I will pause for a week or two and not continue with the subject I have been spending a considerable amount of time on — the subject of institutional finance and economic development. Instead, I will write today about something of immediate concern for a country in Pakistan’s situation. I refer, of course, to America’s coming war with Iraq. On Wednesday, February 5, Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, presented the American case in the UN Security Council. He told the world why, in the minds of the current leaders of America, it makes sense for them to go to war with Iraq.

What would another war on Iraq led by America mean for Pakistan? The one in 1991 caused Pakistan a great deal of economic damage, both short term and long term. In the short term a sharp increase in the price of oil significantly increased Pakistan’s import bill. It also resulted in the repatriation of hundreds of thousands Pakistanis working in the Middle East. They returned to their homeland and added to the pool of the urban unemployed. The workers’ return also meant a decline in the amount of foreign capital Pakistan was receiving as remittances. And what was then not realized, the American action on Iraq and the stationing of its troops in Saudi Arabia, led to the rise of Al Qaeda. Pakistan is still paying a heavy price for that development.

What should Pakistan expect from the second war in Iraq? The second Iraq war could cause Pakistan even greater damage. Let us understand why that might be the case. We have the second largest population in the Muslim world, after Indonesia. We sit on two fault lines in the world of Islam. Pakistan is where the Arab Islam meets the Asian Islam; it is also where these two Islams meet the resurgent Islam of Central Asia. If, today, the world of Islam is in turmoil, and if that turmoil is exacerbated when Iraq is attacked by America, the tremors it will produce will be felt at these two fault lines. Pakistan, as a result, could shake to its feeble foundations.

Pakistan also is the well-advertised frontline state in America’s continuing war against Al Qaeda. It is now generally accepted that Al Qaeda remnants are lodged in the swath of tribal territory that serves as an unsettled border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. While the remaining followers of Al Qaeda may have congregated in the wild place where the writ of Islamabad runs poorly, their influence reaches into the heart of Pakistan. As if to remind the world so pre-occupied with Iraq and Saddam Hussein that Al Qaeda still exists to do mischief, a powerful bomb exploded in an affluent sector of Karachi. The explosion was probably set off by a suicidal bomber on February 2 — only three days before the US secretary of state addressed the UN Security Council— perhaps to send a reminder to policymakers in Washington.

Pakistan’s large Muslim population, its location on top of the two fault lines in the world of Islam, and the continuing war against international terrorism currently sponsored by al Qaeda are not the only reasons why a military conflict in Iraq will have great consequences for our country. There is no doubt it will change for good the world in which we live. There are two additional reasons why Pakistan should be concerned. The war will have an enormous economic impact on Pakistan and it will bring about a significant realignment among the nations around us. But to understand these two additional consequences of the second Iraq war, let us see the environment in which the US took the final step towards militarily confronting that Middle Eastern nation.

That step was taken by Secretary Powell in his one-hour long speech on February 5 before the fifteen nations — including Pakistan — represented on the Security Council. “My colleagues, we have an obligation to our citizens, we have an obligation to this body to see that our resolutions are complied with. We must not shrink from whatever is ahead of us,” the American diplomat told the Security Council. The war seems just round the corner.

It is always useful to read the editorial pages of the American newspapers to understand the full import of a coming event. The media — including the print media — have the tendency to focus most of their attention on one event. Minus the Security Council debate on Iraq, the disintegration of the space shuttle Columbia would have been that event.

The Security Council met a day after the Americans, including President George W. Bush, eulogized the seven astronauts who lost their lives as their space vehicle disintegrated into tens of thousands of pieces over California, Arizona, Texas, Louisiana and other states of western and southern parts of America. But on their editorial pages the newspapers gave more attention to Iraq than to the shuttle tragedy, signifying the importance they attached to the impending war.

In a way the shuttle disaster as well as the national and ethnic composition of the crew that lost their lives should have reminded America of two important things. The disintegration of the shuttle showed that there are severe limits to the use of technology to surmount all hurdles. A great deal has already been said and written about the enormous technological change that has occurred since America fought with Iraq a decade ago. But the shuttle tragedy showed the limits of technology. And the multinational composition of the shuttle crew — an astronaut from Israel and a woman born and educated in the Indian state of Punjab before becoming a naturalized American — should have also signalled to the US how important globalization has become in all human endeavours. By going into Iraq against the wishes of so many people around the globe, America was giving up the great advantage of collective action. But these aspects of the shuttle disaster were hardly mentioned by the American analysts as they contemplated the consequences of their country’s move against Iraq.

Let us see what was said in the mainstream American press on the day Secretary Powell spoke at the United Nations. If Henry Kissinger’s multi-volume memoirs are a good indication of the influence on policy-making of the editorial pages of the more important newspapers of America, then we should always take seriously what The Washington Post says on important policy issues. The newspaper usually prints long, two column editorials when it feels that its voice needs to be heard by policy-makers. On February 5, its comment almost reached that length.

Published under the title of “The Case for Action,” the editorial broke away from liberal thought in the United States and advised the Bush administration as follows: “We believe that it would be a mistake for the United States and its allies, confronted with continued intransigence, to shrink again from decisive action in Iraq. Unless expected change takes place in Baghdad, the United States should lead a force to remove Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. . . The Iraqi regime poses a threat not just to the United States but to [the] global order. . . A continued failure to act would send dictators and terrorists a devastating message about the impotence of the United States and the United Nations. It would encourage extremists in their rush for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.”

But, as we will discuss below by referring to an editorial in another newspaper, the world’s dictators and terrorists may draw a very different lesson from the one feared by The Washington Post.

The Washington Post’s case was the most articulate defence to date of the Bush administration’s doctrine of pre-emptive strike against nations and places not seen acting responsibly in support of the emerging global order. But what was responsible behaviour and what was the nature of the global order America would seek to preserve by pre-emptive action? These questions were asked in several quarters but no easy answers were supplied. But that debate did not deter the editorial writers of The Washington Post. “War is never to be welcomed,” they declared. “But a decade of failed diplomacy and containment has brought the nation to a point where war may soon be the only credible option for ending the threat of Saddam Hussein.”

The reason why the Bush administration had decided to focus so much of its attention on Iraq while the conflict with Al Qaeda continued to simmer was discussed and debated in many policy circles. That an extremely cruel despot rules Iraq is something most reasonable people will accept, even in the Muslim world. That Iraq and the world will be a better place without Saddam Hussein is something again that would not be debated. That a democratic Iraq could lead the rest of the Middle East towards representative forms of government is something that resonates favourably among liberal thinkers in the Muslim world. If these are indeed the objectives of the pressure on Iraq most people would be willing to pursue them. But is a bloody war the only way to achieve them?

In the meantime, the threat from North Korea continues to mount. It is the only country in the “axis of evil” that has admitted that it has in place an active programme for developing nuclear bombs. If the production of weapons of mass destruction on the part of “rogue nations” is indeed a threat to the preservation of a civilized global order, then wouldn’t it make sense for Washington to focus its attention on North Korea?

That question was asked by The New York Times in its editorial published in the issue of February 5. “North Korea’s rapidly advancing nuclear weapons programme is the most urgent threat facing America today. Yet the administration, intent on dealing with Iraq first, has been reluctant to give diplomacy with North Korea the priority it warrants,” lamented the newspaper. “While the White House frets about the appearance of rewarding North Korean misconduct with unconditional talks and worries about temporarily shifting the spotlight off Saddam Hussein, North Korea seems to be getting ready to build bombs on a very fast timetable,” continued the newspaper.

Some segments of the British press followed the line of argument adopted by The New York Times — that North Korea posed a much graver challenge to the security of the United States and some of its allies than did Iraq. “Yet the Bush administration’s North Korea policy, in contrast to its fervour about Iraq, has been almost insouciant,” editorialized the Financial Times on February 5.

The Financial Times had one additional worry about the way Washington was reacting to the twin challenges of Iraq and North Korea — a worry seldom articulated in the American media. “Washington’s determination to attack an Iraq that does not have the bomb, could persuade ambitious tyrants that they must fast acquire nuclear or other doomsday weapons. Pyongyang, the worst proliferators of missile technology, would be well placed to supply this ‘buy now while the stocks last’ stampede.”

INDIA had not expected that, in the wake of September 11 carnage, Pakistan would join the fight against the Taliban. However, it was itself keen to enter into an alliance with the United States and, in its haste, offered all military facilities and full logistic support to it.

Expecting Pakistan to be reluctant to join the US-led coalition to fight global terrorism, India smelled the opportunity to get it declared a terrorist state and thus harm its strategic assets and the Kashmir cause. President Pervez Musharraf’s decision to join the coalition thwarted its designs against Pakistan.

However, it seems that India has not yet given up its hope as its propaganda against Pakistan continues unabated. The latest in the series is its Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani’s accusation that the epicentre of terrorism has shifted from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Coming at a time when Pakistan is being wantonly accused of secretly transferring nuclear technology to North Korea and the United States’ current stand-off with Iraq on the alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction by the latter, it is not difficult to understand the motive behind India’s ruthless propaganda against Pakistan.

Either taking its cue from India’s propaganda or driven by its own prejudice against Pakistan, which has acquired nuclear status, the western media has launched a diatribe against it. It is questioning the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets and expressing worry at the imaginary possibility of their falling into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. Feelers have also been put out in the western media that Israel may target Pakistan’s nuclear capability installations if there was a threat of fundamentalists gaining access to it. An American think tank, Lexis Nexis, has gone one step further. It has suggested that, given Pakistan’s political instability and fragility, the destruction of its nuclear arsenal may be necessary.

The same think tank has gone to the extent of recommending that the only long-term solution of the problem is the “reunification” of the Indian subcontinent which ought to be an object of western policy. One only hopes that Indian leaders’ repeated threats to wipe out Pakistan are not linked with the American think tank’s incredible suggestion. The policy makers in Pakistan should not treat these warnings as empty rhetoric which actually reflect the inner desires of their authors. They should seriously ponder which way the wind is blowing.

The apprehensions in the western world that the Islamic political parties in Pakistan, who captured a large number of seats in the recent general elections, could trigger political instability in the country, which may enable the extremists to gain access to the nuclear assets, are ill-founded and rather over-stated. The Islamic political parties in Pakistan are not extremists in their outlook in the real sense of the word. They are as sensitive to the vital interests of the country as any other party in the country. They have repeatedly declared that they would not do anything which may destabilize the country politically.

In any case, the Islamic political parties are not alone in opposing the US-led armed intervention in Afghanistan. This opposition emanates from their desire to prevent the massacre of innocent people of Afghanistan with whom the people of Pakistan share affinities of geography, history, religion and culture. It should also be understood that, in Pakistan, the political parties of every hue want to preserve Pakistan’s identity as an independent and sovereign Islamic nation but none of them, the religious parties included, bear malice towards other religions and communities in the world.

The possibility of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons has been one of the main concerns since the early days of the nuclear age. The security of nuclear material, is, therefore, an essential part of the responsible and peaceful use of nuclear energy. The prime responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the nuclear states themselves. Pakistan, being a signatory to the Convention of Nuclear Safety, is fully committed to enforce the internationally recognised safety measures for its nuclear assets. It has, therefore, made a conscious effort to ensure the safety of its nuclear arsenal and devised a clear and well-defined command and control system. Well trained commando units are deployed to guard the nuclear installations and other nuclear-related sensitive areas which foreclose the possibility of terrorists gaining access to nuclear weapons.

The nuclear states generally keep their weapons in an unconstituted form for safety reasons. Enormous inter-organizational effort is required to re-constitute them. Only a highly trained manpower can do that. It is, therefore, extremely unlikely that the terrorists, even if they are able to get hold of such weapons, would be able to reconstitute them for detonation. This is precisely the reason that terrorists have never used a nuclear weapon anywhere in the world. Thus, it may be safely presumed that the nuclear terrorism is only a conjectural hypothesis. The responsible states, nevertheless, never adopt a lax attitude to nuclear safety regulations. On the contrary, they continue to make efforts to strengthen them further as a safeguard against terrorists’ threats.

The nuclear weapon has two aspects: to be sure, it is a weapon of awful destructive power, but it has a political dimension too. The latter arises mainly from the political and military difficulties attendant upon its actual use in war. It has been used only twice in war. That was when its full destructive potential and after-effects were not known not only to the world public but also to its creators. Since then, the likelihood of its use has been hinted at, or even openly threatened, only against a non-nuclear adversary. The Cuban crisis was the only occasion when a war between two nuclear-armed powers appeared close.

In today’s unipolar world, the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state seems to have become more likely, since no state, nuclear or non-nuclear, is going to court the danger of a nuclear attack for the sake of another state. That was the reason why England and France, America’s close allies, developed their own nuclear weapons even during the cold war when they had the US nuclear umbrella protecting them, as did the Soviet Union’s ally, China.

From then on, the massive stockpiles of these weapons with the great powers, which grew with every arms limitation treaty, have had primarily a political role. This was due to a regime of great power relations which they had worked out to prevent the cold war degenerating into a nuclear showdown. The regime has broken down with the disappearance of one of the poles. Russia has kept the weapons of the Soviet Union, though it has ceased to be a contender as the other world power.

But the problem is that of the defence of smaller states, which do not have nuclear weapons and do not enjoy the support of one world power against the other. How do they protect themselves — not from a world power, which they cannot, but from regional bullies or neighbourhood hooligans.

Pakistan had once enjoyed a reasonable measure of security because of its alliance with the US. With the break-down of the old global power regime, it was not certain what degree of security would be available to it against a local nuclear threat. Still, Pakistan refrained from crossing the nuclear threshold even after the Indian nuclear test of 1974. But New Delhi’s relentless pursuit of its hegemonic ambitions, adding a nuclear arsenal to its preponderant conventional might and its frequent use of threats against its neighbours, forced Pakistan to opt for a minimum nuclear force as a deterrent.

Thus, the responsibility of the nuclearization of South Asia rests with India. Pakistan responded to the Indian nuclear tests in 1998 only in self-defence. The threat to Pakistan from India is real and, therefore, it cannot compromise on its basic security requirements. India not only has an edge over Pakistan in the nuclear field but also enjoys superiority in conventional forces. Therefore, any attempt to disturb the existing strategic balance in the region would be detrimental to its security interests.

Pakistan expects from its friends and allies greater understanding of the threat posed to its security by India. They are also expected to understand the centrality of the Kashmir dispute in the context of Indo-Pakistan relations. Nothing can be more painful than an unsavoury and coercive attitude being adopted by friends and well wishers towards a trusted ally in its time of difficulty.

The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan.