| 23 February 2005 | Wednesday | 13 Muharram 1426 |
Significance of the bus accord
Women in Islamabad
Post-poll scenario in Iraq
The decision by President Mahmoud Abbas of Palestine, and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel, to call off hostilities, at their meeting in Sharm-al-Sheikh in Egypt on February 8, could be the harbinger of durable peace in Palestine.
After the violence and mayhem of the past four and a half years, during which, 3000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis died, the end of violence has produced an air of optimism that the half a century old conflict between the Arabs and the Jews might finally be over.
The intermittent war, that has deeply divided the West, and the oppressed Arab and Islamic countries, has been one of the negative consequences of the two world wars fought in the first half of the 20th century.
If one were to look for the roots of modern terrorism they would be traced to the injustice perpetrated on the Palestinians to create a Jewish homeland in a land holy to all three revealed religions, on the basis of military and economic strength.
The Balfour Declaration by Britain, during the First World War, and the forcible creation of the state of Israel through US power after the Second World War, gave birth to a dispute, which has poisoned the global environment for two generations.
There was the first Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948, when Arab states sought to extinguish the Jewish state created through a UN resolution favouring partition. The Jewish armed forces, based on terrorist organizations, defeated the Arab coalition that included Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and occupied much more territory than the UN partition plan had awarded to it.
The powerful Jewish communities in the US, Britain and other European countries extended comprehensive support to Israel. Memories of the holocaust, perpetrated on the Jews by Hitler's Germany, generated mass sympathy for them in view of the genocide of six million Jews in Europe during the Second World War.
The Zionist movement became extremely powerful, and with Zionist Jews dominating financial institutions and the US (now the richest and most powerful country) media, the Israeli cause enjoyed total support. Bit by bit, Israel consolidated itself, and took over more and more of the territories and resources belonging to the Palestinian Arabs.
Though the UN had been created largely through US leadership and support, the organization was not able to enforce its charter and principles in the Arab-Israeli stand off.
Except for 1956, when President Eisenhower refused to extend US backing to the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt over the nationalization of the Suez Canal, with Israeli participation, the US was the reliable ally of the Jewish state in its efforts to maintain itself against Arab hostility.
The Arab-Israeli dispute became enmeshed in the cold war, with the West backing Israel, while the Palestine Liberation Organization and its Arab supporters, secured the support of the Soviet bloc.
The Arab states also remained in a state of war with Israel, which exploited the situation by launching a pre-emptive strike against Egypt and the other Arab states on its periphery in June 1967. Within six days, it occupied not only Arab-held parts of Palestine, but also the Golan Heights that formed a part of Syrian territory.
The UN Security Council did adopt Resolution No 242 calling for Israeli withdrawal from the territory it had occupied, but it, language was cleverly devised to link Israelis withdrawal to its security.
Smarting under their defeat, the Arabs sought to recoup their losses in 1973, but after some initial success, there was no doubt of the outcome when President Nixon intervened on the Israeli side.
The US worked on Egypt, the largest Arab country, to agree to a separate peace with Israel, which would sever its close links with the Soviet bloc, while the balance of power in the Arab-Israeli dispute would shift decisively in favour of Israel.
President Sadat signed the Camp David accord with Israel in 1978, which brought numerous benefits to Egypt, while delivering a major blow to the Palestinian cause.
Though Egypt was expelled from the Arab League and the OIC, it became the second highest recipient of US aid and also flourished on the basis of increased tourism and investment from the West. President Sadat was assassinated shortly afterwards, but his successor, Hosni Mubarak, has remained faithful to the 1978 accord.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 created a new situation, in which the Muslim countries largely supported the Afghan struggle against Soviet aggression directed at a sensitive and largely Muslim region.
Egypt won back its standing in the OIC and the Arab League while the Palestinian issue receded into the background. The status of the US in the region changed as it extended full support to the Afghan Mujahideen, and many Islamic militants were brought to join the jihad against the Soviet Union, including people like Osama bin Laden.
After the Soviet Union was forced to withdraw from Afghanistan, in 1989, and conceded victory to the US in the cold war when it began to unravel, leading to its final collapse in 1991, events again took a violent turn in the oil-rich Middle Eastern region.
After Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein occupied Kuwait in August 1990. The US, under President George Bush (senior) fashioned a global coalition to tackle this aggression.
The UN was used skilfully to pass several resolutions, and hostilities started in early 1991, after the US had achieved a formidable concentration of its forces in the Gulf countries. Following intense aerial attacks that largely destroyed Iraqi defences, the land war achieved its goal in just four days.
The consequences for the Palestinian cause were disastrous as Yasser Arafat had cast his lot with Saddam Hussein. The US in order to improve its standing in the Arab and Islamic world launched a peace initiative in 1991 to promote a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
The PLO decided to join the process, and took some historic decisions as it recognized Israel's right to exist and abandoned the path of armed struggle. It is notable that both the peace process that was initiated in Madrid in 1993, and the Oslo accord, promoted by the Clinton administration in 1996, were rendered null and void by Israeli tactics, and the use of force, with the US vetoing any action by the UN.
President Bill Clinton made one last effort in his last year in office, the year 2000, to promote another accord at Camp David, between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat.
Though Barak made what was described as a generous offer to withdraw from over 90 per cent of occupied territory, the major issues of Jerusalem, and of the right of return of Palestinian refugees were not touched, and this effort also ended in failure.
The election of George W. Bush as president in the 2000 election brought to power a person who was surrounded by advisers who were either Jewish, or more sympathetic to the Jewish cause than any previous administration.
Ariel Sharon, who had sparked a new intifada among the Palestinians by deliberately showing disrespect for the Al Aqsa mosque, rose to power the following year, and adopted an aggressive stance towards the Palestinians. He tended to show the same arrogance in Palestine as Bush manifested on the global stage.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US led the latter to declare war on terror, and Sharon intensified his brutal approach by dubbing the Palestinian freedom fighters as "terrorists".
President Bush initially went along with this approach, but then he realized that being a unique superpower, his country had to maintain a modicum of international law, and of human rights. He, therefore, came up with a "roadmap", that was supported by the UN, the European Union, and Russia.
Though Sharon also accepted the concept of a "two-state" solution in Palestine, he maintained an arrogant stance, with scant regard for Palestinian rights or sensitivities.
The life of Yasser Arafat, elected President of the Palestinian Authority was made difficult, and large areas of the West Bank annexed by building the Israeli security fence in such a way as to include 10 to 15 per cent of Palestinian territory.
The death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004 removed a charismatic leader who had become the symbol of Palestinian resistance. However, his successor, Mahmoud Abbas, also known as Abu Mazen, has always opposed an armed struggle, and advocates a settlement through peaceful negotiations.
He is more acceptable as an interlocutor than Arafat, both to the US and to Israeli hawks like Sharon. With President Bush also coming under pressure both from the Islamic world, and other supporters of the "roadmap", he appears to be giving high priority to promoting pace in Palestine through a two-state solution.
The new US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, included Palestine in her first foreign tour after being sworn in. She met both Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas, who have agreed to a cease fire, and initiated many measures to promote confidence.
However, if the past is any guide, it is doubtful if the main Palestinian concerns will be addressed to secure a durable peace. The three crucial issues to be settled are Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, the Arab demand for return of East Jerusalem, and a satisfactory solution of the problem of Palestinian refugees, three million of whom were uprooted and are scattered in camps in a dozen countries.
Even authoritative US opinion-makers believe that without pressure from Washington, Israel is unlikely to "make the hard choices" needed to achieve a just and viable agreement.
Many settlements on the West Bank would have to be withdrawn, whereas the solution talked about by the Israelis envisages the return of barely 40 per cent of the West Bank, that will consist of "Bantustan" type enclaves separated by Israeli roads and security zones.
Letting the Arabs have East Jerusalem, where Islam's third holiest site is located, is also important for a settlement that will permit the Islamic countries to have normal relations with Israel.
Lastly, the right to return of Arab refugees expelled from their lands figures in the UN Resolutions 242 and 338. Though all of them will not be able to reclaim their lands, the principle will have to be conceded and large funds mobilized for their rehabilitation.
The road to peace in Palestine lies through Washington, whose involvement is indeed indispensable in all issues affecting regional or global security. The world will welcome a return to this role, which distinguished the US in the first quarter century after the Second World War.
Significance of the bus accord
The reaction to the 'bus accord' signed by the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan last week in Islamabad has been a mixed one. While those who staunchly support peace between the two countries have welcomed it as a fillip to the composite dialogue which can now be expected to move forward.
Others who have adopted a hard line on Kashmir feel that the decision to link Muzaffarabad and Srinagar by a bus service will be hurtful to their cause. For instance, the BJP, which started the dialogue with Pakistan and is now in the opposition, feels that the bus will allow terrorists to infiltrate the Valley.
In Pakistan, the Jamaat-i-Islami perceives it as a "ploy" to put the Kashmir dispute on the back burner. The Islamist militants have condemned the agreement threatening to disrupt the bus service because they feel it amounts to all the sacrifices of the freedom fighters having gone in vain.
It is now time to take a rational and realistic view not just of the bus service but also of the Kashmir issue as the two are closely inter-linked. Even those in Pakistan who have expressed staunch support for the accord on the bus service and have advocated the furtherance of people-to-people contacts between the two countries and the two parts of Kashmir bring up the status of the disputed territory as the unresolved issue which should be taken up concurrently with other CBMs in the ongoing dialogue.
What needs to be understood is that the agreement on the bus service, which is a relatively uncomplicated question - peripheral is the word being used by commentators in Pakistan - required a lot of hard negotiations and hard bargaining involving a process of give and take.
The proposal made by Pakistan had been on the table for six months. India wanted the passengers from the Valley to travel on Indian passports which Islamabad would not accept as it would imply accepting India's legitimate control of its part of Kashmir.
It was finally decided that an entry permit system would be used after the identity of the passengers had been verified. In return for this Pakistan had to modify its condition that only Kashmiris could use this route. It has now been agreed that any citizen of Pakistan or India can travel by the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service.
This accommodation was possible because the talks took place behind the scenes away from the glare of publicity. This has now been confirmed by Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri.
In a press conference on Saturday he disclosed that India and Pakistan had established a "secret channel to avoid confusion (at this stage)". He also explained why the two foreign ministers had refused to field questions at their joint press conference on Wednesday to "avoid a situation that could lead to a particular self-defeating spin". This is a sensible approach adopted by the two sides.
History shows that international negotiations on sensitive issues never take place on a public platform or before the media. The negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam went on in Paris for five years (1968-73) before an agreement was reached.
The peace process between the PLO and Israel was initiated after behind-the-scenes talks in Oslo between the two sides in 1992-93. The US and China negotiated on the quiet in Warsaw from 1955 till 1971 before they agreed to extend formal recognition to each other.
In such negotiations before two adversaries can reach a tentative agreement on a broad blueprint they are not in a position to prepare public opinion in their respective countries. But if the details of the negotiations were to be revealed prematurely, public pressure could force them to play to the gallery at home and reiterate their hawkish stand for their domestic compulsions. That would jeopardize the understanding that may be within their reach.
Hence the secret channel on Kashmir between India and Pakistan is the most significant and positive piece of news we have received from the government in recent months. It should be welcomed.
The most important implications of the bus accord are for the Kashmir dispute itself. It would facilitate traffic across the LoC in Kashmir and enable people-to-people contact among the Kashmiris. Until now this has not been possible.
Apart from the humanitarian aspect - divided families can visit each other - it has political importance. The leaderships of the two parts of Kashmir will be able to interact freely which they have not been able to do until now.
Since the Kashmiris are a party to the India-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir they must evolve a common stance on the future of the state. Unfortunately, they do not have that at the moment.
The hard line jihadi groups in Azad Kashmir, namely, the Jaish-i-Mohammad, the Hizbul Mujahideen and the Lashkar-i-Taiba, want the state to accede to Pakistan. The ruling People's Democratic Party in Srinagar and the National Conference are not resisting the present arrangement with India but want the human rights abuse and violence to be checked and more autonomy to be granted to the state.
There are others, such as the moderate section of the Hurriyat who would also go along with them if autonomy is assured. Yet others like the JKLF want independence for the state.
It is evident that a plebiscite as envisaged in the UNCIP resolutions of 1949 is no longer possible after 56 years when the situation on the ground has changed totally.
Hence the next option is to allow Kashmiri political parties to evolve a consensus or lobby freely among their people so that the one with the largest following can claim to represent the opinion of their masses.
As Mr Kasuri correctly pointed out, the bus service would ease contacts between the Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC and thus allow them to be associated with the India-Pakistan dialogue.
This is of primary importance. Any agreement on Kashmir reached between New Delhi and Islamabad should be acceptable to the people of Kashmir if it is to be implemented. What better way is there of ensuring this than associating them with the dialogue.
Since Pakistan has of late conceded that whatever is acceptable to the people of Kashmir will be acceptable to Pakistan too, it is essential that the Kashmiri leadership be in the forefront in the negotiations.
In this context it needs to be pointed out that India is seeking to negotiate with the Hurriyat and other Kashmiri leaders on giving greater autonomy to the state. Again, it is not for Pakistan to intervene in this matter.
It should be left to the leaders of the state to decide how to respond to the proposals from India. Of course a free interaction between the Kashmiri leaderships on the two sides of the LoC will help since they will be able to work out a common strategy.
Pakistan should use the secret channel to persuade India to reduce its military presence in the Valley and end its human rights abuse in the occupied state. In this, Islamabad can display its good faith by checking infiltration across the LoC which has certainly been reduced tremendously.
Women in Islamabad
Some years ago when the International Games for women from Islamic countries were staged in Pakistan, somebody commented that, because of its special nature, the event could only have been held in Islamabad.
Maybe this was an exaggeration, because the national women's olympics are regularly held in Lahore and other provincial capitals without any disaster, but it did highlight the distinctive personality of the federal capital.
Again some years ago, when a swimming pool meant exclusively for women was opened near the Jinnah Stadium in Islamabad, it was described by a local newspaper as a quiet revolution.
There was of course the snide remark that the facility had obviously been established for the elite among the city's female population, for (as it was asked) "Can you imagine women from the middle class having a dip in an open swimming pool?" But that was neither here nor there. The Islamabad Club is also for the elite and foreigners, as all clubs are in Pakistan, and you can't picture a member of the middle class entering its portals.
But then the reality was being ignored that the is hardly any middle class in the capital. Even the hordes of underpaid government clerks, who really are from the middle class and below, are snooty and don't want to be known as such. They are always aspiring to become officers.
One special characteristic of Islamabad is that a domestic, unless he or she is given a servant's quarter by the employer, has nowhere to live. All other cities in Pakistan have vast urban sectors consisting of inferior quality housing, even dilapidated, where a low-paid employee, say, a chauffeur or a newly recruited petty clerk from outside, can hire a room or two within his means. In Islamabad there are only bungalows or flats for the well-to-do and no other kind of housing.
There are slums, of course, but they have been created by the lowest type of domestic and official workers - the Christian sweeper class - and have no place for Muslims of the same, or slightly higher, status.
By the way, you will see more women sweepers in Islamabad, working for the Capital Development Authority's sanitation department, than in any other city municipality in the country.
They are invariably decently dressed, wear a yellow CDA tunic, and have none of the looks of the traditional bare-footed sweepers seen in all Pakistani cities and in almost all Indian towns.
When columnists like me write about life in the federal capital and its different facets, we do not mean to imply, even remotely, that we are in any way showing up a city that is representative of Pakistan.
Not at all. Islamabad has a character and a personality all its own. But even if it looks exotic and foreign it must be written about, for after all, it is part of Pakistan.
Or is it? You may have heard the quip about our national capital so appropriately coined by someone who was obviously not a Pakistani. A foreign diplomat assigned to this country asks a friend who has lived here for some time, "Where exactly is Islamabad?" The answer he gets is, "Its eleven miles from Pakistan!" Nothing else better exemplifies the style of Islamabad as a city.
A woman columnist has been mirroring the sentiments of women from diplomatic families about what they had expected in Islamabad (and Pakistan) and how they were pleasantly surprised to be proved wrong.
She says, "Many expat women tell me they were scared out of their wits before they got here because the briefing had warned them they wouldn't be able to shop alone, they couldn't wear European clothes, and things like that. But when they reached Pakistan they found it different."
Yes, Islamabad is different, but not the rest of the country by a long chalk. It is true that in the capital there are hardly any cat-calls or wolf whistles, or the propensity to touch a white female, or (to take it to the extreme) the urge to pinch bottoms.
Because of the make-up of the population the common man is hardly in evidence here, while young boys from affluent modern families are so accustomed to female company in their daily lives that they do not indulge in their usual pranks. But that does not explain why one sees so many European women going shopping (if not on social visits) dressed in shalwar-kameez instead of their normal dress of frock and jeans.
Actually most of them are those who work with relief agencies and the aid offices. But women from diplomatic families too take recourse to the Pakistani dress when they roam in the Sunday bazaar.
With all the assurances that they are safe, there is the lurking fear that all may not be well, and that you never know. Till a few years ago there was no sign of any Pakistani women's organisation in Islamabad except for a somewhat watered-down Women's Action Forum.
The reason may be that, except for the chronic problems of women which don't seem to be getting less, there is hardly any incident in the capital that would call for a ringing protest from WAF. And I don't know what you will say to the bland statement that there hasn't been a rape in Islamabad, or its rural environs, for years.
Leaving aside Islamabad proper and whatever is perpetrated against women in its drawing rooms and bedrooms, the rural areas here are a little different from those of Central Punjab, the home of crimes aimed at helpless women.
Here, there is more respect for females, and a Nawabpur would be a rarity. Maybe this is a spill over from the adjoining Frontier Province whose mores and customs have considerable influence over Northern Punjab.
Also the village society is hardly feudal, and its bigwigs don't have to ride roughshod over the lives and rights of their women in order to gain local ascendancy through property.
Karachi is known to be a truly cosmopolitan city, but I doubt if women there have as much freedom as in Islamabad. During the evening hours here you see as many women in joggers taking long walks as men, and without covering their heads.
Despite this, many women find the capital dull and boring. Perhaps because society here moves in its two or three fixed grooves that hardly ever overlap. But if this is so because they hanker after a more exciting and spirited time, I would be happy to take it as a sign of life in them.
Post-poll scenario in Iraq
Post-Election Iraq faces formidable challenges. Firstly, the insurgency continues unabated. Foreign occupation has fuelled intense nationalist resistance and provided an opportunity to Al Qaeda to wreck havoc.
The colossal loss of life that has occurred during and since the Iraqi elections punctures the buoyancy and enthusiasm expressed by President Bush in his grand vision of creating a " new Iraq" that will serve as a beacon for the rest of the Middle East and the Muslim world.
Secondly, there is a potential danger of the country splitting on sectarian and ethnic lines. Although all the major groups stand for a united Iraq, including the Kurds, but the sheer force and ferocity of chaos may lead the country into an abyss.
As expected, it was the Shias and Kurds who thronged the polling booths, for they had the maximum to gain from the polling. It would give them the power denied to them for decades.
Shias were therefore justifiably resentful that Arab and Muslim leaders failed to criticize and condemn Al Qaeda's Zarqawi for pouring venom on them and subverting the elections by planting suicide bombers.
The Sunnis, on the other hand, are in the forefront of leading the national resistance against US occupation and find it incompatible with democratization. Convincing the Sunnis to accept a peaceful solution may also not be easy in view of the treatment that has been meted out to them since the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
The harassment and discrimination against them was because of their predominance in the Baath party and close association with Saddam. Moreover, Sunnis having ruled Iraq for decades find it difficult to reconcile and play a second fiddle in the emerging power structure.
The Iraqi people are also devoid of democratic traditions as monarchs and dictators like Saddam have oppressed them for generations. Sunnis do not subscribe to the concept of clergy like the Shias and having never experienced democracy are deeply divided and devoid of any effective leadership.
This generates in them a strong feeling of insecurity and has given the insurgents the opportunity to play on their fears and fill in the leadership vacuum.
Elections under such difficult circumstances obviously could not have been perfect, but still the exercise was a great achievement and could serve as a means of renewal for the Iraqi people and a step in the right direction. It could also provide an opportunity to draw the Sunnis back into the political mini stream.
Thirdly, the interim government miserably failed to address the every-day issues of survival that the people are facing ever since the invasion of Iraq. There has hardly been any effort at building the governing institutions that have either totally collapsed or are in a state of disarray.
The only emphasis seems to be on raising the police and security forces, which regrettably have become easy targets for the insurgents. Development and reconstruction has also remained a hostage to the worsening security situation.
A massive 80 billion dollars is allocated for military expenditure on Iraq and in sharp contrast a paltry sum of a few billion dollars for development and reconstruction.
The future stability of Iraq will thus depend on what measures the Americans and the new Iraqi leadership take to win the support and confidence of the Iraqi people as a whole and not merely approach the problem as a clash or interplay of ethnic or sectarian communities.
The insurgency so far has remained directed not only against the US occupation forces, but also equally against the transitional government of acting Prime minister Alawi and those elements supporting the US effort.
It is amply clear by now that law and order cannot be established in Iraq unless its people are convinced that the post-election new government is of their own choice and not a puppet of the US fighting the insurgency.
If moderate Iraqi forces that owe no allegiance to the US were motivated to take responsibility of defeating the insurgency, the chances of success could be relatively good.
The central issue arguably is that US forces are needed to provide minimal security and they cannot be suddenly withdrawn, as that would trigger a civil war. At the same time, their presence is a source of continuing insurgency.
It may be premature for any political party to ask for US withdrawal without a viable alternative. As it would take a minimum of two years to raise and train sufficient security forces, the most appropriate exit strategy in the existing scenario would be to replace the coalition forces with a UN force comprising of joint European-Arab-Muslim countries or an exclusive Arab-Muslim force that is perceived by the Iraqis to be neutral with no political or economic interests.
This may be possible if the US is prepared to accept the primacy of the UN, but the neo-conservatives and the Congress so far have been opposed to such on idea. Change of attitude could, however, come about if the public opinion in the US goes against the war for which there are already some indications.
Cooperation of regional states and the Europe is a prerequisite for achieving stability in Iraq. The question is whether Washington will be willing to make such a major strategic shift or wait until American casualties and high defence expenditures compel Washington to do so.
Does the US administration have the moral courage to rethink its original objectives of "turning Iraq into a model secular democratic state, friendly to Israel and pro-US" and allow the people of Iraq to shape their own destiny by gradually de-Americanizing the transition?
Additionally, will the Sunnis accept this approach and a dispensation in which they are relegated to the status of a junior partner without provisions for special safeguards for them? The Kurds too would want a broad level of autonomy and safeguards so that they are no more subjected to the injustices of the past.
The Shia leadership no doubt has repeatedly emphasized that they want to live in peace with all religious and ethnic groups, including the Sunni Arabs and would give them equal rights and not want the country to split along ethno-religious lines.
These sentiments have also been echoed by Shia cleric Ayatollah Ali Sistanni. Moreover, United Iraqi Alliance, essentially a conglomerate of Shia parties, has tried to project itself as an all-inclusive party. Still there is deep mistrust between them and the Sunnis. Kurds fear that once Shias are in power they will promote their interests and transform Iraq into a Shia state.
The newly elected parliament is also saddled with the important task of preparing the draft of the constitution that will determine the future political set-up. For the future stability of Iraq, three stakeholders - Shias, Sunnis and Kurds - should accept a compromise constitutional arrangement, which is in the larger interest of the state.
The Shias will also have to accept the hard reality of running the country on secular lines if they want to keep Iraq united. Fortunately, Ali Sistani shares this concept and does not want to mix religion with governance. Shia, Sunni, Kurds and other minorities can be made to see the common good in a united, peaceful and stable country.
A cooperative approach is a prerequisite for writing a constitution and making a new beginning in Iraq. For this reason it is important that Sunnis are given power commensurate with their numerical strength.
They should be given their due share of influence not as charity but as their right. Moreover, Sunni participation is also essential because they could potentially veto the constitution at the time when the referendum is held in October this year. This will force the Shia leaders to accommodate Sunnis, reasonable demands and help the Iraqis define their own political future.
The writer is a retired lieutenant general.