So, who’s winning this war?

IN the immediate aftermath of the extraordinary terrorist attacks on New York and Washington two years ago, some commentators outside the United States were sceptical of the claim that the world had changed forever.

Forever, after all, is a long time. And it was hard to imagine how a change in the New York skyline, albeit effected in a manner calculated to maximize the loss of life, could catalyze a global transformation.

Perhaps it’s time to admit that we were wrong. There can, after all, be little question that the world we live in today is crucially different in several ways from the one that existed before September 11, 2001.

Yet our scepticism wasn’t entirely misplaced. It was clear from the outset that the way things panned out would depend chiefly on how Washington responded to the first serious foreign attack on the US mainland. (The Japanese raid on Pearl Harbour targeted what was effectively an American colonial outpost in the Pacific. Yet, as we shall see, analogies between — to cite them the American way — 12/7/1941 and 9/11/2001 are not entirely inappropriate.)

It became obvious early on that, whenever it had a choice, the administration of George W. Bush was liable to do the wrong thing.

There wasn’t a great deal of international resistance when the armed forces of the mightiest nation on earth pounced on Afghanistan, in alliance with some of that nation’s most discredited warlords. Ostensibly, the chief purpose of the invasion was to track down Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda factotums. The rout of the Taliban was a bonus.

Predictably, the Taliban melted away into the countryside. Inevitably, thousands of Afghans died during the one-sided conflict. Prisoners of war were denied that status; many of those who survived the bloodlust of Rashid Dostum ended up in cages at Guantanamo Bay, a naval base the US maintains in Cuba against Havana’s will.

The site of their imprisonment was chosen primarily in order to keep them out of the reach of the American judicial system. Small batches, including children and the elderly, have in recent months been returned to Afghanistan or Pakistan. But among those captured during the conflict, there apparently are no senior Taliban commanders or Al Qaeda decision-makers. Those among Osama’s henchmen who have been taken into custody were apprehended via police action — which, logically, ought to have been the way to go had the US intended primarily to track down terrorists with possible 9/11 connections, rather than to demonstrate its firepower.

Today, Hamid Karzai, handpicked by the US to administer Afghanistan, is in effect no more than the mayor of Kabul. Elsewhere, the warlords, sidelined to some extent by the Taliban, have re-established their fiefdoms. The international aid that Afghanistan had every right to expect has not been forthcoming. Poppy fields are flourishing.

Skirmishes between US troops and what are described as reconstituted Taliban have been increasing. And anecdotal evidence suggests that Osama bin Laden is planning more nasty surprises as he flits from one sanctuary to another along the Durand Line.

He may, of course, be dead. Beyond the existential murkiness, however, he hardly figures at all in the rhetoric emanating from Washington. Tomorrow’s anniversary is unlikely to affect his status as the great unmentionable.

Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, just about remains in vogue as a bogeyman. The story of how Saddam came into this particular picture is a tribute to the power of propaganda. It also illustrates the extent of American gullibility.

Donald Rumsfeld was among those who felt that the first response to the strikes against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon ought to have been a blitzkrieg against Baghdad. Better sense prevailed — but not for long.

While intelligence agencies were ordered to dig up evidence implicating the Iraqi dictator in the crimes of Al Qaeda, George W. and the Bushies (a vicious circle that Tony Blair cannot be excluded from) were busy insinuating that such links undoubtedly existed. The CIA came up empty handed. Yet a Washington Post poll at the weekend suggests that nearly 70 per cent of Americans still believe it is likely that Saddam had something to do with the events of September 11.

The alleged Al Qaeda connection wasn’t, however, the main reason advanced for the invasion of Iraq. It was Saddam’s arsenals of chemical and biological weapons, and his nuclear ambitions, that we were told had become intolerable in the wake of 9/11. More than four months after the war supposedly ended, not a shred of reliable evidence has been found to validate the charges.

Never mind, say Rumsfeld and others of his ilk. At least the tyrant is gone. Iraq has been liberated. That being the case, isn’t it a trifle strange that most Iraqis, including many of those who detested Saddam and all that he stood for, seem desperate to get rid of their “liberators”?

Furthermore, if, as Rumsfeld claimed in Baghdad last week, “a wonderful start has been made” to reconstruction, why has the US found it necessary to swallow its pride and plead for help from an organization that was dismissed as irrelevant when the Security Council refused to become a party to Bush and Blair’s grubby little war.

The UN subsequently seemed to cave in by sanctifying the US-UK occupation. But resolution 1483 is a twin-edged sword: it encumbers the Anglo-American occupiers with open-ended responsibility for the fate of Iraq. Hence the current effort to supersede it. The US and Britain needed little assistance in making a huge mess. But they don’t think it’s fair that they should have to clean up afterwards.

It won’t be easy. A UN-guided Iraqi administration and a date for elections would possibly be a welcome outcome, if the US can bring itself to desist from interference at every stage of the process. There was no indication in Bush’s speech last Sunday that he has any intention of changing course, despite overwhelming evidence of a disaster in the making.

He is, however, clearly worried. Bush’s stock among his compatriots is steadily declining as the body bags continue to trickle back home. The US economy is in the doldrums. Suddenly, re-election (make that election, given that 2000 was a virtual coup) in 2004 no longer seems like a sure bet.

However, even if the UN grasps the “opportunity” extended to it, Bush and the even more beleaguered Blair cannot in the short run look forward to relief in terms of troop commitment and cash — which happen to be their main concerns. There is, after all, a price to be paid for criminal folly.

It remains to be seen where the desperate quest for an exit strategy leaves the Plan for the New American Century — which, drawn up back in 2000 by men who subsequently became key members of the Bush brigade, envisaged a rout of the Taliban and the control of Iraqi oilfields. At the time they longed for “some catastrophic and catalyzing event — like a new Pearl Harbor” that would provide an adequate excuse for launching their quest for direct global domination.

Was 9/11, then, merely a convenient coincidence? Significant numbers of people around the world (including the US) strongly suspect official American connivance in that day’s awful events. If the Washington hawks didn’t instigate the monstrous tragedy, goes the theory, at the very least they decided not to prevent it.

Although some compelling circumstantial evidence can be cited in support of the latter conclusion, it may be unfair to take it too literally. The Pearl Harbor analogy, though, isn’t completely far-fetched. Desperate to enter the Second World War, the Roosevelt administration faced widespread popular reluctance. A German attack on American shipping in the Atlantic would have changed the public mood, but the Nazis refused to oblige. Crippling sanctions against Japan did the trick. Franklin Roosevelt and his closest aides anticipated a Japanese assault, although they didn’t know precisely when or where it would occur. The naval fleet at the Hawaiian base received no warning.

After the attack, Roosevelt breathed a sigh of relief, pronounced it a “day of infamy”, and the US entered the war in time to exercize a profound influence on the outcome in Europe as well as in the Pacific.

Machinations during and after the war enabled the US to transform itself into what the American novelist and polemicist Gore Vidal describes as a national security state. That aspect has been reinforced during the past two years, but there are indications that the days of aggressive empire-building may be numbered. While Iraq and Afghanistan bear ineloquent testimony to imperial overreach, terrorism is proliferating from Iraq to Indonesia and beyond. It provides an excuse for American aggression, but it is also a measure of American failure. Terror certainly needs to be tackled, but not this way.

The world today is a far more dangerous place than it was two years ago. If there is any lesson to be learned from the continuing series of disasters, it is that resistance is not futile. That holds true, above all, for the misled (in more ways than one) people of Britain and the United States.

Email: mahir59ali@netscape.net

As the US returns to the UN

THE situation in Iraq is difficult on many fronts and creates serious manpower and other problems for the occupying powers.

On the security front nearly 300 American servicemen had been killed — only 138 had died when President Bush declared an end to major combat operations on the May 1st, — and another 1400 had been injured. Administration officials claimed that the commanders on the ground regarded the current troop levels as adequate but many experts estimated that at least 400,000 troops are needed. More importantly from the American domestic perspective it had been calculated that with one year rotations even current troop levels could not be maintained beyond March ‘4 unless reservists were called up. The Americans have 130,000 troops there, the British some 11,000 to which they intend adding another 3000 but the other 27 or 28 members of the coalition have been able to muster only about 10,000 troops, most of them financed by the US. Clearly assistance from the international community is needed even if it be on a limited scale.

On another facet of the security front there are reports which suggest that since borders were not adequately sealed perhaps as many as 1000 foreign fighters have made their way into Iraq to fight the Americans. There are other reports, unconfirmed so far, that the Baathists elements having abandoned their past stance are now making common cause with these foreign extremists. Overall in the Muslim world virtually every western intelligence agency has reported that there was a sharp spike in recruitment by Al Qaeda and other extremist organizations. The fury and anger in the Muslim world has of course been enhanced by the developments in Palestine where the “road map” has been more or less cast aside and where the Americans seemingly cannot be persuaded to say a word of condemnation against the reinstatement by the Israelis of their policy of “targeted killings”. The fury is against the Americans and the Americans in Iraq are the closest available targets. Clearly it would be helpful if the security duties in Iraq could be farmed out to other countries that are regarded as less inviting targets.

On the reconstruction front Ambassador Paul Bremer having made a realistic assessment said that $13 billion was needed to produce the required amount of electricity; $16 billion to ensure required water and sewerage facilities; and that the total requirement could well exceed $100 billion over a number of years. Other estimates were higher; one appearing in the respected ‘Globe and Mail’ of Canada cited a figure of $600 billion. From the American domestic perspective these figures had to be seen in tandem with a budget deficit which was estimated by the Congressional budget office at $ 480 billion for next year (the administration’s estimate was $475 billion) and which was expected to grow even if there was a surge in the economy next year, and reach a cumulative total of 5.8 trillion by 2013 ( the administration in contrast expected the deficit to fall significantly next year and trashed the estimated cumulative deficit as an inaccurate extrapolation). The $480 billion deficit amounts to only about 4.5 per cent of the $10 trillion plus American GNP, but when the economy appears sluggish and when even this sort of deficit has necessitated cuts in domestic spending and is said to have been occasioned by tax cuts benefiting the rich the administration has reason to worry about the political consequences of any further growth in this figure.

The Americans have proposed a conference in Madrid early next month at which the international community could pledge assistance for the reconstruction of Iraq. This would be preceded by a similar pledging conference for Afghanistan that is to be held this month. Clearly the US would want the international community to share the burden in a substantial way.

It was against this backdrop that President Bush agreed to endorse Powell’s proposal to go back to the UN for a fresh resolution, which would give the UN a greater role in Iraq and in return for which the EU countries would contribute financially for the reconstruction of Iraq and other countries like Pakistan, Turkey and India may find it possible to send some troops.

The exact text of the proposal the Americans have made is not known but its principal elements are said to be:

* The military forces in Iraq to be designated a UN force under US command with the commander being required to report from time to time to the UN Security Council.

* The UN secretary general’s representative to be given additional responsibilities for the reconstruction activities and perhaps for helping the Iraqi governing council in drawing up a constitution and in making the other preparations such as electoral rolls which would be needed to enable the Iraqi people to choose their representatives and their government.

What has emerged about the informal discussions the Americans have held so far is that the French and the Germans having termed the proposal inadequate are suggesting that the UN should have the lead role in the political restructuring and that there should be a timetable for handing over power to a representative Iraqi government.

The real problem, of course is that with Ambassador Bremer being in charge, the Germans and the French fear the American companies will have the inside track for reconstruction contracts as also for any energy exploration concessions. They are also worried, one would imagine, that if the governing council has on it, in positions of influence men like Ahmad Chalabi, long beholden to the Pentagon and long an associate of American oil interests even the full indigenization of governance in Iraq will not mean the restoration of a level playing field.

On Sunday evening when President Bush addressed the American nation, he said he was doing so to “keep you informed of America’s actions in the war on terror” but it was clear that one of his principal aims was to address the questions that have arisen about the costs, human and material, of the Iraq situation and about the prospects of America securing some international assistance in dealing with the problem.

His words offered little by way of concession to the views of the other members of the Security Council. He did say that his strategy for Iraq had, as one of its objectives, “enlisting the support of other nations for a free Iraq”. But for the most part it was America’s role that he focused on Iraq, he said, was now the central front in the war against terrorism and defeating the terrorists would take time and entail sacrifice. But America “will do what is necessary, will spend what is necessary, to achieve this essential victory in the war on terror, to promote freedom and to make our own nation more secure...” On additional troop requirements he said “our commanders have requested a third multinational division to serve in Iraq. Some countries have requested an explicit authorization of the United Nations Security Council before committing troops to Iraq. I have directed Secretary of State Colin Powell to introduce a new Security Council resolution, which would authorize the creation of a multinational force in Iraq, to be led by America”.

On possible financial burden sharing he conceded that there had been differences on the American decision to “enforce Security Council resolutions and remove Saddam Hussein” but these he felt should not stand in the way of “present duties”. “Terrorists in Iraq have attacked representatives of the civilized world, and opposing them must be the cause of the civilized world. Members of the United Nations now have an opportunity — and the responsibility — to assume a broader role in assuring that Iraq becomes a free and democratic nation”. Clearly implicit was the fact that the assumption that they should do so under US leadership and control.

The most important indicator possibly of the American willingness to go it alone if international cooperation was not forthcoming on American terms was contained in what he said about the funding request he would send to Congress. He would ask for $87 billion of which $66 billion would be for military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and the balance ($21 billion) for reconstruction in these two countries. Since it is known that for Afghanistan the Americans are proposing an addition of about $1 billion to the $900 million already provided in the budget this would suggest that $20 billions are being provided for Iraq. This is the figure — perhaps conservative — that many analysts have suggested would be needed on an annual basis for Iraq.

As negotiations on the US proposal for greater international burden sharing in Iraq proceed the permanent members of the Security Council will have to weigh their responses carefully. There is the feeling that the rest of the world and the Europeans in particular are enjoying American discomfiture in Iraq and are inclined to let them stew in the juice of their making, because the longer this discomfiture lasts the less the prospects of this administration using military means to resolve the problems they have with other “axis of evil” countries and perhaps the less the prospects of a Bush re-election. But the fact also remains that the US is the only superpower in the world and the principal trading partner for most countries. Relations cannot be strained too far. Moreover, differences of approach notwithstanding, a stabilized Iraq is also a Russian and EU interest. Even if the US offers no more than a limited sharing of decision making in the political restructuring process or a limited share of contracts in the reconstruction process these powers may see it as politic to go along.

The writer in a former foreign secretary of Pakistan.

Boys and mountains

A FEW weeks ago the 12-year-old son of a dear friend joined class-fellows from his school to go mountaineering under the aegis of the Adventure Foundation of Pakistan, a most admirable organization started and run by retired Brigadier Jan Nadir Khan. The boy was most enthusiastic when he went and even more excited when he returned to tell stories of the trip to his parents and younger brother.

This foundation is the only body of its kind which encourages young boys to go out in the holidays, live in tents, suffer the discomforts of a life away from the mollycoddling of mothers and, in a way, be more grown-up than they actually are. It is a great adventure for them and they all thoroughly enjoy it. Though the worries of fond parents are fit to be seen and we all felt sorry for Adil’s father and mother. They acted as if the boy was leaving for Iraq or somewhere equally dangerous.

For a long time I have wanted to write about schoolboys and mountaineering, which, you will agree, is not a very common subject, and I was glad that Adil’s adventurous outing gave me the opportunity. For being so uncommon, it needs a preface of sorts in which the Doon School of Dehra Dun (India) has pride of place, and so, in a way, has my friend Gurdial Singh.

Gurdial and I were at Aligarh Muslim University in the early forties. He was doing his Masters in geography while I was trying to become an engineer — against my will but pursuant to the will of my engineer father. Gurdial joined Doon School in 1945 as assistant master and retired in 1979 as deputy headmaster. At the school he became an avid mountaineer since Dehra Dun, lying at the foothills of the Himalayas, offers excellent opportunities as a take-off point, and the school had earned the distinction of being the nursery of mountaineering buffs. He came to be known as Guru in the school, though at Aligarh we used to call him Gordial (to rhyme with cordial).

Gurdial achieved fame when, in 1951, with three companions, he succeeded in climbing Trisul (23,360 feet), the first Indian to do so. It has been said about the feat, “When Gurdial Singh climbed Trisul the age of mountaineering for India began”. The historic achievement was dully acknowledged with awards, including the national Padma Shree.

Most of what I know about the subject of schoolboys and mountain-climbing is gleaned from “For Hills to Climb”, a beautiful 432-page book published by the Doon School Old Boys’ Society, about their alma mater’s unrelenting promotion of this fascinating sport. It is edited by Aamir Ali who studied at the school in 1938-39 and was a master there in 1944-46, and later pursued a professional career in the International Labour Office in Geneva.

The sixty write-ups, articles, memories, narratives and pen-pictures of mountaineering stalwarts have been painstakingly collected from numerous sources, with Gurdial assisting the editor. The Doon School is involved in all of them in one way or another, and the book reflects in a splendid manner “the philosophy, poetry and affinity with nature of a sport fostered by the school”.

Many well-known personalities of Pakistan were students of Doon School before Partition. I can think of only two at the moment: Miangul Aurangzeb of Swat who has been member of the National Assembly a number of times, and the late Lieut-General Ghulam Jilani Khan who, as Governor of Punjab, transformed Lahore into a city of gardens. General Jilani and some others were inspired by the Doon School to establish the magnificent Chandbagh School on the same lines a few miles outside Lahore, and the Headmaster of Doon School was invited as adviser for the project. However I do not know if Chandbagh’s inspiration from Doon School also includes a penchant for serious mountain-climbing.

The book “For Hills to Climb” has made me wonder how many of our public schools, other high schools and our colleges have done anything to instill in their students a love for mountain-climbing, even though some of them are located at a proverbial stone’s throw from the Karakorams. I have no information on this point, though the Adventure Foundation of Pakistan has done solid pioneering work in this behalf. The foundation invites schools to become members and draws up a year-long schedule of trekking and mountaineering for groups, making all the arrangements regarding logistics, guides, servants, etc. These groups do not go to heights where mountaineering becomes a dangerous sport, limiting themselves to 16,000 or 17,000 feet.

I am told that some years ago the Doon School invited a group of Pakistani youngsters through the Adventure Foundation, as also boys from Bangladesh and Nepal, for a short stay there related to mountaineering. Our boys are said to have come back with glowing reports about their reception and what they did there. This means, happily, that there is already communication between Doon School and youthful Pakistani mountaineers.

Apart from the initiative taken by the Adventure Foundation, I wonder if anyone in the government has ever thought of following in its footsteps, for instance the so-called Ministry of Youth Affairs. Government leaders are forever haranguing young people to do something useful and not waste their time in idle pursuits, but they are never seen making positive suggestions and showing the way.

The Doon School Society book says: “Mountaineering is not just a physical exercise; it is also an exercise of the mind and the spirit. It calls for a sense of reverence for the mountains, a sense of communion with nature. The soul of man is lifted up, a wider, nobler horizon is offered to his view. The whole environment — trees and forests, rivers and lakes, plants and flowers, birds and animals — demands a kinship with nature”.

Once I exhorted young people in this column to go north during their holidays and see the real Pakistan instead of whizzing around junk food centres in motor cars with mobile phones glued to their ears. My words may not have left an impact on their minds, but I invite them to ponder the phrases from which the title of the Doon School book is taken. They are from one of the prayers recited by the boys in the morning assembly: “Creator of life and light .... We thank Thee for physical joy, for the ecstasy of swift motion, for deep water to swim in ... for hills to climbs, and hard work to do”.

Posner’s fiction of 9/11 episode

WE are only a day away from the second anniversary of 9/11 and everything that it has come to stand for and symbolize. Already across the US and in other countries as well, columnists and editorial writers of all persuasions and ideologies are sharpening their pens and turning thousands of thoughts to what they want to say and what needs to be said.

In addition there are others who are also busy writing. Many of them have private agendas which they dress in 9/11 terms in order to give themselves and their words a certain acceptability. I am referring here to those writers and self-designated experts on Islam, the war on terror and Osama bin Ladenism. They too are working feverishly to have their material ready for the anniversary so it can take full advantage of the attention it will attract by its sensationalism if not by its truth.

Much of their work — books, articles, TV reports — is based on collections of stereotypes and an avalanche of inaccurate information, incorrect news reports and interviews with unsavoury and unreliable characters. And worst of all, the majority of these writers base their conclusions on hindsight.

During the past few weeks, quite a few such books have appeared on bookshelves and in bookshops across the United States. The writers of most them have few credentials as authors and no qualifications of information and personal experience on which to base their often biased conclusions. Few, if any, of them have even visited the countries they write about nor have they met those who figure prominently, and usually discreditably, in their writings.

And as the public is generally familiar with the machinations of these “gurus” and terrorism experts, I find it hard to swallow that these “techno thrillers” are anything but cheap shots used to advance careers, to make a quick buck and to get invitations to advertise themselves on early morning TV talk shows across the US.

“Why America Slept” (Random House) by Gerald Posner (reviewed in TIME magazine, August 31 issue), who alleges an Al Qaeda leader made explosive statements while being interrogated, is one such example of what I deplore. There is virtually no new information in his book and indeed, much of what is there, is already public knowledge.

Gerald Posner has built a reputation and made a great deal of money by writing sensational stories about some of the most high-profile controversies in modern history, ranging from the JFK assassination to the hunt for the infamous Nazi Dr. Mengele. While critics have continually questioned Posner’s veracity, few can question his ability to capitalize on popular conspiracy theories, real or imagined. In the course of his career, Posner has demonstrated a knack for writing what sells, and ‘Why America Slept’ is no exception. It should come as no surprise then, that Posner’s latest book explores the conspiracy de jure, that of Saudi Arabian involvement in the September 11 attacks. Allegations of Saudi non-compliance in the war on terrorism generates news for writers, journalists, and politicians alike.

Posner uses few primary sources in his latest expose. In fact, his two most important sources remain anonymous. As with his past literary efforts, the charges levelled in ‘Why America Slept’ could not stand up in a court of law because most of his evidence is hearsay, not fact. Surely, a Berkely-trained lawyer like Posner knows that he would have a hard time convincing a court that his latest work is non-fiction.

He wants us to believe, however, that his information came from “two government sources” who are unnamed but “in a position to know.” Amazing and unsubstantiated assertions! Talk about taking the cake!

He writes about Abu Zubaydah, an Al Qaeda member who is supposed to have named some prominent Saudis who had close links to with Osama bin Laden. Abu Zubaydah’s statements, let us be quick to point out, were made after he was forced to swallow first pain killers and then Sodium Pentothal, which is better known as ‘truth serum.’ In other words, after having his mind and judgment chemically altered, he made statements which we are asked to accept as truth. What is surely more likely than the truth of any of his statements is that the whole story is simply fiction — made up and passed off as fact to those who are ready to believe anything detrimental about Saudi Arabia and Islam.

I personally don’t believe a word of what Posner says about the connections of some Saudis with Osama. One of those defamed is the late Prince Ahmad ibn Salman with whom I had the privilege of working for over fifteen years. During that time, I got to know him very well. Prince Ahmad was totally apolitical. He was genuinely humane, sincerely devoted to his family and an enthusiastic sportsman. His love of horse racing and breeding thorough-breds took up a great deal of his time. In addition, he was chairman of one of the Arab world’s leading publishing houses. To believe that he had any connection with Al Qaeda would be as absurd as believing that my mother was the “planner” of 9/11!

Not only is Posner outrageously slanderous but he goes off the deep end by naming two other individuals who are also dead. None of these people are here to defend themselves. And even if they were, it would hardly be necessary to defend oneself against such absurd allegations. Even US officials and others in the media I spoke to dismissed the claims in the book; one said that it was obviously an attempt to “sensationalize” the issue. A US intelligence source described the allegations in the book as “totally absurd.” The French news agency quoted him further: “These claims have no basis at all.”

The only one of the Saudis mentioned in the book who is still alive is Prince Turki Al-Faisal, the present Saudi ambassador to London. And he has vehemently and categorically rejected the allegations. “This information is totally false and groundless,” Prince Turki told Asharq Al-Awsat, a sister publication of Arab News a few days ago. “I have had no contacts with Osama since 1990, and have never had contacts with Al Qaeda, which is a satanic terrorist organization,” he added. After reading a review of Posner’s book in Time magazine, Prince Turki explained that he had spent years trying to bring Osama to justice and he reminded the world, “Saudi Arabia revoked Osama’s citizenship in 1994.” The prince condemned all attempts to link him and the Kingdom with Al Qaeda and its terrorist activities.

It comes as no surprise that a writer is capitalizing on September 11 and the apparent American fear and mistrust of Saudi Arabia that has emerged in the last two years. But it is surprising that a supposedly credible newsmagazine would give his flimsy dossier publicity. As witnessed by the ascendance of Fox TV, sensationalism rules the day in American media. It seems that since the gross and unfounded garners greater readership, even Time has had to lower its journalistic standards.

Fairy tales, so the song tells us, can come true. But they are usually recognized as just that. Children shiver with delight at stories of witches and giants and magic but deep in their hearts, they know that the stories are no more than that. The sad thing about Posner and his book is that he is writing about what is unknown and unfamiliar to most people. And when authors choose to do that, it is relatively easy to pass off fairy tales as fact.

The writer is editor-in-chief, Arab News, Saudi Arabia

Deepening doubts on Iraq

WHERE are the weapons of mass destruction? As President Bush and other administration officials made the case for war with Iraq, their biggest selling point was the claim that Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime possessed chemical weapons.

Allegations he had biological weapons were shakier; assertions he had nuclear arms or could build them were even more dubious. There were other ever-shifting official rationales for the Iraq invasion, like Hussein’s torture and killing of his own people and promoting Mideast democracy through his ouster. The main justification, however, for sending Americans to die in the desert was Hussein’s earlier use of chemical weapons, his continued possession of them and the imminent threat he would inflict them on the United States.

In this year’s State of the Union speech, Bush cited United Nations reports or U.S. intelligence that showed that Hussein had failed to account for 25,000 liters of anthrax, 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin and material for 500 tons of sarin, mustard agent and VX nerve agent. “From three Iraqi defectors, we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapon labs designed to produce germ warfare agents,” Bush said. Where are those chemicals, those poisons or those labs?

An NYT report says that U.S. intelligence officials were now labouring to learn whether they had been fed false information about Iraq’s weapons, especially by defectors. U.N. inspectors’ prewar searches found no chemical, biological or nuclear stockpiles.

Hundreds of inspectors combing Iraq since major combat ended May 1 have fared no better. One U.S. intelligence official says analysts may have been too eager to find evidence to support White House claims about Iraqi arms. Intelligence and congressional sources told NYT in October, five months before the invasion, that senior Bush officials were pressuring CIA analysts to shape their assessments of the threat to build the case against Hussein.

—Los Angeles Times