The travails of Iran
Iran's first vice-president, Dr Mohammad Reza Aref, is currently on a short visit to Pakistan, which is its important neighbour. Iran is of course interested in ensuring that relations with Pakistan remain good.
There have been irritants recently such as Iran's disclosures to the IAEA about the proliferation underworld without informing Pakistan or Iran's concern about the sectarian violence in Pakistan even though it recognizes perhaps more so in the past that this is Pakistan's internal affair.
It is to be hoped that the visit will help clear the air on these issues and even perhaps allow discussions on economic cooperation to proceed beyond the signing of agreements.
The recent thaw in Indo-Pakistan relations should theoretically permit some advance in the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project but the principal obstacle - finding financing for the project - will remain there so long as Iran's relations with the West remain problematic.
Iran's principal preoccupation, therefore is with the issues that impinge on its relations with the international community's influential western members, the image that it can project in these countries, and on the nature of the economic relations it can hope to develop with them.
The first issue and the one of more immediate concerns is Iran's nuclear programme. Iran's signature of the additional protocol with the IAEA which gives UN inspectors the right to inspect all of Iran's nuclear facilities and to seek a full disclosure of all its nuclear activities and the announcement that it was suspending nuclear fuel production had been hailed as a great step forward.
It was the expectation thereafter that this matter would drop from the headlines and that the EU which had brokered this deal would move towards concluding the economic agreements that Iran was seeking.
Unfortunately it seems that this is not the case. The first report that the IAEA inspectors have prepared and which is to be considered at the meeting of the IAEA board on the 8th has been leaked to the press making certain allegations that cast doubt on both the completeness of Iran's disclosures and the veracity of some of Iran's statements.
Apparently the report states that Iran had concealed plans and experimental work to make sophisticated centrifuges, including a model called the P-2, a second-generation Pakistani design that has also been found in Libya.
The Agency report states that the Iranian explanation for this programme when it was discovered by the inspectors "was difficult to comprehend". "The omission", says the IAEA report, "is a serious concern, particularly in view of the importance and sensitivity of those activities."
It also suggests that Iran's claim that it had not itself produced enriched uranium and that the traces of enriched uranium the UN inspectors had found were from the contaminated centrifuge parts Iran had imported were false since 36 per cent enriched uranium had been found only in negligible quantities on the imported parts but appeared to be present in much larger quantities at a site which housed the indigenously constructed prototype.
The Iranians also failed to account for a discrepancy between the amount of plutonium they showed the inspectors and the amount the inspectors calculated the Iranian equipment should have produced.
The report also maintains that the Iranians have been experimenting with the production of polonium 210, a radioactive isotope which can trigger a nuclear warhead. The isotope's civilian uses are limited and Tehran is unable to provide records or other evidence to support its explanation that it was meant for such civilian uses.
The report nonetheless stops short of asserting that Iran, contrary to its protestations, had a nuclear weapons programme. This restraint can be attributed to both technical and political factors.
On the technical plane it could be argued that uranium enriched to 36 percent falls far short of the 90 per cent enrichment needed for a nuclear device, that the discrepancy between the amount of plutonium declared and the amount that could have been produced was again not enough to make a nuclear device, that while polonium 210 could be used to trigger a nuclear device it had a short half life and could not be stored for future use, and so on.
The political factor is that if the Agency determined that Iran had embarked on a nuclear weapons programme the matter would have had to be referred to the UN Security Council and the imposition of sanctions on Iran would have been mandatory unless it agreed to the same sort of dismantling of its programme as had been negotiated with the Libyans by the British and Americans.
The Iranians have, in the meanwhile, taken the precautionary step of promising to freeze the manufacture, assembly, and testing of uranium centrifuges, and to store any other components in the programme under the control of the IAEA's inspectors.
Whether this will be sufficient to ease the pressure the Americans are bringing to bear on this issue is unclear. The CIA director, George Tenet, in a testimony before the Senate maintained that even after signing the additional protocol and agreeing to cooperate with the IAEA the Iranian regime was "trying to preserve its WMD options".
On the other hand, the IAEA has made it clear that Iran has cooperated fully with the inspectors and has not hindered any independent investigation that they wished to carry out.
The Europeans and the rest of the international community will suggest that as long as the inspectors are allowed to do their work, no further action against Iran should be contemplated. They will not however move towards the economic cooperation Iran desires until they have fuller satisfaction on the nuclear issue.
The second problem is the recently concluded elections to the 7th Iranian Majlis. The rejection by the council of guardians of more than 2000 reformist candidates including some 80 odd members of the sixth Majlis, the banning of reformist newspapers and the alleged rigging, ensured the victory of the conservatives.
Western sources suggest that the call for the boycott of the elections led to less than 50 per cent of the votes being cast as against the more than 67 per cent who had voted for the sixth Majlis.
Iranian conservatives, however, maintain that more than 60 per cent voted and the drop in voter turnout was insignificant. Some observers, among them Iranian reformers, concede that the failure of the reformists to push their agenda when they had a majority had disillusioned the voters and that even without the draconian measures adopted by the council of guardians there would have been voter apathy and a drastic drop in the support for the reformers even among those who did vote.
The election results are not being legally challenged. Though final results have yet to be announced it is clear the conservatives will win more than the 146 seats they need in the 290-member Majlis for a majority. They will be in a position to ensure that President Khatami follows a conservative dictated agenda for the rest of his term.
What is not certain is what this agenda will be. The reformists in Iran on the eve of the elections took the unprecedented steps of organizing protest sit-ins at the Majlis and of addressing open letters to the leader questioning his absolute authority and the absolute power enjoyed by the clergy. After the elections the reformists maintained that the conservatives had gained the maximum of power but at the cost of maximizing their distance from the people.
Some stated that while this election represented the end of the Khatamist reforms it did not represent the end of the reformist struggle and suggested that even with their reduced numbers in the Majlis they would continue to work for reform. The fact however is that the reformists now have little hope of overcoming public apathy and rallying the sort of public support that could shake the regime.
This will depend on the performance of the conservatives in the anticipated internal struggle. One wing of the conservatives would want to allow the personal liberties allowed to the general populace to continue and even be cautiously extended.
Externally they would want Iran's foreign policy to be guided by pragmatism and to permit such pragmatism to include reaching out to the United States and being sensitive to American concerns in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East. They may seek the support of the reformist bloc for this purpose.
On the other hand, there are those who will want to reverse the limited liberalization the reformists had been able to bring about and to pursue a more ideologically pure foreign policy.
The American expectation seems to be that the latter will prevail. George Tenet said in the testimony referred to earlier that "The strengthening of authoritarian rule will make breaking out of the old foreign policy patterns more difficult," and that "Because Khamenei and his allies have kept a close rein on foreign policy, we do not expect the defeat of the reformists to lead to a sudden change in Iranian policy." Internally the CIA chief expected Ayatollah Khamenei to take further action against channels of dissent and heavy handed repressive action that "produces public outrage and protest".
While it is risky to hazard a guess on what lies ahead in Iran, there are some indications that pragmatism in foreign policy will prevail. The negotiations for the signing of the IAEA's additional protocol were conducted by Mr. Rouhani, identified as Ayatollah's man.
Former president Rafsanjani, the current head of the council of guardians which disqualified the reformist candidates has been quoted as saying that he favoured opening negotiations with the US but kept silent since Ayatollah Khamenei had opposed such a step.
Internally it is likely that there will be some concession to those advocating a return to a sterner regimen. The regime will avoid taking drastic steps for fear of creating a backlash among the two million strong student community.
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
A Faiz anniversary
The birth anniversary of the country's most popular poet, Faiz Ahmad Faiz, is celebrated by different organizations every year in February but I feel that the Pakistan Academy of Letters (PAL) happens to be the most regular in this respect. The function arranged by it in its local office this time was presided over by Hameed Akhtar, a close friend of the poet.
Everyone would agree that Faiz was an epoch-making poet. Living through the stormiest period of the world history, as also that of his own country, he maintained an unprecedented integrity both in his person and his poetry.
His poetry reflects many moods with references to society around him besides personal experiences. He is multi-dimensional - he talks of the oppressed as also of ecstasy and love.
As he said himself, his verse was hikayat-i-dil (stories of the heart) with an abundance of gham-i-jahan (concern for the world around him). In short, everyone would agree with the person who said that Faiz "is the most sublime of lyricists and purest of revolutionaries.....
In an age of rampant corruption, the destruction of democratic values, the reign of the mediocre and the sycophant, and the dominance of rank opportunism, Faiz stood out as the beacon light of truth, beckoning the disillusioned and the downhearted to new goals and fresh ideas".
His popularity was not confined to his own country. One of his poetry reading sessions in Calcutta (Kolkata) was attended by 15,000 people.
Several speakers propounded their views about Faiz at the function arranged by PAL. Prof Jawaz Jafri referred to the Lenin Peace Price awarded to Faiz and said that he was the first Asian considered worthy of the honour. Dr Arif Saqib confined himself to the poetic prowess of Faiz and said that his verses went to provide to modern Urdu poetry.
Azhar Ghauri was happy that Faiz was no longer considered a controversial poet and was being accepted as one of the greats by people of different views. Rashid Misbah was somehow sceptical at the thought that efforts were currently being made to present Faiz as a poet of the puritans and hence called for more critical appreciation of his works.
In his presidential remarks Hameed Akhtar made particular mention of the musical refrain in the poetry of Faiz and said that was the reason for the popularity he enjoyed throughout his life time and even today when he has been dead for 20 years.
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The Pakistan government's literary monthly, Mah-i-Nau, is being published almost regularly. It is besides the point that the issue for January is distributed at the end of February.
I feel that the publication lacks as quality control. One issue appears fairly commendable while the other leaves much to be desired. Without making a detailed analysis of the present issue, I may mention a few things.
First, an article by Dr Salim Akhtar bears the heading, Dr Tahir Taunsvi Behesiat Savaneh-nigar, but while going through it one finds that it is all about one person called Arsh Siddiqi. Moreover, it is an extremely sketchy piece.
Second, an article by Dr Muzammil Bhatti says something which I cannot digest. The writer asserts that Ahmed Faraz is the top most poet living today. I really cannot understand how people tend to lose balance in praise.
Some other sentences in the article are equally ridiculous. Finally I cannot understand the need for a so-called pen portrait of Abdul Aziz Khalid. Could Mr Muheet Ismail, the writer, please tell me what he has said happens to be in praise of Khalid Sahib or in his condemnation.
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The prolific writer and author of over half a dozen books, Husain Shahid, who has adopted Holland for a home, was recently in Lahore and honoured me with a visit.
Basically a writer of Punjabi, he is credited with being the first to write literary criticism in the language. It was published in 1972 under the title, Purney. In addition, he has two collections of Punjabi verse and a novel, Drakel.
Husain Shahid has spent long years abroad, working for private firms in Iran and Germany. Finding a permanent job in Holland, he ended up there where he continues to live to enjoy a handsome pension. However, he makes sure to visit his country almost every two years.
During his trip in 1997, he got a collection of his short stories published from Lahore. Titled, Doosri Khirki, it was an Urdu translation of his Punjabi stories published earlier under title, La Preet. His travelogue in Urdu, Girtey Pattey, has already been published while he has given finishing touches to his second during the current visit.
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Lack of space prevented me from writing earlier about the passing away of Saleem Shahid. A good friend of mine, I cannot forget the few happy days we spent together during one of the writers' conferences at Islamabad. We were allotted rooms on the same floor of a hotel while Yunus Adeeb was also in the same row. What followed can only be imagined. The last I met him was at the recent funeral of Intezar Husain's wife.
Saleem Shahid was known for his radical views and anti-establishment stance. He even suffered imprisonment on that account. But then he was a good poet with three collections to his credit, besides a novel. He did not lag behind in his love for the Punjabi language either. I attended the launching of his Sohni Mahiwal in Punjabi verse.
EU working on 'Wider Europe'
BRUSSELS: Immigration fears may have soured the European Union's pre-expansion mood but, whether old Europeans like it or not, the once exclusive club of 15 rich western nations will be opening its doors to Malta and Cyprus as well as eight poorer, former communist, eastern European nations on May 1.
The EU enlargement will be making world headlines for many months to come. But the historic big bang expansion into a 25-member club of diverse nations is only part of the story.
Policymakers in Brussels are involved in thrashing out an even more ambitious - albeit less well-known blueprint - for creating a "Wider Europe" that will have the new, expanded EU at its core, but also cover the bloc's many neighbours in both the east and the south.
The plan - also known as the EU's new neighbourhood policy - will encompass Russia and Ukraine, but also possibly Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as most of North Africa and the Middle East.
The initiative has yet to capture the attention of Asian and other governments. But the creation of a "Wider Europe" of independent states, linked by a complex network of free trade agreements and mutually-agreed plans for political and economic integration, looks set to become the next big instalment in the EU's drive to become a more powerful global actor.
Building a "Wider Europe" of inter-connected states will help the EU achieve its post-Iraq war dream of developing into a counterweight to the US. But many in Europe also say the plan is needed to counter Asia's growing economic power and the rising number of free trade pacts and economic integration taking place among countries in the region.
European Commission President Romano Prodi, a key architect of the scheme, says membership of "Wider Europe" will be available to all EU neighbours who, despite their proximity to the Union, do not meet the bloc's political and economic criteria for entry.
Instead of EU membership therefore, nations such as Russia, Ukraine and North African states are being told that they can progressively secure some benefits of EU membership _ such as the full freedom of movement for people, services, goods and capital - without joining the bloc's institutions.
Entry into the arrangement, however, will only be available to countries that adopt EU rules, regulations and values. Nations that agree to do so will be given increased EU aid, technical help and expertise, to upgrade their economic structures and improve political governance.
In fact, say officials, the EU will apply the same mixture of carrot and stick that it used to prod and encourage reform in the former communist nations that will now be joining the Union.
Some diplomats in Brussels admit that it is a question of survival _ and prosperity. A relatively resource-poor EU clearly needs access to Russia's many raw materials as well as the country's oil and gas. Also, given its aging work force, EU industry must either move to the low-cost but labour-rich countries of North Africa and the Middle East - or bring the region's young workers to Europe.
Turning the plan into reality is not proving easy, however. The bloc's relations with Russia remain strained, with Moscow sulking over EU enlargement and complaining that the bloc is slowing Russia's membership of the World Trade Organization by demanding too many trade concessions.
Also, creating a vast Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone connecting the EU to the Middle East remains problematic. A recent European Commission report warned that most Middle East nations were lagging far behind in efforts at economic reform and warned that governments in the region continued to stifle private sector initiatives.
Mr Prodi and other EU officials stress, however, that "Wider Europe" was never meant to be created overnight. The process will be long and difficult. But as the EU expands over the next years to include Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey _ followed by the nations of the Balkans _ a new Europe of perhaps 33 countries will eventually take its place on the international stage. And behind this new EU, will be an even "Wider Europe" of interdependent countries stretching into the Caucuses and the Middle East.




























