Liaquat: an assessment
By Sharif Al Mujahid
NAWABZADA Liaquat Ali Khan (1895-1951) was the first prime minister of Pakistan (1947-51). And he was chosen for that office by the All-India Muslim League (AIML) which, having won some 88 per cent of the Muslim seats and secured about 75 per cent of the popular vote cast in the Muslim constituencies during the critical 1945-46 general elections, was the sole representative body of the hundred million Muslims of (undivided) India. This meant that Liaquat was next only to Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah (1876-1948) at that historic moment.
Now, what were Liaquat’s credentials that got him nominated without the least opposition as the executive head of the new state of Pakistan? Liaquat was the leader of the Muslim League bloc in the interim government for some nine months (October 1946-July 1947). He was the deputy leader of the Muslim League Assembly Party in the Central Assembly since 1940, and since Jinnah, if only because of his engrossing engagements, seldom attended the assembly sessions, Liaquat was for all practical purposes the de facto leader. He was also general secretary of the AIML, to which post he was elected unanimously at the Bombay (1936) League session, and this at the instance of Jinnah himself. More important; he was the longest serving general secretary of the League in all its annals, even out-serving the legendary Sir Wazir Hasan (1912-19) of yester-years.
Liaquat was also a member of the League Central Parliamentary Board. He was, thus, in part responsible for the selection of League candidates for the Central Assembly and for adjudicating disputes between prospective League candidates for the provincial polls during 1945-46.
As leader of the League group in the interim government and as finance minister, Liaquat had presented “the poor man’s budget” in February 1947, which badly mauled the capitalist and merchant class patrons of the Congress. This exasperated the Congress leadership, especially Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (1875-1950), “the Iron Man of the Congress”, inducing them to conclude, however reluctantly, that working with the Muslim League as coalition partners was totally impossible, and that partition was the only way out of the festering Indian deadlock. It may be remembered that the grudging Congress acceptance came within two weeks of Liaquat’s epoch-making budget — March 8, 1947.
Jinnah was known to be a strict disciplinarian; he was also an exacting president. To work in an organization headed by him, and that next only to him, was no mean task, nor was it enviable. That Liaquat served under him for 11 long years and still continued to enjoy his confidence, says a good deal about his capabilities to implement policies and programmes decided upon by the League’s high command, and to look after day-to-day organizational matters. More important, Liaquat was also supremely successful in keeping factious and feuding provincial leaders within reasonable limits of divergence and infighting. Liaquat was unassuming all the time; he believed in working behind the scenes; he never sought the limelight; above all, he was content to work under Jinnah’s towering shadow. Hence his role in the organization and in solving problems that arose from time to time has not generally received the kind of attention and recognition it should normally have.
However, a study of the Quaid-i-Azam Papers and the archives of the freedom movement which have become accessible to researchers only recently reveal that all through this period he served as a shock absorber and trouble shooter. Above all, his quiet diplomacy and unassuming demeanour enabled him to play out this role rather superbly.
Indeed, several top leaders (e.g., Nawab Ismail Shin of the UP, Sir Sikander Hayat Khan of Punjab and Fazlul Haq of Bengal) sent messages to Jinnah through Liaquat — messages which they could not address directly to Jinnah, for fear of being misunderstood. Thus, Liaquat helped to narrow down differences within the party’s leadership from time to time; to keep Jinnah apprised of developments which, if left unchecked, could have led to crises, to mollify estranged leaders or Jinnah, as the case may be, to checkmate the differences coming into the open, and to keep the somewhat ‘monolithic’ edifice of the League’s leadership intact. Clearly, this was a critical prerequisite for success in the on-going tussle against the Congress, in inducing the fence-sitters to join the bandwagon, and in the struggle for Pakistan.
On occasions, Liaquat deputized for Jinnah, and also served as his (unofficial) spokesman. For instance, in his address to the Aligarh students on Sept 22, 1945 when Liaquat called upon them “to play their part boldly” in the forthcoming general elections which was “a matter of life and death to the Muslims”, arguing what use would be a degree “if the future is dark and disappointing”. Likewise, at the Meerut divisional conference on March 25-26, 1939, where he propounded partition as the most rational solution to India’s constitutional problem. Again, in December 1939, in his interview with Sir Stafford Cripps when he proposed three possible constitutional solutions: outright partition between Muslims and Hindus, a loose confederation with a limited centre, and the provincial option. Remarkably though, these proposals corresponded to the three major British answers to the Indian problem in the 1940s: Mountbatten’s partition plan (1947), the Cabinet Mission three-tier scheme (1946), and the Cripps’ (local option) offer (1942). On all these occasions, Liaquat’s call and proposals, as the case may be, were meant to be trial balloons, if only to test the mood and reaction from the respondents, without however committing Jinnah and the AIML to them officially.
Jinnah was, of course, the supreme leader, but as I have argued in my Jinnah (1981) book, he was, like Lenin (1970-1921), essentially a party man, with his personality being sustained by, and developed within, the party. Moreover, during the momentous decade of 1937-47, he came to be identified as The Party. Yet even he needed a team of lieutenants to put his plans through, and that team was headed by Liaquat.
How ably he headed comes out demonstrably during the birth-pangs of the fledgling state. Pakistan’s birth, as is well known, was made all the more cataclysmic by a host of problems that engulfed the new-born nation on the morrow of freedom — problems such as the Punjab holocaust, the en masse migration of the Hindu and Sikh business, managerial and entrepreneur class, the immigration of some seven million refugees from across the border, the lack of a central government, a capital, an administrative core and an organized defence force, and India’s denial of a major share of Pakistan’s cash balances and defence equipment and store, its occupation of Junagadh and its back-door entry into Kashmir through fraudulent means, and the shutting off, in April 1948, of the flow of water from headworks in India into Pakistani canals, which irrigated some 1.7 million acres.
Jinnah’s presence at this juncture was, of course, critical — not only in formulating policies to steer the new-born nation out of the crisis it had found itself enmeshed in, but, more important, in energizing the people, in raising their morale, and in canalizing along constructive channels the profound feelings of patriotism that the coming of freedom had generated. But Liaquat was the man who supervised the implementation of these policies, filled in the gaps, and attended to the details. Indeed, as The Times of India (Bombay) remarked on his demise, “No man played more successfully the role of Cavour to his leader Mazzini.”
However, the acid test came in the wake of Jinnah’s death on Sept 11, 1948, when Liaquat was called upon to don the mantle of leadership. Some American circles, for instance, speculated whether the desire for a separate existence among Muslims would survive the catastrophic event. Even George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950) wrote to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) on Sept 18, 1948, “I am wondering whether the death of Jinner (Jinnah) will prevent you from coming to London. If he has no competent successor you will have to govern the whole Peninsula.” But during the next three years (1948-51) Liaquat proved to be more than a competent successor. He belied the assumption that Pakistan would collapse once it had to face the problems by itself without the guidance of the great leader.
Jinnah, even as Richard Symonds remarks, had “contributed more than any other man to Pakistan’s survival”; but as prime minister, Liaquat did a good deal in consolidating what had already been achieved in Jinnah’s life-time, and, moreover, in enlarging those gains and in carrying the process of building Pakistan further. The deft manner in which he tackled internal and external problems and consolidated Pakistan in the wake of the Quaid’s death won him recognition, both nationally and internationally. And as Sir Olaf Caroe, the last British Governor of the NWFP, said: “Three years of Liaquat Ali Khan’s leadership carried Pakistan through difficulty and crisis to the achievement of a degree of political stability rare in any democratic country..., of economic prosperity beyond her own rosiest dreams, and of an honoured place in the affairs of nations.”
Indeed, in Liaquat’s time, torn as several Asian countries were by internal disorders, political strife, and economic problems, Pakistan was considered the most stable and unified nation in Asia, with a firm commitment to freedom, democracy, social justice and world peace, and economically solvent.
— The author, founder-director of the Quaid-i-Azam Academy (1976-89), is co-editor of Unesco’s “History of Humanity”, vol. VI).

