Behind the Beslan carnage

The world watched with horror as the siege drama of a school in the north Ossetian town of Beslan unfolded. A group of terrorists, that included Chechens, Ingushetians, some Arabs and also an African, took an entire school hostage, and appeared determined to use the hostages as a lever to extract political concessions from Moscow.

A large Russian military force surrounded the school, and negotiations were initiated, with the hostage-takers making demands for the independence of Chechnya, and some reports say, Ingushetia as well.

Following some explosions, the hostages tried to escape, and the terrorists fired at them. With Russian troops joining in the fray, the drama ended with over 300 dead, half of them children, and over 180 still unaccounted for.

Though the focus of the world's attention in the war against terrorism has been on the Middle East, the number of incidents targeting Russia has been on the rise in recent weeks.

Two Russian passenger flights crashed in early August, killing all 90 passengers and crew. The incident was traced to Chechen women-suicide bombers. Shortly thereafter, there was an explosion outside an underground railway station in Moscow, killing ten people. The Beslan's was the most destructive incident, clearly related to the war in Chechnya.

World leaders, as well as spokesmen for major religions, including Islam, have condemned this outrage that targeted school children, and their parents. Even Chechen leaders have disowned any role, though the Russian government has placed a price of 10 million dollars on two of them.

The overall Russian mood so far is for revenge, and the head of the Russian armed forces has claimed the right to hit any place suspected of harbouring the perpetrators concerned.

There is need, however, to examine the background before Russia treats this tragedy as its own version of 9/11 and proceeds to adopt the dangerous path of pre-emption. Some voices have already been raised in Russia as well as in other countries that instead of resorting to anger and vengeance, which would generate further violence, Russia should examine peaceful options.

The increase in terrorism, evident from the series of incidents mentioned above, shows that the tactics being used in the Caucasus region, have increased hostility towards the state to a point where suicide attacks are becoming commonplace. The basic fact that cannot be ignored is that resort to state terrorism as a policy to crush terrorism is proving counterproductive.

Chechnya has resisted Russian colonization over the past three centuries. As the Czarist empire sought to expand into the Caucasus, it encountered determined resistance from people who set great store by independence.

The Chechens, n particular, won international attention by their resolve and bravery under Imam Shamil who led their struggle for 25 years in the 19th Century. The Czarist empire prevailed but the spirit of resistance did not die.

Following the communist revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks re-established their control, but during the Second World War the Chechens collaborated with the Nazi forces after they moved into their area.

Stalin deported them en masse after victory, to Siberia, under inhuman conditions so that 25 per cent of them died during their transport in open wagons in the winter. Their lands were given to other settlers.

Khrushchev, who rose to power in 1956, denounced Stalin, and allowed the Chechens to return. A high percentage of them became refugees, and joined the underworld in Moscow, as they found that their lands had been taken over by others. Therefore, the struggle of the Chechens for their rights did not cease; rather it became more intense.

When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, and the constituent republics became independent, the Chechens declared independence under the leadership of Lt.Gen Dudayev, a former officer of the Soviet army.

The government of the Russian Federation sent in troops, and a struggle ensued. Dudayev died in a crash and was succeeded by Mashkhadov. An understanding was reached, in 1996, whereby the internal administration was retained by the Chechen regime, though its demand for complete sovereignty was not conceded. No country in the world recognized the state of Chechnya.

Though Russia's internal weakness was such, at that time, that it could not assert its authority by force, many in positions of power remained opposed to the virtual independence achieved by Chechnya, Putin, who was appointed prime minister by Yeltsin in 1999, was among those who believed in a strong line against the Chechen freedom fighters, and he sent in a large well-armed force that virtually destroyed most cities and towns, in the fighting that ensued.

At that time, the European Union took notice of the massive human rights violations that took place in Chechnya. However, Putin gained a lot of popularity on account of his tough stance, which was a factor in his election as president in 2000.

The heavy-handed repression by the Russian government, which resorted to large-scale killings of the Chechen population, aroused widespread revulsion, and failed to suppress the Chechen struggle.

A small number of foreign jihadis joined the Chechen struggle, and the taliban government in Kabul recognized the Chechen state. Human rights organizations in the western countries remain critical of the savage repression in Chechnya, and terrorist incidents began to take place in Moscow.

The events of 9/11 that were followed by the declaration of war against terrorism gave Russia a free hand in its state terrorism in Chechnya. The number of Chechens killed ran into tens of thousands.

The Chechen population also suffered from enormous economic hardships, as many could not get employment. The Chechen struggle continued, as the persons picked up by Moscow to head the government in Chechnya failed to win any support, and the last puppet president, Kadirov, was assassinated.

Many thinking people in Russia have been trying to influence the government in Moscow that instead of using massive repression, it should try to come to terms with the Chechens by offering them internal autonomy and economic incentives.

But Mr Putin remains opposed to any conciliation. And after Beslan, there are stronger calls for revenge and punishment. The US policy of punishment and revenge in Afghanistan and Iraq has only fanned the flames of nationalist agitation. Washington has sought a role by the UN, and perhaps Russia should try that approach as well.

Those who participated in the hostage taking, or organized it, certainly deserve no mercy. The way they behaved, denying water and food to school children, and killing and maiming so many of them, was hardly a human approach and they should face the full force of law.

However, if Russia feels justified to resort to pre-emptive action, and does pick up some target that is likely to be in a Muslim country, the consequences would be catastrophic.

The outrage has been universally condemned and in Muslim countries as well. Just as the US is paying greater attention to the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia should demonstrate statesmanship and vision, and deal with the causes of terrorism in Chechnya. They have already suffered the worst horrors in their recent history, and deserve to be humanely treated.

A 'uniformed' presidency

The issue of President Musharraf continuing to hold the office of chief of the army staff beyond December 31, 2004, has suddenly come to life again. Though the president has not publicly confirmed so far that he would definitely continue as the COAS, his recent statements on the subject and the intense campaign launched by his supporters leaves little doubt that he does not intend to retire as COAS at the end of this year.

This is contrary to the political settlement arrived at between the presidential team and the MMA last year. It was because of this settlement that the MMA had facilitated the passage of the 17th amendment to the Constitution thereby resolving the year-long dispute about the Legal Framework Order (LFO) 2002.

The opposition, particularly the MMA, has strongly opposed this idea. This has generated a debate as to whether the president can legally continue to occupy the office of the COAS after the agreed deadline of December 31, 2004, without amending the Constitution once again.

Article 41 of the Constitution provides that a person shall not be qualified for election as president unless he is qualified to be elected as a member of the National Assembly.

Article 62 prescribes the qualifications for election as a member of parliament while Article 63 dis qualifications from being elected or from being a member of parliament. There is at present no dispute that he possesses the qualifications required under Article 62.

The most controversial provision is Article 41(7) of the Constitution. The earlier Article 41(7) had provided for General Zia's presidency. This was substituted through LFO 2002 and further amended through the 17th amendment to the Constitution. Article 41(7)(b) provides that the chief executive:

"Having received the democratic mandate to serve the nation as President of Pakistan for a period of five years shall, on relinquishing the office of the Chief Executive, notwithstanding anything contained in this Article or Article 43 or any other provision of the Constitution or any other law for the time being in force, assume the office of President of Pakistan forthwith and shall hold office for a term of five years under the Constitution, and Article 44 and other provisions of the Constitution shall apply accordingly. Provided that paragraph (d) of clause (1) of Article 63 shall become operative on and from the 31st day of December, 2004."

Article 63 (1)(d) disqualifies a person from being elected or chosen as, and from being a member of parliament if he holds an office of profit in the service of Pakistan other than an office declared by law not to disqualify its holder. The office of the COAS falls within the definition of service of Pakistan as defined in Article 260.

On the basis of Article 41(7)(b), the president' supporters argue that on relinquishing the office of chief executive, General Musharraf assumed the office of president and shall hold that office for a period of five years.

The restrictions and clogs imposed under Article 43 or any other provision of the Constitution or law has been rendered inapplicable to him for a period of five years.

Thus, it is argued that although Article 43 prohibits the president from holding any office of profit in the service of Pakistan, it is, and shall remain, inapplicable to General Musharraf (for five years) because of the non-obstante clause i.e. the use word "notwithstanding" in Article 41(7)(b).

It is also argued that the proviso to Article 41(7)(b) added by 17th Amendment which provides that Article 63(1)(d) shall come into force on and from December 31, 2004, will have no application to that term of five years either.

Alternatively, even if it is assumed that Article 63(1)(d) would apply to General Musharraf after December 31, 2004, ordinary law may be passed excluding the office of the COAS from the purview of Article 63(1)(d) for a specific period.

This interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution is disputed by the opposition and other independent circles. However, the arguments advanced by the president's supporters are necessary for his survival not only as the COAS but even as president.

If it is not accepted that Article 43 and other contrary provisions of the Constitution have been excluded for his term of five years as president, and he agrees to relinquish the office of the COAS on December 31, 2004, then he would also cease to hold the office of president on account of Article 63(1)(k).

This Article disqualifies a person from being a member of parliament if he has been in the service of Pakistan and a period of two years has not lapsed. Thus, if General Musharraf retires as COAS on December 31, 2004, then on January 1, 2005, he would also be disqualified as president for a period of two years under Article 63(1)(k).

The president may argue that qualifications and dis qualifications are distinct and dis qualifications under Article 63(1) including clause (k) do not apply to him. However, if that is so why was Article 63(1)(d) added as proviso to Article 47(1)(b).

Thus, the president now faces a legal dilemma. He would have to remain COAS beyond December 31, 2004, to save his presidency. If he resigns as COAS on that date under legal compulsion, then his presidency also goes.

This is based on the assumption that he intends to honour his commitment to the people made last year that he would give up the office of the COAS on December 31, 2004. The legal web which he had crafted to save him from their constitutional challenges clearly indicates that he never intended to retire as COAS on December 31, 2004.

The correct legal position can only be determined by the Supreme Court. The president has a formidable legal team. The arguments advanced by his supporters are not altogether frivolous.

But the law goes that far. If his entire claim to continue in the dual capacity as president and COAS is based on these legal niceties, it is a thin claim devoid of any legitimacy.

The Constitution is not about legal niceties. It is a normative political document which represents the aspirations of the people, not the judges. General Musharraf has claimed that he needs the office of the COAS because he has to make certain vital decisions affecting the future of the country including construction of dams, etc. This in itself would be a good reason for him to relinquish that office.

The COAS has no business or role in taking such decisions of national importance. The office of the COAS carries with it raw military power, not the legitimacy and credibility required to determine the destiny of the nation.

If the general intends to use raw power to bulldoze issues of vital national importance, the result would be upheaval, not dams. Haven't we learnt a lesson from the tragedy of East Pakistan?

By relinquishing the office of the COAS General Musharraf would not only honour his commitment to the people but would also strengthen the political process he has himself presided over during the last two years.

As far as vital national issues are concerned, he would have to develop consensus by taking the opposition into confidence and mobilizing public opinion. The two main opposition parties do not necessarily disagree with the contents of his national agenda.

When he acts with modesty, he has demonstrated formidable talents as a communicator. He should rely on his personal ability to develop national consensus rather than the complexion of his dress.

A lame duck prime minister?: The clash of power and economics-II

Leaving aside the question of the legitimacy of his election, what can the new prime minister be expected to achieve in the uncertain period he may be allowed to serve under the political constraints that have been mentioned earlier? His credentials as a smart economic manager have been generally acknowledged both at home and abroad.

The successes of the economy under his direction frequently recounted are mostly fortuitous and attributable largely to the special relationship enjoyed by Pakistan with the United States in the past three years.

However, there is no doubt that he has implemented the policies agreed to with the international financial institutions skilfully and has steered the economy back to some semblance of normality, though at considerable cost to economic growth and poverty reduction.

But managing an economy in the present competitive global economic order and moving it forward, without causing economic and social imbalances, requires a vision which smart economic managers, wise political leaders and astute generals alone cannot achieve.

It requires a much broader participation of the whole society, which unfortunately the present regime has neither attempted to nor has the ability to mobilize. Within this overall framework, it would be unfair to expect Mr Shaukat Aziz to deliver a great deal.

Since Benazir Bhutto's first prime ministership, the military has appropriated much of the powers of the prime minister in sensitive security areas, such as nuclear development, intelligence and Afghanistan.

Subsequent prime ministers have tried to wrest back some of the powers pre-empted by the military, with varying degrees of success and cost to their tenures in office.

Mr Shaukat Aziz, who is a virtual novice in the political arena and has been inducted in the office primarily for his lack of political savvy, is likely to be hemmed in even more than others and his turf is likely to be restricted even further and encroached upon even more frequently. His powers will not be much more than those enjoyed by him as finance minister.

With the president and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, the Muslim League president and outgoing prime minister, constantly looking over his shoulders, if not directly breathing down his neck, he will, at best, be a lame duck prime minister.

The danger is that if the economy doesn't revive as quickly and as fast as expected after the ephemeral honeymoon with the US and owing to increasing difficulties in the global economy, such as the rising price of oil and the promulgation of the WTO regimes, he may be made a scapegoat for a faltering economy and may not be as fortunate as his immediate predecessor in completing his term.

Meanwhile, the demands of the military for keeping its dominance are becoming more explicit and resonant. Recently, General Musharraf has openly defended the extension of the military's purview to all spheres of life, which has steadily increased since independence.

The General not only defended the "defence housing societies" which are sprouting all over the country as citadels of affluence and symbols of elite capture in the face of increasing housing shortages and skyrocketing real estate and building material prices, but also argued for greater role of the military in economic matters. The general seemed to be telling Orangi's slum-dwellers why they didn't build houses in DHA, making Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan turn in his grave.

The general claims that the military has the touch of Midas and all its economic ventures, including housing, industry, banks and education are the best. But no one has independently investigated this claim and no other group such as workers, peasants, educationists and other professions has been showered with the perks and privileges accorded to the military institutions. Neither has there ever been any independent investigation allowed into the military farms scandal in Okara.

Mr Shaukat Aziz may also have to face the imminent drying up of an invisible resource which has swelled the coffers of the exchequer and the foreign exchange reserves at the State Bank of Pakistan in recent years.

While India prides itself on its outsourcing boom in recent years as a result of its successful investment in the IITs, Pakistan's main earnings have been through the intelligence services outsourced by the US to ISI in pursuit of Al Qaeda and the elusive Osama bin Laden.

If the War on Terror in Afghanistan should go off the radar screens of US administration, as the war of liberation did in 1980s, or if the US decides not to outsource these services any more, Pakistan will face a severe resource crunch.

It is of course possible to counteract this by shifting the resources from ISI to IIT-like institutions and make a more honourable living, but the difficulties faced by Afghanistan in shifting from heroin production to other crops illustrates the inherent challenge of such a shift. Such a grim economic scenario will seriously damage the government's grandiose plans to alleviate poverty and pursue a large development programme.

It is unlikely that either the economy or the polity of Pakistan will be able to face up to the emerging challenges without a grand national effort to achieve reconciliation and reconstruction of national institutions, including the military.

The unquestioned faith in the military as the sole instrument for achieving a secular, democratic enlightened and prosperous state is the day-dream whose time for demolition has come.

The CIA speaks

Amazingly, a full three years after the Sept 11, 2001 attacks, America's politicians and media still continue to gravely deceive the public about that assault and the so-called war on terrorism.

Now, the definitive book on terrorism has appeared that should be mandatory reading for all who care about this crucial issue. It's a bombshell. Imperial Hubris, by Anonymous (actually, Michael Scheuer) was written by the CIA's senior terrorism analyst and in-house expert on Osama bin Laden.

It is totally unprecedented that a serving CIA officer has been allowed to publish a book, and one that is clearly a dramatic and pointed rebuke to the pro-Israel neoconservatives who drove the US into two wars.

Scheuer's work is a goldmine of information and brilliant analysis. It breaks taboos and sweeps away the clouds of lies about Al Qaeda, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It is also the latest sign of the increasingly bitter struggle being waged in Washington between the neoconservative Pentagon and National Security Council, and the CIA and State Department on the other.

' US leaders refuse to accept the obvious - we are fighting a worldwide Islamic insurgency - not criminality or terrorism..' he writes. 'The US has only made 'a modest dent in enemy forces.'

None of Osama bin Laden's reasons for waging war on the US 'have anything to do with our freedom, liberty, and democracy (as President Bush claims), but everything to do with US policies and actions in the Muslim world,' notably unlimited support for Israel's brutal repression of Palestinians, and the destruction of Iraq.

'For cheap, easily accessible oil, Washington and the West have supported Muslim tyrannies Osama and other Islamists seek to destroy.' 'The war has the potential to last beyond our children's lifetimes and be fought mostly on US soil.'

Osama bin Laden, says Scheuer, is no terrorist or madman, but a skilled warrior and man of honour, courage, and humility. He is sole Muslim leader standing up to predatory western powers and, the author suggests, is Islam's greatest hero since Saladin.

US and British military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq 'are completing the radicalization of the Islamic World,' a prime Osama goal. George Bush's misbegotten invasion of Iraq was, 'icing on bin Laden's cake.'

The threat today facing America, 'is the defensive jihad, an Islamic military reaction triggered by an attack by non-Muslims on the Islamic faith, on Muslims, on Muslim territory..'

Muslims are increasingly fighting back. Since their incompetent governments have largely useless military forces (Pakistan and Turkey excepted), many individuals and groups have adopted with what amounts to private-enterprise warfare against the West.

The Muslim world believes it is under total attack led by President Bush and ally, Israel's Ariel Sharon: a massive effort to crush all who oppose US domination, destroy Islam's inherent political role, eliminate Muslim charities, impose western values on the Islamic world, and maintain compliant puppet rulers- what is known as 'spreading democracy' in Bush's lexicon.

Terrorism, as the great humanist Sir Peter Ustinov observed, 'is war of the poor; war is the terrorism of the rich.' Says Scheuer, citing Chechnya, Kashmir, China's Muslim Uighurs, and Uzbekistan, 'America stands by governments determined to exterminate Islamic fighters struggling not just for independence but against institutionalized barbarism.'

He adds, US military operations in the Muslim world validate bin Laden's contention the US is attacking Islam and supports any country willing to kill or persecute Muslims.'

Breaking the ultimate taboo, Scheuer observes of the US's 'one-way alliance' with Israel: 'Israelis have succeeded in lacing tight the ropes binding the American Gulliver to the tiny Jewish state and its policies.' Meaning: Israel's powerful US lobby and media supporters have made its war with the Muslim world into America's war.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are lost causes, Scheuer concludes. This is the last thing the Bush Administration wants to hear. The US is totally unable to create legitimate governments in either chaotic nation, only puppet regimes. supported by American bayonets.

If the US stays, it will bleed endlessly; if it retreats, the US faces political disaster. Washington, he charges, has no strategy and is merely making up policies as it stumbles forward.

In one of his most acute insights, Scheuer explains the US cannot for all its riches buy its way to victory in Afghanistan or Iraq. 'Honour is still the currency of value in the Middle East, more so than goods and services.' Blood links trump all other affiliations or loyalties, as Pakistanis know all too well. Americans, however, remain largely ignorant of this basic fact about Asia.

Honour is why Afghanistan's Taliban refused to hand guest and war hero Osama bin Laden to the US, and why he has still not been betrayed in spite of a $25 million reward in a nation where annual income is $147. Honour that was not as much in evidence in the actions of Afghanistan's southern neighbor.

At least there is one person in Washington who understands the violence surrounding the US - and had the courage and patriotism to tell Americans the truth: that a cabal of ideologues and far rightists is driving the nation into a no-win war against the world's 1.3 billion Muslims. -Copyright

Rewriting the record

The organizers of this year's Republican National Convention engaged in some very shrewd rewriting of history. If you watched carefully, you noticed a narrative of the war on terrorism in which most of the past two years disappeared.

Viewers got enormous detail on the bravery displayed by Americans after the attacks of Sept. 11. But there was no pause to discuss how the Bush administration chose to sell the war in Iraq, how so many of its assumptions went haywire or why our strategy was so flawed that we have now conceded large parts of the Sunni Triangle to our enemies. There were no reminders of "Mission Accomplished" or "bring 'em on."

Of course the Bush team wants voters to shield their eyes from the specifics of its record in Iraq. Otherwise, Americans just might hold the president accountable. So President Bush and Vice President Cheney get us to look the other way by focusing on the vague question of which candidate is "tough" enough to handle terrorists.

This leads to such elevated forms of discourse as a convention video comparing John Kerry with a beret-wearing French poodle sock puppet named Fifi, and, this week, Cheney's scabrous observation that if voters "make the wrong choice" in this election, "then the danger is that we'll get hit again."

Faced with a Bush campaign based on amnesia and demagoguery, Kerry gave his big Iraq speech Wednesday at Cincinnati's Union Terminal, the same place Bush gave an October 2002 address justifying a U.S. attack on Saddam Hussein. If Kerry is lucky, his choice of venue just might encourage a look back at Bush's record.

Bush's speech of two years ago can only be read as an effort to scare our country into war. Iraq, Bush said, "is seeking nuclear weapons. . . . The Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons. . . . We've also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas.

We're concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States." And, oh, yes, Bush couldn't resist touting, through loose association, the supposed link between Hussein and Sept. 11 that the Kean-Hamilton commission has discredited. "We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy - the United States of America," Bush said.

Why is it that what Bush told the American people before the war is no longer a live issue? If Bush's rationale for war no longer holds up, neither does the administration's analysis of the aftermath. In his new book, "The Folly of Empire," John Judis cites a February 2003 Army War College report on Iraqi reconstruction.

Presciently, the report declared: "Long-term gratitude is unlikely and suspicion of U.S. motives will increase as the occupation continues. A force initially viewed as liberators can rapidly be relegated to the status of invaders should an unwelcome occupation continue for a prolonged time.

Occupation problems may be especially acute if the United States must implement the bulk of the occupation itself rather than turn these duties over to a postwar international force."

But the administration seemed to think it was wiser than a bunch of smart military guys. On "Meet the Press" in March 2003, Cheney blithely dismissed Tim Russert when the host asked what would happen if "we're not treated as liberators but as conquerors." Would the American people be "prepared for a long, costly and bloody battle with significant American casualties?"

Not to worry, said Cheney: "I don't think it's likely to unfold that way, Tim, because I really do believe we will be greeted as liberators." Cheney dismissed Gen. Eric Shinseki's view of how many troops an occupation would require: "To suggest that we need several hundred thousand troops there after military operations cease, after the conflict ends, I don't think is accurate. I think that's an overstatement." Have we forgotten this, too?

Many also forget the context of Bush's famous "bring 'em on" line of July 2, 2003. It was in direct answer to a question about whether, in light of rising casualty rates, the administration might want to get "larger powers" to join the U.S. effort in Iraq. Bush said he wasn't worried. After the "bring 'em on" line, his next sentence was: "We've got the force necessary to deal with the security situation."

In judging whether this administration has the right answers to terrorism and war, voters can rely on the images. Or they can rely on the record. -Dawn/ Washington Post Service.