PAKISTAN’s relations with Iran were cordial until the advent of the Islamic Republic in 1979. They went downhill during the next twenty years. Efforts are now being made to revive their earlier closeness. I propose to take a quick look at the stages through which these relations have passed, and then see which way, and how far, they may reasonably be expected to go.

In 1955 Iran and Pakistan, along with Iraq and Turkey, entered an American-sponsored anti-communist alliance called the Baghdad Pact, renamed as the Central Treaty Organization (Cento) after Iraq’s withdrawal from it in 1958. Cento was disbanded after Pakistan’s dismemberment in 1971. Iran and Pakistan were also linked in organizations established to promote economic cooperation between members (RCD and later Eco).

When Pakistan and India went to war in 1971, Iran offered Pakistan access to its air bases in case Pakistan wanted to place its combat aircraft beyond the reach of India’s striking capability. Following the secession of East Pakistan, the Shah began to speak and act as if the remaining Pakistan had become his special responsibility to protect. He declared that he would send his forces to assist Pakistan in case it was invaded again.

Iranian helicopters helped the Pakistan army in combating the Baloch insurrection that erupted after Prime Minister Bhutto’s ill-conceived dismissal of Ataullah Mengal’s government in that province in the spring of 1973. Iran gave Pakistan a loan of $580 million in 1974, and another loan of $150 million, at a modest interest rate of 2.5 per cent, to relieve its balance of payments deficits. It also agreed to fund some development projects in Balochistan.

Relations between Iran and Pakistan began to slide after the Shah’s ouster. Riding the high horse of ideological zeal, Ayatollah Khomeini called upon the Muslims in Pakistan and elsewhere to overthrow their corrupt governments. Needless to say, this call annoyed Ziaul Haq, for it implied that his claims to Islamic virtue were fake.

In September 1979 Iraq launched an unprovoked invasion of Iran. The ensuing war lasted more than eight years and wrought enormous destruction on both countries. Pakistan, like other members of the OIC, urged the parties to stop fighting. But not once during this long war did Ziaul Haq’s government (or, for that matter, any Muslim government other than those of Syria and Libya) even condemn the undisguised Iraqi aggression, not to speak of sending aid to the victim.

Iranian-Pakistani relations began to take a turn for the worse following the Soviet withdrawal and the onset of a war between rival factions in Afghanistan. Policy makers in Islamabad believed that their need for “depth” in defence would be best served if the Pushto-speaking Afghans (Pukhtoons), kin of Pakistan’s own Pukhtoons in NWFP, dominated the new government in Kabul. Those in Tehran favoured the Farsi-speaking and/or Shia tribes in western and northern Afghanistan. Iran recognized an Afghan government headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani but Pakistan did not accept it as legitimate.

Taliban, raised and trained in seminaries run by Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan, emerged as an effective fighting force in 1995, expelled Rabbani’s government from Kabul, and by 1998 they had taken all of Afghanistan except the Panjshir valley. These developments took place with Pakistan’s approval and assistance. But they disconcerted the Iranian government.

Taliban represented a version of Sunni Islam that is extremist, exclusivist, and militant. They killed more than 8,000 Shia Uzbeks (and some Iranian diplomats) in Mazar-i-Sharif, and their cohorts have been killing Shias in Pakistan. No wonder then that the Iranians were dismayed by the support Pakistan gave them. They have also been aggravated by the Pakistan government’s failure to apprehend and prosecute the killers of Iranian officials and citizens on its soil.

All of this changed overnight following the events of 9/11. Once regarded as freedom fighters, Taliban came to be seen as terrorists. Under pressure Gen Musharraf’s government agreed to support the American drive to eradicate them in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Their government in Kabul has been disbanded, they have been chased out, and such of them as remain are being hunted down in their hiding places in Afghanistan and Pakistan — all with the help of Pakistan.

This change in Pakistan’s posture has removed a major irritant in its relations with Iran. Music of brotherhood can once again be heard at higher volumes in Islamabad and Tehran. During his visit to Pakistan in December 2002, the Iranian president, Sayed Mohammad Khatami, declared that our two countries had the same “soul” and they were parts of the same body. Let us see if any substantive improvement in relations between the two countries is accompanying their rhetoric of solidarity.

Harmless, and inconsequential, declarations of intent to cooperate in unifying the Muslim Ummah, returning sovereignty and governance in Iraq to its own people, and the political and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan can be set aside. Neither one of our two countries has the capability of making a significant contribution to the accomplishment of these objectives.

During President Khatami’s visit to Islamabad and during Prime Minister Jamali’s visit to Tehran last October, numerous agreements and understandings were reached, providing for expansion and diversification of trade between the two countries and cooperation in the fields of education, science and technology, gas and oil, agriculture, and plant quarantine It is hard to say how these agreements will fare; similar accords made previously have not been fully implemented.

The scope of exchanges between Iran and Pakistan is inherently limited. They are not capable of producing machines or even high quality durable goods (e.g., automobiles, refrigerators, etc.). Pakistan can sell relatively small quantities of wheat, rice, citrus fruit, mangoes, carpets, fabrics, and light weapons. Iran exports oil, petroleum products, and carpets for the most part.

Pakistan does not need Iranian carpets, it buys oil and petroleum products from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait at discounted prices, and it will probably want to stay with these suppliers. It follows that the volume of commercial transactions between Iran and Pakistan is likely to remain modest, and no amount of exhortation will change that basic reality.

Some additional avenues of cooperation are, however, being broached. Two new exit and entry points may be established at the border towns of Panjgur and Sarawan in Balochistan for the movement of persons and goods between the two countries. Iran is offering to supply electricity to two Pakistani border towns in Balochistan. This would be a less expensive alternative to supplying these towns from Pakistan’s own grids.

Then there is the huge project of laying a pipeline to carry Iranian natural gas, running through Pakistan, to India. Iran has a lot of gas to sell and India wants it because it would cost a lot less than liquefied gas. The pipeline from the Iranian deposits to the Indo-Pakistan border is estimated to cost between three and four billion dollars. Estimates of the transit fee that will accrue to Pakistan range between four hundred and six hundred million US dollars.

Pakistan, on its part, will also be able to buy gas from the same source at a price lower than the going rate. Already the demand for natural gas in the country exceeds the supply from its own reserves. According to one estimate, the deficit will reach about 500 million cfpd (cubic feet per day) by 2010 and it will be twice as much by 2020.

The gas pipeline project was first broached some fifteen years ago. It has been discussed by officials from Iran and India, and by those from Iran and Pakistan, several times since then. The bad state of Indo-Pakistan relations has been the main impediment to its implementation. Pakistan is not anxious to be a facilitator of advantages to India without a political quid pro quo.

India is understandably apprehensive that Pakistani hostility makes the uninterrupted passage of gas to its destination uncertain. During Prime Minister Jamali’s recent visit to Tehran, the two governments constituted a joint committee of experts to further study the project. It remains to be seen whether this committee will be any more productive than its predecessors.

Relations between Iran and Pakistan are inhibited by the latter’s antagonistic relations with India and its status as a client of the United States. Iran and India have recently concluded a pact that will allow the Indian navy access to Iranian ports in the event of a war with Pakistan. In a recent statement (August 19) Mr Khurshid Kasuri maintained that Indo-Iranian defence cooperation posed no threat to Pakistan. This was surely a weird statement, for word of this “cooperation” came as a shock to many politically aware Pakistanis, who saw it as an anti-Pakistan move. On the other hand, Pakistan’s reluctance to let Iranian gas go to India is bound to annoy Iran inasmuch as it keeps Iran from earning substantial profits from this deal.

American officials have been accusing the Iranian government of supporting international terrorism, operating a tyranny within the country, and preparing to produce weapons of mass destruction. They regard Iran as a part of an “axis of evil.” The late Ayatollah Khomeini called America the “Great Satan” and, in their recent meetings with Gen Musharraf and Prime Minister Jamali, his successors have designated America as an enemy of Islam and as an instigator of discord between Muslim nations. They have asked the Muslims to move against American machinations.

It is clear that in these circumstances Pakistan’s open-ended pledge of cooperation with the United States is liable to strain its ties with Iran, and Pakistani measures calculated to develop any real closeness with Iran will be unwelcome in Washington.

If I may borrow a metaphor from Governor Caumo of New York, speeches over good food and drink in presidential palaces can be “poetry,” but the actual practice in foreign politics, as in statecraft generally, has to be unadorned, even sobering, “prose.” This insight deserves to be kept in mind while interpreting the Iranian and Pakistani declarations of mutual affinity and eternal affection.

The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA.

e-mail: ssyed@cox.net

THE president and the prime minister alternately assure themselves that parliament is in existence, the government is working, the frontiers are guarded and there is no crisis. The people are much less complacent.

The National Assembly indeed has been in existence for a year at a cost of, along with the Senate, a billion rupees. The speaker marked the end of the year with a feast which, like the proceedings, was boycotted by the opposition. More appropriately he should have informed the people what their representatives had done in the course of the year to benefit them or, at least, to mitigate their sufferings.

The members on their part felt they had done more than enough to double their salaries. The banter and the threats on the occasion only poured salt over the wounds of the people and added to their anxiety. They view the prospect of street protest by the combined opposition more seriously than the prime minister does. It is flippant to “welcome” public agitation which in our political culture invariably leads to violence and disruption of economic activity.

Even if the agitation doesn’t succeed, as the prime minister feels it will not — for, he says, the opposition has neither a cause nor popular support — the absence of its members will continue to hamper the proceedings of parliament and also impair whatever little representative character it has. The deadlock, however prolonged, wouldn’t hurt the members on either side but practically disenfranchise the people. They will continue to enjoy their pay and privileges as if parliament was created only to employ them.

How and when the differences, apparently irreconcilable, will result in a working agreement, is a question that can be answered only by political pundits and not by the legal experts nor by plain-thinking citizens. The deadlock is built into the scheme of elections (disqualifications and alleged rigging) through which parliament has come into being, divided itself into the treasury and opposition benches (horse trading) and then a large cabinet was put together which, temptingly, remains open to expansion.

The argument and protest now is all about the survival or recognition of political cadres and their leaders for which the Legal Framework Order has become a rallying point. Almost every party — and the president himself — has shown willingness to negotiate a compromise on its various ingredients. At one stage the government and the alliance of the religious parties (MMA) were reported to have all but agreed on the substance of the changes, but no longer.

It may turn out to be a stroke of good luck for the country though Chaudhry Shujaat, the new-found messiah of Pakistan’s politics, continues to insist that his Muslim League and the MMA are natural and inseparable allies. Some ascension and dumping, thus, may be in the offing.

Even if a deal is made with the MMA or any other party or alliance, parliament and consequently the government will remain unstable as the political parties which sustain and run a parliamentary system have splintered into many bits without any programme or direction. Ours is a strange parliament in which the members elected from the platform of one party are now working for another party and yet continue to profess allegiance to their own party. All of them want to keep their position of power and yet not close their option to return to the fold of the original party whenever expedient.

From the look of things and attitude of parliamentarians it is unlikely that the factions forming the government will ever coalesce into one party or even a coalition with a common programme. The complexion of the opposition is also likely to be similar. It will thus remain an a’la carte parliament as long as it lasts.

Policies and plans will continue to emanate as they did in the first three years from the president and his advisers who may or may not be ministers. That may be a negation of democracy but should not hamper internal administration and development.

It is at the stage of execution of policies and projects that the real and serious difficulty is arising. In the provinces not the legislature alone, but the implementation machinery is fragmented and lacks direction.

The duality of control travels from the governor/chief minister down to the lowest level. The tussle over jurisdiction and powers between the provincial and district governments remains a cause of waste and delay. Particularly neglected are the executive and quasi-judicial functions where the bureaucratic heads have been abolished but the commissions, authorities and ombudsmen that were to take their place have either not come into being or are still-born. The new system is thus working neither at the top nor at the grassroots.

Pakistan’s fragile political structure poses not only a threat to internal order but also raises many international concerns. Doubts are expressed about the will and ability of the government to curb the extremists (a euphemism for religious militants or killers) because it needs their political support. The Indian accusation against Pakistan on this score is well known. Now Afghanistan is lending credence to it. Both countries may have their own failings and biases against Pakistan but not our good and great friend China, which also fears Pakistan’s armed zealotry making inroads into the neighbouring Xinjiang region.

Such reputation, or mere suspicions, have lost Pakistan whatever little support or sympathy it commanded in the international community for a just solution of the Kashmir dispute. The government’s spokesman Sheikh Rashid too recently conceded in Delhi that the hope for a settlement with India now lies only in the statesmanship of Vajpayee — not in the freedom fighters, UN resolutions, our allies or OIC. No country can afford to antagonize India which has long been recognized as the world’s largest democracy and has now also become its second fastest growing economy. Pakistan, on the other hand, is seen as teetering on the verge of either bankruptcy or anarchy.

Many possible solutions to the current crisis could emerge once General Musharraf recognizes that a crisis does exist and the present parliament is not a solution to it, and the opposition too realizes that street protest wouldn’t produce one either.

Whatever Musharraf may choose to do, he should not let the country remain hostage to a bargaining parliament for four more years and, secondly, he should not become president of the Q League on the goading of Sheikh Rashid. Ayub Khan had succumbed to a similar plea from his sycophant information minister. That decision proved fatal both for him and for the Muslim League.