N-exports ban: a bold move
By A.R. Siddiqi
THE notification to impose stringent export controls on nuclear and biological-related materials by Islamabad is bold and may be called a timely initiative. It must go a long way towards strengthening Pakistan’s image and credentials as a responsible nuclear state. The odium attached to it ever since the disclosure of Dr Abdul Qadir Khan’s illicit network must lose much of its sting even if not forgotten.
Although not a signatory either to NPT or the CTBT, Pakistan’s role and status as a committed non-proliferator should, in due course, be above reproach. Unlike India, which had to depend on the US as its ‘strategic partner’ to underwrite its credentials as a responsible nuclear state, Pakistan has done it on its own.
The notification, besides listing the goods placed under export control, re-affirms Pakistan’s policy to implement its national and international commitment in respect of non-proliferation. This is indeed a most welcome and refreshing departure from our traditionally reactive policy towards India and restricted policy towards the United States, especially in its war against terrorism.
Whether Pakistan stands to lose more than gain from its contribution to the US-led war remains to be seen. It’s, however, quite another issue with no relevance to Pakistan’s status as a nuclear state.
Pakistan’s export control inventory covers the entire scope of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Australian Group (AG) relating to biological weapons and toxins. It also covers the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) concerning the development and range of tactical strategic missile. None of the above is UN-mandated covenants like the NPT and the CTBT, but collective/group arrangements among the signatory countries.
There is yet another body in the category of group arrangements the so-called Zangger Committee, named after Prof Claude Zangger of Switzerland. The Zangger Committee was established to define what was meant in the NPT’s Article III by not only the ‘source or special fissionable material’ but also by ‘equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material’. This was specially provided for to ensure that the parties concerned did not export such items to any Non-Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS), unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to safeguards. The committee completed its first ‘trigger list’ in July 1974.
In August of the same year, the governments of Australia, Denmark, Canada, Finland, West Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Soviet Union each addressed letters to IAEA subscribing to the ‘trigger list’. (South Asia on a Short Fuse by Bidwai/Vnaik and Going Nuclear by Leonard S. Specter). As for the Nuclear Suppliers Group, it was formed in London in 1975 following India’s first nuclear explosion in 1974, by seven industrially developed countries ‘working behind closed doors’ at US advice and initiative. It was a ‘broad-based’ group to ensure against the export of ‘sensitive’ nuclear technologies to future tactical proliferators. These countries were Canada, Germany, France, Japan, the Soviet Union, the UK and the USA.
The NSG now has over 15 countries as members, including some members of the former Warsaw Pact (Ukraine and Russia), the European Union and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
The MTRC was established as a ‘Close Door Group’ in 1987 comprising all members, less France, of the NSG, ‘to restrict transfers or sales of missiles or its components above the range of 300km.
Pakistan announced the successful test-flight of its medium-range (under or up to 300km), Ghauri, in April 1998. A month later in May of the same year, India took the lead in conducting multiple nuclear tests, followed by Pakistan responding in kind.
It is interesting to note that in spite of notoriety Pakistan earned as a proliferator, in principal, it has been not only against proliferation but also for nuclear disarmament. On May 17, 2000, Pakistan reiterated that ‘it remains firmly committed to the goal of achieving general and complete nuclear disarmament, elimination of weapons of mass destruction or the regulations of small arms. Pakistan believes that the core, principle and objective of disarmament should be to assure equal security for all states, regardless of their size and status.’ Short of natural fossil fuel reserves and hydral power, however, Pakistan must generate some 8800MW of nuclear power by 2025 to meet its growing energy demands. The recently opened second phase of Chashma Nuclear Power Plant under construction by China Nuclear Corporation after Chashma-I would help Pakistan achieve its energy target as planned. Both Chashma I and II, under IAEA safeguards, are dedicated energy producers.
— The writer is a retired brigadier of Pakistan Army


