Mischief in low turnouts
By Shahid Javed Burki
IN THE elections held recently in three of the more populous countries of the developing world, a significant number of voters abandoned the centre of the political spectrum and marched towards the fringes. In Brazil, the electorate chose a left leaning politician who will become that country’s president on January 1, 2003. In Turkey, voters elected a parliament with a clear majority of representatives belonging to a political party with deep Islamic roots. In Pakistan, voters sent a sizable number of Islamists to the National Assembly and two of the four provincial assemblies. The electoral triumph of the Islamic groups will make it difficult to keep them out of power in the provinces and not to take their politics into account if they remain in opposition at the centre.
It is clear that in all three cases — in Brazil, Pakistan and Turkey — the voters’ march to the fringes was a reflection of people’s extreme unhappiness with mainstream politics and with the politicians who represented that part of the political universe. In a previous article I provided some reasons why the unhappy citizens of Brazil chose a candidate of the left to be their next leader and why, in Pakistan and Turkey, those who voted in the elections breathed new life into the Islamic parties.
The move to the religious right in Pakistan and Turkey was in response to two very different sets of circumstances. In Pakistan the fire was lit by external developments — by the on-going war in Afghanistan and by the growing anti-Muslim sentiment in the West. While these events produced the spark, the political conflagration was caused by the presence of plenty of highly inflammable tinder that had gathered on the ground. By staying with this metaphor, we are led to the obvious question: how can the flames lit by the elections of October 10 be doused so that they don’t spread to other parts of the country?
It would be wrong to interpret Turkey’s swing to the right as part of a phenomenon that is affecting political development in the entire Islamic world. The electorate’s reaction in Turkey was in response to a set of developments that were entirely domestic. Over the last several years and in spite of the help given by the international community, Turkey’s economy has steadily deteriorated. It is now at the point of near collapse. Turkey today is in the situation where Pakistan was three years ago when General Pervez Musharraf brought the military back to power to stop the haemorrhaging of the economy.
In developing a better understanding of the swing to the right in these two large Muslim countries we should focus on a series of events and developments that, on their own, have little to do with Islam per se. The dynamics that produced the results in the countries and gave salience to the Islamic parties had little in common. The only thing common is that in both countries Islamic parties will have a larger political presence for several years to come.
Let us turn to Pakistan. The impressive electoral showing of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal in the elections of October 10 can be explained in terms of four developments, each in its own way reinforcing the remaining three. The four developments I have in mind include, one, the collapse of the public educational system that led to the rise of the madaris. Two, the loss of confidence and with it the decline in interest on the part of a large segment of the population in the political process. This is reflected in the steady decline in voter turnout in the elections held since 1985. Three, the failure of western-style political parties to develop into effective political institutions and gain a loyal following. Four, the way one segment of the population made an electoral issue of the antipathy of the citizenry in the West towards Islam and Muslims.
In several previous articles I have discussed the segmentation of the Pakistani educational system into three parts and how this is producing three different social classes that will eventually come into clash with one another — if that has not begun to happen already. I will not cover this ground here once again. Instead, I will focus on voter turnout, passion in politics and the absence of modern political institutions to which the majority of the population could relate.
Several weeks ago Anwar Syed, one of Dawn’s regular columnists, writing from Washington, provided some interesting data on voter turnout in Pakistan’s elections since 1970. The voters’ participation was very high in the elections of 1970 — the first to be held in the country’s history. This was for two reasons: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s charisma and the passion with which he delivered his message. Bhutto, at the head of a new political party — the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) — was able to draw towards him the kind of political support given only to one other Muslim politician in South Asia, Mohammad Ali Jinnah.
Time and chance helped Bhutto to overthrow the political establishment and introduce a new political order. A large turnout of voters helped him secure an electoral triumph in 1970 that no one — not even he — expected. In just over half a dozen years, Bhutto, however, managed to lose the affection of most of the people who helped him into power.
The next time voters turned out in large numbers and showed some passion for the political process was in 1988, a few months after the death of the long-ruling military dictator, General Ziaul Haq. The circumstances and the messages that brought the voters out were not very dissimilar from those that had galvanized the electorate eighteen years earlier, in 1970. The political stage was now dominated by another extraordinarily charismatic leader, Benazir Bhutto. People’s response to her having assumed her father’s mantle was palpable — they turned out in large numbers to get her back into power.
From 1988 to 1991 — a period described accurately by General Pervez Musharraf as Pakistan’s lost decade — politicians failed the people. People’s respect for politicians, for the political institutions over which they presided, and for the political process itself declined significantly. This was reflected in the voter turnout numbers which reached the lowest proportion in 1997 when only 36 per cent of the electorate voted. In those elections Benazir Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif, leaders respectively of the People’s Party of Pakistan and the Pakistan Muslim League, competed vigorously. No observer then saw any apathy or indifference among the voting public.
The elections of October 10, 2002 were expected to produce an even lower voter turnout. Most observers watching the political scene saw apathy. Several predicted that the absence of the two persons who had led their parties to electoral victories twice in the decade of the 1990s was the reason for the absence of excitement amongst the electorate. But, at least according to the data released by the Election Commission, the voter turnout was 41.8 per cent of the eligible voters, nearly as high as in the elections of 1988.
It is the difference among provincial voter turnouts that is most revealing. The highest turnout was recorded in Punjab, the country’s largest province and the one that is most politicized. By “politicized” I mean the presence of a number of things. Punjab has more developed political infrastructure than is the case in other provinces. Political parties have developed fairly deep roots. Most of them have workers and local organizations that can be mobilized to spread the party’s message — if there is a message to send — bring out people to attend meetings addressed by local candidates and take the people to the polls on the day of election. Sindh is the next most politicized province. And, for obvious reasons, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas — the FATA — are the least politicized of all the Pakistani regions.
It is not surprising that there was a direct correlation between the level of politicization and voter turnout in the elections of October 2002. With 46.3 per cent, Punjab had the highest turnout, 11 per cent more than the national average. Sindh came in second with 38.2 per cent, 9 per cent below the national average. The North-West Frontier Province was third with 34.6 per cent, 17 per cent below the turnout for the country. Then came Balochistan with 28.5 per cent, 32 per cent below the estimate for Pakistan. In FATA the turnout was only 25.5 per cent, 39 per cent below the country’s average.
There is a positive relationship between voter turnout and the success of Islamic parties — lower the turnout, higher the success of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal. Why did that happen? Modern political parties were less well organized in these regions with hardly any institutional structure. The Islamic parties, on the other hand, successfully exploited the mosque and the madrassahs to galvanize their support. They provided the passion that was missing from the campaigns of the mainstream parties. As I said in an earlier article, the lack of enthusiasm among the supporters of the mainstream parties had nothing to do with the absence of their leaders from the electoral scene. It was the consequence of the absence of a message to which the voters could respond. On the other hand, the Islamic parties had a powerful message for the voters.
The coalition of religious parties spoke to the people by using the context of the on-going war against international terrorism which had deeply affected their lives. The message they sent was not pro-terrorism but against America’s handling of the struggle. The American war on terrorism was portrayed successfully as a war against Islam. The fact that well known American evangelists such as Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson and Franklin Graham had spoken so disparagingly of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) lent considerable credence to the message that issued forth from the mosques.
I draw a simple conclusion from this analysis. A strong message delivered with great passion was able to pull their voters to the polling stations even though the majority of the voting public stayed home. Having lost its respect for politicians and their parties, it left the stage to the forces of radical Islam, particularly in the regions most affected by America’s war against terrorism. This means the political parties have their job cut out for them: to gain through deeds, and not words, the respect of the people. Only then will a large number of people will be prepared to go to the polls and overwhelm the forces of obscurantism.


Blaming religion for terrorism
By Martin Woollacott
IT has always been true that many things done in the name of God would be abhorrent to a benign deity. But, with terrorists attacking Israelis in Kenya, Muslims and Christians killing each other in Nigeria, a mission nurse murdered in Lebanon and Hindu worshippers and Muslim assailants shot down in Kashmir, this seems like an especially bad period for the abuse of religion.
Religion continues to be a vehicle for political expression and change, whether peaceful or violent, in a way surprising to those who once expected a progressive secularization to ultimately reach every part of the globe.
What is really going on during religious revivals or in the growth of political movements based on religion, or of terrorist groups claiming religious justification, are vexed issues, but between, say, the Iranian revolution and the emergence of Al Qaeda, there have been some clues.
Those are both dates of developments within the Islamic world, but this is a period which also encompasses the growth of the Christian right in the US, an increase in religious influence in Israel, a war in the Balkans in which religiously derived identities played a baleful part, the emergence of a more extreme form of Hinduism in India and the sometimes intolerant reassertiveness of the Orthodox churches in former communist states.
Such a list suggests a pathology, and that is certainly there, as the Mombasa outrage confirms. But for the more general phenomena of religious politics it might be better to go back to that understanding of religious change which sees it as reflecting the appearance of new classes, but also as shaped by local political tradition. The Middle East, in particular, shows the range of different kinds of religious change that have accompanied similar forces in countries such as Turkey, Iran, Egypt and even Israel.
That suggests it is these forces, foremost among them population growth and rapid urbanization, which are primary, and the religious consequences which are secondary. This in turn suggests that “blaming” religion as such for unwelcome changes and for violent acts misses the point, which is not the same as saying that clerical elites do not have a responsibility to oppose distortions of religion.
As the Islamist movement in Turkey grew, some sympathetic observers a few years ago likened it to the Methodist movement in Britain in its early days. The immigrants from the countryside coming into Turkey’s big cities, and the children born to them there, wanted a religious and political presentation, and representation, which catered to them. The older parties tried, had some success, but usually lost any credit they gained on the campaign trail in government.
Equally, perhaps, Turkish Islam, characterized by state control of the formal structures on the one hand and a Freemason-like network of religious orders for the more privileged on the other, did not meet the needs of the new classes in the cities. It may be that the most important aspect of the recent triumph of the Justice and Development party is that it registers fully this demographic and social shift in Turkey rather than that it brings Islam into Turkish politics in a way not permitted before.
In Iran very similar social changes are having an almost opposite effect, as many have noted. The movement into the cities and the tensions between old and new kinds of businessmen contributed toward the revolution which removed the Shah. But population growth and urbanization have since gone at a pace beyond anything seen in the Shah’s time. So Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution has been faced with new classes and masses and their needs just as was the Turkish establishment.
Since political Islamists are in power in Iran, frustration and anger with the government has taken on an inevitably secular character. A principled opposition among those clerics who were always doubtful about the legitimacy of Khomeini’s innovations has also grown.
President Mohammad Khatami has kept political Islam going by promising reform, but the long struggle between his supporters and the hardliners may now be heading for some kind of resolution. A victory for the reformists might be a kind of Iranian equivalent of the Turkish changes, or, if the Iranian hardliners crack down, to the clash between the new government and the armed forces which is still a remote possibility in Turkey.
In Israel and the occupied territories, the same population growth and urbanization have taken peculiar forms but are still profoundly influential. Palestinian population growth and the lumpen urbanization represented by concentration in refugee shanty towns, on the one hand, and by commuting to work in Israel on the other, happened in areas both inside and outside Israel’s control. Whichever it was, Israel faced problems it had not anticipated.
The Palestinian community in Israel, in the occupied territories and in the countries where Palestinians lived in exile, grew immensely in size, and maintained and strengthened its identity — exactly the opposite of what the Israelis had hoped. In the territories, the new classes had new demands like their equivalents elsewhere, although of course shaped by the distorted and impoverished conditions imposed by the conflict, and movements like Hamas and Islamic Jihad can be seen as responding to those demands in ways the Palestine Liberation Organization and then the Palestine Authority could not or would not.
Meanwhile, Israel’s own Jewish population growth and greater urbanization, reinforced by immigration, played a part in the decline of the Labour party, better fortunes for Likud and the increased influence of the religious parties that have characterized its recent political history.
Egyptian developments show yet another possibility. Where there is little formal political access for those with apparently religious answers to political problems, and where the violent takeover of the state has both failed and been repudiated by a majority in the movement, new leaders responding to new needs can proceed by taking over the informal and non-governmental institutions of society. The success of Islamists in the Middle East can be accounted for by the inadequacy of existing governments, and putting the blame on the US for sustaining such governments.
Those truly devoted to their religion must continue to try to moderate these effects. There is no denying that, whatever the ultimate causes, killing in the name of religion of the sort recently seen represents a moral breakdown.—Dawn/Guardian Service.

