive role. The trouble is, it isn’t working — just as “Vietnamisation” of the Indochinese conflict proved to be an almighty flop in the early 1970s.
Not only is the ISG’s call for the gradual withdrawal of US combat units from early 2008 conditioned on the ability of the proxy forces to sustain in power a US-friendly regime with reduced American assistance, but it implicitly accepts the imperative for an indefinite US military presence in the region, even though it calls on Bush to make clear that Washington does not seek permanent bases in Iraq. Perhaps neo-conservative irritation with the report stems in part from its brutally frank — albeit largely uncontroversial — assessment of the existing situation.
The ideologues are even less thrilled by the Baker-Hamilton commission’s emphasis on a new diplomatic offensive that involves an international support group consisting of Iraq’s neighbours, other regional powers, the US, the European Union and other interested countries. They are particularly disenchanted by the idea of a place at the table for Syria and Iran, and that the US should unconditionally engage in a dialogue with these two nations, leaving the dilemma of Iran’s nuclear ambitions to the UN Security Council.
This is arguably the most interesting suggestion to emerge from the ISG report. One can only assume that it takes cognisance of developments last month, when, according to reports in the American press, the Saudi regime effectively summoned Cheney to Riyadh and issued a stark warning: if the US pulls out of Iraq without establishing adequate safeguards, the Saudis will feel obliged to step into the breach in order to protect the minority Arab Sunni community, even if this entails war with Iran.
The latter is, of course, an appalling prospect from almost any point of view, and the ISG’s support group proposal appears to be motivated in part by the presumption that a platform for negotiations would reduce the likelihood of hostilities breaking out. The neo-cons, however, look upon the contemplated regional conference as a cover for cutting and running. There is little evidence to support their suspicion.
This is unfortunate, because a precipitate withdrawal may be the least damaging option available to the occupying power. The fear that it would lead to an upsurge in violence may not be entirely misplaced, but it may well be exaggerated. There is at least an equal chance that once the indignity of a brutal occupation is removed from the equation, most Iraqis will feel increasingly motivated to work out a modus vivendi as an alternative to open-ended sectarian strife.
That may seem like an over-optimistic conjecture, but the likelihood of any good flowing from any of the alternative options is even more remote. Of course, had the ISG called for an immediate withdrawal, the Bush administration would have ignored it; but at least the idea, authored by a bunch of retired luminaries with impeccable conservative credentials, would have been out there in the public. As things stand, Bush has anyhow rejected the diplomatic angle favoured by the ISG: he obviously has no intention of heeding Baker’s warning that the report will produce results only if each of its 79 recommendations is followed.
The report has also encountered vociferous opposition elsewhere, notably in Iraq and Israel. However, unlike Jalal Talabani and Ehud Olmert, Bush is more or less under an obligation to come up with a new strategy, and to announce it to the nation before Christmas. He says he is waiting for three other reports: from the Pentagon, the State Department and the National Security Council. It is extremely unlikely that any of them will contain any greater wisdom than the ISG’s offering.
The emerging consensus that the occupation of Iraq has been an unmitigated disaster is a step forward from the state of denial: even Donald Rumsfeld appeared to acknowledge as much in a memo he circulated two days before resigning. The next logical step would be to admit that the invasion itself was the gravest US foreign policy error since Vietnam. But don’t count on that happening anytime soon. Nor can there be any serious expectation that Bush will come up with a less absurd strategy in the next few days — or, for that matter, in the remaining two years of his presidency. If, in his address to the nation, he can avoid the blather that characterised his joint press conference with Tony Blair last week, that will be achievement enough.
Meanwhile, beyond the prospect of defeat in Iraq, many neo-cons have lately had much else to bemoan. The shock caused by the impending departure of Rumsfeld and John Bolton must have been compounded by the pain of losing Jeane Kirkpatrick, who served in the UN as a belligerent representative of the Reagan administration. She had been brought to Ronald Reagan’s attention after she wrote an article titled Dictatorships and Double Standards, in which she argued that right-wing authoritarian dictatorships were reliably pro-American and therefore perfectly acceptable, whereas “revolutionary autocracies” of the left-wing variety ought to be fought tooth and nail. She felt that although conservative dictators compounded disparities of wealth, but “because the miseries of traditional life are familiar, they are bearable to the ordinary people”.
Naturally, her obnoxious rationale proved irresistible to Reagan. One can only wonder whether Kirkpatrick had Saddam in mind, but she was almost certainly thinking of Augusto Pinochet, the corrupt US-supported tyrant who brutalised Chile for 17 long years. This week he followed in Kirkpatrick’s footsteps by shuffling off the mortal coil at long last, having managed for years to evade justice. Unlike Bush, the two of them at least had an exit strategy. Margaret Thatcher announced she was “saddened” by Pinochet’s demise. She wasn’t alone, but she was certainly in a minority.
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