Myths ending in wars

A MYTH is a make-believe mental mechanism. Its origins lie in obscure psychic phenomena. We all have myths. We believe in them and realize them as best as we can. But the myths of a dictator consisting of unexamined, unchallengeable beliefs can, by process of state power, become the ideological burden of a nation.

It can lead to war (WWII); genocide (Pol Pot’s Cambodia, Karadzic Bosnia); self-inflicted economic ruin of a nation (Stalin’s suppression of Kulaks and Mao’s Cultural Revolution) are all examples of the realization of myths causing mega death and destruction.

Consider, Hitler, Chancellor of Germany 1933-1945. Apart from his anti-Jew and Pro-Aryan phobia, he believed that the arable land of Germany could not support its future population (Lebensraum). The enactment of this mythical belief led to Hitler’s attack of Poland to grab its vast agricultural lands. Having agreed with British Prime Minister Chamberlain in Munich that his aggression would stop at Czechoslovakia (Munich is a synonym for appeasement of dictators), he attacked Poland on September 3, 1939, which resulted in World War II. What happened thereafter is writ broad in the history of the 20th century. Millions died.

Myths are anti-reason. The ‘Lebensraum’ myth which ended in the utter ruin of Europe could not envisage the notion of science doubling or even trebling agricultural output in less than a decade. With today’s agricultural science Germany can feed not only itself but also all of Poland, if required.

Let us examine a few of myths of our own. In the early summer of 1965 we managed to get the better of Indian troops in the Rann of Katchh in a brief encounter. This gave rise to myth that four Indian soldiers were equal to one of ours. The myth had a tail as long as Halley’s Comet. It was finally demolished at Kargil in 1999.

Towards the close of the Ayub Khan years a myth was woven from a cocktail of self-serving economic analysis that Pakistan’s economy was controlled by 22 families. This was music to the ears of the intellectuals of the time who believed nationalization to be a cure all for social imbalances. A nascent capitalism was crippled by devastating nationalization. The most progressive engineering works of Pakistan (BECO) was converted into a graveyard of steel and iron in less than a decade. Excellent banking (Habib Bank) and shipping companies (Cowasjee) were utterly destroyed by corruption and inefficiency. The newly nationalized schools became the fiefdoms of bureaucratic schoolmasters in ghoulish classrooms.

The myth of socialism was engendered by the feudal grandee, foreign-educated Z.A Bhutto. No heed was given to the failure of nationalization to deliver on its goals anywhere in the world. The revenues of the state were diverted from welfare to supporting the deficits of the white elephants of state-run industry.

The myth of our military establishment in the 1990s was that Afghanistan provided “strategic depth” for the ultimate defence of Pakistan. The enactment of the myth led to our coopting the Taliban as our closest allies: a bunch of illiterate fanatics without any scruples. The “strategic depth” theory implied that if India were to overrun Pakistan, the Pakistan armed forces would retreat to the rugged hills and warrens of Afghanistan to fight a rearguard action to reclaim the motherland. It was never clear to anyone how the Pakistan armed forces, sans the navy for obvious reasons, could save Pakistan from remote Afghanistan if it could not save it from its own soil.

But such is the power of the myth that “strategic depth” theory was at one time part of our military doctrine. Contemporaneous to this was another shallow notion, which probably still claims adherents today. That a low-level, cost-effective Jihadi infiltration would “bleed” India by pinning down a huge Indian force in Kashmir. The number of Jihadis — both Kashmiri and Pakistani - has never been more than a few thousands. To combat them India was required to keep an army in Kashmir of over half a million men. But the hard facts are that between 1990 and 2000 it was not India that bled but Pakistan that haemorrhaged. See the chart below (Source: World Bank). No further comment is necessary:-

Pakistan vs India per capita in US dollars.

Politically for most of the lost decade of the 1990s we were pariahs internationally because of jihadism and our embrace of the Taliban. And morally, the guns of at least one of the major jihadi organizations were aimed at the Shias in Pakistan. This well known organization with plenty of loose cannon was regarded as terrorist in Pakistan but as a group of warriors in Kashmir.

None of the myths mentioned above are subscribed to by any intelligent forum today. Yet, no sooner a myth is seen to be redundant than a new myth is created to take its place. The prevailing myth in relation to Kashmir and India runs somewhat as follows: if the freedom fighters are deprived of all material support by Pakistan, India’s attitude on Kashmir will harden to make it a bilateral non-issue (which it has in any case).

And if the freedom struggle is watered down, it cannot be revived. Militants deprived of financial help and a vocation, will then be sucked into an uncontrollable Islamic militancy like the Hamas in Palestine and become tomorrow’s civil war warriors. I don’t buy this assumption, but if we are to descend to the lowest depths of mindlessness, better a civil war than a nuclear holocaust.

These myths do not take into account ground realities in Srinagar and New Delhi. The principal Kashmiri militant organization, Hizbul Mujahideen, is today virtually a dormant force after the assassination of its popular and able leader, Commander Dar. Militancy in the Valley has been in a diminishing state in the last three years among the populace. What people most want is peace and a continuation of the struggle internally by peaceful means. Let there be no mistake about this. True, the people of the Valley are overwhelmingly anti-Indian, but this does not necessarily mean they are pro-Pakistan. Genuine, unchangeable autonomy leading, paper to Valley independence is the Kashmiri dream nothing else.

A negotiation implies a partnership. And a partnership implies drawing red circles on those positions that would endanger the credibility of either partner. A huge gray mass and area of negotiation exist outside these red circles, which provide the building material for interim solutions. Only a time process can heal the major fault lines created at independence.

The writer is a member of the National Assembly.

E-mail: murbr@isb.paknet.pk

The costs of Iraq

IN eight days in Iraq, beginning from January 5, five young Americans died from hostile fire. All together, 66 have perished either in fighting or in accidents since Baghdad fell on April 9 — nearly half as many as died up until then.

As their comrades and families can painfully attest, the war in Iraq didn’t end that day — nor was it over when the president appeared on an aircraft carrier May 1 to celebrate under the slogan “Mission Accomplished.”

The war was still raging last week, as thousands of U.S. troops conducted sweeps in central Iraq aimed at rooting out a scattered and loosely organized but nonetheless lethal enemy. American soldiers continue to fight and to sacrifice their lives, even if the embedded journalists have gone home and the president himself has turned his attention elsewhere. It looks as though they may have to keep at it for a long time to come.

Their cause of extirpating a dangerous and criminal regime remains as clear and important as it was on March 20, when the war began. By most accounts the ongoing Iraqi resistance comes from diehard loyalists to Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party. Since neither the dictator nor his sons have been accounted for, the enemy may dream of wearing out U.S. forces and eventually restoring the old regime.

The chance of that happening is slim: In most of the country, coalition forces have ended armed resistance and made a start at reconstruction. In Mosul in the north and Karbala in the south, U.S. commanders are working smoothly with local Iraqi authorities, and life for most people is already considerably better than it was under Saddam Hussein. Even in Baghdad the situation is much improved over a month ago.

Security is far greater, the power is mostly on, and gasoline supplies are back to prewar levels. One recent survey in Baghdad and Mosul showed majority support for continuing the occupation for now and for establishing a secular Iraqi state in the future.

It nevertheless becomes clearer every day that the job of pacifying Iraq is going to be harder and take considerably longer than many in the administration hoped — or than they have led the country to expect. The US troops will have to fight enemies and provide security for many months, if not years, to come.

Thanks to the Bush administration’s insistence on monopolizing the postwar administration, not much help may be offered: Barely 12,000 allied troops are now in Iraq, compared with nearly 150,000 Americans, and fewer than 8,000 additional coalition troops have been lined up. Administration officials keep saying they are willing to make whatever commitment is necessary for as long as it takes.

But they have done little to prepare the country for the real costs — in resources and in lives — that likely lie ahead. The last time he spoke about Iraq, in Qatar on June 5, President Bush again described the war in the past tense; the only indication he gave of being aware that any fighting was still going on was his passing reference to “pockets of criminality.” That was the day Pfc. Oberleitner died.

— The Washington Post

Politics of disruption

BENAZIR Bhutto observed recently that we were going through a period of political instability. The same has been said often enough with reference to other times. Political instability denotes, among other things, frequent changes of government. It is regarded as undesirable because it generates uncertainty with regard to public policies, especially those relating to economic affairs, making it difficult for investors and other businessmen to plan courses of action.

In our own experience the first parliamentary regime (1947-58) was often dubbed as exceedingly unstable: following the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951, six prime ministers came in and went out within a span of seven years. Even if rapid changes of government did not hurt our economy during this period, they did damage the national psyche. They generated a pervasive disappointment with, and then a deepening cynicism towards, the operating political system.

The instability under reference here was not owed, at least initially, to the dynamics of political affiliation in the National Assembly. Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad and, later, President Iskander Mirza ordered or engineered the changes of government in question. They had inherited the British civil servant’s low regard for the “native” politicians. They were persuaded that democracy, which would necessarily involve rule by politicians, was not suited to our “genius.” It may have been a part of their design to debunk democracy as a system of governance in Pakistan. Note that the military bureaucracy shared the same attitudes and opinions.

If instability is bad because it generates uncertainty, indecisiveness on the part of policy-makers has the same effect. It may result from incompetence, but it may also be caused by crises of legitimacy. A government may be immobilized if its support base is collapsing, the means by which it came to power are considered unlawful by a large proportion of the politically aware people and organs of civil society, or if a widespread revolt against its authority has developed.

We in Pakistan, more than most other polities, are particularly vulnerable to the forces of disruption. For one thing, we are probably the only people in the world who, instead of being grateful to God for having been given a country of our own and cherishing it, have been asking for the last fiftysix years why we got this country in the first place. We have not been able to reach agreement on fundamentals. There is a whole cluster of nagging and unresolved questions relating to the place of Islam in our polity. Then there are issues concerning the form of government (presidential versus parliamentary), jurisdictions of central and provincial governments, medium of instruction in educational institutions and the working language in public establishments, among others, on which we remain divided. Even a reasonably decent government, born of free and fair elections, can be projected as illegitimate on the ground that it is not Islamic enough, and it is thus untrue to the purposes for which the country was (professedly or allegedly) created.

Disruptions of specific regimes, and those of the political system, sometimes emanate from the politicians themselves. A widespread rejection of the governmental system that Ayub Khan had imposed on the country culminated in a revolt that overthrew his regime. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s extreme harshness in treating political opponents, and rigging of the elections in March 1977, brought on the revolt that gave General Ziaul Haq the excuse for ousting the prime minister and seizing the government.

But apart from specific events and episodes, certain attitudes that form part of our political culture also militate against orderly governance. The trouble here arises from a basic misunderstanding of the democratic process and an unwillingness to accept some of its cardinal procedural norms. There is first the intolerance of the opposition. Those who win an election are not content with forming a government and proceeding with the implementation of their image of a good society. They want to silence, put away, even wipe out critics and opponents. They do not see that democratic politics is a game which cannot be played unless there is an opposing side, and that they will kill the game itself if they eliminate their opponents.

The opponents, on their part, are not content with being critics. Deep down they are not at peace with the idea that in operational terms democracy means majority rule. They are not content with being able to voice their views on national issues and waiting to see if the voters will treat them more generously at the next elections. They often want their wishes and views to be accommodated here and now. They want to be taken into “confidence,” and they begin to call for decision-making by “consensus.”

Needless to say, there is something to be said for unity and consensus, and there are doubtless situations in which it is almost essential to have them. But an indiscriminate quest for unity and consensus will encourage a rejection of democratic norms and a denial of the individual’s rights and freedoms. Let us, by all means, be united in preserving and defending our territorial integrity and national independence. Let us have consensus that Pakistan, regardless of the state of implementation of any given ideology within its bounds, is a thing of value that deserves to be loved and cherished.

But beyond such imperatives it is not a bad idea to “let a thousand flowers bloom.” That is the context in which ideas such as that of “unity in diversity,” and dictums such as that “united we stand, divided we fall,” become meaningful. Otherwise calls for consensus are invitations to pervasive tyranny; they are also calls for the shutting down of doors to the advancement of knowledge, innovation, and creativity. It should be understood that disagreement is the first step to the enhancement of knowledge and wisdom.

Let us now turn to the current state of affairs in our country. Following the elections of last October, legislative majorities have been put together, and governments formed at the centre and in the provinces. A coalition of Islamic parties (MMA), factions of the PPP and PML, and a couple of smaller groups have banded together to immobilize the governments in which they are not participants, notably the federal government and the Punjab provincial government.

They have not stopped the executive organs of these governments from doing their work. But they have had considerable success in preventing the federal parliament from proceeding with its legislative business. The weapons they have used in their campaign of obstruction are those typical of non-cooperation and civil disobedience movements. They are calculated to stop the machine by clogging its wheels: violation of parliamentary procedures, disregard of the speaker’s rulings, noise, disorderly conduct, and boisterousness on the floor; processions, rallies, and marches outside.

The parties under reference here disapprove of the present government because, allegedly, its principal component (PML-Q) won its victories through electoral fraud, and then resorted to “horse-trading” to assemble a parliamentary majority. But at this time they are not engaging in disruption to secure a regime change. That may become their goal later. They are agitating against the system that General Musharraf has decreed for us through his Legal Framework Order (LFO). Having discussed the LFO in some detail in two previous articles (June 1 and 15), I do not feel called upon to dwell on it today.

The opposition being mounted against the LFO may be more apparent than real. While the MMA’s spokesmen denounce the entire document as unlawful, they are willing to live with much of it, if certain designated portions are rescinded. The attitude of the PPP and PML(N) in this regard may be even more pragmatic. The PPP’s objections would probably vanish if the criminal cases against Benazir Bhutto and her husband were withdrawn and the two of them were allowed back into the country’s politics. Similarly, PML(N) wouldn’t care how many uniforms Musharraf wore if only he let the Sharifs return to Pakistan and re-enter the political playing field.

The MMA may not be quite as flexible but it does seem to be ambivalent. There were reports a few weeks ago that it could accept Musharraf, even with his uniform, as president if he would move to further Islamize our polity, economy and society. Then we heard also that the MMA’s opposition to the LFO was firm. The general has recently declared that he will not take off his uniform until the time for such a move is propitious in his own reckoning, and he does not intend to implement the MMA’s version of an Islamic Pakistan. Unless one of them relents, the impasse thus created will probably continue.

It is interesting to note that the ruling majority in parliament accepts the LFO, including Musharraf’s uniform. In normal democratic practice the will of the majority prevails and the minority abides by it, even if reluctantly. In the making and amending of constitutions, where the approval of a two-thirds majority may be required, the dissenting one-third accepts the majority’s decisions. The fact that constitutional issues formed the subject of deliberations does not negate the majority’s right to prevail. In our present situation it appears that the opposition does not fully subscribe to the norm of majority rule. Nor is it willing to go along with judicial verdict with regard to the LFO.

The MMA’s case is a very special one. Even if the LFO were somehow to be thrown out, Musharraf relieved of his post and all of his work rolled back, and the Constitution of 1973 restored in its pre-1999 version, MMA’s commitment to the resulting political system would still be at best tentative and expedient. It is fully committed only to its own version of an Islamic system. Any other system is to be tolerated only until it can be ousted and replaced by one that answers its description of an Islamic system in all particulars. Given that attitude of mind, the inclination to disrupt “imperfect” governments may well be inherent in the MMA’s ideological orientation and commitment.

The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, the USA.

E-mail: syed.anwar@attbi.com

How may we put it down?

He turned towards the fresh shoulder of the United States and urged President Theodore Roosevelt to pick up at least some of the white man’s burden. Teddy Roosevelt went ahead and liberated Cuba, although he had to free it from some other white men. When America defeated Spain in 1899 the Philippines came as a bonus. But the latter did not seem that eager to be liberated, and at least some of them waged a bitter guerrilla war against American troops. When the casualties began to rise, the New York World published a ditty:

We’ve taken up the white man’s burden Of ebony and brown; Now will you tell us, Rudyard, how we may put it down?

That’s always the difficult part: How we may put it down. More than a hundred years later, America still does not have the answer. There is of course the romantic answer, shaped by the extraordinary success that the Americans had in reshaping the fortunes of their principal enemies in the Second World War. Germany and Japan were recreated in the democratic-capitalist mode and became exceptional success stories.

But there is a very basic difference between the Second World War and subsequent hot wars that America has either started or become involved in. The Second World War was fought between two alliances that were battling to control the world. It was a war between imperialists. Japan wanted to rule the whole of Asia, and its military effort to do so began much before war broke out in the European theatre. You could date this to as far back as 1905 when Japan stopped a European thrust towards the Pacific with a dramatic naval victory over Russia.

But even if we do not link this with later events, then Japanese imperialism certainly takes on a military, and brutal, dimension with its invasion of China. Similarly, Adolf Hitler was carving out an empire for Germany that included Europe of course but also stretched far beyond, towards the natural resources that were critical to the economic success of any empire that promised prosperity to the conquering race.

When Hitler publicly offered to sign a peace treaty with Britain after the fall of France, he had only one condition: Britain could retain its empire, he said in a speech, but it must hand over Iraq and Egypt to the Germans. He wanted control over the Red Sea and Suez Canal; and he wanted all the oil of Iraq. Germany wanted the best parts of what the British already possessed.

France too was an imperial power and showed no desire to release either Africa or Vietnam from its tentacles. In a sense, America, which kept out of this bloody struggle for the world, changed the ideological dimensions of a war that it was forced to enter after Japan attacked Pearl Harbour when Roosevelt promised freedom to all the nations of the post-war world.

If that promise was genuine, then it was overtaken by a second conflict for the world, the 45-year cold war between America and the Soviet Union. The ideological overtones of this conflict were different, but neo-colonialism was not the monopoly of either side. The Americans were happier with democracy among their friends; the Soviets preferred dictatorship.

But the existence of two superpowers ensured a balance that permitted space for degrees of neutrality, as evident in the non-aligned movement. It is no accident that the non-aligned movement has fallen into disuse after the collapse of the Soviet empire. It is axiomatic that the United States and Britain would not have invaded Iraq if the Soviet Union were still in business. The risk of response would have been too high.

America is too powerful to be denied victory; and the American Defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld is too brash to be denied his wars. But you must understand the nature of the war you are engaged in if you want to declare happy closure. There is no evidence that either George Bush or Donald Rumsfeld have fully understood what they are up against in Iraq. Saddam Hussein was toppled on April 8, but was that the end of war or the beginning of one?

Suddenly American troops are discovering an army, or organized armed resistance, that they say they had decimated in April. One hundred days after Saddam’s statue fell in Baghdad, Iraq seems to be swarming with what the Americans call his supporters. Whether the armed resistance comes from Saddam supporters or now, there are real battle conditions in cities like Balad and Fallujah to the north and west of Baghdad.

At least two hundred Iraqis have been killed within 48 hours as I write this, and the real figure could be much higher as the American forces are moving into civilian areas. Inevitably, Iraqis believe that most of those killed are innocent, and the resentment bubbles even higher. There are enough complaints about homes being ransacked and property looted.

The Pentagon accepts that 49 US soldiers have been killed since May 1, and if you include the casualties since April 9 you reach the startling conclusion that almost as many Americans have died in the war improper as died in the war proper. One war has merged into another, even as in nearby Afghanistan the Taliban resurfaces to harass and battle the Americans. The body count is hurting.

Bush knows that he cannot carry this burden into an election campaign, and has therefore come up with the bright idea of leasing out his war to countries like ours. Before some bright sparks convince the government of India that the world runs on arithmetic, and that if India sends one division of insurrection-hardened Rashtriya Rifles some endless treasure from Alladin’s Cave (which was once located in Iraq, but has now been transferred to Wall Street) will start flowing into Delhi and Mumbai.

This is nonsense. The real consideration is different. Whether the White House has taken this into account or not is immaterial. India must ask itself a question to which there may be no easy answer: has the war against Saddam given way to a war against Iraqi nationalism? Has the Anglo-American invasion rekindled memories of colonization and 37 years of rule by a three generation Hashemite monarchy that was more loyal to Britain and America than to the people of Iraq?

Memories are fashionably short, but when the British conquered Iraq (using the Indian army) during the First World War, they thrust a monarchy on the country. Winston Churchill, then minister for colonies, picked up Faisal, son of Sherif Husein, and handed over the throne of Baghdad to him. The only trouble was that Faisal had never seen Iraq before.

On July 14, 1958, when a group of army officers overthrew the dynasty, they massacred every single royal in the palace: the wife of the regent Abdullah survived only because the rebels left her for dead amid the pile of corpses. Abdullah’s body was put on public display, while parts of the prime minister Nuri Said’s corpse were distributed as trophies by the mobs. The only bit of respect was shown to the 23-year-old king, Faisal II: his body was given a secret burial. Why? Not because of him but because his father, Ghazi, king between 1933 and 1939, was the only monarch to challenge the British. The British had him assassinated in 1939.

The tyranny of Saddam should not obscure us to Iraq’s past, and its history of anger against colonialism. Iraq has seen more than one intifada and its streets have heard gunfire before. Iraqis know that this war is for control of oil. Oil and nationalism are synonymous in the Arab world.

Saddam Hussein usurped that nationalist platform for over two decades, and his absence may have created space for a more genuine and therefore more powerful nationalist movement. It will not have the structure of a regular army, or an organized political force. But, as in Afghanistan, anger against the enemy and a dream of independence will sustain the challenge through every frustration.

America’s allies on that field will not be excused from battle in what will inevitably be called a jihad. The Pentagon is already reporting that many of the fighters in Balad and Fallujah are not local Iraqis but Arabs who have come from elsewhere. Shades of Afghanistan are already on the horizon. It stands to reason. If Arabs could come all the way to Afghanistan to fight a jihad, there is no reason why they should not fight one in their own land.

The letter allegedly written by Saddam demanding that US troops leave by June may or may not be a fake, but that does not matter. It expresses a sentiment that is strong on the ground, and gets stronger with each battle against the occupying forces. Should our Rashtriya Rifles get caught in such a crossfire?

The writer is editor-in-chief of Asian Age, New Delhi.

Contradictions and conciliation

THE threat to Pakistan’s security arises not from external enemies but from its internal feuds; this is President Musharraf’s one finding on which it is not possible to disagree with him.

The feuds are many and spreading fast even by our wasteful and senseless standards. The grievance is that President Musharraf has done little to resolve or mitigate them. His policies have in fact given a sharper edge to some and his ministers and acolytes step in only to exploit or exacerbate them.

The external threats have indeed receded with India less belligerent than before and the Americans mighty pleased with our spying on the Taliban and armed assistance in expelling or arresting them from the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. Our own freebooting or committed jihadis and the government’s many and garrulous spokesmen can, however, spoil the atmosphere on both the Indian and Afghan fronts and are doing so.

In the past few days General Musharraf has spoken at home and abroad of many options to settle the Kashmir dispute but, wisely, elaborated none, for it would be premature to disclose our negotiating strategy. Yet he left no doubt that a solution could emerge only out of a compromise or give and take in the course of the talks. Also, perhaps for the first time, the hard-line Indian deputy prime minister, L.K. Advani, has conceded, while talking to a London daily (at a time when Musharraf too was in London) that Kashmir indeed was an issue (he still hesitates to call it a dispute) between the two countries and India would give up its past rigid stand if that would end the mayhem in the Valley.

A day later Sheikh Rashid, the information minister, spoke to dispel any speculation that there would be any bargaining with India on self-determination in Kashmir. Since he claims to be the prime minister’s spokesman on all matters, including foreign and nuclear issues, it leaves one puzzled whether he was expressing his personal opinion or, more ominously, the prime minister’s old rigid views as opposed to the president’s new-found flexibility. It needs to be considered how it would have gone down in Pakistan if Advani, or his spokesman, were to state at this sensitive moment that discussion will be only on terror in Kashmir and not on its future, for it is an integral part of the Indian Union.

Both sides now want peace and have to give way to make peace. Reassertion of the known traditional stands at this juncture, when both countries have agreed to talk without preconditions, will be ill-advised if not irresponsible.

It may also be said here in passing that while the president in his recent interviews linked Pakistan’s future relationship with Israel with progress in the implementation of the Middle East “roadmap” leading to the creation of the state of Palestine, Sheikh Rashid has ruled out any change now or in the future. What the president obviously left unsaid was that when the Palestinians recognize Israel, it would make no sense for Pakistan not to do so when Turkey, Jordan, Egypt and some other Muslim countries have already recognised it. After all, we have no quarrel with Israel other than the right of the Palestinians to a homeland.

Foreign affairs, Kashmir and the impending talks with India are a subject too sensitive and important for a glib, populist comment. Every official pronouncement must be weighed and vetted beforehand for its favourable or adverse repercussions. It is a task better left to the foreign minister.

Whatever Musharraf, India’s Advani or our own street-wise Shaikh Rashid might have to say about Kashmir, a cynical but correct verdict came from Indian journalist Sharma when questioned on the BBC. Vajpayee, Sharma said, has to face elections in four states in the months ahead. Musharraf’s presidency is continually assailed by the militants on the one hand and by moderate but more aggrieved Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif on the other. Neither Vajpayee nor Musharraf would risk losing power by appearing weak on Kashmir.

In fact, Musharraf in his BBC interview admitted as much. Excessive emphasis on crossings of the Line of control, he feared, might cause a popular backlash in Pakistan to the glee of the extremists and terrorists whom he was chasing. Thus, Musharraf has raised a spectre the world dreads, and has also persuaded India to resume talks. Never had the world events, not of Pakistan’s making, created an environment more conducive for a Kashmir settlement as now. Squandered, such an opportunity may not come again.

It is a misfortune of the people and damaging to the image of the country that its constitutional crisis and political feuds all revolve round the president who should be the guardian of the constitution and, as head of the state, above partisan politics. Though elections have been held and power has been transferred, the president remains at the centre of the nation’s predicament over the controversial Legal Framework Ordinance.

General Musharraf had promised, or wished, before the elections that after transferring power to the politicians, that he would play golf and just keep an eye on the institutions and men to warn or to intervene if they deviate from the constitutional path. That has not happened. All policy directions on foreign or domestic affairs emanate from him. All significant executive actions are attributed to him.

Lyse Ducet, BBC’s Pakistan expert, asked General Musharraf in London the other day to give some more space to the politicians to be effective in public affairs. Clever Lyse knew well that whatever space he had vacated was now occupied by his nominees. At about the same time Benazir Bhutto pointed out that when all avenues of political arbitration in a pluralistic society (which Pakistan is) are blocked, the opponents of the regime are left with no alternative but to shout in the parliament or run riot on the streets.

The chairman of the Senate, the speaker of the parliament, the Election Commission and the courts, she explained, have all become branches of the government owing allegiance to the president, who is also chief of the army, and have ceased to be independent institutions of the state.

General Musharraf, in turn, relies on the majority in the parliament for endorsing his remaining the chief of the army, and on the ruling of the speaker holding the LFO a part of the Constitution which is the source of his presidency. That may be correct in form but is deficient in substance. The base on which he has raised the whole new structure is narrow and its foundations are shaky. A majority formed by bringing together disparate factions and individuals and the ruling given by a speaker elected by them at his behest cannot sustain the new system with all its irksome innovations for five long years.

Now that the elements, mostly religious, who could make it to the parliament only because of the new system have also disowned, it, General Musharraf should broaden the popular base of the institutions by enlisting the support of the liberal and still popular leaders who were excluded from the electoral process either by his laws or they themselves chose to stay away out of apathy or fear. Benazir Bhutto looks inclined to negotiate a compromise. So, it seems, is Shahbaz Sharif. Benazir Bhutto has a remarkable grasp of international affairs and Shahbaz is known as a stern, no-nonsense administrator. Both have suffered enough for their defiance and alleged transgression already.

It would be advisable for President Musharraf to go into the background, leaving the task of assembling a new government of conciliation and competence to the prime minister. That may bring to an end the battle of egos and result in a working arrangement within the present constitutional dispensation till the next elections which one can foresee happening much earlier than 2007.

Who knows by then General Musharraf may emerge as an umpire in the political wrangling rather than a contestant in it. Politics all over the world has its quirks but it is weirdest in Pakistan.