The forthcoming Palestinian elections have suddenly transformed from a shoo-in for Mahmood Abbas into a real contest. The transformation has, of course, come about because of the last minute entry of jailed Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti.
Some see his candidacy as throwing a spanner in the works of the, until then, smooth succession of power process. Others have welcomed the move as strengthening of democracy and the Palestinian cause. Diverse, almost polarized reactions: which is right?
Why is Barghouti's candidacy a bad thing? How will it harm the Palestinian cause? The principle argument against Marwan Barghouti's entering the Presidential race is that it will - indeed already has - undermine the unity that the Palestinians have shown throughout Arafat's illness and death. No one should underestimate the scale of that achievement.
Divided on political, ideological and factional grounds, the chronic Palestinian inability to unite has been almost as big an obstacle to their cause as the Israelis.
All the analysts were predicting that after Yasser Arafat what little unity remained would totally collapse and the Palestinians would degenerate into feuding and internecine conflict. Remarkably, that has not happened.
Had Barghouti stuck to his earlier announcement that he would not run against Mahmoud Abbas, that unity would have persisted at least until after the election. His abrupt U-turn has changed all that. Now that the Palestinians have a real contest on their hands, the divisions will re-emerge.
Given that the scale and intensity of Palestinian feuding amongst themselves is inversely proportional to their ability to fight Israel, it is not hard to see how Barghouti's decision has undermined the Palestinian cause. And what will the divisions and fighting achieve? Marwan Barghouti can never be Palestinian president. It is not practically possible. Yes, he is a popular leader and could well get elected. But he is also in Israeli custody serving five life sentences.
Ariel Sharon is certainly not about to let him go free - president or no president. This means that if he wins, either he will be in charge of an Authority he cannot run or he will have to delegate power and authority to someone else. Why go for a job that you will not be able to perform?
Optimists are hoping that the presidential elections in January will be followed by the resumption of negotiations for a permanent settlement and a Palestinian state.
For many months Yasser Arafat was the obstacle preventing this: George Bush and Ariel Sharon conveniently declared they would not negotiate with Arafat because of what they saw as his failure to stop 'the terrorists'.
Should Barghouti be elected president, Sharon will be able to offer similar excuses and escape the negotiating table. Should Abbas be elected - a candidate who has publicly condemned violence and advocated an end to the intifada - it would be much harder for Sharon to wriggle out of talks.
Taking that point further, Mahmood Abbas is the favoured candidate of Washington, Europe and the Arab world. All of these are key stakeholders in the Middle East peace process.
All have a voice and can make a big difference - for or against the Palestinians. Having Abbas as president will help secure outside support for the Palestinian cause. It will help them overcome the massive disadvantage they face because of Americas unflinching support for Israel.
Why is Barghouti's candidacy a good thing? How will it help the Palestinians? Firstly, it will ensure that whoever wins can claim a solid (as opposed to a hollow) victory.
Should Abbas win in a race that did not include Barghouti he will always be vulnerable to accusations that he was not the proper winner, that he only succeeded because Marwan let him.
Should he, on the other hand, win against Barghouti he will have a much stronger mandate to rule. And should Abbas lose to Barghouti, well, that will be what the Palestinian people want - that will be democracy at work. In short, a strong and credible democratic process is only possible if all major players are involved in it.
Like Abbas, Marwan Barghouti also favours negotiations. He too has accepted the irreversible reality of Israel. The major difference between them is that Abbas has ruled out armed struggle and violence: for him negotiations are the only way forward.
Barghouti does not rule out armed struggle: just as the Israelis want to negotiate whilst continuing their occupation, he wants the Palestinians to negotiate whilst maintaining their resistance.
Marwan Barghouti is an active defender of the intifada. He has been imprisoned by the Israelis on charges that he strongly refutes. Barghouti is a symbol of Palestinian suffering and oppression. He is a constant reminder of what the Palestinian people have to endure every single day: occupation and injustice.
Out of sight, sidelined from the presidential elections, it is all too easy to forget both Barghouti and the Palestinian suffering he represents. As a candidate and prospective victor, both he and that Palestinian suffering are forced onto the global consciousness.
Barghouti and Abbas also differ greatly as people. Abbas belongs to Arafat's generation: the old guard. That generation has been proven to be hopeless: whether you look at running the Palestinian Authority, meeting the aspirations of the Palestinian people or presenting Palestine's perspective to the world, Arafat and his generation come across as incompetent and ineffective.
President Abbas will mean more of the same. President Barghouti by contrast, will mean a younger more dynamic leadership infinitely more in touch with what ordinary Palestinians feel and think.
Barghouti's circumstances mean he will not be able to actually serve as president. Who is to blame for that? The Israelis. Why then should the Palestinians have to pay the price? Why should they be denied the right to choose who they want as their leader? Yes, it will be inconvenient, practically difficult to have Barghouti as their president: but is it the job of the Palestinians to make allowances for obstacles placed in their path by Israel? Is it the job of the Palestinians to make things easy and convenient for Israel?
Returning to the question raised at the beginning of this piece: who is right? Those who have condemned Barghouti's candidacy as a blow to the Palestinian cause or those who have welcomed it? Some answers can be gauged from the points made above but, ultimately, neither and both are right. For the Palestinian destiny is the same: irrespective of whether they are led to it by Mahmood Abbas or Marwan Barghouti.
With George Bush ensconced in the White House for a second term, with Condoleezza Rice in the state department, Donald Rumsfeld in the Pentagon and Ariel Sharon heading the government in Tel Aviv, the Palestinians can forget about getting even a remotely fair and just settlement.
Their fate will be meted out by Tel Aviv and Washington, determined by Israeli and US interests. No one will listen to the Palestinians and what they need or deserve. They will not be asked: they will be told what they are to get.
iffatidris2000@yahoo.co.uk.
Votes can be milked out of fear
By M.J. Akbar
The traffic in Dhaka is not irrational; it is merely Bengali. Witness the desire, for instance, to overtake when there is nothing to take over there. All the familiar problems of travel on the subcontinent accompany you.
Bangladesh Biman tends to have an illegitimate relationship with its timetable, so every journey encourages whispers from those with inside knowledge, particularly if you are catching an en route flight.
So it depends on how you view a three-hour delay at Bangkok airport, from where I flew into Dhaka: it is, of course, much worse than being on time, but far better than being six hours late, which was the situation on the previous evening.
But let us stress the fact that the destination is far more attractive than the journey. A visiting Indian must, of course, get through the angst barrier. It is not just hawks who carry chips rather than epaulettes on their shoulder.
Perfectly normal people do not feel that they have done their good deed for the day unless they can throw a bit of ritual cold water on an Indian but this is soon forgotten in the sunshine of natural hospitality, the cool edge of high intelligence, and, for those who know Bengali, the joy of a shared language.
We were in Dhaka at the command of an old friend Farooq Sobhan, and there is always something mildly uplifting about a worthy mission. Farooq had brought together young journalists from Bangladesh and India on the valid assumption that ignorance and absence of human contact were the major reasons for the trust-deficit that plagues media on both sides of a complicated border.
The generation that covered the 1971 war, and through it discovered each other (not always for the good), has gone the way of most journalists. That generation is tired even if it has not retired. The younger lot are fed with that familiar evil, dis-information masquerading as nationalism.
The dialogue opened on an expected note: a speech by a minister. Journalists of any age and generation very quickly develop a Nelson's ear to speeches by ministers. Admiral Nelson, saviour of England and victor of critical battles against Napoleon's France, made his blind eye famous by turning it towards anything he did not want to see.
Similarly, journalists turn a Nelson's ear towards any speech they do not want to hear. This does not imply any disrespect towards the dignitary concerned. It is simply one of those immutable laws of media life.
When reporters have to do a report on a speech they did not therefore hear, they check the text, put something from the opening paragraphs at the top of their story, and go home, confident that even if the story is published no one will bother.
Perhaps this was the reason why some interesting, and perhaps even remarkable, points in the speech delivered by the Bangladesh minister for information, M. Shamsul Islam, were missed.
One sentence cried out for greater attention. "Changing concepts of sovereignty, humanitarian law, the nature of security, the role of multilateralism all have brought about dynamic changes (in geo-politics)," he said.
He was making this argument against a specific context. He had said earlier: "The balance between politics and economics always remains a vital one. Our two countries (Bangladesh and India) are bound by history and geography that have left many cobwebs and irritants. We are also tied by many enduring commonalities - ideas, traditions, culture and a shared past covering centuries. All the factors that divide us can also unite us."
As a fully paid-up member of the Press Club (Dyspepsia Department) let me first turn to scepticism. Politicians don't mean what they say, do they? A bureaucrat checks out the biases of the audience for whom the speech is meant, and writes down the right noises for them to deliver and survive another day.
So why make a fuss? In any case the track record of the present government in Dhaka towards India is more knee-jerk than level-headed, so why treat a whiff of honey as anything more than ephemeral scent?
Because you do not have to be thoughtful when platitudes will serve. Mr Islam used the opportunity to suggest ideas that were both above the India-Bangladesh equation as well as relevant to it.
We are living in a world whose geopolitics was shaped by the outcome of two world wars. If Germany and Turkey had won the First World War - and they were close enough to doing so, until America intervened - the map of the Arab world, and the nature of its polity, would have been significantly different.
The Arabs, who had helped Britain in that war after they had been promised freedom from the Ottoman Empire, were dumped into the quagmire of neo-colonization while pliant regimes handed over their precious oil to the masters of the world at ridiculous prices.
And though Britain was too weakened by the Second World War to hold on to its most important colony, India, a divisive legacy continues to extract a heavy toll. So many nationalisms were derived from the politics of the colonial period.
Even as the old world order collapsed a new one was fashioned through the creation of the United Nations (a term coined by President Franklin Roosevelt to define the allies against the fascist axis of Germany, Japan and Italy) with a veto for the five nations who won the Second World War: the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China. (Communist China and Russia are successor states to the nations that fought the war.)
This club of five, sits in the Security Council because it defines security as an extension of its interests. That is why these states consider their possession of nuclear arms as legitimate, and condemn any other nuclear power as "irresponsible" or potentially "evil".
Israel, under the divine protection of the United States, is permitted a not-so-secret nuclear arsenal without comment or question. While there is grudging acceptance of India and Pakistan as nuclear powers, the last word has not been said on the subject, and those on the subcontinent with apprehensions are wise to be apprehensive.
When there were differences between matched powers among the Big Five, as during the cold war, the world seemed to rest on a more balanced keel. By the early nineties one half of the post-1945 arrangements had collapsed, with the crumble of the Soviet empire. With Moscow unable to pull its former weight, unilateralism moved into a vacuum.
Militarily, the European Union power is a myth; politically, it is easily divided, as Washington proved, taking time off only to sneer at France's pretensions. But is this sustainable? Questions that were unthinkable during the cold war, and dormant in the nineties are being asked with vigour now.
One of the issues that Vladimir Putin had to address during his visit to Delhi last week was the possibility of an expanded Security Council. His response would have pleased any Tsar. Putin argued that any restructuring that extended the right of veto to a new member would lead to confusion and collapse of the United Nations.
He knew that he was being a trifle indelicate in his candour, for India will be a member of any altered Security Council. The Indian foreign minister, Natwar Singh, has very coolly, and correctly, said that India was not impressed by any second-class status offer.
Churn is in the air. A cynic, or even a realist, could argue that there has been perpetual war since 1945, and if this is what the Big Five have delivered in the name of stability then it is time to return to the drawing board.
Most wars have been fought over conflicting definitions of nationalism, creating fertile options for superpowers interested in their own security as well as domination of natural resources.
It is significant that if Mr Shamsul Islam's comments had been made by an Indian minister in Dhaka, he or she would have been accused of hegemony. Suspicions die hard, and votes can be milked out of fear.
Mr Islam spoke above both temptations. Twenty years ago General Ziaur Rahman set the subcontinent on a new curve by suggesting cooperation among seven South Asian nations through Saarc.
As someone wryly pointed out, Pakistan's first reaction was to wonder whether this was a version of the Hindutva brigade's "Akhand Bharat" and India wondered whether it would mean a gang of six against one.
The 13th summit, fortuitously in Dhaka next month, is building up huge expectations of further breakthroughs in regional prosperity. (Peace may not always bring prosperity, but prosperity does tend to bring peace.)
Saarc leaders, having travelled so far along the pragmatic, must also seek to spend a little time once again on the conceptual, for each horizon is only a means to the next.
There is enough time to pencil Mr Islam's phrases into the agenda. It will take a long while for the pencil to become ink, but there is no harm in putting a little more writing on the wall.
The writer is editor-in-chief, The Asian Age, New Delhi.
Price of staying power
By David Ignatius
The good news and the bad news are the same in Baghdad: America isn't leaving. A sign of how this resolve to stay the course is playing out in the minds of some Iraqis comes from the local real estate market.
An Iraqi businessman was negotiating several months ago to sell a prime piece of commercial real estate in central Baghdad. He had tentatively agreed on a price with a Kuwaiti investor, who planned someday to build an electronics superstore on the 9,850-square-foot property.
But after President Bush was re-elected in November, the Iraqi jacked up the price 25 percent. The prospect that a re-elected Bush administration would stay and fight - and ultimately stabilize Iraq - had instantly made his property more valuable.
Dramatic evidence of this American resolve came with last week's announcement that the United States would increase its troop strength over the next few months to about 150,000.
It's a symbolic demonstration that the administration is deepening its investment in Iraq - determined not simply to prevail here but to show radical Islamists that America cannot be intimidated by force.
"It is all about staying the course," says Gen. John Abizaid, the US commander with overall responsibility for the war. "No military effort that anyone can make against us is going to be able to throw us out of this region."
I travelled with Abizaid last weekend to Baghdad, Mosul and Irbil. The trip offered a quick snapshot of the U.S. military's battle to prevail against what has become a classic insurgency.
At each stop Abizaid had the same message for his local commanders: Destroy the insurgents who are attacking U.S. and Iraqi government forces. Find them, engage them, kill them.
"We should have no illusions about the hardest core of this enemy," says Abizaid. The former Baathists and Islamic jihadists who are fighting against the U.S.-led coalition will not compromise. These fighters, he says, "will have to be killed or captured."
Both sides have hunkered down over the past month. The United States took the war more aggressively to its elusive enemy with November's bloody re-conquest of the insurgent safe haven of Fallujah.
But the insurgents, far from broken, have been stepping up their attacks in Baghdad and the northern city of Mosul - hoping to intimidate the Iraqi police and security forces that are the shaky centrepiece of America's strategy.The war has become a classic test of wills.
An example is the insurgents' campaign to close the capital's most important strategic artery, the road from the airport to central Baghdad and the Green Zone. When the insurgents added roving car bombs to their mix of ambushes and roadside explosives, the United States decided last week to ban official travel along the road.
It was an insurgent victory, but probably a momentary one. The Americans have already decided on their response: They will take two lanes of the four-lane highway and create a dedicated road that will be open only to official traffic.
Iraqis, car bombers and ordinary citizens alike, will be forced to use the other two lanes, safely across the median. Next come the Iraqi elections, scheduled for Jan. 30. U.S. officials know the process will be messy and violent, especially in areas where the Sunni Muslim insurgency is strong, but they say people who want to vote will be able to do so. Asked what life will be like the day after the election, several commanders say it probably won't be very different from the day before.
The insurgency will continue, the Americans will remain, the battle will go on. Abizaid and his generals hope that there is a tipping point ahead - a moment when Iraqis conclude that the Americans really do mean to stay the course. "They're sitting on the fence, waiting to see who's going to win this thing," says Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz, who commands day-to-day military operations in Iraq.
"They have to see that we're going to take this thing to the conclusion." Once people are confident the Americans have the upper hand, Metz predicts, there will be a "stampede" to support the new Iraqi government. The Iraq war has been characterized, since its earliest planning, by too much wishful American thinking.
The U.S. commanders still talk with an optimism that is hard to square with the chaotic situation in Baghdad and the Sunni heartland. But it's at least tempered by a realistic understanding that this will be a long, bloody fight - and that some form of insurgency will probably continue after the Americans finally leave.
The measure of victory will be that Iraqi security forces can take over the fight. But that's a factor, unfortunately, that remains beyond the ferocious willpower of the American generals. - Dawn/Washington Post Service
Zoellick's lonely path
By Sebastian Mallaby
Bob Zoellick is an outlier in the Bush economic team. He is not an ideologue. He is not a former private-sector chieftain. He has not been dismissed yet. Whereas the style of the Bush people is measured, plain-spoken and determinedly unflustered, Zoellick is intense, wonkish and furiously competitive.
Rather like his short mustache, he bristles with a fiery energy. He beams this energy, what's more, at an untypical Bush target. Far from disdaining multilateral powwows, he has used his position as U.S. trade representative to launch a whole new round of multilateral trade talks.
To drive these talks forward, he sprints manically around the globe: He's in Europe today, then on to Benin, Mali and Senegal, then Namibia and Lesotho. Let Colin Powell conduct telephone diplomacy from his armchair.
In February Zoellick logged 32,000 miles in a dash around the world, determined to make 2004 a year of progress despite the distractions of a U.S. presidential election. Zoellick has done well so far.
The Clinton administration tried to launch a new round of multilateral trade talks; it failed to do so. The Clinton administration tried to get "fast track" negotiating authority out of Congress; it failed there too, whereas Zoellick succeeded.
February's turbo-charged diplomacy led to an outline agreement on agricultural liberalization, one of the trickiest areas of the talks, and one of the most important to poor countries. But the question for Zoellick now is whether formidable brains and energy can vindicate his controversial theory of progress - one that most trade economists regard as dangerous.
The theory is that, in order to advance global trade liberalization, it pays to shove ahead with bilateral and regional deals, too, and never mind that bilateral deals don't always expand trade or reduce poverty. By embracing this theory, the Bush team's chief wonk has alienated fellow wonks at campuses and think tanks.
He is an out lier not only in the Cabinet but among his natural soul mates. The case against Zoellick is not just that regional and bilateral deals may do no good but that they may actually be harmful.
In extreme cases, which tend not to involve the United States, a group of countries may unite their markets while raising barriers against the rest of the world, destroying more trade than is created.
But even in less-extreme cases, the proliferation of small deals creates a cat's cradle of overlapping customs rules, tariff schedules and regulatory schemes, with the result that economic activity gets strangled.
The average African country already belongs to four different trade agreements. Moreover, bilateral and regional deals theoretically reduce the momentum for worthwhile multilateral ones. Zoellick has negotiated free-trade areas with 12 countries, and he is in the midst of negotiations with 10 more.
Each of these nations is counting on preferential access to American consumers. Why would they favour a multilateral deal that extended the same access to rival producers in India or China?
Equally, small deals can complicate trade politics within the United States. Because America's market is such a rich lure, other countries will accept almost any conditions that U.S. negotiators demand as the price of an agreement.
Poor countries may agree to abide by exacting labour and environmental standards that they would never tolerate in the context of a multilateral deal; they may allow US producer groups, such as cattle ranchers or sugar growers, to dilute a deal with outrageous protections.
This creates precedents that anti-trade lobbyists can exploit. Ever since Jordan signed up to tough labour rules, for example, protectionists have attacked subsequent trade deals for "backsliding." -Dawn/Washington Post Service.