Afghanistan in transition
By A.R.Siddiqi
THE country is yet to find itself a proper and formally approved name and appellation. It is being variously designated as the ‘Republic of Afghanistan’, the ‘Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’ and ‘Daulat-i-Intiqali Afghanistan’ translated into English as Afghanistan’s Islamic Transitional Authority (AITA), also referred to as Afghanistan’s Islamic Transitional ‘State’ or ‘government’. Almost all the Afghan passports, I happened to see, carried the stamp of ‘the Republic of Afghanistan’.
Whereas there appears to be nothing wrong with ‘transitional government,’ the description ‘transitional’ used for ‘State’ is hardly appropriate. Much less appropriate would be the word ‘Authority’, (like the Palestinian Authority which is neither a government nor a state in the fullest sense of the term).
As for the actual power and the writ of the Karzai government, it remains confined to Kabul only and that too not very effectively, considering the multi-ethnic character of his cabinet with a preponderance of the Panjshiri non-Pathan elements. As regards Hamid Karzai’s own personality and performance as the head of the state and government and his absolute, unflinching commitment to the preservation of the Afghan millat as one organic whole, there would not be two opinions.
Left alone and secure in his exalted office until the first elections (if and when?) he seems to be adequately equipped with the will, the capability and the necessary political acumen to steer his country through the transitional period. If Afghanistan remains in the dangerously fluid state, it would not, however, be possible to make a fair guess even about the near future.
Considering the number of forces — external and internal — each playing its own game outside a common, nationalist matrix, one seemingly little overstep or transgression could do grave damage to the fragile structure put together under the Bonn Agreement. The Bonn Agreement itself went only as far as the formation of the interim government for six months — Dec 1 to June 2 — until the holding of the Loya Jirga to legitimize it for the period intervening between its formation and the first general election.
Thus the practical utility and relevance of the Bonn Agreement all but ended with the re-validation of the Karzai government after the Loya Jirga. There is already talk of a Bonn-II or Kabul-I. Bonn-II, as a foreign-brokered protocol is, however, ruled out as something basically offensive to the native temperament and tribal autonomy. The so-called Kabul-I would, therefore, appear to be a more practical and acceptable option.
What exactly is Kabul-I remains open to debate? In simple language, it would mean a meeting of the Afghan warlords and other zonal / area influentials to decide about setting a time table for the next elections; re-composition / rationalization of the existing cabinet on the basis of more balanced ethnic lines; role of the foreign forces, of the US-led coalition force, in particular, redefinition of its role and objective and telling it to quit soon after the job is done. Also, to revive the economy and introduce currency reforms to balance the Afghani vis-a-vis foreign currencies.
While the Loya Jirga of June, convened mainly to re-validate and restore the writ of the Karzai government, Kabul-I would set the agenda for the future governance of the country, its relations with its neighbours and the world community, etc. Kabul- I would be a purely internal process without any outside intervention. These are briefly (even roughly) the points emerging from my informal interaction with various interlocutors and lay no claim to absolute authenticity.
Now a closer look at Afghanistan’s present ethnic imbroglio and divide. In the capital itself, Karzai reigns if not exactly rules. He has managed quite creditably to get along with his Panjshir colleagues, not all of whom are known as his friends. He has been trying hard to make the best of what he has, by extending his hand of friendship even to someone as opportunistic and volatile as Gulbadin Hekmatyar.
In a press statement carried by the English section of the multi-lingual (Pushtu / Farsi) Kabul Weekly (dated Sept 26), he invited Hekmatyar to stop opposing the government and to cooperate with it. He went on to say: “The only way to stabilize peace and security is to be united and to work together.”
Regarding the attempt to assassinate him, he said he didn’t want his assailant to be killed and any more Afghans to be killed. He vowed “to continue the war against Al Qaeda and international terrorism” and would never change his mind about the suppression of the gun’s rule in the country.
His invitation to Hekmatyar, a Ghilzai Pakhtoon and absconder, may well turn into a double-edged weapon against him. For one thing, Hekmatyar is about the most distrusted and disliked person in the former Mujahideen ranks; and for the other he is a Wahabi Pathan. Karzai’s move may well be misinterpreted as a ploy to shore up his own position by having a Pathan and his tribe on his side. The move is bound to be misunderstood and resented by the Panjshiris even if did not actually materialize. There is hardly any chance of Hekmatyar’s homecoming without a general, unconditional amnesty being proclaimed.
Outside and away from Kabul the ethnic picture remains even more chaotic and daunting. To the south in Kandahar, Karzai’s own home town, sits Gul Agha Sherzai, apparently no great supporter of Karzai. It was in Kandahar that the assassination attempt on Karzai took place. To the west in Herat sits commander Ismail with his own strong militia. He is well-known for his centrifugal past and commitment to his personal / local authority.
In the east (Gardez) rules Bacha Khan Zadran, braving the main brunt of the US bombings to the admiration of his supporters. Whether or not in touch with Hekmatyar, Sherzai could be said to have been harbouring him, if the reports about Hekmatyar’s reported presence in his area have even an iota of truth.
The north remains under the overarching domination of Gen Abdul Rashid Dostum. However, he is no longer the unchallenged, absolute ruler of the North. There are others like Ustad Mohammad Atta and Mohaqqiq to challenge his authority.
When I had been there last in 1992, Dostum was the absolute, unchallenged ruler of the entire North. Under him the area was a zone of unruffled peace and tranquillity. This unfortunately is no longer the case and there is much fighting going between Dostum’s and Atta’s factions.—The writer is a retired brigadier.

