NEW YORK; A new book by Bob Woodward, Managing Editor of the Washington Post, reveals details of how the Bush administration cajoled President Pervez Musharraf into submission and Washington’s apprehension about Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

The book, Bush at War, which hit the book stores on Wednesday, also details the role the Indian intelligence agencies which are “well-wired into Pakistan” by providing US intelligence information about Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

Woodward says that in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Powell decided that Pakistan was bound to be the linchpin if the US was to take on the Al Qaeda on its turf. He and his deputy Richard Armitage then draw up a list of seven demands from Pakistan:

1) Stop Al Qaeda operatives at your border, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and end ALL logistical support for (Osama) bin Laden,

2) Blanket overfreight and landing rights,

3) Access to Pakistan, naval bases, air bases and borders,

4) Immediate intelligence and immigration information,

5) Condemn the Sept 11 attacks, curb all domestic expression of support for terrorism against the United States, its friends and allies,

6) Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban, and

7) Break diplomatic relations with the Taliban and assist us to destroy (Osama) bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network.

“In so many words,” says Woodward, “Powell and Armitage would be asking Pakistan to help destroy what its intelligence service had helped create and maintain: The Taliban.”

Gen Mahmood: Ironically, Woodward writes that the bearer of this bad news for Musharraf would be his intelligence supremo Gen Mahmood Ahmed. By sheer coincidence, the ISI chief was visiting Washington at the time of the 9/11 attacks and was called into to the CIA headquarters.

At a meeting with CIA Director George Tenet and his deputies, Mahmood defends Taliban leader Mullah Omar, saying he is a religious man, “a man of humanitarian instincts, not a man of violence, but one who had suffered greatly under the Afghan warlords.”

“Stop!” Tenet’s Deputy Jim Pavitt says. “Spare me. Does Mullah Omar want the United States military to unleash its force against the Taliban? Do you want that to happen? Will you go and ask him?”

Later, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage invites Mahmood to the State Department to crank up the heat. He begins by saying that it is not yet clear what the US would ask of Pakistan, but the requests would force “deep introspection.

“Pakistan faces a stark choice, either it is with us or it is not. This is a black and white with no gray,” Armitage tells him.

Mahmood, sounding utterly defensive, says his country had faced tough choices in the past but Pakistan was not a big or mighty power. “Pakistan is an important country,” Armitage cuts in.

After Armitage has softened up Musharraf through his emissary, Secretary of State Powell calls him up in Islamabad. “As one general to another, we need someone on our flank fighting with us,” he says, and then adds meaningfully: “Speaking candidly, the American people would not understand if Pakistan was not in this fight with the United States.”

To Powell’s surprise, says Woodward, Musharraf promises to support the US with each of the seven actions.

An elated Powell then conveys his achievement at a National Security Council meeting in the White House Situation Room, saying: “I’d like to tell you what we told the Pakistanis today,” before loudly and proudly reading out the seven demands. When he finishes, he tells the meeting that Musharraf has already accepted them.

“It looks like you got it all,” Bush says. Others in the room ask for a copy of the US charter of demands.

Woodward’s book also reveals that the US and Indian intelligence agencies work closely and exchange information.

At one point during the critical days after 9/11, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card draws Bush aside in the precincts of the Presidential mansion and warns him of another threat to the White House.

This information, which the US deems credible, had been sent to the CIA from the Indian intelligence service that Pakistani jihadis were planning an imminent attack on the White House. Woodward says the threat was consistent with other intelligence that established immediate danger. The Indian intelligence, he says, was well-wired into Pakistan.

Woodward’s book also reveals that the Bush administration was constantly seized of the effect a collapse in Afghanistan would have on Pakistan, Pakistan’s own instability, and its tensions with India, and the need to be sensitive to India’s concerns. At one point at a cabinet meeting Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says: “We’ve got to avoid the image of a shift to Pakistan.”

N-PROGRAMME: In a passage President Bush tells writer Woodward: “We began to get serious indications that nuclear plans, material and know-how were being moved out of Pakistan. It was the vibrations coming out of everybody reviewing the evidence.”