| 21 October 2004 | Thursday | 06 Ramazan 1425 |
Saying 'no' to Bush
Nibbling away at autonomy
Partnership, not expediency
As world oil prices continue to soar, touching as much as $55.33 per barrel of US light crude, the conviction that the global economy would sustain a growth level of five per cent in 2004 has given way to vexatious uncertainties. The unflappable Alan Greenspan, chairman of the US federal reserve, says the damage done to his country's economy by current oil prices is not as bad as that caused by the oil shock of the 1970s. However, if oil prices keep on rising, the US as well as the world economy would be seriously affected.
Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, author of Globalization And Its Discontents, excoriates President Bush for his "four years of failure" and his policy of enriching the rich in the hope that this may ultimately help the poor. Instead of wealth filtering through the rich to the poor, low-income groups in the US have been hit hard by Bush's economic policies.
The uncertainties in the Pakistani economy are increasing. They spring not only from the higher price of oil and the merciful decision of the government so far not to increase POL prices at home, although that has wiped out the rich petroleum surcharge and lowered the government's fiscal resources.
The government has budgeted for a trade deficit of $3 billion this year instead of $2 billion targeted last year in view of the higher oil price. But the new estimate is that the deficit may rise to $4 billion, maybe even $5 billion, if oil prices do not come down early enough.
Meanwhile, because of increasing exports, the export target has been raised to $14 billion that is reasonable enough. Mercifully, home remittances of overseas Pakistanis went up by 10 per cent in the first quarter of the financial year ending September 30 and rose to $981 million. If overseas Pakistanis send more of their earnings home through banks instead of the hundi or havala system, the sting of high oil prices can be reduced to some extent.
The trade deficit will rise also because of the import of a million tonnes of wheat and far more machinery than before. More industrial inputs like raw materials are also being imported. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz talks of importing another million tonnes of wheat if the shortage in the country so demands. Easy availability of consumer banking facilities is also causing an increase in the import of luxury goods, particularly expensive cars.
The second negative trend is the steady but gradual rise in the exchange rate of the dollar against the rupee.
The dollar has become weaker abroad, particularly against the euro because of the adverse economic indicators in the US but has been rising in Pakistan. If earlier it touched Rs 60 for a dollar in the open market, by the weekend that had become the inter-bank rate. Apart from traders booking dollars for future import transactions, there is demand for dollars by 100,000 Pakistanis going for umrah. The forecast is that the dollar will rise to 62 by next year.
At the rate of Rs 60 for a dollar, the Pakistan currency is way below the Indian rupee which is now at 46 to the dollar and is on par with the Bangladesh taka which too is selling around Rs 60. If trade on a large scale begins with India, Pakistanis will have to pay 33 per cent more in their rupees for a dollar's worth of Indian goods. Those who buy Indian books in Pakistan are already paying 50 per cent over the Indian marked price. On the other hand, the Indians will find Pakistani goods cheaper by 33 per cent or more.
Since Pakistani pride may be hurt by this kind of trade, the government is trying to shore up the rupee by selling more and more dollars in the market. In recent months, it injected $460 million into the market. Last week, it was reported to have sold $35million to $40 million in the inter-bank market. The government wants a soft-landing for the rupee.
However, the rupee has gone down by almost three per cent since July 1.
There are reports from Islamabad that the government may review the Exchange Rate Liberalization Act of 1992 enacted by the Nawaz Sharif government.
It is argued that the rupee is losing almost five to 10 paisa against the dollar every day. It lost 20 paisas on Monday and since April last has lost Rs 2 against the dollar. Earlier, there was a managed float of the currency but now the float is determined by the inter-bank rate. This policy does not seem feasible and may be reviewed to suit the current needs of the country.
Pakistan has now foreign exchange reserves of $12.313 billion. The reserves would have been higher if only larger imports were not made, including those of wheat, higher priced oil and more machinery. If another million tonnes of wheat is imported the reserve can come down further.
There has been a clamour in Pakistan that the large foreign exchange reserves should be used for developing the infrastructure and other employment creating projects. That clamour has subsided following the assertion by the government that the reserves are not meant to be spent but to create confidence in foreign investors and others who deal with the government.
But the government of India, under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, has decided to use a substantial part of its $120 billion reserve for expanding its infrastructure. The reserves equal 20 months of imports of India and had tripled in three years.
India spends $2 billion on its road network compared to $30 billion a year spent by China. Owing to its poor infrastructure India received $5 billion of foreign investment last year, while China received over $50 billion. So the Reserve Bank of India is to sell $10 billion to $15 billion of bonds the sales proceeds of which will go to a public infrastructure fund.
There is opposition in India to spending reserves in this manner as the federal and state budget deficits total 10 per cent of the GDP. But the government argues that the reserves are far in excess of what is needed by the government and India can now withstand any foreign exchange shock.
Critics say that the reserves if used in the manner proposed may create "several white elephants". Others argue that if India wants to sustain an economic growth rate of eight per cent it needs a far more developed infrastructure.
Pakistan, too, wants to achieve a growth rate of eight per cent in the medium term, up from the current 6.4 per cent, and thereafter wants to seek a growth rate of 10 per cent. For that we need a far more developed infrastructure and not such clogged roads and cluttered cities with people dying as a result of traffic and other accidents. We may be well advised to use a small part of the reserves for development of the infrastructure. Anyway, the Indian moves will restart the debate in Pakistan on the use of the foreign exchange reserves.
Meanwhile, the government follows a policy of soft landing in various troubled sectors of the economy. It wants to increase the interest rate but gradually.
So it has rejected the high interest carrying public offer to buy treasury bills and preferred the medium increase in rates. The State Bank of Pakistan accepted six months treasury bills offered at 3.19 per cent but rejected offers at rates higher than that.
Interest rates as well as the exchange rate of the rupee is affected by the extent of inflation in the country. Inflation is on the rise. At 9.18 per cent in the year ending September 30, inflation is far above the five per cent targeted by the government. The poor man's Sensitive Price Indicator has risen in the same one-year period by 14.02 per cent. The market reality is far worse.
The index for the month of Ramazan will be far above the monthly average and will contribute significantly to pushing the annual index up. The efforts of the government to fix the price of meat, fruits and vegetables have failed totally. Traders have pushed their prices up arbitrarily.
The meat sellers have announced they would reduce the prices of No 1, 2, and 3 quality meat by only Rs. 10 below their regular prices of Rs 220, Rs 210 and Rs 200 during Ramazan. After Ramazan they will bounce back to the old levels or even higher. Vegetable and fruit prices have been soaring with the advent of Ramazan and will keep up the upward trend until Eid.
The State Bank of Pakistan is looking into the operations of the commercial banks. It has already forbidden the banks from providing loans to applicants to buy housing plots for speculation and wants the loans to cover both the plots and houses.
The governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, Dr Ishrat Husain has cautioned the banks against providing large low interest loans on the presumption that interest rates will remain very low for long.
The governor has also come up with a detailed roadmap for banks for the next five years so that they serve a far larger number of borrowers than the restricted figure they serve now. He wants the lenders to be "enterprising, prudent, strategic" and not be risk-averse or inflexible. He wants banks to give a better deal to the 28 million depositors through innovative means.
Dr Ishrat Husain wants banks to extend banking facilities to at least three million households in the agricultural sector and credit facilities to two million SMEs (small and medium enterprises) and micro-enterprises in the cities. Clearly, he wants banking facilities to be opened up for large sections of people hitherto unable to avail themselves of this facility.
When it comes to the SMEs, South Korea furnishes a good example of how not to finance them.
After the conglomerate debacle, and the major credit card crisis, the SMEs there have run into serious financial trouble. Nearly 90 per cent of the small and medium enterprises are in debt to the extent of $190 billion, which is a third of its 2003 gross domestic product. Hence, the banks should not be too generous to them.
Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz says national unity is the key to economic progress. Is the government doing enough to promote and sustain national unity? Is what has been happening in parliament a contribution to national unity and economic progress? The government has to do a lot of soul-searching and self-correction before it talks of national unity in credible tones.
Saying 'no' to Bush
It should be a straight shoo-in. The outcome of the US presidential election should have been decided long ago. Any assessment of the facts, of real issues, leads to just one possible conclusion. Start with the war on terror and the war in Iraq (depending on your viewpoint, two different conflicts or one and the same thing). Uncharacteristically these foreign policy issues dominate the campaign. If the next president were being decided by who can best wage and win the war on terror, his identity would not be in doubt.
George W. Bush's record in the war on terror is unequivocally disastrous. He took America to war in Afghanistan to crush Al Qaeda and their Taliban hosts. More than two years on, Osama bin Laden has not been caught, Al Qaeda is flourishing, even the Taliban are gaining strength. Pledges of bringing democracy and development to Afghanistan are periodically touted but not implemented. The recent polls do not change the fact that both democracy and development in Afghanistan are distant, if not impossible, dreams.
The next target was Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Bush took America to war against Saddam because it had weapons of mass destruction that it would (imminently) use against America or that it would pass on to terrorists - who would then use them against America. But Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction. The Iraq Survey Group has just spent hundreds of millions of dollars to verify that: there is not a single WMD in Iraq.
Bush took America to war against Saddam because the regime had links with Al Qaeda, and thus with 9/11. The impossibility of an openly secular regime being allied to religious extremists like bin Laden should have been obvious from day one. Both Bush and Defence Secretary Rumsfeld have since conceded that there was no hard evidence of a partnership between Saddam and Al Qaeda.
The US president took his country to war against Saddam because he wanted to liberate the people of Iraq from the clutches of the evil dictator. Saddam was evil: the Iraqi people are now rid of him. But in his place they have to deal with the new horrors of war, civil conflict, instability, violence, terrorism, administrative collapse, shortage of food, water and other basic facilities. On average, their lives are probably harder today than they were under Saddam.
Bush's policies in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in the Middle East (where he has turned a blind eye to Ariel Sharon's parallel "war on terror" and its constituent violence and oppression) and his cavalier attitude towards the United Nations, international opinion, the rule of law - have alienated America in the world. They have made America despised in Europe and the Muslim world. They have swollen the ranks of Al Qaeda and other terrorists. They have made Americans more, not less, unsafe.
Now consider the domestic front: taxes, jobs, the economy, abortion, gay rights, healthcare, education - the issues on which Americans traditionally choose their president. Bush's economic record is appalling. In less than four years, he has managed to turn a several hundred billion dollar surplus into a several hundred billion dollar deficit. Despite this, he has given generous tax cuts to America's wealthiest - at the expense of social services for its poorest. Education, health care, social programmes, all have deteriorated under the Bush presidency.
His unapologetic use of religion and his pampering to the conservative right have alienated many on America's middle and left. The United States today is the most polarized it has been for many decades. Divisions over the war, over social policies like gay marriage, over the economy and over simple party affiliation, are dangerously wide. Bush has overseen that polarization. He is blatantly incapable of healing it.
The contest for the White House is about policies and parties but - at the end of the day - it is about individuals. (Why else did Al Gore fail to secure an unassailable lead in the 2000 election?) The presidential election is a contest between two (three with Ralph Nader) candidates: not a simple beauty contest (though looks do count) but also of brains, of capacity, of past actions, of integrity, of decisiveness and leadership, of character.
George Bush wins only on the decisiveness front: he has chosen a set of policies and he will implement them - irrespective of the negative results that stem from doing so. Bush is single-minded: he will not change. The flip side of this, as pointed out by Kerry, is that he cannot, he does not learn from his mistakes. He continues to follow disastrous courses. What other "personal" qualities does George Bush have? He is good-looking, and he does a remarkably good impersonation of being an ordinary bloke - ironic for someone from such a privileged background.
But on the minus side, his many gaffes show both his lack of education and his lack of understanding of issues. Bush is a president constantly leaning on advisers, spokesmen, and colleagues. Without them he would not be able to function. Anyone seeking proof should watch the tapes of his reaction to the news that two planes had crashed into the World Trade Centre: "without anyone to tell him what to do, (he) picked up a child's book and began reading it" (paraphrasing Michael Moore in Fahrenheit 9/11).
For a "war President", as Bush is so fond of reminding everyone, George was remarkably anti-war when he was on the other side of the fence: taking orders to go to war instead of giving them. George sat out the Vietnam War doing national guard service in Texas - even there his record was dubious. One could justifiably point to the hypocrisy of a draft-dodger being so keen to send American troops into battle - or to the cruelty of sending them into a war that should never have been waged.
Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11 showed all these facets of the Bush personality, and the folly with which he has waged the war on terror. But it also exposed many things that were a lot darker: links between the bin Ladens, Saudi money and the Bush family, between Halliburton and the war on Iraq; the deliberate failure to go after bin Laden; the blatant untruths told by the administration.
John Kerry is not perfect. He has not always been consistent in his policy positions. He did support the war on Iraq when it was launched. He is too pro-Israel. He can be a boring speaker. He can come across as aloof and patrician. But, next to George Bush, his plus points are overwhelming.
Kerry has an excellent understanding and grasp of issues, domestic and international. He has two decades of experience in the US Senate. He has learnt from the mistakes of the past: he does appreciate that the war on Iraq was a disastrous decision that should never have been made but, now it has, needs to be repaired. He appreciates that the key to that is multilateralism, working with the UN and the rest of the world.
On the domestic front, he sees beyond the rich elite: he sees the pain of America's middle and working classes. He is far more the fiscal conservative than George Bush. And while Kerry too claims religious faith, his is a faith that tolerates and accepts those who are different.
Kerry's personality came out in the debates. He can speak crisply, to the point. He can make jokes about himself. Most of all, he can stay calm and composed no matter how vicious the assault. Kerry's courage and his qualifications to be a "war president" are infinitely stronger than those of his rival: as someone who has not only seen active service, but won bravery awards for it, Kerry is no coward. Nor, as his subsequent campaigning against the Vietnam war showed, is he afraid to take a principled stance.
Kerry has the wisdom, vision and character to lead both America and the world out of the abyss into which four years of the Bush presidency have sunk it. The 2004 presidential election - if it were fought on the facts - would be no contest.
Email: iffatidris2000@yahoo.co.uk
Nibbling away at autonomy
Last August, the then prime minister, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, announced in the Senate the setting up of a special parliamentary committee to look into the grievances of Balochistan often raised by Baloch members lamenting systematic erosion of provincial autonomy. A month later the composition of the 29-member committee was later raised to 34.
The first meeting held a few days ago decided to form two sub-committees - one to examine the current situation in Balochistan and the other for making recommendations for the protection of provinces' rights.
The feat of the adoption of the 1973 Constitution unanimously by all provinces was made possible only after the issue of provinces' rights was addressed. The Frontier signed the Constitution after its right to the net profits from the bulk generation of power at a hydroelectric station located in its territory was accepted. Sindh and Balochistan agreed to it only after their demand for royalty from gas produced in the provinces was accepted. These provisions were incorporated in Article 161 of the Constitution.
At the time of the adoption of the 1973 Constitution, it was also promised that the Concurrent List would be progressively abolished within a period of 10 years. However, even after the passage of more than 30 years the list still stands and the federal government continues to interfere in subjects which should be within the domain of provinces like tourism, environmental pollution, labour welfare, transfer of property, newspapers, educational curriculum, etc, to name but a few.
Unfortunately, instead of fulfilling the promise of devolving more powers on the provinces, during the past three decades laws have been made which have usurped even the existing powers and autonomy of the provinces. If the parliamentary committee cannot devolve more powers on provinces by abolishing the concurrent list, it should at least address the issue of systematic erosion of provincial autonomy even in areas which are their exclusive domain under the Constitution.
Baloch leaders have been agitating vociferously in parliament and outside against the setting up of new cantonments in the province. It would, therefore, be helpful if the parliamentary committee also made an in-depth study of the need for and implications of more cantonments in Balochistan and how they erode provinces' autonomy and authority.
Take for instance the constitutional right of the provinces to levy property tax. Under the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act 1958 the provincial governments have been levying property tax even in the cantonment areas. This was quite natural as even though the government properties are exempt from tax, the private properties and those built on lease lands in the cantonments are subject to tax which is the right of a province to levy and collect. Furthermore, under the Constitution levying of tax on the urban immovable property is not in the federal legislative list and it is the right of a province to levy and collect this tax.
A subtle but deep encroachment was made on the provincial autonomy some decades ago when the federal government claimed that all lands in the cantonment area belonged to the government, hence any property situated in cantonment areas should not be subject to the imposition of provincial property tax. By this one clever stroke the provinces were not only denied a legitimate source of income but also an island was created in their midst beyond the purview of the provincial government.
When it was challenged in the Supreme Court in the seventies the apex court gave a verdict against the federal government. According to the verdict, cited in the 1975 PLDSC 37 and 1973 PLJSC 39:
"There is nothing in any constitution or any law to show that a cantonment area is not to be included within the territorial limits of a province in which it is situated. In the circumstances, there is no escape from the conclusion that the claim of the federal government that all lands and buildings included in the cantonment areas are exempt from payment of Urban Immovable Property Tax imposed by provincial legislatures of the provinces of Pakistan, is not tenable. The exemption given by the Constitution to the property of the federal government will of course be available, and it has been made available even under the provisions of the provincial acts themselves".
The federal government has been arguing that under the Constitution it is the federal government that has the power to legislate in respect of a cantonment area. However, the Supreme Court has ruled thus:
"Under all the constitutional provisions, the property of the federal government is exempted from taxation and it is federal legislature, which has the power to legislate in respect of a cantonment area but with regard to certain matters only. Since taxation on land and building is specially mentioned in the provincial legislature list as a separate item of legislation, legislation in respect of taxes on land and buildings comes within the competence of provincial legislature and the law so made would (operate) in any part of the province making the law, unless the area sought to be excluded has been specifically exempted under the law or under any constitutional provision".
Knowing that the taking away of property tax in cantonments from the provinces and making structures of parallel state power there was unconstitutional and illegal, General Zia issued a special Presidential Order 13 of 1979. Under this order not only the property tax but also another provincial levy, namely the entertainment duty, was taken away from the provinces.
The Presidential Order 13 of 1979 was clearly in violation of the Constitution and the Supreme Court verdict and it was feared that when martial law was lifted it would be struck down by the courts. So at the time of lifting martial law in 1985 this Order was indemnified under the seventh schedule and cannot be challenged in a court.
Similarly, the local bodies and the law and order are also provincial subjects. Laws in respect of local bodies and police can be made only by provincial assemblies.
However, following the previous pattern, General Pervez Musharraf also first made local bodies laws for all the provinces and promulgated the Police Order 2002 against the provisions of the Constitution and then barred the provinces from making any changes in them by making them part of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.
The cantonment in my hometown of Peshawar has become a sort of parallel government in itself where the writ of the provincial government does not run. A manifestation of this was witnessed recently when a doctor on duty was not allowed to pass through the barricaded cantonment until he had a special security pass issued by the military authorities.
The Baloch leaders protesting against the cantonments cannot be faulted. During the military dictatorship of General Zia the financial powers of the provinces were systematically taken away for the benefit of these militarized islands in the heart of cities and provincial metropolises. These islands have over the year become centres of parallel authority beyond the provincial and local governments.
The writer is a member of the Senate.
Partnership, not expediency
Pakistan's relations with the United States have revived and regained strength since 9/11. Prior to that catastrophe, the United States felt it could afford to ignore events in remote lands. Its precipitate loss of interest in Afghanistan in the wake of Soviet withdrawal created a power vacuum and opened a window of opportunity for the Al Qaeda to move in.
Pakistan underestimated the perils of Osama bin Laden's presence next door, even after the bomb attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania provoked retaliatory US cruise missile attacks against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. While Islamabad was becoming increasingly disenchanted with the Taliban's antediluvian policies and its uncooperative attitude, it was not deemed expedient to threaten Mullah Omar's regime with a break in relations.
President Clinton's national security adviser Sandy Berger's testimony to the 9/11 commission indicates that Pakistan did not apply the requisite pressure on the Taliban to expel Osama bin Laden because it was under US sanctions.
The jolt of 9/11 provided the necessary impetus to Pakistan to turn a full circle by opting to become a US ally in "Operation Enduring Freedom" and the war on Afghanistan-based terrorism. This title is ironic, as enduring freedom in a destructive sense has truly been achieved; a Hobbesian state of bellum omnium contra omnes prevails in much of post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Warlord rule, violent crimes, poppy cultivation, heroin production, and many other evils have increased manifold. As a friend of Afghanistan, Pakistan can only hope that Afghanistan's presidential elections will herald a more peaceful and stable era.
Pakistan's efforts to eliminate terrorists who sought safe haven in the country's rugged mountains and teeming cities have earned it US recognition as a "major non-Nato ally". During President Musharraf's visit to Washington in September, Pakistan received assurances of continued US support, but whether it will receive all the benefits that are due to a "frontline state" in the struggle against terrorism is open to doubt.
While the US may not be fully satisfied with the degree of Pakistan's commitment against its erstwhile allies, the Taliban, President Musharraf has gone out on a limb by launching military operations in the autonomous tribal territories. In so doing not only has he risked his life, but has also aroused the hostility of local Pakhtun tribesmen.
The flaw in Pakistan-US relations is that they appear to rest primarily on expediency. It was anti-communism during the 1950s, the alliance against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s, and today counter-terrorism is Pakistan's trump card, which sets it apart from other states in the minds of US policymakers. American goals to restore peace in Afghanistan are provingdifficult to realize and could become next to impossible without Pakistan's active cooperation.
Assuming that this time round certain new elements or compulsions require that the Pakistan-US partnership should be made to endure over the long haul, in the larger interests of the two countries, it is incumbent on the two governments to address issues of bilateral concern objectively and in a focused manner.
The first problem is that of approach. Before the current relationship has even jelled, moves are afoot in the US Congress to enact pettifogging legislation (spearheaded by Representative Ackerman) aimed at facilitating the applications of sanctions on Pakistan in the future. One hopes that legislators in Washington realize that sanctions and embargoes against Pakistan have always produced unintended consequences, without diminishing Pakistan's determination to strengthen its security.
Since the mid-1970s, Pakistan's nuclear programme has been subjected to western scrutiny and opposition. What needs to be understood is that Pakistan's nuclear and missile programme is a clear case of responding to multiple challenges, starting with the 1965 US arms embargo. This was followed by India's conventional weapons build-up culminating in the bitter experience of 1971. In 1974, India carried out its first nuclear test and also launched an ambitious ballistic missile programme.
Pakistan appreciates the potential threat that the proliferation of WMD technology poses to American security, especially in the light of the 9/11 attack. The US authorities may still be harbouring doubts that they have been apprised fully of the relevant facts in the recent transfer of nuclear technology case.
In fact, Pakistan has shared all relevant information with the US and the IAEA. Likewise, there is no danger of terrorists or any other non-state groups gaining access to our nuclear assets, as the government has ensured responsible control over the entire strategic programme.
A sensitive issue is Pakistan's nuclear status as compared to India's. One of the factors that impelled Pakistan to test its atomic weapons in May 1998 was the belief that the West would tacitly accept India as a nuclear weapons state, but not Pakistan unless it too demonstrated its nuclear capability. Another issue that is likely to arise in the foreseeable future is that of the Fissile Materials Control Treaty.
Military rule, other perceived shortfalls in democratic practices in Pakistan, allocation of woefully inadequate resources to health and education, suspected official tolerance of jihadi culture in religious seminaries (madressahs), human rights violations, gender issues, religious intolerance and bigotry, and child labour are big negative policy points for Pakistan in the eyes of Washington. We have to address these problems not in order to please the US, but in the larger interests of our own people.
Pakistan is at the receiving end of inspired news reports that its Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) is operating free of central control and sponsoring radical Islamic terrorist organizations in Afghanistan, in Indian-held Kashmir and within Pakistan. Such reports lack substance because in fact the ISI is a disciplined agency answerable to the chief of army staff.
Several US policies are a source of concern to Pakistan, forcing the government to look beyond the immediate benefits of US assistance of $3 billion, pledged over five years. A common fear is that the boom-bust cycle of Pakistan-US relations may repeat itself. When Afghanistan becomes less of a concern to Washington, interest in Pakistan could taper off swiftly. Ongoing defence and economic cooperation could be terminated, and sanctions re-applied on any pretext.
Pakistan is deeply disappointed that the US and other western nations, having initially favoured self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir, and having supported UN Security Council resolutions to that effect, have changed their position in favour of an unjust status quo.
It would be a big mistake to treat the on-going India-Pakistan "composite dialogue" as a pretext for postponing the solution of the Kashmir problem through interminable talks and posturing. The search for a mutually acceptable solution has to be pursued in all seriousness.
Peace and stability in South Asia is in the interest of the United States as well as all the states of the region. In this respect, the Kashmir dispute is a major stumbling block. The US cannot impose a solution, but it can strongly encourage both sides to move forward.
Pakistan apprehends that the US does not intend to supply weapons systems to Pakistan that will significantly enhance its overall defence capability. The F-16 issue still rankles. The military equipment requested by Pakistan under the five-year aid package is facing delays owing to red-tape and more serious issues of release. US reservations and lack of trust are being reinforced by Pakistani reluctance to bear the high political cost of rendering assistance to the US in Iraq by sending peace-keeping troops.
The problem for the US is Iraq, which is demanding the lion's share of American resources and impacting on areas of lower priority, such as aid to Pakistan, which is $600 million per annum, plus an additional $100 million in the first year. In retrospect, the US decision to intervene in Iraq is proving to be a costly blunder, as it is diverting resources from the struggle against global terrorism; in fact, the Iraq conflict may be fuelling terrorism.
Just as India looks askance at any US military assistance to Pakistan, the latter is worried that the growing US-India strategic partnership, especially in hi-tech areas, including space, which may adversely affect Pakistan's security.
Pakistan would like the US to play a greater role in its economic development through export-led growth. At present, Pakistani exports to the US amount to a modest $2.5 billion annually, which is about a quarter of one per cent of US imports. High on Pakistan's wish list are increased American investments, greater access to the US market for Pakistan's products and removal of restrictions on travel and opportunities for Pakistanis to study in the United States.
Harsh treatment of Pakistanis in the US, including impediments to our nationals wishing to study at American universities, is a source of deep concern. The imbalance between the requirements of security and the academic needs of overseas Muslim students is another policy issue for the US which is impacting on its relations with Pakistan and other Islamic countries.
President Bush and Musharraf have established a good personal rapport but one hopes that the convergent national interests of the two countries will form a more solid basis of continued US support for Pakistan, no matter who is elected in the upcoming US polls.
Pakistan needs America and not for the first time does America need Pakistan. Hindsight has shown that as the sole superpower, with global interests and vulnerabilities, it is in the US interest to stay engaged with a pivotal country like Pakistan in an increasingly interdependent world.
The writer is a former ambassador.