| 29 July 2004 | Thursday | 11 Jamadi-us-Saani 1425 |
Dr Fahim Aazmi remembered
If correctly reported, Prime Minister Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain has not quite ruled out the possibility of setting up a judicial commission to fix responsibility for the Kargil episode. His only condition is for the opposition to come up with 'counter-evidence' against his observations.
The crux of the prime minister's comments on the issue was that the then prime minister Mian Nawaz Sharif had been 'fully briefed' about the Kargil operation by the army chief, Gen Pervez Musharraf - no less than six times.
He could say that 'on oath' and challenge the opposition to disprove his statement. "In the backdrop of the seriousness" of the issue, he went on to explain, "the politicians and the top military brass were one on the Kargil episode."
Significantly, he has said nothing about any comments and queries raised by Mr Sharif during the course of the army chief's briefings or afterwards during the normal question-and-answer hour.
Kargil was all but a dead issue until the prime minister responded negatively to an interview Mr Sharif gave to India Today, the Indian weekly. Mr Sharif had blamed Gen Musharraf for 'sabotaging' his peace efforts that led to Indian premier Atal Behari Vajpayee's visit to Lahore and the signing of the Lahore Declaration.
The army, naval and air force chiefs had absented themselves from the formal reception accorded to the visiting dignitary at the Wagah border. Although Mr Vajpayee's was not exactly a state visit to warrant the presence of the service chiefs in the reception line led by the prime minister, their absence was widely commented upon in the media.
But the three chiefs attended the formal luncheon at the Lahore Fort the next day (February 21, 1999). The first phase of the Kargil incursion reportedly got under way just about the time of Mr Vajpayee's Lahore visit or a little after that.
The crux of the problem is not whether the army chief kept the prime minister informed about the progress of the operation, but who authorized it in the first instance. Who planned and eventually launched it and did the operational plan and its phased execution enjoy the blessings of the civilian chief executive, the prime minister?
Furthermore, what was the grand strategic design behind the deep incursions into Kargil? Was it a repeat of the unfortunate Operation Gibraltar of August 1965 preceding and precipitating the 1965 war? The collapse of Gibraltar within just a couple of days after its launch should have been a good enough lesson and warning to military planners against daring but essentially disjointed moves.
What lent a touch of tactical gloss to the move and contributed to its initial unhindered success was the startling failure of Indian intelligence at the level of field formation (brigade-division-corps) GHQ and the notorious RAW.
The Pakistani advance was virtually in its third month without reportedly meeting any resistance when the Indians got wind of it. And that was not before the first week of May.
The disclosure struck India's top leadership like a thunderbolt and awakened them to the grim reality of the enemy sitting entrenched in their backyard. They threw in everything they had in their military arsenal, men and material, absolutely unmindful of the cost.
The Pakistanis' biggest disadvantage was their tenuously held supply and communication lines. The Indians hastened to disrupt and cut these off. When they made it to the Pakistani positions after nearly a fortnight of a hard climb, our men had reportedly consumed the last ounce of their field rations and were practically isolated from the main base.
They had imposed heavy casualties on the Indians, about the heaviest suffered in any single operation. At the end of the day, however, Pakistanis were left with little to fight back with.
Between February/March, about the time the operation was launched, and July when the ceasefire was ordered were five long months of tense waiting and bitter fighting. Our men and officers had suffered the ordeal bravely beyond the call of duty, considering the inhospitable operational environment.
Mr Sharif made a desperate air dash to Washington to call on president Bill Clinton on July 4, a holiday on account of America's national day. Mr Clinton intervened to contact Mr Vajpayee and persuaded him to agree to a ceasefire and order his troops back to their original positions.
The Pakistani troops were guaranteed safe passage home, behind their part of the LoC. Whether the Pakistanis involved were regulars or para-militaries or mujahideen did not matter so long as they were recognized as Pakistani soldiers.
According to Mr Sharif in his India Today interview, Mr Vajpayee's response to Mr Sharif's assurance that "there is no Pakistan Army fighting" was: "Nawaz Saab, aap ko pata nahin hai. It's your regular forces attacking our positions and occupying our posts."
TAILPIECE: Reacting to the skirmishes in the Rann of Kutch in April/May 1965, India occupied three Pakistani posts in Kargil. These were returned after the Tashkent Declaration.
India re- occupied these posts in 1971. Their present status is not known, however. It is high time the nation was informed as to which side of the LoC these posts have been since 1971.
The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army.
Dr Fahim Aazmi remembered
KARACHI: A meeting to condole the death of noted writer, poet and critic Dr Fahim Aazmi was held by the literary committee of Arts Council on Tuesday. Prof Saher Ansari was in the chair and among those who spoke on the life and merits of the great literary person included his daughter Nighat Raza Rizvi, son-in-law Azher Haider Naqvi, fiction writer Shamshad Ahmad, critic Rauf Niazi, Salman Siddiqui, Prof Anis Zaidi and Hasan Zaheer.
Ms Rizvi, in her detailed paper, described the last moments of her ailing father, who was also the editor of his journal Sareer, as to how he was engaged in the compilation of the paper's annual number till a couple of hours before he breathed his last and could hardly put his signature on the editorial page.
Fahim Azmi coming from a family of poets and writers - his younger brother the late Sajjad Baqer Rizvi was a well-known writer and poet - was author of Urdu novel "Janam Kundali", a symbolic novel "Destination Manhole" in English, a collection of short stories "Artamas nager ke phool", a poetry collection "Shauq-i-Munfail" and most importantly his editorials reproduced in three volumes titled "Aara".
The late Dr Fahim Azmi brought out his journal in 1989 from Karachi and the editorials published in its annuals spread over 15 years were so rich in knowledge that those would be enough to educate the readers for another decade, Ms Rizvi claimed.
Prof Saher Ansari admired the late writer's total commitment to the promotion of modern critical theories in literature. He was in himself a modern man as his creative interest was well known.
At the same time, he had his roots in our cultural traditions. Prof Ansari suggested that a Fahim Azmi number of Sareer should be brought out and a committee may be formed to compile it.
Rauf Niazi described Dr Fahim Aazmi's interests in modern critical theories, post modernism, the construction and de- construction theories and his role in the promotion of rational thought.
Salman Siddiqui in his brief paper admired Fahim Azmi for his creative writings, balanced criticism, and the editing of an opinion journal, always open to criticism from others, without becoming a controversial person.
Shamshad Ahmed, who had developed an emotional attachment and friendship with the late editor, described him as an amicable, generous, lively and likable person. Dr Fahim Azmi had spent some days in the United States, his daughter informed the audience and disclosed that his manuscript "My few days in America" was already with her and would be published in near future.