Bush’s Iraq safari
By Brigadier (R) A.R. Siddiqi
IT would be foolhardy to make a value judgment on President George Bush’s repeated vows to impose a full-scale war on Iraq. For how could an analyst, with his own limited knowledge of military affairs and practically none whatsoever of the Pentagon’s and the State Department’s top secret planning, claim more than the combined wisdom of America’s top civil and military planners? Furthermore, in matters of peace and war the least one can and should do is to allow his imagination as little rope as possible. This is important, if only to make sure that he does not let go off both the ends of the rope.
However, there is nothing to stop one being curious about certain things, out and beyond the normal span of one’s own comprehension and incompatible with even ordinary common sense. For instance, what beats one completely as far as President Bush’s resounding war vows are concerned, is what are those all about? Whether it’s the conquest of Iraq itself and the mass massacre (collateral damage!) of its civilian population that must inevitably go with it. Or is it simply to get rid of a single individual called Saddam Hussein and ‘strip’ him of any weapons of mass destruction by force if necessary...?
As for the outright conquest of Iraq, it would not only violate America’s own code of ethics and morality but also its own publicly stated military posture. In an incisive article ‘How America Does It’ one of its best-known scholars, Josef Joffe wrote: “It (America) irks and dominates, but it does not conquer. It tries to call the shots and bend the rules, but it does not go to war for land and glory. Indeed, the last time the United States actually grabbed territory was a hundred years ago, when it relieved Spain of Cuba and the Philippines... (Foreign Affairs, 75th Anniversary Issue, September / October 1997).
If Joffe’s formulation does, in any way, reflect America’s basic military philosophy, outright conquest would be ruled out without much debate. However, if this is what happens to be Bush’s real aim then it would take the world back to the era prior to the Treaty Westphalia of 1648 recognizing the right of smaller states to stay as independent and sovereign entities within their own territories.
Conversely, if America’s military (strategic) objective is to get rid of Saddam, concentrating over a hundred thousand men together with an armada of warships and warplanes would make little sense.
What if in the meantime, the individual concerned either dies a natural death or gets bumped off in a coup or resigns of his own free will to leave the invading force without an enemy, looking silly in the face. Should such a contingency ever materialize, (and it may well do) how will the US president convince the US taxpayers and frontline soldiers of the wisdom of his extreme measures? That would indeed be the most ludicrous and awkward situation for the US to face.
If Saddam ever invokes his extreme option of quitting power, it need not mean quitting Baghdad at the same time. Well over two decades of absolute power; a fierce eight-year long war with neighbouring Iran; a short and suicidal one with the rest of the world under US command and a UNSC mandate (1990-1991), must have hardened the man enough to face death with a straight face.
These are but some of the hypotheses that may never materialize. Nevertheless, hypotheses, favourable and unfavourable, make woof and warp of strategy: and it just can’t be that the Pentagon planners may not have taken them into account.
“No one starts a war or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so without being clear in mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” So wrote Clausewitz in his On War, one of the classics military thinking.
On Jan 13, Saudi Arabia warned that waging war against Iraq would be ‘a loss to all parties’. America would not be a winner even if an assured victor in a narrow military sense. Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz expressed his country’s ‘deep concern towards developments in Iraq, reaffirming the kingdom’s keenness to preserve Iraq’s unity and national integrity’.
As regards the Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), — nuclear, biological and chemical — the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection experts have not found any ‘smoking guns’, that is real live munitions so far. That would hardly satisfy President Bush and his defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, however. The lurking fear remains that Saddam had them hidden in ‘dark corners and caves!’ What argument could be effective against such dark musings?
CIA Director George Tenet even told the Congress that Saddam would be ‘likely to use any biological, chemical or nuclear weapons he had in response to an invasion’.
And he might just as well when pushed over to the wall. The question is, what is he waiting for? What’s there to stop him from deploying and launching his WMDs now to preempt the US’s nuclear onslaught? That would only be compatible with the Bush doctrine of a preemptive strike as when and where the initiator or the aggressor might so choose at his own discretion.
The Bush Doctrine would allow nuclear weapons employed against ‘targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack’ similar to the US concentrated bombardment of the Tora Bora caves in Afghanistan, supposedly hiding Osama, Mulla Umar and the surviving Taliban leadership.
What happens between now and 27th January after UNMOVIC Chief Hans Blix is scheduled to make his first report to the Security Council about the findings of their WMD hunt in Iraq may not be hard to guess. It would, in all likelihood, be the continuation of the existing tense stand-off. The D-day tentatively set for late February would, however, remain subject to sudden changes depending on the unpredictable course events might take.

