| 08 August 2004 | Sunday | 21 Jamadi-us-Saani 1425 |
Meeting the terror challenge
Keeping balance in the dialogue
Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain appears willing to vacate the prime minister's office once the chief election commissioner formal confirms Mr Shaukat Aziz's election to the National Assembly followed by the completion of a few other formalities. He will yield to Mr Aziz for want of an option. General Musharraf asked him to go through a drill, and he is doing it. What happened to his yearning for high public office? He says he does not have any, but a claim such as that is not to be taken seriously.
A man may wish to enter public service even if he is independently wealthy, as Mr Hussain is, because he wants to serve his country. It is a fair assumption that several of the judges in our high courts and the Supreme Court could have made much more money as practising lawyers than what they get in salary from the state. They endure this loss of income because they prefer the satisfaction of administering justice to the gratifications of money.
Exercise of power carries its own unique pleasures. Some of those who have the requisite will feel abundantly fulfilled if they have done well by their country. Others get a great feeling from being able to give or deny good things of life to supplicants. They also enjoy the deference the commoners show them. Still others see high public office as a window to personal aggrandizement.
We need not exclude the possibility that the desire to do good forms some part of Chaudhry Sahib's calculations. But if anyone wants a fuller insight into his thinking, he might find that the last two of the considerations noted above were the more relevant.
One may wonder how he will have any power to exercise when he is no longer the prime minister. Given the way our political system actually works, the formal holder of an office is not necessarily the one who exercises the powers pertaining to it. Someone else may do it from behind the scenes. That is, perhaps, what Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain hopes to be able to do.
This is not to say that General Musharraf will retire from directing the affairs of state, or that Mr Shaukat Aziz will be allowed to exercise the normal powers of his office. The likelihood is that until the general gives up his army post the troika will rule the country.
It remains to be seen what the pattern of governance after December 31 will be. One may assume that Mr Shujaat Hussain is looking beyond that date, trying to forestall unwanted developments, and making moves to bring about desired arrangements. He has been speaking of the ruling party's entitlement to direct and supervise the government. I have argued earlier that this idea would work to subvert good governance.
The supervisory role belongs to the party's representatives in parliament, not to its organization and functionaries outside. If his proposal gains acceptance, he as the party's president could emerge as the government's overseer-in-chief.
He has already gained acceptance for the pernicious idea that the ruling party should be able to direct the deployment of development funds which, in the current fiscal year, amount to over Rs 200 billion. Even if a part of this allocation is somehow placed beyond the party's reach, it is clear that he will be sitting on top of a huge pile of money. Past experience suggests that much of this money will go into wrong hands for wrong purposes. One may be reasonably give that a large chunk of this pile will come under Chaudhry Sahib's personal control and be in his giving.
A couple of weeks ago, parliament amended the Political Parties Order to enable persons to hold offices in government and their respective political parties at the same time. This practice had been followed in Pakistan since Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's assumption of the post of PML president in October 1950. It worked to the detriment of our political system, for it made the party a handmaiden of the government and hindered its development as a viable institution. General Musharraf banned this practice, presumably to exclude Benazir Bhutto (PPP chairperson for life) from holding ministerial office, but he has now authorized its resurrection.
When he becomes prime minister, Shaukat Aziz may not desire a party office. But if one is offered to him - let us say, the post of the party secretary-general - he may not know how to decline it without appearing to have belittled the party. If he accepts it, he will serve under Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain. The latter will then become the boss of the man who is the country's prime minister. His aspiration to be the government's overseer will come closer to fulfilment.
According to another interpretation, the PPO has been amended to open the way for General Musharraf to become PML president after he has given up his army post. It may be taken for granted that he would like to keep that post if he could. But given the relevant provision placed in the Seventeenth Amendment, there is no way he can keep it. It will be extremely difficult, and gravely destabilizing for the country, to amend the Constitution once again to suit his inclination.
What is likely to happen when he does take off his uniform? To begin with, he will become a civilian president. In choosing his successor in the army, he will doubtless look for an officer who is the most likely to be loyal to him. But his care will be of no avail. The new incumbent will soon discover that he is the one to exercise the political influence which goes with his office. After he has settled down to his new job, he will begin to expect respectful attention from the president, instead of giving him unquestioning loyalty.
In adopting this posture, he will have the support of his corps commanders, for they would have shifted their loyalty from the former to their current chief. In their tradition, loyalty goes to the office, not to an individual as such. It follows that the army will not serve as Musharraf's power base when he is no longer its head. And who can say that the prime minister will not develop his own equation with the new army chief independently of Musharraf.
General Musharraf would do well to recall that when the crunch came in March 1969, Yahya Khan, army chief at the time, declined to come to Ayub Khan's rescue. In a similar, though graver situation, the generals turned power over to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto instead of standing by President Yahya Khan. General Ziaul Haq put Bhutto to death even though he had been chosen for the job in the expectation that of all the corps commanders he would be the most loyal to the prime minister. In Pakistan, loyalty is transient in situations that are essentially political.
If General Musharraf cannot rely on the new army chief's continuing and unqualified support, where will he find the basis for directing the prime minister and his team? It is not to be found in the Constitution. He cannot keep flaunting Article 58-2 (b) on a day-to-day basis. If he does ever invoke it to dismiss the National Assembly as a way of getting rid of the prime minister, the courts may reverse his action.
Would it help if he became president of the PML? Not likely. This party, as currently constituted, is not unlike a house of cards. Bereft of the sponsorship and support of a serving army chief, it may collapse. It may be useful to recall that when Ayub Khan became president of PML, the party split in two (Council and Convention). But let us suppose for a moment that the party remains intact. Musharraf will then have to learn to function as a politician. This will be hard, for he does not have the needed skills or aptitudes. Nor does he have a popular support base anywhere in the country.
Why would Shujaat Hussain, and the likes of him, listen to Pervez Musharraf then? As a politician, he will be so easy to ignore. It follows that he will no longer have any basis for primacy in the government or in the party. The prudent course of action for him may be to settle for the role of a "constitutional" head of state after his retirement from the army. But who can say that he is open to sensible advice. The likelihood is that he would rather be regretful later than put a lid on his sizzling ambition now.
Even more disquieting is the sight of the muddy waters into which Mr Shaukat Aziz has agreed to throw himself. He is contesting election to the National Assembly from two constituencies, one in Attock (Punjab), the other in Tharparkar (Sindh). He has no support base in either one of them. An attempt on his life was made in Attock (July 30), which he survived, but he is not leaving home to do any more campaigning. His sponsors will have to manage his election for him.
They are said to have allocated Rs 600 million in development funds to the union councils in his Attock constituency. A substantial part of this money will probably go to the local nazims and others capable of getting the vote out. It may be assumed that various public officials will also be called upon to help with his election.
Mr Aziz is learning to be a politician, but his choice of teachers leaves something to be desired. He is promising the voters in Attock that he will make Pakistan militarily and economically strong enough to act as the leader and guardian of the Islamic ummah! Let us all pray that God, in His infinite mercy, may save this man from the purveyors of deception and hypocrisy.
The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA.
E-Mail: anwarsyed@cox.net
Meeting the terror challenge
In its fifth stint since independence, Pakistan's parliamentary democracy is faltering once again. The restructuring of institutions and the exclusion of "erring" politicians from the electoral process hasn't made it work this time round juts as it hadn't on previous occasions.
Realistically viewed, it has got even worse. The threat has grown not just to the parliamentary system but to the federation itself and the constitutional premise on which it was based. Quite obviously, a system cannot be said to be working in which (as Zafarullah Jamali once said when he was prime minister) every member of the parliament is disgruntled unless made a minister, and fifty among them constantly vie to become the prime minister. Neither can the federation be safe if one or the other part at one or the other time has to be bombarded into submission.
Much is made of the 1973 Constitution as a source of national consensus, without paying a thought to the fact that 150, or more, amendments made to it over 31 years have drastically changed the originally conceived balance of power between the executive and the legislature, between the prime minister and the president, and also between the centre and the provinces - though in this case, more by administrative centralization than through constitutional provisions. Sadly, judicial pronouncements at various crossroads of national history did not correct, in fact aggravated, this imbalance.
Illustrating this transformation by a populist example, it cannot be said to be the same Constitution under which first Zulfikar Bhutto and Chaudhry Fazal Elahi were prime minister and president. Then came Nawaz Sharif and Rafiq Tarar and in more recent times, Zafarullah Jamali and General Musharraf. Fazal Elahi and Mr Tarar were both figureheads. The argument could be only on the point who received more courtesy or was exposed less to ridicule. Whatever little role the Constitution gave to their poets too was denied to them by overbearing prime ministers.
The legal and actual distribution of power between General Musharraf and Jamali is public knowledge. Though Mr Jamali as prime minister was the chief executive, he knew well that he owed his position to the president and not to his party or parliament.
If the president could appoint him without a protest from party members he could also remove him without causing a murmur. Yet, Mr Jamali would have served the system better had he not publicly owned General Musharraf as his boss.The Constitution in its current forum, thus, is neither a source of political stability nor a binding force for the federation.
It has been used alternately by the politicians, bureaucrats and generals only to provide a cover to their personal rule and to procure immunity against legal action when it ended. The sanctity attached to the 1973 Constitution is misplaced for it no longer exists.
In examining the causes of instability and conflict in the country the focus has always been on the legal structures ignoring the flaws of the political process through which they were created. The fundamental principle of the electoral exercise in a democracy, whatever its from, is the representation of the mass electorate (i.e. every adult citizen) in power and its orderly replacement at fixed intervals or earlier if need arises.
Judged by this measure, the parliament and the provincial assemblies that now exist must be replaced for the representation of the people in their election was both limited and flawed. Their representative character is further impaired by the parties splitting and members realigning their loyalties.
In a society like ours where the middle class is weak, the illiterate masses look for help and guidance to a charismatic leader rather than a party. That inevitably implies centralized autocratic direction rather than the delegation of authority to the councils regions. This trend can be checked only by frequent recourse to elections in which all political forces, dissenting or anarchic, are encouraged to participate in a free atmosphere through a fair ballot. Mr Bhutto, the most charismatic leader of the post - 1971 era, paid with his life for not doing so.
The autocratic trends in Pakistan's politics have gained strength from two unrelated, undemocratic developments. The one to which the ruling Muslim League of the day subscribes is the insistence on conforming to an ideology.
The other is a fast- spreading belief that in the current domestic and world conditions, the army is the only force capable of maintaining order in the country. These thoughts are not new but are now assuming proportions that are menacing for democracy.
Groups preaching an ideology perceived as standing above the Constitution and will of the people have always been around. They have gained ground as the "nationalist" or "liberal" forces came under increasing restraints of all kinds. The ideological elements, however, were never numerous or strong enough to influence public policy. But after the last elections, they found a powerful voice in the assemblies and other corridors of power because the moderate political forces were kept out by force of decree.
Likewise, reliance on the army to restore order when it is disturbed is not new. As early as 1953, the army was called out in Lahore to put an end to sectarian riots which the political government of the time was unable or unwilling to handle. The army had to come out again in 1977 to control the much wider disturbances which were instigated by the politicians in opposition against Mr Bhutto.
That brought General Ziaul Haq on the scene who with his great guile combined an elusive ideology with the hard reality of power to carve out a permanent and dominant place for the armed forces in the national politics and administration of Pakistan.
It is this combination of raw power and vague ideology which has made terror the bane of people's lives. It can be eradicated by frequent and fair elections and not by a show of arms. America is seeking to win the war on terror by holding elections. So should its ally Pakistan.
Keeping balance in the dialogue
Following the Saarc foreign ministers' meeting in Islamabad, during which the Indian foreign minister also met the top leadership, the composite dialogue process has picked up momentum, and meetings are being held on various issues in New Delhi and Islamabad. The foreign secretaries had met earlier, and the foreign ministers will meet on September 5-6, 2004.
The meeting on the Wullar Barrage could not reach agreement, reflecting how delicate water issues remain. One should not expect breakthroughs on other matters during the initial meetings at which both sides would be inclined to state their known positions. Some concrete steps can be taken quickly, to signify progress, such as restoring the rail link between Sindh and Rajasthan.
The resumption of the dialogue is by itself a significant development, and there can be no doubt about the strength of popular sentiment on both sides to move forward. However, one should not underestimate the effect of over 50 years of confrontation, which have bred mistrust. India had tried coercion for 10 months, from December 2001 to October 2002, and was persuaded to respond positively to the repeated calls for dialogue by Pakistan.
It would be wrong to assume that there are any other factors, besides the failure of coercion, that would compel India to make major concessions on key issues, notably that of Kashmir.
The process of rapprochement is going on at two levels, multilateral, through Saarc, and bilateral, through the resumed composite dialogue. While a breakthrough was achieved in January this year, following the Musharraf-Vajpayee meeting after the Saarc summit in Islamabad, in the shape of a decision to start a new phase of relationship, the defeat of BJP-led NDA in India's general elections brought unexpected changes.
Mr Vajpayee, though the leader of a Hindu extremist coalition, appeared to have a personal stake in ushering in a new era of friendship. This unexpected development has produced a situation in which chances of quick progress in the dialogue have been reduced.The Congress, which has led India for nearly 50 of its 50 year history, has a tradition of asserting India's leadership in the region.
While it talks the language of secularism and moderation, it has been more assertive of India's destined role as the dominant power in the Indian Ocean region. Pandit Nehru, who led the country for the first 17 years, visualized India as one of four great powers in the world, the others being the US, Russia and China.
He had sought to carve out a leadership role in the Non-Aligned Movement, though, ultimately, India tied its chariot to the Soviet juggernaut. In the decisive proxy war between the superpowers in Afghanistan, the US felt obliged to revitalize the flagging alliance relationship with Pakistan.
After the end of the Cold War, with Islam viewed as the successor threat to communism, the US took a 180-degree turn, and identified India as its new strategic partner, particular as China began to emerge as a potential challenger of its hegemony.
Though the 9/11 terrorist attack has restored Pakistan's relevance to US concerns, and Washington is anxious to promote a detente between the two South Asian rivals, the stance of the US is not really balanced. This is partly because of the overall recognition of India as the emerging economic and political power in the region, and partly because of the view held by Israel that Pakistan's nuclear capability constitutes a long-term threat. Our internal divisions and vulnerabilities also present a contrast to the stable democratic institutions in India that appear favourable for take-off by that country in the near future.
With poverty and deprivation posing the main challenge to our people, many believe the time has come to get our priorities right, and to concentrate on economic development instead of maintaining the costly arms race with the emerging Great Power next door. China provides an outstanding example, whereby, without abandoning its principled position on Taiwan, it has concentrated on economic development over the past 25 years.
As we take up the composite dialogue item by item, there are already signs that India is not ready to make significant concessions on political issues, at least not in the opening rounds. As major issues, like peace, security and Kashmir come up, there might be some progress here and there, on matters such as nuclear CBMs, but India has already sought more time to take up the issue of Jammu and Kashmir seriously. Indeed, the sum total of progress made both on multilateral and bilateral issues leaves little doubt that the resumption of the dialogue does not imply a readiness to compromise, and that national perceptions and goals will remain uppermost.
Taking up the multilateral issues first, there has been progress, especially on trade issues through the agreement on Safta, and also on counter-terrorist cooperation. Differences have emerged, however, on the future expansion of Saarc. India is pushing for the inclusion of Afghanistan, since it hopes to acquire transit rights to Central Asia.
China has expressed interest in being associated with Saarc, which Pakistan would welcome but India may not. Smaller members want Saarc to have links with other regional groupings, but India does not favour this at present.
The Asian Cooperation Dialogue process has made progress through the meeting held in May in China, and the next meeting will be held in Pakistan. Here also, India is less than enthusiastic on inter-regional cooperation.
The overall impression is that India, while willing to activate Saarc owing to the interest of the smaller members, is less keen to see it play a leading role in regional cooperation, as it continues to seek a major role for itself.
Energy is one area where progress is likely, and Pakistan, which chairs the energy committee, may have greater success, in integrating the electrical grids and tapping extra-regional resources.
The Indians have shown cautious interest in the gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan. Indeed, such will be the growth in demand for energy as India develops, that other pipeline projects, such as the one from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan and Pakistan may also be encouraged.
The bilateral dialogue is being pursued on the basis of the composite eight-point agenda agreed on in 1997. The opening meetings on each item are bound to witness a reiteration of the national stance, but some token advances may take place.
There is already some move to liberalize visas, and the reopening of consulates-general in Karachi and Bombay has been agreed. Whether the former residence of Quaid-e-Azam in Mumbai will be made available looks doubtful, with Shiv Sena's Bal Thackray still commanding considerable clout in the city.Progress on major issues such as peace and security was recorded when the foreign secretaries met in New Delhi in June. The agreements like advance intimation of missile tests show a movement forward, and India has also proposed other military CBMs.
However, India has pleaded for more time before taking up the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan favours the start of a negotiation process in which such matters as the role of Kashmiris, and measures to reduce violations of human rights can be taken up along with other modalities relating to President Musharraf's four-point plan, that seeks to cater to sensitivities of both sides.
The principle of simultaneity in progress on all items of the composite agenda remains important for Pakistan. However, realism demands that if progress is possible on some matters and is beneficial to both sides, then it should not be ruled out because the sides are moving more slowly on other items, notably Kashmir.
India is seeking to demonstrate some progress on Kashmir, by proposing that the bus service from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad be started and since there is a ceasefire along the Line of Control, trade across it and even tourism may be allowed.
The two countries could cooperate on environmental issues. However, the fact remains that the start of the dialogue has not ended the freedom struggle inside Kashmir and Indian repression has stepped up. An agreement to withdraw some of its forces by India should be a logical response to the commitment by Pakistan to prevent cross-border movement by militants, which has reduced greatly.
The resumption of the composite dialogue is a major development. It has full support of the people on both sides, as also of the major powers. However, given the history of confrontation and mistrust, we should be realistic in our expectations.
There is need to maintain unity in the ranks of our people as it will affect the progress we actually make. As we approach another milestone of history on August 14, we need to rise above petty and parochial considerations to fulfil the Quaid-i-Azam's dream.