Kashmir: no room for unprincipled deal
By M. Yusuf Buch
THESE days there is a good deal of talk about the changed atmospherics of the Kashmir dispute. The talk is inevitably loose, betraying a lamentable shift of focus from the human content of the dispute — the continuance of military occupation of the Vale of Kashmir and its adjacent areas with its heavy toll — to the realpolitik of India-Pakistan relations.
The only indication that the trip to wonderland has not enthralled everyone lies in the fact that international media have so far refrained from following their wont: they have not blown up the non-event of the changed tone, the less abrasive language, of the dialogue between the two countries into an event of concrete progress towards secure and stable peace.
Do these observations suggest a preference, almost a nostalgia, for the tensions and hatred that have darkened the subcontinental scene for decades? Hardly. It would be perverse to deny that a protracted situation of no-war and no-peace, sometimes verging on near-war, has utterly failed to make a dent in irrational intransigence, to shake entrenched positions and to generate a stimulus towards rethinking propositions which have been held close to the bosom as dogmas.
But while tensions and violence have been uncreative, the complacency that is being promoted now is not the healthy alternative, either. Indeed, it is chock-full of dangers. An outstanding one among these is that it dismisses what should be the paramount consideration in the quest of a settlement. This may be settled as follows:
The long, chequered history of the dispute, the way it has reverberated through the political life of the subcontinent, the baleful effect it has had on the region as a whole, the diverse phases it has gone through, the wars it has caused, the ravages it has wrought on Kashmir itself, the grim harvest of deaths, more than 60,000, which it has reaped from the fields of repression and insurgency against Indian occupation — all these make it extremely doubtful that a settlement, no matter how pleasing to the present leadership of India, Pakistan or, for that matter, even the United States, will carry a stamp of genuineness unless it has a rational framework, rests convincingly on principle and is transparently democratic.
This consideration is intrinsic to the India-Pakistan situation. But it gains force from the present global imperative of pulling out the roots of extremism, quenching the fire of the rage behind it and giving psychological strength to the forces of moderation and rationality. No better present could be handed to extremists than an unprincipled deal between India and Pakistan which mocks the suffering and sacrifices of Kashmiris and nullifies the sustained effort, historically launched under western leadership at the United Nations, to enable Kashmiris to determine their status and future by their unconstrained will.
The extremists on both sides would exult at such a phenomenon. The extremists on the Pakistan-Kashmir side would welcome it as vindicating their asserted belief that no trust can be reposed in them. The extremists on the Indian side would jubilate over the tangible proof provided to them that all the atrocities committed to maintain Indian occupation of the Vale of Kashmir have not only remained unpunished but have actually been handsomely rewarded. There will probably be no explosion but the reverberations, even if but faintly audible to some ears, will continue for eras in the future.
The consideration I am trying to stress will remain entirely unaffected even if both India and Pakistan procure the endorsement of the Kashmiri personalities whom they respectively patronize to a deal between themselves. I use the word “personalities” rather than “leaders” advisedly because no authentic Kashmiri leadership has been yet allowed to emerge. The personalities I refer to cannot be deemed to have acquired representative credentials unless they have gone through elections, which are impartially supervized, rendered credible by wide popular participation and wholly immune from the suspicion of being rigged. No such elections have yet been held.
At this time, therefore, we can not only pose the question from whom the Indian and Pakistani leaders derive the authority to decide the future of a people who have not abrogated it to them; we are also obliged to look askance at the claims or pretensions of Kashmiri political figures who are strutting about whether on India’s side or the opposed one.
Of course, it would be grossly unfair to forget that, over the years, the Hurriyat had shown remarkable maturity, cohesion and freedom from party egotisms and that the prominent men in it had borne great personal hardships in the service of the cause of liberation. Unfortunately, however, by falling prey to factionalism, they have now dissipated part of the great credit they had earned; it is most unedifying to see some of them basking in Indian or Pakistani patronage.
One of them is reported to have said that he has before him as many as 35 options to consider. Though we may charitably hope that he was speaking in youthful jest, there is an underlying syndrome, which cannot be lightly disregarded. It is caused by wrong mental direction. Both natives and foreigners tend to think that the question before them is what shape the final settlement of the Kashmir problem should take, while the prior problem to be resolved is how that settlement can be achieved.
What should be the essentials of the desired procedure? When responsible attention is paid to the question, the confusing multiplicity of options (which either perplexed or gratified the Hurriyat gentlemen) disappears. Here are some requirements of the plan involved:
— It should ensure that each region of the state of Jammu and Kashmir elects its representatives under impartial supervision.
— It should take full cognizance of the ethnic heterogeneity of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and enable the representatives of different regions to decide a settlement without pressure from either India or Pakistan and even from one dominant region or another.
— It should by itself neither promote nor rule out any conceivable settlement — accession in whole or in part to India or Pakistan, the eventual joining or separation of any two regions, independence or quasi-independence, etc., etc.
— It should allow a transitional phase, a phase of detoxification, before its decisive elements come into operation. Rather than hustle a solution and arouse passions, it should usher in a gradual process over several stages leading to a just, sustainable and definitive settlement of the dispute.
In conclusion, I would stress that the situation with regard to the Kashmir imbroglio cannot improve in reality if either (a) the flexibility being shown by President Musharraf remains unreciprocated or (b) both his flexibility and Indian rigidity pay insufficient or little regard to the rights and wishes of Kashmiris. The “setting aside” of the UN resolutions is one thing; the discarding of the principle they embodied is altogether another. The latter amounts to throwing the baby with the bath water.
The principle involved is twofold: first, the settlement of the problem must accord with the wishes of Kashmiris and second, equally important, these wishes must be impartially ascertained. Gimmickry and manoeuvres, no matter by whom encouraged and approved, cannot be a response to a demand for which thousands have shed their blood.
The writer is a former ambassador and senior adviser to the UN secretary-general.

