Architecture for peace

Initial statements made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Congress president Sonia Gandhi are very positive. They indicate that the direction and tone set by the Islamabad declaration during the Saarc summit in January 2004 is likely to be maintained.

This gives reason for hope that if practical steps are taken to strengthen cooperation at all levels between India and Pakistan, they could transform their bipolar rivalry into a mutually cooperative relationship.

The challenge is to anchor the India-Pakistan dialogue in a solid and stable framework that could lead the two countries towards the resolution of issues, particularly Kashmir, in a just and equitable manner.

The forthcoming secretary-level talks should determine the framework of negotiations, the range and prioritization of different items. A multi-track agenda containing positive elements of previous agreements, meetings and summits, particularly those included in the Lahore Declaration and the 1997 MoU agreed between the secretaries of the two countries, could be a good beginning.

It is encouraging that both sides recognize the need for an all-inclusive agenda. However, it may not be possible to make progress on all major issues. From the Pakistani perspective, if there is no discernible progress on Kashmir, and from an Indian viewpoint, if the issue of cross-border infiltration is not resolved, the process could be derailed.

The engagement should be sustained and substantive and avoid media hype. Deliberate efforts should be made to educate public opinion on the imperative for normalization of relations and to prepare it for the reality that a possible solution of Kashmir will require considerable flexibility and understanding.

For sustaining the negotiating process, both countries will have to give due attention to ensuring that the ceasefire holds. They should evolve a regime for border management that minimizes the chances of conflict.

Periodic meetings between the opposing force commanders and close contact between the DGMOs have facilitated in stabilizing the LoC and should continue in the same spirit of understanding.

Serious consideration should be given to pulling back artillery and mortars beyond the firing range of either side to give confidence to the civilians to resume their normal lives.

An agreement on further pullback of deployed forces from existing positions, with a firm undertaking that there will be no forward movement will be another useful confidence-building measure (CBM).

The two sides could determine certain areas as no-deployment zones, and agree on limiting forces in areas that are prone to conflict. Both sides could also agree to employing electronic and aerial surveillance devices in certain selected sectors as part of a cooperative approach to border management.

As Pakistan has made sincere efforts to curb cross-border intrusions, India has to reciprocate by substantially reducing its military and paramilitary forces in Kashmir, which, according to some estimates, is in the range of 600,000.

Reduction of armed forces in Kashmir and an improved human rights situation there should lower the compulsion for violent resistance and allow the peace process to move towards a political solution.

A verification mechanism has to be introduced to ensure the reduction of forces and the prevention of human rights abuses on the Indian side and cross-border movement of insurgents from Pakistan.

One possibility might be to use the UN or neutral observers or joint teams comprising Indian and Pakistani members for this purpose. By granting access to observers from human rights organizations, India will help in easing the tension.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), which gives unlimited powers to the Indian army and the police personnel to summarily arrest, detain indefinitely and interrogate anyone suspected of complicity with, or sympathy for, the Kashmiri freedom fighters has to be reviewed.

Similarly, an understanding for establishing a viable mechanism to monitor cross-border movement of activists should help relieve India's concern on this score. The attrition caused by the Indian security forces as well as the Mujahideen is taking a heavy toll on the people of Kashmir, without clear military or political gains for either side.

Progress on finding a solution would depend on the extent of flexibility that New Delhi and Islamabad are prepared to show, and whether the two sides realize the importance of the collective good of the region and the long-term benefits of a rapprochement.

Several proposals about Kashmir have remained the subject of discussion by various think-tanks and policy experts, but the governments have never formally addressed them at a bilateral level.

Among those that have been widely discussed are a plebiscite under UN auspices, conversion of the LoC into the international border, independence of the whole or part of Kashmir, and division on the basis of religious or geographical lines.

Once the peace process moves forward, the two sides should examine these proposals and look at their feasibility or, alternatively, come up with new ideas aimed at resolving the conflict.

Events have shown that two years after the state elections in Kashmir, the Saeed government has failed to normalize the situation in the state. Violence, including attacks by insurgents on military targets and repression by Indian security forces, continue unabated.

For durable peace to be established, New Delhi will have to involve the APHC and its militant groups in any future dialogue. India's policy of putting pressure on the APHC to factionalize it would prove counter-productive.

Islamabad, too, should not take sides with any of the factional groups of APHC so that internal political dynamics can take their normal course and produce a genuine leadership.

When India and Pakistan support favourites among the Kashmiri groups then political process degenerates into a proxy power game hurting the real interests of the Kashmiris.

Opening the direct Srinagar-Muzzafarabad road link, and subsequently, connecting a few more cities of the two parts of Kashmir, easing visa restrictions and softening the borders will provide a fillip to the peace process. If Kashmiris are allowed to interact, they can also work out what is in their best interest.

Until the recent announcement of a ceasefire, there were no restrictions on military activity in the Siachen area. Troops on both sides suffer heavy casualties mostly because of treacherous weather conditions and accidents.

India and Pakistan had twice come close to finding a solution to the Siachen dispute but had to set this aside for political reasons. This exercise needs to be reactivated.

Similarly, it would be prudent to seriously address the issues of Sir Creek and Wullar Barrage. Sir Creek has given rise to friction between India and Pakistan on matters of territory and limits of economic zones.

Both countries continue to arrest each other's fishermen on charges of "trespassing territorial waters" and subject them to the hardships of long detention.

The delineation of the Sir Creek will have to address the problem of the land border, the boundary within the creek and the maritime boundary between the two countries. The Wullar Barrage construction was unilaterally undertaken by India in the disputed Kashmir area.

Pakistan's objection is that it contravenes the Indus Water Treaty and will reduce the flow of water, adversely impacting on the capacity of dams and the generation of hydropower.

Given sufficient political resolve, the resolution of all these issues should be possible, or else the two sides could agree to international arbitration.

Keeping the hard-liners in both countries under control would be necessary. The development of strong peace constituencies of businessmen, politicians, intellectuals, and other segments of society should neutralize their influence.

An encouraging development is that religious political leaders are showing an interest in Indo-Pakistan reconciliation. The main opposition parties in the two countries need to be kept involved, as their support for developing a national consensus on major issues particularly Kashmir, is essential.

Mr Vajpayee had taken certain bold initiatives on bilateral relations and it is hoped that the BJP will continue to remain supportive of this trend.

While the US presence has increased significantly in South Asia as a consequence of the events of 9/11, its current preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan and the forthcoming presidential elections are likely to prevent it from devoting any serious attention to the region apart from encouraging peace dialogue between the two countries.

Washington also realizes the limits of its leverage as former United States Deputy Under Secretary Strobe Talbott once aptly stated: "No amount of diplomatic exertion on our part - on nonproliferation or any other subject - will have much effect unless and until India and Pakistan liberate themselves from their own enmity."

The writer is a retired Lt-General of the Pakistan Army.

A conspiracy of silence

This is not an editorial. It doesn't offer any solutions, because there don't appear to be any. This is also not an indictment of any person in particular, because nobody accepts responsibility and nobody really knows who is responsible.

Matters have, in fact, reached such a stage in the political evolution of Pakistan's largest city, that the people no longer have a control over their destinies, and all that remains are questions without answers.

As far as this writer can remember there has always been a collective proclivity to destabilize Karachi. And though there has hardly been a month without some kind of tension generated by ethnic or sectarian strife, nothing can compare with the events of the last month.

First, there was that dreadful explosion in Hyderi Mosque, followed by that blast at the KPT. Then the detonation of two cars outside the PACC, after which lucky survivors treaded gingerly on shards of broken glass which crunched under their feet, after avoiding wooden spikes and angle irons which had been wrenched out of twisted doors.

Then there was the senseless killing of a religious cleric, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai. And finally the horrendous blast at the Ali Raza Imambargah. After the explosion on Fatima Jinnash Road, a private news channel reported that it had heard that there had been a third blast that very day in Guru Mandir, which didn't surprise anybody, but which subsequently turned out to be without any foundation.

Whenever a bomber vents his fury on an unseen enemy in Pakistan, a spokesman for the government is usually called upon to make a statement. For some time, this unenviable task has fallen on the shoulders of Sheikh Rashid.

Predictably, he made his usual inane comment about Karachi being a dangerous place, and that the public should not be surprised when a suicide bomber blows himself up, or when a bomb is detonated. Karachi has become that sort of place.

After the Imambargah was shaken to its foundations and the death toll mounted by the hour, the prime minister expressed his profound grief and the president said he was greatly saddened by what was happening in Karachi. Both men, cocooned in mediaeval fortresses, vowed to stamp out extremism, a task in which they have been strenuously engaged for the last two years. Closer to home, the governor and the chief minister promised to take steps to curb the violence, and to stamp out terrorism, something these worthy law-abiding citizens have also been engaged in for the last two years. Meanwhile, the public waits in fear and wonders where and when the next strike will take place.

The day after the blasts on Fatima Jinnah Road, graphically covered by a private local TV channel, this writer was astonished to see on the last page of a number of national newspapers, a huge six-column advertisement which brought back fond memories of the time when Harold Macmillan, the Conservative prime minister of Great Britain, reminded the British public, that they had never had it so good.

Something similar was being attempted in the hastily drafted advertisement in the Pakistan national press, which showed in glorious colour a somewhat grim looking prime minister, and a less cynical president, beaming at the reader.

Now that the economy is fully rehabilitated, the terse message stated, the next milestone that the duo was determined to cross, is the achievement of the greatest good of the greatest number.

A gullible public was then informed that this year Pakistan's economy had registered an impressive growth of over six per cent. A lot of glowing statistics followed, each as impressive as the next.

The nation learned that Pakistan now had in reserve over twelve and a half billion dollars, and that exports to the United States alone had crossed the 11 billion dollar mark Large scale manufacturing had grown by 15 per cent and the private sector was reaping the benefits of a huge credit. The taxation boys were also given a pat on the back as revenue collections had increased by 13 per cent.

There were other positive statistics like the one about the development budget being increased by nearly 80 per cent and the account balance remaining in surplus for three years. These are impressive figures indeed, and the president and his team must be congratulated for the efforts that have been made in the field of economics.

But as this writer waded through the balance of the statistics, he couldn't but help get the impression that something terribly important and vital was missing, and he searched in vain to catch a glimpse of a mention, even a small one, of efforts to combat some of the social evils that are plaguing our society and giving the country a bad name abroad.

Like, how to control the dour misanthrope whose identity and motive is unknown, who is killing and maiming Muslims and is bent on destroying the fabric of society.

There has been too much projection of economic achievements, and not enough emphasis on how to come to grips with antiquated, outmoded customs and ordinances which militate against the freedom and rights of the underprivileged. The narrative tone of the government is always skewered towards the former, and though this device is momentarily arresting, it is beginning to wear thin. The constant repetition of such garrulous accounts are becoming increasingly tiresome.

What is the point of the country having twelve and a half billion dollars, when the citizens of Karachi are becoming increasingly afraid to pray in the house of God? What is the point of having such substantial reserves when the denizens of Pakistan's commercial capital wonder with a mixture of fear and excitement where and when the next disaster will strike?

The paragraph that caught my eye, which would have warmed the heart of the Adam Smith, was the last one. "The government aims to achieve the greatest good of the greatest number in the shortest possible time...to build a happier, stronger and peaceful Pakistan."

A peaceful Pakistan? The fellow who wrote that advertisement should show it to the widows and children of the worshippers who died in the mosques, and the maimed scattered in the corridors of the overcrowded hospitals. Each time there is an assassination of an important person or a group temporarily bivouacked in an act of worship, feelings of intense rancour are unleashed, and the machinery of collective destruction is set in motion.

Maqbool H.H. Rahimtoola's Ode to Karachi, which was sent to me as an email, bears reproducing. It provides an interesting footnote to a city whose inhabitants have been numbed by years of unrepresentative government and pointless infighting by selfish incompetent, corrupt administrators. It is an ode to a people who have lost the will to protest.

"The morning mist settles to the sound of wailing. The young and the old, all there in white, lifted toward their burials. A war? A plague? No, just Karachi.

"To the sound of bullets, the smell of death slowly walks this city. But who cares? No one. More deaths, more suffering, the hospital beds are full. A war? A plague? No, just Karachi.

"Fear in their eyes, dryness in their mouths, children tread these roads, people leave for work. Who will return alive?

"Random bullets fill our roads. A war? A plague? No, just Karachi. The gunmen move about with the message of death, yet remain untouched, unnoticed and invisible to the agencies. Blind to the causes, the city buckles confused and uncared for. Will it ever stop? Who cares? It's just Karachi."

Challenges for the Congress

As widely predicted, the Indian elections have produced a hung parliament with no party commanding a simple majority in the 545-member Lok Sabha - the lower house of parliament.

Whenever there is a hung parliament, the logical outcome is a coalition government, which is inherently weak and unstable. Coalitions make for strange bedfellows with divergent and often incompatible views. Not surprisingly, such marriages of convenience are on the rocks from the very outset and generally fall apart.

As for India, from 1989 to 2004, the country has had six general elections and on each occasion the electorate has given a split mandate. It was only on two occasions that the government could complete its tenure: the Congress government headed by Narasimha Rao (1991-96) and the last Bharatiya Janta Party-led coalition captained by Atal Behari Vajpayee (1999-2004).

All other coalitions collapsed prompting three parliamentary elections in three years. On one occasion, the coalition lasted less for than two weeks - this was during Mr Vajpayee's first stint as prime minister.

This appears unusual compared to the nation's earlier political history. However, it also brings out the strength of Indian democracy. Notwithstanding political upheavals, the country has continued to move along the democratic path, amply demonstrating that such events are no cause for upsetting the apple cart of democracy.

Contrary to predictions, however, it is the Congress not the BJP that has emerged as the largest single party and has formed the government. The Congress has won 145 seats defeating the ruling BJP, which secured 138 seats, by a thin margin.

If we add the seats won by the allies of both parties to their tallies, the parliamentary strength of the Congress and the BJP is 215 and 182 respectively. This again is a small gap in a large chamber.

The fact that Mr Vajpayee did not resort to unfair practices to continue in office, and chose instead to step down gracefully also testifies to the strength of Indian democracy.

The Congress last formed a government in 1991, but subsequently saw its fortunes fall. From 243 seats in 1991, the party's strength in the Lok Sabha plunged to 139 in 1996 polls.

In 1998, the Congress won 142 seats, and in the 1999 elections, the party touched the low mark of 114 seats. That was in marked contrast to the party's performance in the first four decades of independence when its electoral victory used to be a foregone conclusion. Although the Congress is back in the saddle, it has a long way to go before it can regain its lost glory.

The fall in the popularity of the Congress was matched by the rise in the popularity of the BJP. The party which won only two seats in 1984 had its parliamentary strength increased to 120 seats in 1991, 161 in 1996, 180 in 1998 and 182 seats in 1999.

The recent elections, however, have seen a reversal in the fortunes of both the parties. The BJP has lost 44 seats, while the Congress has gained another 31. The BJP suffered major reversals in Bihar, where the number of seats it won fell to five from 23 in 1999, and Uttar Pradesh, where its strength has fallen from 29 to 10. The Congress secured major victories in Andhra Pradesh - increasing its seats from five to 29 - and Tamil Nadu where it won 10 seats against two in 1999.

The two arch rivals stand for different philosophies. Whereas the BJP is an exponent of Hindutva or Hindu fundamentalism, the Congress advocates secularism and pluralism. Hindutva aims at establishing a monolithic society in a country characterized by tremendous ethnic diversity.

The followers of Hindutva also seek to build a temple at Ayodhya where the Babri Mosque was demolished. The massacre of Muslims in Gujarat was also inspired by Hindutva ideals.

Because the Congress and the BJP stand for secularism and Hindutva respectively, can the Congress victory be termed a triumph of secularism over Hindutva? No doubt, the Congress victory will strengthen secularism although it was economics more than religion or culture which tipped the scales in favour of the party.

One of the reasons why analysts predicted a BJP victory was because of the so-called impressive performance of the Indian economy, euphemistically summed up in the phrase "India shining". No doubt, under the BJP, the economy was able to register a very healthy growth rate, but beneath that lurked some harsh realities.

Every student of economics knows that economic growth does not necessarily translate itself into a decent standard of living for the ordinary man. Creation of wealth is one thing and its equitable distribution another.

One of the flaws in the free market economy is its inability to ensure a fair distribution of resources. Since allocation is done by the price mechanism, resources tend to be concentrated in the more affluent segment of society.

It is for the government to correct such ills of the market economy by a fair reallocation of resources, something which the ousted BJP government failed to do. A large section of the Indian population does not have access to such basic amenities as clean water, health and electricity.

Both the infant and under-five mortality rate among Indians continue to be high. Per capita income is only $470. Nearly one-third of the people live below the poverty line, while more than 45 per cent of the population is illiterate. Add to this, a prolonged drought adversely affecting the rural population, which makes up two-thirds of the electorate.

The BJP's image was also tarnished by religious riots in the party-controlled state of Gujrat in which, according to independent sources, more than 2,000 Muslims perished.

Though the BJP has won 14 out of 26 state seats for the Lok Sabha, the figure is six short of 1999 figure of 20. The Congress, on the other hand, has doubled its tally in the state from six seats in 1999 to 12.

Though in its early life the Congress was wedded to socialism, like most other centre-left parties it has recanted the doctrine and come to subscribe to the market philosophy.

In fact, the liberalization of the economy, which received a lot of momentum from the BJP government, was initiated by a Congress government (1991-96), whose finance minister was the new Indian prime minister.

There is thus little, if any, doubt that the new Congress government will not backpedal on the market-oriented policies of its predecessor. Besides, high stakes of multinational enterprises and mega Indian businesses in economic liberalization will also ensure that the party sticks to capitalism.

However, the biggest challenge for the party government will be to even out the fruits of economic liberalization, a proposition which has stumped many other governments in the world.

The Congress's inability to do so is likely to bring it into confrontation with its communist allies, whose strength in the new Lok Sabha is as high as 60, as well as earn the wrath of the voters, who, as the present elections show, are more intelligent than they are generally rated to be.

Troops for Iraq: why and why not

On June 1, the US and Britain filed a revised draft in the Security Council seeking a fresh UN resolution on Iraq. This move followed the creation of an interim government in Baghdad. The whole process enjoys UN cover, albeit of an increasingly controversial nature.

The revised document under consideration incorporates certain compromises offered by the US to buy French support. Though the debate, in all likelihood, will stretch for many days and will in all probability result in some further concessions by the Americans, it is expected that, sooner than later, the US will be able to win the support of the Security Council for this resolution.

Pakistan will then be confronted with a very interesting and important question: Will its troops be landing in Iraq as peacekeepers, and ostensibly under US command that, according to the draft resolution, will constitute a "distinct entity" within the so-called "multinational force"?

It is an open secret that Islamabad, for the past year or so, has been trying to find ways and means of sending its soldiers to Iraq. In fact, last year for a short while, both India and Pakistan were in competition to oblige Washington on this count before India backed down under domestic opposition and Pakistan had to shelve its ambitions when the UN suddenly withdrew from Iraq after the bombing of its headquarters in Baghdad.

But the issue kept on simmering. It was in the air even before US ambassador Nancy Powell spoke of it during a meeting with Foreign Office officials in April. Later, in the second week of May, the visiting US assistant secretary of state for South Asia, Christina Rocca, apparently discussed it with top officials including the president and the prime minister.

To some observers, Pakistan's status as a major non-Nato ally should also be interpreted as a sequence of this process.

Last year, Pakistan was repeating the mantra of "troops only under the UN mandate". However, in the last few weeks, the Foreign Office has made certain cosmetic improvements in its wish list.

It now says that four conditions must be met before troops can be sent: one, the Security Council must give its mandate; second, it would be only to protect the UN mission in Iraq; third, only if they are welcomed by the Iraqis, and fourth, if the decision is acceptable to Pakistani people.

Now, given the mood in Security Council, it is obvious that the first three conditions will soon be met - though the welcome by the Iraqis leaves much to fertile imagination - but what about the acceptance by the Pakistani people? How and by what magic trick will Islamabad obtain that remains to be seen.

Will this issue be discussed in parliament where arms can be conveniently twisted or will it be by presidential decree? Irrespective of the modalities, given the public sentiments and perceptions in Pakistan, the issue will be widely controversial and deeply divisive.

Yet, in the logic of "real politick" sending troops to Iraq can be effectively defended. There is no shortage of such decisions in history when governments take extremely unpopular steps in the perceived larger national interest. The 19th century British prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli, used to support the "infidel Ottomans" against "Czarist Russia" to maintain the balance of power in Europe at a time when his population hated the Turks because of their atrocities against the Christians in the Balkans and Greece.

In more recent days, Tony Blair and the British establishment were convinced that, irrespective of the logic of this war, sticking close to the Americans was the only way to guarantee Britain a role in the world beyond its actual size.

Former Spanish prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar, was motivated by the desire to enhance the Spanish self-image - battered, bruised and troubled since the days of the Spanish American wars. This list can go on but let us examine what compels Islamabad, or more precisely, the Musharraf government.

Three closely interrelated factors are important in assessing the Pakistani dilemma: one, what are the real objectives of the Musharraf government; two, how will it sell its decision, if at all, to the Pakistani public across the political divide, given the shared deep-seated fear and suspicion of US intentions in Pakistan, in the region and in the Islamic world; three, what is the emerging American vision of Iraq and are there any compromises in the offing to buy greater French and Russian support in the Security Council?

Unlike the Disraeli, Blair and Aznar governments, there is no credible, democratic dispensation under Musharraf that can forge and sustain a consensus in the face of opposition, or like Spain provide for respectable safety valves if the going gets tough. This makes the question of Islamabad's objectives all the more important.

Pakistan has benefited, since 9/11, not only from the political and financial mileage provided by Washington, but also from the direct and indirect support in international forums such as the UN, WTO and the Commonwealth.

Additionally, the State Department under Collin Powell, Richard Armitage and Christina Rocca has struggled hard to instill confidence in Delhi and Islamabad that this time round its engagement in South Asia will not be allowed to turn into a zero-sum game.

But Washington's support has also allowed General Musharraf to buy political legitimacy for democratic facades at home.

If Pakistan now takes the decision to send troops to Iraq the question is: can the move be sold to the Pakistani public as part of a larger coherent vision in which the state is seen as a mature responsible partner that is helping bring stability to the region and the Islamic world? Or will it be viewed as an act motivated by the regime's self-interests in order to earn US goodwilland legitimacy, an act that may help in dodging commitments to shedding the military uniform in December?

The leadership in every country has to conceive and contrive messages to galvanize public opinion. These messages must connect with the overall consciousness of the people, their sense of identity, history, fundamental values and the hopes and fears that inspire them.

This is precisely why Messrs Bush and Blair had to invent the lollipop of "WMD" and "liberating the Iraqi people" and that is precisely why President Bush keeps on talking in terms of faith, trust, terror, darkness, etc. to appeal to the most basic and fundamental instincts of the American people. But what message can the Musharraf government send out to the Pakistani people?

From time immemorial, powerful men have showered their mistresses with gold and silver but have seldom felt comfortable in sealing their relationship through marriage. Many Pakistanis have used this image to draw parallels with US-Pakistan relations.

This is why symbolic American acts like making Pakistan a "major non-Nato ally" have become important in assuring a troubled Pakistani psyche. And this is why the decision regarding Pakistani troops needs careful consideration by both Islamabad and the State Department.

If the Pakistani public sees itself as humiliated in the process, and if this results in the president's not honouring his commitment to take off his uniform; and if this results in retarding the process of democratic transition in Pakistan, then far from cementing US-Pakistan relations, such a move will ruin the progress achieved since 9/11.

Let us turn to the most important aspect of this discussion. As one reflects on the lessons of the past one year, it becomes clear that unless the US administration shows a sincerity of purpose, sense of direction and clarity of mind, no number of foreign troops will be able to deliver stability to Iraq.

But is there a new evolved and coherent US view on Iraq? Or is the interim arrangement a mere tactic to shift painful media attention away from the US role in the run-up to the presidential elections?

The proposed UN resolution stipulates that the interim administration will hold elections not later than January 31, 2005. The resulting constituent assembly will then work on a constitution.

The revised draft of June 1, in order to entice the French, now offers a vague timetable for withdrawal of the US troops, timing this with the writing of the Iraqi constitution. More concessions may follow.

But whereas the British and US administrations repeatedly refer to the interim Iraqi arrangement as "sovereign", all evidence points to an impotent entity created to take responsibility and blame without having any real authority.

Many ministers in this interim government, including Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and President Ghazi Yawar, are from the handpicked Iraqi Governing Council, an entity that enjoys little credibility with the Iraqis or neighboring Arabs.

Interestingly, Mr Allawi, who enjoys the public reputation of a CIA-funded politico, was neither selected by UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi nor by the members of the Governing Council but was simply nominated by the Americans. The embarrassment which the UN suffered through the whole drama is a story in itself.

American pressure tactics focusing on the selection of a president failed but only after raising the troubling question of what lies ahead. If the US finds it difficult to control an entity totally of its own creation, then what about the elections? How will the US deal with the constituent assembly? And how will it interact with an assertive Iraqi leadership?

It is understandable that in the coming days the Foreign Office will be monitoring developments in the UN very closely to see what further compromises the US is prepared to offer. But, given the importance of this debate to Pakistan, it is expected that legislators, media commentators and other opinion-makers will also stay tuned.