| 20 June 2004 | Sunday | 01 Jamadi-ul-Awwal 1425 |
Problems of governance
Towards N-stability in South Asia
Muslim statesmen and thinkers maintained that in addition to being learned in the law, a judge should be a good listener, willing to bear with detail, patient and persevering in examining the facts and arguments placed before him, and that he should settle issues without fear or favour. Such men were hard to find, and they should therefore be paid well if they were to be retained in service. In terms of protocol, they should be placed high enough so that other officials could not intimidate them.
Let the judges be above every kind of pressure or influence, beyond intrigue or corruption, wrote Ali ibn Abu Talib, the fourth pious caliph, in his massive (over 8,000 word) and celebrated letter of directives to Malik bin Ashtar. In his well-known work on governance and politics, Siyasat Nama, Nizam al-Mulk also spoke of the judiciary's exalted station. Judges, he wrote, were the caliph's deputies and "standard bearers."
Their prestige and their reputation should be high, and all other public officials must aid them and uphold the dignity of their courts. If anyone ignored summon to appear in court, he should be compelled to attend, however high of rank he might be.
Needless to say, graft among public officials is condemned, and so is nepotism. They are urged to accept an ascetic discipline, keep their "extravagant and inordinate yearnings" under control. They are not to keep for themselves "anything which is the common property of all."
It may be recalled that Umar bin Khattab, the second pious caliph, confiscated one half of the property of Amr ibn al-Ass (governor of Egypt at the time) on the ground that some of it might have been acquired or retained improperly. Even if no misappropriation was involved, wrote Umar, the governor should have spent a larger proportion of his acquisitions in the way of God instead of accumulating them.
In his biography of Umar (Al Faruq), Maulana Shibli Nomani wrote that under Umar's rule every official (amil) filed a declaration of his assets upon taking office, and if his financial status improved noticeably during his employment, he was asked to account for it. The appointees also pledged to shun "Turkish horses, fine clothes, and fine flour."
A public official is not to let his personal interest intrude upon his duty to safeguard the "rights of mankind." Nor is he to confer benefits upon undeserving men and, thus, incite jealousies among others. In making appointments, he should scrutinize the capabilities and the character of candidates and make decisions without allowing "external influences" to bear on his consideration.
Friends and relatives do tend to surround a ruler and attempt to misdirect his actions. "If you find such men around you," said Ali to one of his governors, "do away with them and bring this scandalous situation to an end." Nizam al-Mulk counsels that public officials should not be admitted into the circle of the king's "boon companions", and the latter should not be appointed to public offices. Business and pleasure should be kept apart.
Once Umar's sons went to Egypt for a visit, and in that connection he wrote to the governor, saying: "If a member of my family sees you, you must not give him any gifts or otherwise treat with him in a preferential manner. If you do, suitable action will be taken against you."
Nizam al-Mulk advises that the king must maintain an efficient system of surveillance and reporting. He should keep himself posted on the condition of the peasantry, state of law enforcement, and the conduct of public officials. Overseers should send him situation reports regularly and promptly.
If he does not find and punish the wrongs his agents are committing, the people will feel that if he knows of them and does not prevent them, he is an oppressor like them, and if he does not know, he is negligent and ignorant. It is, therefore, vital to have ministers and officials who will tell the ruler the "bitter truth" unreservedly, without embellishing it merely to make it sound good. Umar and Ali voice the same concern in their official correspondence.
Nizam al-Mulk observes that persons should be appointed to watch the conduct of judges, tax collectors, police officers, and inspectors of weights and measures. Those found to be dishonest should be dismissed, and barred from future employment. Their assets should be seized, their victims compensated, and the remainder of their ill-gotten possessions confiscated.
Earlier Ali had given Malik the same advice.
Find the best available person for the job to be done. Nizam al-Mulk quotes the Prophet (PBUH) to the effect that he who appoints a man to a position, knowing that a better man is present in the community, has betrayed God, his Prophet, and the entire body of Muslims.
Much to the reader's pleasant surprise, he stresses another administrative principle, to wit, that no official should be allowed to hold two posts at the same time, for he will perform one of them poorly, and quite likely fail in both. Likewise, a single function should not be placed in the charge of two or more officials. Such sharing would generate irresponsibility, for each incumbent will reason that any work he does might go unacknowledged and unrewarded.
"The master will suppose that my partner has done the work." Apparently, the desire on the part of some officials to grab as many positions of power as possible was even stronger than it is in our own time. Nizam al-Mulk lamented that "there are men, utterly incapable, who hold 10 posts, and if another were to turn up, they would spend their efforts and money to get it; and nobody would consider whether such people have the requisite ability... and whether they can fulfil the numerous tasks they have already accepted."
We have seen Nizam al-Mulk's emphasis on competence and diligence. Public servants should do the day's work on the same day and, as we say now, clean up their desks before they go home. Writing to Abu Musa, Umar observes: "Let it be understood clearly that, for successful completion of a job, it is necessary that today's work is not put off to the next day. If it is, work will accumulate... and many things will remain undone."
In order to retain honest and competent officials, one must give them the highest consideration when merited. Speak well of them when they deserve praise, let their accomplishments be appreciated and made known. Recognition will increase their dedication to public service. Muslim administrative prescription tends to be generous in the matter of compensation. In the thinking of Umar and Ali, the state is obligated to provide every citizen the basic necessities of life.
The idea of a minimum wage is clearly implicit in this persuasion. One encounters the observation repeatedly that public officials should be paid well so as to keep them from temptation to corruption. But not so highly that they can adopt ostentatious lifestyles.
In his letter to Malik, the fourth pious caliph has contributed another interesting concept. The various levels in government, and in society at large, depend upon one another for their well-being. The government as a whole is like a "closely woven net" so that one class of officials cannot work satisfactorily without the support of others.
Judges, police officers, secretaries of state, and officials in all other departments perform roles essential for good government. They all have rights which the "Merciful Lord has fixed." The implication here seems to be that the various elements in this seamless web should be so placed as to keep them from overawing one another.
In sum Muslim administrative ethic would seem to include the following emphases: a service role and orientation; exclusion of arbitrariness, rule of law, and equality of all citizens before the law; facility of access to officials; arrangements for handling grievances against officials, including those of the highest rank; a reliable reporting system; unequivocal condemnation of graft, nepotism, and favouritism; selection of the right man for the right job; caution against excessive concentration of functions and power in a single individual; caution against "backlogs"; "human relations"; and balance within the public service system.
These emphases and principles appear to be eminently suitable for a state that wants to modernize its public administration. If Pakistan's administration were Islamic, it would ipso facto be modern. But it is not Islamic. In its actual functioning it violates every one of the concerns explained above.
The vast majority of the Pakistani public servants are Muslim. It is a fair assumption that they bear some degree of attachment to Islam. What keeps them from following its ethic pertaining to their craft? It cannot be ignorance. Islam is a required subject of study in most of the Pakistani schools and a fairly popular elective in college. It is also taught in the academies and institutes that train public servants. But apparently all this exposure is making no impact.
It may be argued that the bureaucracy, other organizations, and indeed the community at large will not turn to the Islamic ethic until the Islamic establishment (the professional ulema) turns its focus on mutual rights and obligations in societal interaction, concerns of the "earthly city," or what we call "haqooq al-ibad." Not until the individual Muslim begins to understand that, beyond attaining eternal bliss in the hereafter, Islam has an ameliorative relevance to his needs and aspirations, his longing for fulfilment, his pursuit of happiness, will the Islamic ethic have a significant number of adherents in actual practice.
Let it be remembered that the pious caliphs and the Muslim thinkers, referred to above, were addressing themselves to, and bringing Islam to bear upon, issues and problems relating to the well-being of the people here and now, not in some other life and in some other world.
The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. US. E-mail: anwarsyed@cox.net
Problems of governance
The form of government and quality of governance aside, the gulf of mistrust that separates the people from the rulers in Pakistan has been widening. Today, it is wider than it ever was because of the double life and double-speak of the leaders.
The leaders have also been growing rich while in the service of the people. The disparity in the living standards of the ministers and their majority constituents has shown a progressive increase much more than, say, that between the managers of industry and the labourers.
The members of the assemblies have used their representative status and the influence this brings more to feather their own nests at the expense of the folks who voted them into power. Horse-trading has become a source of illicit and quick gain, without any compunction. That combined with incompetence, corruption and delays in bureaucracy, police and court affairs has made most people cynical, and some violent.
Yet the prime minister admonishes the people for being impatient "expecting everything to be done just now". It would take generations, he pontificated in a recent interview to an English daily, for "Pakistan is not an easy country to govern."
Indeed, it takes generations to change the lot of the poor but the point which Mr Jamali and other leaders must ponder is whether two generations after independence does the common man today feel more contented and free than he was 57 years ago, or 32 years ago, four years or 18 months ago? The inescapable and undisputable finding would be that through all these landmark stages the freedom and contentment of the people have deteriorated into fear and despair.
Mr Jamali should be aware that the current conduct of public affairs and the course of events portend a situation still worse. Time is running out fast for his government. His answer to the country's "treacherous" political culture and mud-slinging on his person is to recruit more ministers for every member of the parliament aspires to become a minister. More ministers would give no comfort to the common man (they are already one too many) and the mud would still stick somewhere.
The hard reality to be recognized is that the cabinet over which Mr Jamali presides and the parliament that he leads are subject to no discipline or programme, and a parliamentary government cannot function without these attributes. He led no party to victory in the elections nor has he put together the coalition he is now supposed to be heading.
It is an a la carte affair in which everyone does what he likes. Now, rumour has it and Mr Jamali concedes that 50 among his own partymen, or coalition partners, are trying to succeed him. The support to him comes from Maulana Fazlur Rahman who, if it were to be a true parliamentary system, would have been the only one aspiring to become the prime minister, for he is the leader of the opposition.
The Maulana fears that Mr Jamali's removal would bring the precariously raised parliamentary edifice crumbling down and he would loath to see that happen. Qazi Hussain Ahmad, too, has become Jamali's advocate before the president, defending him against his own partymen.
The line separating the government (or the treasury benches in parliament) from the opposition thus represents the opposing programmes nor party loyalties. That both cut across the dividing line is no secret. The naturally ordained alliance (as Chaudhry Shujaat calls it) between the League and the MMA is proving stronger than the political alliance forged under extraneous pressures. For a prime minister to look up to the opposition to continue in office is a new and bizarre experiment in parliamentary democracy.
The remnants of the parliamentary system which had escaped the hatchet of the 17th amendment are now being destroyed by the parliamentarians themselves. The prime minister has lent support to them by admitting that in the current situation, it is not he but President Musharraf alone who can effectively lead the country. The current situation appears to be a lasting one.
Whether it is for a change in the form of government or for the revival of the parliamentary tradition and practices to the extent the amended Constitution permits, a recourse to the electorate has become indispensable. The last election suffered from every conceivable evil. The latest evil is nepotism practised in the nomination of women to the seats reserved for them.
A large number has gone to the ladies closely related to the party bigwigs. Most seats have been claimed by parties or individuals who believe that the rightful place for a woman is at home. The temptation to go against traditional belief must have been enormous for sitting in parliament is not merely a distinction, it also pays well. The way the women have come into the parliament they cannot but speak for their families and parties, and not for their gender as was intended.
Nepotism is thus yet another ground added to many others - low turn-out, official interference, disqualifications, graduation, horse-trading - for holding elections afresh. Overriding them all, however, is the riotous and rudderless parliament born of the last election. The country would not be difficult to govern for any prime minister, even for Mr Jamali, if elections were to be held frequently and fair and free.
The country was easy to govern till the sectarian, or parochial, parties came to wield influence over politics far out of proportion to their popular standing. All religious parties, whatever their assertions to the contrary, are necessarily sectarian. To them, all those who do not subscribe to their creed are profane or heretics. They have spawned the sipahs and lashkars which kill not for political dissent but for religious belief.
These very religious parties now claim to be the custodians of the ideology of Pakistan. The ideology of Pakistan is nothing more than what Jinnah said and did. The theologians of various schools had nothing to do with the struggle for Pakistan launched and won solely by Jinnah. He had only lieutenants, no peers or ideologues.
It is a measure of the leadership of the present time that the president appeases the clerics and the prime minister leans on them to save his office when the religious groups represent no more than 10 per cent of the electorate and that too in pockets or on the fringes of the society. No doubt Mr Jamali finds it difficult to govern this country.
Towards N-stability in South Asia
It augurs well that India and Pakistan are currently engaged in a serious dialogue on nuclear issues. Considering that relations between them have a crisis-prone nature, which has been demonstrated time and again by crisis and war during the last 56 years, it makes eminent sense that taking advantage of the current thaw, they give high priority to this vital issue.
The widely held view that nuclear powers do not engage in conventional conflict for fear of escalation was falsified twice, first during Kargil and later when India mobilized its forces on the common border for 10 months to wage a "limited war", betraying a "stability-instability paradox".
Fortunately, there is a growing realization in New Delhi and Islamabad of the enormous responsibilities that they bear as nuclear states. Both countries are aware that with nuclear weapons war is no longer a viable option and any future escalation of conflict will not remain confined to the region but would draw in the global powers.
During the forthcoming security talks the two sides could review the state of implementation of the existing nuclear CBMs and consider developing new ones that generate greater trust, facilitate management during escalation and stabilize their relationship. It is expected that high priority will be given to the establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres (NRRC) to reduce chances of a nuclear conflict through an unintentional or accidental launch. These centres were established between the US and former Soviet Union during the Cold War period and they still exist and have served a very useful purpose.
Pakistan and India too can benefit from their experience with appropriate variants and establish effective communication links for notifying the other side of events on its territory that could be misperceived and lead to a conflict. Other functions for the NRRCs could include exchange of notifications, monitoring CBMs and supplementing other crisis control measures. In view of the great importance of reducing chances of an inadvertent nuclear conflict, the creation of NRCCs should not await progress in other areas.
Both countries already have a missile notification programme that is by and large being adhered to. There is, however, a need to refine this CBM for creating greater confidence. For example, they could agree as to how far in advance the notification should be issued. A minimum of seven to 10 days' advance notice is necessary for building trust. Similarly, they could also include additional details about the trajectory and the duration of the tests.
Now that India is developing cruise missiles and Pakistan too may follow suit, its advance notification should become part of an agreement. Despite the fact that the two countries have developed long-range territory, surface-to-surface missiles that practically cover each other's entire territory, pulling back Prithvi and Ghaznavi / Shaheen-1 from forward to rear locations will be a positive nuclear CBM.
Inflammatory statements by politicians and military leaders about nuclear matters, particularly during times of crisis, tend to be highly destabilizing. It becomes difficult to differentiate whether these statements are for domestic consumption or are directed against the other country. This also conveys a highly negative image to the international community and their acceptance of us as nuclear powers becomes more problematic. Repeated mention of Kashmir being a potential nuclear "flash-point" also scares foreign investors away.
Since the overt nuclearization of India and Pakistan the process of doctrinal development has gained pace. India's nuclear doctrine is ambitious in its strategic thrust. Nevertheless, its full evolution is likely to depend on the state of its relationship with China and Pakistan and the nation's overall economic growth and national priorities. There is a justifiable fear that India's development of the triad could intensify Pakistan's feeling of insecurity and invite a Chinese response that generates rivalry in the region, creating difficulties for the peace process.
Additionally, it cannot be ignored that India is currently adding to its stockpile of fissile, material, moving forward its land-based and air-based deployment and gradually working on sea-based deployment. The "no first use" nuclear policy of India does not inspire sufficient confidence in Pakistan because of its concepts of "limited war", "cold start operations" and the overall level of mutual mistrust. Moreover, in the absence of a verifiable mechanism, the authenticity of the "no first use" doctrine would always remain suspect.
Pakistan has not formally enunciated its nuclear doctrine although it has spelled out the salient features of it in the form of non-acceptance of no-first use of nuclear weapons. There has to be an element of transparency in the nuclear doctrine that can help in stabilizing the nuclear relationship between the two countries. Use of common terminology will help in removing misunderstanding about each other's strategic concepts.
Indeed, deterrence rules out ambiguity in many areas of nuclear operational policy. Development of a common strategic language would facilitate stability that could reduce chances of misinterpretation during times of crisis and promote restraint. An understanding of each other's "Red Lines" can have a restraining influence. India's policy is clear that it will respond with massive retaliation in the event of a WMD attack, reminiscent of the US-Soviet model.
Pakistani military leaders have vaguely referred to certain "territorial red lines". A major setback to its conventional armed forces can also be assumed to be a critical threshold. A somewhat clearer definition of these concepts without disclosing the exact nature of response could emerge from a nuclear dialogue.
Pakistan now has an effective command and control system in place. Nevertheless, a more robust involvement of civilian political leadership in the decision-making process would further enhance its credibility. Islamabad has also taken a series of administrative and legislative measures to make the nuclear export control regime more stringent.
India and Pakistan could examine further strengthening their nuclear safety systems. They could jointly conduct exercises in responding to nuclear accidents and share experience on safety issues. Notwithstanding legal limitations, the US may be willing to provide nuclear safety assistance to the two countries.
Another aspect is the question of nuclear testing. The memorandum of understanding signed during the Lahore summit in 1999 that had committed the two governments to "abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions" can be given a legal cover.
India's plan to develop anti-ballistic missile systems is likely to be destabilizing for the region, heighten Pakistan's insecurities and could lead to an arms and missile proliferation race. This issue needs to be seriously addressed by the two countries in due course in the overall context of a strategic restraint regime.
If India increases its conventional forces either qualitatively or quantitatively and alters the existing balance significantly, then Pakistan's reliance on nuclear capability will correspondingly increase thereby lowering the nuclear threshold, however self-destructive this policy may be.
For India and Pakistan it is, therefore, important to move from an adversarial to a cooperative relationship to undertake conventional as well as nuclear restraint measures. A mutual balanced force reduction and pullback of forces from forward points can be achieved without compromising security. Cooperative politico-security structures will, however, be possible only when there has been significant progress on the political front. It is through a combination of political understanding and a process of arms restraint that India and Pakistan may transform their relationship on a sound and stable footing.
The writer is a retired Lt-General of the Pakistan Army.