KABUL: The biggest challenge facing the government of President Hamid Karzai is a criminalised, drugs-dominated political economy that is militating against any attempt to improve security and consolidate the rule of law in Afghanistan. Information recently released by the Afghan government and the United Nations suggests that the problem is getting worse.

With the adoption of the National Drug Control Strategy (May 2003) and the London Compact (February 2006), the Afghan government launched an extensive campaign to address the booming drug economy. The government not only created a special department at the deputy ministerial level within the Ministry of Interior but also established a Ministry of Counter Narcotics in order to prevent cultivation and smuggling of opium and its derivatives.

But this year’s opium harvest indicates that the government institutions concerned as well as relevant international agencies have failed in their stated mission as opium production this year increased by 59 per cent. Farmers cultivated 165,000 hectares of land and harvested 6,100 tonnes of opium, which constitutes 92 per cent of the world’s drugs demand. Poppy production at this level is 30 per cent more than the world’s poppy demand and counts for one third of this war-ravaged country’s gross domestic product (GDP).

Afghanistan’s southern Helmand province, the capital of the drug mafia, and one of the most restive regions of the country, witnessed a 160 per cent increase in the production of opium, enough to meet approximately half of the world’s opium demand.

This steep rise in drug production has created a massive illicit economy and the entrenched interests of different stakeholders could explain why the Taliban and their allies have concentrated so many of their battle hardened forces in this province and in many instances fought long and bloody battles against under-quipped government and reluctant international security forces.

The drug economy has fostered large-scale corruption among local and central level officials, including governors and police chiefs, raising serious concerns about the viability of the newly resuscitated state institutions. There is already talk of Afghanistan turning into a narco-state.

At present, it is widely accepted that the Taliban are receiving massive financial and political gains from the drug trade which is being used for financing their war against the Afghan government and its international backers.

Also, as a result of this year’s bumper opium harvest, drug traffickers have sufficient reserves to keep on amassing profits even if production were to fall next year.

Recently, Kabul was rife with rumours that Habibullah Qadiri, the counter narcotics minister and a close ally of President Karzai, might resign, especially in the light of the fact that his ministry has spent huge amounts of domestic and international funds paying salaries, undertaking expensive studies and drawing up strategy papers, organising seminars and conferences and conducting public education campaigns to stop the menace.

But that seems unlikely. Past experience in Afghanistan has shown that it is customary for public officials to stay in office even if they fail in their duties. Politicians’ accountability to the public will remain a distant dream unless adequate public pressure is built through open political discourse and clear demands for accountability.

It is interesting to note that opium production increased despite severe drought and poverty in the south and north. This year, the northern provinces of Badakhshan and Mazar-i-Sharif produced more opium. In contrast, the southern province of Ningarhar experienced a noticeable reduction in its opium output. Counter narcotics measures pursed by the Afghan government and its international partners require a multi-pronged approach to include providing alternative livelihood means to farmers, arresting traffickers and dismantling their networks, and cleaning up the bureaucracy and security institutions from corrupt officials

A key priority will be to improve security to enable state institutions to function in these remote areas. Such a comprehensive strategy cannot be successfully carried out unless Afghanistan enjoys the technical, financial and security support of the international community.

The Afghan government cannot go after the Taliban and the drug mafia on its own. According to the UN, 60 per cent of the Afghan opium is consumed in the immediate region, while the remaining is exported to Europe.

According to statistics from the ministry of health and the UN, Afghanistan has a population of 9,20,000 drug addicts. With over-production this year and a possible fall in the price of opium, this figure is likely to increase.—Dawn/IPS News Service