| 08 December 2004 | Wednesday | 25 Shawwal 1425 |
Why staff cars?
Nuclear vacillation and duplicity
Choosing between Viktors
It now seems certain that when the results of President Musharraf's 14-day visit to the Americas and Europe are evaluated, the meetings he had in Washington will stand out as the most significant part of the tour. The president's visit was, if memory serves me correctly the first official visit by a Pakistani head of state to Latin America.
Prime Minister Bhutto had been to Colombia to attend the non-aligned summit but that was not a bilateral visit nor was there any particular effort given time constraints, to use the opportunity to boost Pakistan's relations with Latin America. President Musharraf's visit was the first deliberate effort to develop Pakistan's relations through a well-prepared high level visit.
If no significant immediate results were achieved in promoting economic and trade relations with Brazil, Mexico etc, an awareness of Pakistan's potential as an economic and trading partner was created and, as is normal in international relations, this may bear fruit in the future.
It is, unfortunately true that for Pakistan, as for the vast majority of countries, it is the political, economic and trade relationship with the United States that matters more than any other.
The Washington stopover, arranged on a weekend by a president who in the past has been extremely loath to take on official tasks on holidays, established that the political relationship was in good shape.
President Bush offered a ringing endorsement of the role President Musharraf had played in the battle against terrorism and flatly dismissed suggestions that the recent redeployments undertaken by Pakistani troops in South Waziristan had been seen in Washington as reflecting a diminution Pakistan's anti-terrorist effort.
If there was one particular point that President Bush sought to make in this regard it was that in waging the battle against terrorism President Musharraf was protecting the interests of the Pakistani people as much as he was doing a favour to the Americans and the rest of the anti-terrorism coalition.
President Bush was quick to remind the mediamen at a press conference that Musharraf had been the target of two assassination attempts and to add, with perhaps pardonable hyperbole, "there is nobody more dedicated" to tracking down Osama bin Laden or other extremists.
This was not the only political issue on which President Musharraf could draw satisfaction. Press reports based on American briefings made it clear that while the A.Q. Khan question had been brought up and that although some concern had been expressed about the amount of information that the Pakistani side had passed on to the Americans, no demand was made for American inquisitors to have direct access to Dr. Khan.
Instead, there were words of praise for the "treasure trove" of information that Pakistan had already passed on and the expression of hope that on his return to Pakistan, Musharraf would try and secure answers to some other unresolved questions.
In his own interview to the Washington Post, President Musharraf made it clear that given Dr Khan's image in Pakistan there was no question of allowing any outsider to question him.
This one can be certain is a source of heartburn for many in the corridors of power in Washington but at this time there appears to be a determination in Washington to ask for nothing from Musharraf that could undermine his domestic standing.
This perhaps also explains why the question of the president retaining the office of chief of staff after December 13, was not brought up by Bush in his meeting with Musharraf.
The American official who provided the American media with a briefing made it clear that the Americans had accepted Musharraf's contention that he was committed to full democracy but would move towards it "at a pace that works for Pakistan".
It is, however, a reasonable assumption that even while this question was not brought up, either Bush, or more likely Powell, with whom the president met later, did have words of encouragement for the efforts currently underway to bring the mainstream political parties back into the Pakistani body politic.
For the Americans it is now a self evident truth that the battle against extremism in Pakistan cannot be successfully conducted by the army alone nor can the armed forces by themselves negate the growing popularity of the religious parties when the latter appear to be the only credible political force in the country.
Whether or not the Americans had something to do with the release of Asif Zardari may be open to question but there is no doubt that from their point of view it was a welcome step and that they would welcome a similar gesture towards the PML (N).
It would, however, be naive to expect that the Americans will seek to dictate the pace at which President Musharraf should move towards forming a national reconciliation government that many circles in Pakistan believe is round the corner.
At this time from the American point of view President Musharraf is their "best bet" in Pakistan and must be offered full support even when he sets aside their advice on internal developments.
It was significant in this context that Bush made it a point to emphasize that Musharraf was "a person with whom I've worked very closely over the past four years, a person with whom I look forward to working closely over the next four years".
This need for building up Musharraf's standing may also explain in part why President Bush not only talked of the priority his administration would attach to the resolution of the Palestine question in his second term but chose to suggest that President Musharraf could have an important role in helping bring this about.
On bilateral political relations and on the American perception of Pakistan's political scene, President Musharraf had reason to be happy with the results of the Washington visit.
There was less by way of concrete immediate results that he could derive satisfaction from on the regional situation and on Pakistan's economic and defence needs.
The usual American line of welcoming the positive developments in Indo-Pakistan relations and the expression of hope that the two countries would work out their problems was repeated without any commitment to asking the Indians to look more seriously at the ideas that Musharraf had floated.
On the defence front, President Musharraf stated that the subject of the Pakistani request for the supply of F-16s had been broached but did not elaborate further.
Powell said the some but emphasized that no decision had been taken. What was perhaps important in this respect was a hint in President Bush's statement that his administration would be willing to assist Pakistan in acquiring the weapons that it needed to fight the "new threats" that had emerged.
It is noteworthy in this respect that a few days before the Musharraf visit, the administration had notified Congress of the arms that it intended to sell to Pakistan. The principal item in this package was surveillance aircraft that could be used to detect and interdict crossings across Pakistan's borders.
It would appear that in gauging Pakistan's defence needs, the American emphasis is on weapons needed to combat non state actors rather than upgrading conventional capability.
The last word on this has, however, not been said, and it is possible that further dragging their feet the Americans will concede that there is a genuine need to upgrade Pakistan's conventional capabilities, given the massive acquisitions that India has embarked upon.
On the trade front, President Musharraf apparently made a strong pitch for greater access to the American market for Pakistani goods, particularly textiles.
It can be safely assumed that in doing so he argued that increasing the volume of Pakistan's exports to its most important market would generate the jobs and the economic activity that could best combat the spread of extremism. The Americans have said that they recognize this.
In signing an agreement on market access with Bahrain last September the US trade representative said that, "A contest for the soul of Islam" was raging, and that "we can help" by striking trade deals that generate jobs and reduce poverty.
Unfortunately, this has not been extended to the larger and more vulnerable Muslim countries. Only Jordan got the privilege of selling textile products to the US with duty exemption and that too subject to the condition that such products must have an Israeli component.
This concession enabled Jordan to increase its textile exports to the United States from $16 million in 1998 to $678 million last year, and helped generate 30,000 jobs for the economy. In Pakistan's case, according to our commerce minister, $1 billion in additional trade would generate 200,000 jobs and provide support for a million Pakistanis.
President Bush said that he had listened very carefully to what President Musharraf had to say on the issue of whether Pakistani goods were being fairly treated in terms of access, and conceded that he had put forward constructive ideas on how to deal with the situation.
The truth of the matter, however, is that if Bush so chooses he has in hand a mechanism that could meet the demands of Pakistan and other Muslim countries that are allies of the US in the war against terrorism.
This mechanism is the "Silk Road Bill" introduced as proposed legislation by Senator McCain and Senator Baucus last year. The essential element of this legislation, which the Bush administration opposed, was that goods from Muslim countries - allies in the war against terrorism - should be granted duty free access to the American market without insisting on immediate reciprocity on the part of these countries.
Whether this was one of the constructive proposals put forward by the Pakistan side is not known but it is to be hoped that President Bush will look at this as suitable compensation for Pakistan and its leader who has been "most dedicated" to the hunt for Bin Laden and for the elimination of terrorism.
The foregoing may appear to suggest that apart from a strong reiteration of American support of President Musharraf, nothing particularly beneficial was achieved for Pakistan.
That would be unfair. I would gauge the visit as a success not only for Musharraf but also for Pakistan. The seeds have been sown; they have not fallen, as far as one can tell, on infertile ground and they should therefore bear fruit in the not too distant future.
Why staff cars?
Last week I talked about cars in my life, including staff cars. To me the latter have always seemed a luxury that a poor country like ours could well do about. They only give to those authorised to use them a sense of superiority. Maybe I sport corny ideas but I think it is the lower government staff who need transport of some kind rather than the senior officers who can, and do, keep two cars of their own.
I know they will hate the idea of using their personal cars for official purposes (although they'll be paid a compensatory allowance) because I've seen here in Islamabad federal secretaries sending for a strip of aspirin from the Government Services Hospital and pestering the PWD to replace a broken electric switch if they are occupying an official residence.
I have often wondered what would happen if there were no staff cars for government officers. Would administrative efficiency and performance, already at a low ebb, become lower? No, I don't think so.
Then why have staff cars at all? You will at once retort with a sneer, "This man enjoyed this luxury during much of his service life and is now giving us lectures on economy and all that."
You may think so but I can state in good conscience that I never considered the staff car as a patrimony, a birthright. At the same time I can't swear that I never used it for non-official work or that my family never sat in one.
But I do claim that when I reached the position of having administrative control over staff cars, I made it a point to pay for their purely private use. In fact, for five years with the Wafaqi Mohtasib (my last appointment) I was the only officer who did that.
My case against staff cars is based purely on the absence of ethical justification. They are allotted to only those civil and military officers who (as I've just said) usually have two private cars, and are never available to those who sometimes can't even afford to buy and maintain the smallest Suzuki. It's just like the equally unethical appointment of experts on fabulous contracts in which the perks cost the government more than their salaries.
It is another matter that many more officers who are not otherwise entitled manage to keep and use staff cars through an almost permanent arrangement and also receive a conveyance allowance.
When a joint secretary verbally directs a department or agency to place a staff car at his disposal, the officers in charge of the latter don't even dream of saying no to him.
At least I never observed such a miracle during my long service. This highlights the fact that the number of staff cars in departments and agencies and their unauthorized use, particularly in the autonomous corporations, is nothing short of a scandal.
Same is the case with the field officers where the token supervision of the government is entirely absent. In an earlier piece I had narrated the story of the information officer who ran his staff wagon every day from Hyderabad to Hala as a public transport, sharing the spoils with the driver and the office head clerk.
The point is, what used to happen when there were no staff cars. Yes, believe it or not, there was such a time and not just in the British period. Let me first tell you something that sounds like a fairy tale today.
In 1945, my father took me along to the Civil Secretariat in Lahore. We were sitting with the Home Secretary when the Chief Secretary's orderly came in and asked if someone could be sent out to fetch a tonga.
It seems that the private car of the Chief Secretary (an Englishman) would not start and he wanted to go home. Today even a Grade 18 officer would rather give up the ghost than be seen riding in a tonga or motor rickshaw.
Every officer used his private car for touring and was paid travelling allowance. In every department there was one official car, and certainly not the latest model limousine, for duties that entailed imperative use of transport. No minister was ever seen in a staff car, and no staff cars were seen standing at their residences awaiting their pleasure or that of their family.
The biggest advantage of this system was that neither begums, nor adolescent sons of officers roamed about in office vehicles. Interestingly you could tell a minister's financial background from the size and model of his private car.
My first assignment on being appointed information officer in 1949 was as PRO to Sheikh Nasim Hassan, one of the six advisers (ministers) to Governor Abdur Rab Nishtar, notified after the dismissal of the Mamdot ministry in Punjab. (Incidentally the Governor's two sons went to Government College on their bicycles.)
The six included the father of our ex-President Farooq Leghari. Mr Nasim Hassan was a lawyer by profession, a very fine person, learned and humble. Most of the time he let me drive his small Ford Prefect, ignoring the services of the official chauffeur.
I do not recall now when ministers started using staff cars and made a fuss when the model or make were not to their liking. Similarly I am not in a position to state with exactitude when departmental staff cars began to proliferate and became an integral part of every government office. But there was certainly a snowball effect and the cost of purchasing and maintaining them assumed outrageous proportions.
Occasionally a ruling regime would announce pompously that stern action would be taken against misuse of government vehicles. Staff cars standing outside schools or photographed in shopping expeditions became the favourite subject for newspaper reporters.
But of course nothing happened. Those who were to take notice of these adventures - ministers and senior officers - were themselves the most guilty and could hardly be expected to become indignant at their misuse. So the Great Staff Car Scam continued, and till goes on.
Only once did a prime minister say something about the matter. Ms Benazir Bhutto was "horrified" to learn from a newspaper that a Sindh provincial minister had nine government vehicles standing at his residence.
She issued immediate orders for rectification of the scandal. Of course there was no question of the minister having to pay for the "over-use" but he made amends by sending back five of the nine cars.
After that the newspaper did not follow up its story. There was also a press report earlier that five posh staff cars and 12 brand new motor cycles were seen at the Raiwind farm of Punjab CM Nawaz Sharif. God knows what they were doing there.
Nuclear vacillation and duplicity
"All the world's a stage," said Shakespeare. It is only when the play on the world stage gets suddenly sinister that ordinary citizens must face the inevitable terror of the final act.
Several months ago an Iranian government official stated that Iran's nuclear ambitions were not towards the development of a nuclear weapon, for Islam forbade the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.
Not that the United States was at all coddled by that for just as it is for Iran the Great Satan, Iran for America is evil incarnate. No loss of international affection there. With four more years of evangelical extremism in the United States the confrontation with the Ayatollahs of Iran is now a level moral playing field.
The lead article "Will Iran be Next?" in the current Atlantic Monthly snags one's attention and with alternating pique and palpitation one reads through the tedium of a war game played out on Power Point.
The article states "the presidential candidates did not spend much time on Iran and its nuclear threat. But the winner will have no choice. The decisions will be like Iraq, but much harder".
The simulated war game is an American assault on Iran. Sam Gardiner, a retired air force colonel, has conducted war games at the National War College for two decades.
The scenario was set with an imagined meeting of the "Principals Committee" or the most senior national security advisers in the event of Iranian defiance of the IAEA deadline, which was November 22, 2004.
In the role of CIA director was David Kay, the chief UN nuclear weapons inspector, sent to Iraq after the Gulf war and again in June 2003 to search for WMDs and who after not having found any, resigned his position in January this year. Playing Secretary of State were Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution and Reuel Marc Gerecht of the American Enterprise Institute, both also CIA veterans.
The simulated White House chief of staff was Kenneth Bacon; the chief Pentagon spokesman in the Clinton administration and the Secretary of Defence was Michael Mazarr, a professor of national security strategy at the National War College.
The intelligence dilemma posed is that Iran is probably three years away from a nuclear weapon, that there is a nuclear programme that we see and one that we do not see and work is deep underground and maybe in cities.
The real debate concerned Israel and a preemptive attack that it may launch. The principals all agreed that an Israeli attack needed to be strongly discouraged for not only are the Iranian nuclear installations very clandestine, Israeli planes may get there but the problem would be getting home.
Gardiner called for a vote on a specific recommendation to the president: should the United States encourage or discourage Israel in its threat to strike? All urged strong pressure on Israel to back off, for it would serve to stymie European cooperation and because a successful attack was beyond Israel's technical capability.
Compared to Iraq, the principals acknowledged Iran had three times the population, four times the land area and five times the problems. Additionally, US commitment in Iraq is huge and Iran had the capability of making American life in Iraq a worse hell.
After the tedium of simulated ground and air offensives, the conclusion of the war game was that as a tool to slow or stop Iran's progress toward nuclear weaponry, all available military options are likely to fail. Diplomacy has to work.
One felt relieved but only momentarily for after the Iraq fiasco it is plain that the Bush administration does not take the option most likely to succeed, but the one that appeals to its self-righteous myopia.
Trepidation is justified here for not only are the stakes nuclear, the world is more volatile and polarized than ever before. Bush's "you are either with us or against us" and his crusade against evil have catalyzed our journey to this point.
Besides war games, there is a good cop-bad cop game at play here as well. The European trio comprising England, France and Germany had Iran sign the Paris accord on November 15, in which Iran promised to suspend uranium enrichment activities in exchange for potential rewards and in the event of reneging, it would be referred to the UN for punitive sanctions.
Besides its other self-appointed roles in the world relating to policing all forms of human activity, the United States in this situation is the bad cop and appears to be undercutting diplomacy with a push towards sanctions. The threat of military action need not be verbalized; it hangs implicitly in the air.
On November 23 Mohamed El-Baradei, the IAEA director said that Iran had frozen nuclear activity and wished to show that its aims are non-weapon based. On November 25 Iran refused to abandon plans to operate uranium enrichment equipment that could be used either for energy or a nuclear bomb. Iran believes it has the sovereign right to develop peaceful nuclear technology.
Well before 9/11 and the war in Iraq the intelligence community in the United States had known that the greatest threat to America was a dirty bomb, a portable nuclear device that could wipe out entire American cities.
Instead of steering the world wisely and dealing with this threat, Bush chose to morally bankrupt America by invading Iraq. With the fiasco in Fallujah America has no currency with the Muslim world.
America is not just the boy who cried wolf; it is the unprovoked aggressor, for there were no WMDs in Iraq. Even politicians do not trust the perpetrators of such prevarication.
America's lapdog Israel is an undeclared nuclear power and has traditionally moulded America's standards so that it always got extra special treatment. The refrain of American policymakers has been that surrounded by despots and kings, Israel is the only democracy. America forgets that its greatest potential nemesis Iran is also a democracy.
So is it that a Jewish mind can handle a nuclear weapon but a Muslim mind is incapable? Or is it that the Ayatollahs still dominate and fashion Iranian thought and policy and the ultra right cannot but be dangerous? So the question arises, what is Bush himself if not an American ultra-right? Reminds me of that Urdu verse that it is prohibited for you to drink but I can consume with impunity.
North Korea, it is believed, already has a nuclear weapon. Efforts to stem Iran's nuclear efforts are not succeeding. Powell, Cheney and Bush went on an Iraq-has-WMDs media blitz prior to the Iraq invasion and true to a plan, hatched years ago, America barged into a sovereign nation, unprovoked and poorly prepared.
The bloodbath there has washed away any credibility that America may have had in the world, especially the Muslim world. And in the face of this what was a real problem is not now going away.
America is stretched too thin to make military options viable. The thought is chilling for it is said that Iran's nuclear facilities may be within cities. The fallout of such an attack especially in the Muslim world where the sentiment that this is the second Crusades is unimaginable. It may well precipitate a militant detonating a briefcase bomb in the midst of Manhattan.
The writer is a physician practising in Toledo, Ohio, US. Email: mahjabeenislam@hotmail.com.
Choosing between Viktors
Fortunately, there has been no violence. The orange-clad crowds that gathered in the heart of Kiev for a couple of weeks were largely peaceful. The state's security forces were equally restrained in their behaviour.
For the moment, the dispute that led to the possibility of a confrontation has been sensibly resolved, with a rerun of the presidential run-off scheduled for the day after Christmas.
The most intriguing aspect of the Ukrainian crisis hasn't, however, been the disciplined display of "people power" but the extent to which the former Soviet republic is still subject to Cold War power play.
In the aftermath of the supreme court's decision last week to order another election in lieu of the evidently manipulated contest held on November 21, presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko sought international oversight of the new round of polling but warned against foreign interference in the political process. The latter point was also underlined by Russian president Vladimir Putin. And by his American counterpart, George W. Bush.
They weren't all talking about the same thing. Bush and Yushchenko essentially meant that Moscow should butt out. Putin's intention was to return the compliment, with Washington on his mind.
The Russian leader's barely disguised anti-US diatribe during his New Delhi visit betrayed the extent of his frustration at Moscow's declining clout in the world, not least in what post-Soviet Russia regards as its "near abroad".
In the 21st century, the US is disinclined to recognize any sphere of influence other than its own. And there is precious little Putin can do about it, beyond the occasional exhibition of petulance.
There was a time when the US would have been marginally less brazen in going about what it considers to be its business. But the current administration's hubris knows no bounds: it has, if anything, increased in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, whose atrocious consequences apparently have no relevance for the would-be masters of the universe.
Perhaps one ought to be grateful that in other parts of the world the American impulse to impose obedient, user-friendly regimes takes a less violent form. But no one should be under any illusion about what motivates Washington to meddle in the politics of faraway nations.
The self-righteous rhetoric about democracy has always been a load of hogwash; although American enthusiasm for dictators has ebbed somewhat over the decades, chiefly because of PR problems, the US remains perfectly comfortable with authoritarian regimes as long as they don't forget who's boss.
Saddam Hussein did, and paid the price; but the house of Saud is under no pressure to call an election, and it's equally acceptable for Pakistan to be run by its military chief.
Imposing regime change or determining its nature cannot, of course, be regarded as a recent policy innovation. But the US now has the opportunity to carry the practice into territories that were until 15 years ago pretty much a no-go zone for its travelling salesmen.
In PR terms, the American strategy is helped rather than hindered by the fact that in many post-Soviet republics the former Communist Party leaders quickly discarded their ideology in order to cling on to power, often forming alliances with former apparatchiks who were well-positioned to reap the benefits of the economic transition from state control to a free-for-all.
Most Central Asian republics are still run this way; and even though all of them have in the recent past bent over backwards to accommodate Washington, their leaders must nonetheless have been watching events unfold in Kiev with more than a hint of trepidation.
After all, they couldn't possibly be unaware that the US would rather have more reliable proxies in place in Tashkent, Dushanbe and Ashkabad - and their strategy for staving off the inevitable may well be to avoid any sort of elections for as long as possible.
Its periphery now peppered with American military bases, Russia can be excused for feeling somewhat beleaguered. Its predicament helps to explain why Putin - hardly an exemplary democrat himself, although perfectly acceptable to Washington despite occasional conflicts of interest - took such a deep interest in the Ukrainian election and jumped the gun in offering congratulations to incumbent president Leonid Kuchma's preferred successor, prime minister Viktor Yanukovich, well before the official result was announced.
A victory for Yanukovich would have meant the preservation of a Ukraine that looks east for guidance. Yushchenko, on the other hand, is keen to lead his country into Nato - the Western military alliance that effectively lost its raison d'etre when the Warsaw Pact withered away, but has instead been reinvented as an instrument of US hegemony. So was Kuchma, until he suddenly changed his mind after a meeting with Bush in Istanbul last July; Yanukovich has been campaigning on an anti-Nato platform.
Beyond that, not a great deal divides the two presidential hopefuls. Both of them, for instance, have vowed to end Ukraine's token presence in Iraq. Yanukovich is perceived as being more representative of the oligarchs in charge of post-Soviet Ukraine, but Yushchenko too has served as Kuchma's prime minister, and he too counts among his backers some of those who have benefited most from the transition to capitalism. Neither of the rivals is opposed to the free market.
This is not to suggest, however, that the US is mistaken in counting upon Yushchenko as a potentially more reliable western ally. He was introduced to American officials by his US-born wife, Kateryna Chumachenko, a ferociously anti-communist former state department employee described by one acquaintance as "one of the most dedicated conservatives I have known". Once the US took ownership of Yushchenko's candidacy, it poured in the necessary resources and personnel.
Before the first round of the presidential election in late October, Kiev received a number of high-profile American visitors, ranging from Henry Kissinger to Senator John McCain and Richard Holbrooke.
In the second round, the exit polls that favoured Yushchenko were conducted by western embassies. And the apparent spontaneity of the post-election protests has been orchestrated with American advice and funds.
Besides, just as Putin prematurely greeted the candidate he favoured, Colin Powell was also rather too quick off the mark with his equally partisan denunciation of the electoral process.
There can be little doubt that Ukraine's official machinery was indeed geared towards helping Yanukovich across the democratic hurdle. At the same time, it would be unfair to claim that Yushchenko owes his popular standing in his homeland exclusively to US sponsorship.
But it is equally important to note that circumstantial evidence of irregularities in eastern Ukraine, where in some areas Yanukovich was credited with improbable amounts of votes amid implausible turnout percentages, was matched by equally unlikely figures in favour of Yushchenko from certain western regions.
And whereas the Western media has focused only on the pro-Yushchenko mobilizations in Kiev, there have also been large pro-Yanukovich demonstrations in cities such as Kharkov, Donetsk and Dnepopetrovsk. The Russian-speaking east of the country includes the Donbass industrial belt that accounts for 80 per cent of Ukraine's national income.
Perhaps the biggest danger ahead for Ukraine is that Yushchenko's likely victory on December 26 could entrench the regional polarization that has in recent weeks sparked talk of secession - unless the new president is rapidly able to demonstrate his determination to wield power on behalf of all Ukrainians.
Yanukovich would face the same challenge, but his chances of outvoting his rival are now slim - that is why Kuchma and Putin have been keen that the electoral rerun should be organized from scratch, which would enable them to put up a more credible candidate.
Ukraine's status as the cradle of Slavic culture - Kiev was a Russian city long before Moscow came into existence, and the territory was for centuries part of the Russian empire - does not entitle Moscow to any special role in its political development. But it would be even more ridiculous to suggest that the only viable alternative is American tutelage.
This particular US strategy has been tested in eastern Europe before - in Serbia in 2000 and in Georgia last year. It failed in Belarus in 2001, but appears likely to succeed in Ukraine.
There can be occasions when the forces the US helps to propel into power may be preferable to the forces they replace. But that, invariably, is incidental. And it certainly provides no grounds for condoning such a policy.
Once upon a time, military coups were the commonest method of instituting regime change. Now electoral manipulation is the preferred option. As before, the alternative is military intervention. At a stretch, this could be described as progress.
Democracy in all its forms has always been an imperfect institution, notwithstanding its superiority to most competing forms of governance. If in the 21st century elections anywhere in the world cease to mean much more than the state department choosing a winner best suited to American interests, democracy as we have known it (or not, as the case may be) will be stripped of all substance. It could be decades, and possibly much longer, to reverse this trend towards hegemony without borders.