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DAWN - the Internet Edition


September 16, 2002 Monday Rajab 8, 1423

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Opinion


An attack on civilization?
Education: the dividing factor
A year later
To lose one’s centre
How to fill non-Muslim reserved seats?



An attack on civilization?


By Dr Zahid Shariff

THE massive human tragedy of 9-11 has understandably been condemned the world over. Killing of innocent civilians has aroused sympathy for the victims and anger towards those who murdered them.

Since that day a massive national effort was launched in America to both take action and to search for its meanings. The first included the war on terror and it does not have an end in sight; and the second began with asking, “why do they hate us?” and that too is unlikely to end any time soon. Sometimes the two were inevitably mixed, not always for political or partisan reasons.

The search for meanings of 9/11 began to be framed from the very beginning in language that was exaggerated and hyperbolic; it encouraged wild generalizations that substituted slogans for analysis. Such an atmosphere is not only more conducive to hysteria than calm reflection; it is also more likely, as was the case here, to prefer some meanings and interpretations to others.

Initially, it will be recalled, the crashing of four aeroplanes on that day in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania were described by President George Bush as an act of terror which will lead to those responsible being brought to justice. Soon after that, he called it an act of war. But even the characterization of terrorists’ declaration of war on America was not thought to be enough.

Ratcheting the language up further, the attack, he and virtually all the journalists, TV hosts, and most of the analysts said, had been launched on freedom, which was left vague and unspecified, but was closely identified with the United States; the terrorists resented Americans for having that freedom, it was alleged, since they did not have it themselves, and that was why they had struck.

Finally, it was civilization itself that was identified as their real target, although that too was undefined but presumably it was a proxy for both American cherished values and cultivated refinement. (If words like terrorists’ threat to “life” and “humanity” have not so far been pressed into service too frequently, they probably will be in the future.)

The search for meanings for 9/11, as it intensified, demanded not only defending the ever escalating aspirations and explanations (threats to security, freedom, civilization) and policy and political agendas (war, oil, elections) with which they are linked, it also required the corresponding denigration in exaggerated ways of those who were believed to threaten them. And that too has occurred. A new temperament and vocabulary have emerged which facilitate the use of words that encourage venomous denunciation: demonic, evil, violent, dangerous, terror, suspicious,Islamic.

If the terrorists are described as attacking civilization, what does that make them? While President Bush continues to formally urge citizens not to take out their rage on Muslims living in the US and no one in high governmental position has explicitly used the word primitive, the implications are not so ambiguous. These words get translated in public spaces — such as parks, airports, buses, and movie theatres — into ugly behaviour towards Muslims, those who look like them, or those seen interacting with them.

More than 300 cases of harassment of this kind as well as those that include attacks on houses and businesses owned or rented by Muslims, or those who resemble them, have been reported since 9/11, and they include three murders. I recall the words of Thomas Szasz: “In the animal kingdom, the rule is, eat or be eaten; in the human kingdom, define or be defined.”

The desire to understand why terrorists struck on 9/11 has also taken another route. It consists of resorting to a kind of essentialization that is often vigorously opposed in other contexts. For example, those who would never be willing to understand the behaviour of a small group in reference only to its cultural, racial or religious characteristics, have felt perfectly comfortable in doing just that during the last year. I don’t know anyone, for instance, who has wondered what is it about the Protestant religion, white race, or middle class background that produces kids who go with guns to schools and start killing other kids and their teachers.

Furthermore, how often have we wanted to connect the fact that Timothy MacVeigh was a Christian with his terrorist attack on a federal building?

That notwithstanding, the fact that the terrorists were Muslims continues to provide enough justification for many grown and well educated men and women to link the terrorists’ behaviour with their religion. While some serious and balanced discussion of the religion of Islam and the Muslims living in a variety of societies has taken place during the last year, far more frequent has been the daily Islam-bashing — in print and electronic media, journals and books, and movies and TV shows.

One of the worst “scholarly” examples of it is Bernard Lewis’s “What Went Wrong?”, as was recently pointed out by Edward Said in Harper’s Magazine. Instead of opening up possibilities for new meanings and understandings of who “we” and “they” are, another layer of beliefs about the Muslim world is being laid, one that selectively supplies new facts to confirm the old prejudices to define it primarily in terms of its deficiencies and absences. All this is being done, unfortunately, in the name of increasing awareness and reducing misunderstandings about Islam. It appears that the need for oil and stability had only temporarily dampened the orientalist discourse.

If we are willing to search, other meanings of 9/11 are, fortunately, readily available — in addition, that is, to the ‘blood-thirsty Muslims’, ‘inspired by Islam to kill the infidels’ at every opportunity — even though they are not frequently reported. Here is one example. Under the supervision of Madeleine Albright, who was not known to be friendly towards Muslim countries when she was the secretary of state, the Pew Research Centre and the International Herald Tribune conducted a survey of opinion leaders in several countries. As many as “58 per cent of the foreign leaders said US policies were responsible for the attacks while only 18 per cent of the US opinion leaders interviewed held that view” (Chicago Tribune, December 20, 2001).

The dominant understanding and interpretation of 9/11 gravitates towards pointing the finger at some variant or the other of Islam (Wahabi, madrassah-based, fundamentalist, politicized, jihad-oriented, the list goes on) and Muslim culture — beyond the personality and resources, that is, of Osama bin Laden. There is another explanation too, the one that many foreign respondents reflected in that poll.

For many, including Muslims, the meaning of 9/11 is to be found by searching not for vague clues, subtle hints, or hidden messages, but by recalling some of the major events related to the US foreign policy — from the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Iran in 1954 to the present support of Israeli treatment of Palestinians, and a great deal in between. That explanation holds that the bitter memories of humiliation and exploitation of those policies provided the seeds from which we are reaping the current harvest of terror.

Since I work in an academic setting in the US, I could not help noticing a significant increase that has been reported in the number of college courses being offered on Islam here. The motivations behind this development are probably laudable. I wonder, however, about its impact. The readings and learning experiences that the faculty will bring to such courses will certainly have some influence. It is probably safe to say that in their course syllabi and classroom discussions, terrorism will surface as an issue, and when tracing its roots, causes, or origins, Islam and Muslim culture will get attention.

In most cases, this kind of learning is to be feared more often than welcomed. A more balanced curriculum would offer as many courses on the Politics of Oil, Middle East, American Foreign Policy, as are now being offered on Islam.

One of the cherished concepts of liberal democracy and the American academy is pluralism. As we reflect one year later upon a major national tragedy, it is time we apply it to our understanding of it. As we do, I hope our search will yield a multiplicity of meanings. How much were the terrorists inspired by some interpretation of the Qur’an, absence of democracy in Muslim countries, envy of the American way of life, on the one hand, and how much by the deep sense of the betrayal of the mujahideen — some of whom later became the Taliban — who suffered on a massive scale (with their casualties in thousands and dislocation of population in millions) when the United States abruptly left the scene after the Soviets had been forced to retreat from Afghanistan, the stationing of American troops in Saudi Arabia, and America’s special relationship with Israel and its consequences for Palestinians, on the other?

After a year it is time to move beyond jingoism and revenge, innocence and smugness. It is time to move towards an enriched, plural, deeper search for the many meanings of what happened a year ago. The celebrated norms of pluralism, I am hoping, will bear multiple and contested meanings.

The writer is a faculty member, The Evergreen State College, Olympia, Washington.

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Education: the dividing factor


By Zubeida Mustafa

SEPTEMBER 8 was International Literacy Day and the government observed the occasion as best as it could at a time when elections and politics are stealing the show. The media did not show much concern either, as the observance of such days has now become no more than a ritual.

This may sound cynical. But how else would one perceive Pakistan’s approach to literacy and education when after 55 years of experimenting with a variety of programmes and campaigns, those at the helm have not managed to make even half the population (above 15 years) literate?

The UNDP’s Human Development Report, 2002, places Pakistan’s literacy ratio at 43.2 per cent in the year 2000 (Pakistan Economic Survey, 2001-2002, however, claims it was 47.1). In 1985 it was 31.4 per cent. This accounts for an increase of not even 12 percentage point in the literacy rate in 15 years by UNDP measures (16% by the government’s claim). Whichever data we accept, the significant fact remains that in the same period the population grew by 40%.

Given this dismal scenario, one cannot feel very optimistic. Not only is the pool of illiterates in absolute terms growing in Pakistan, we stand low down the rung of the literacy ladder - there being only ten countries in the world with a literacy rate lower than ours. Needless to say, they are much poorer than us in terms of national resources and started their existence as independent states at a much lower benchmark of development.

If we were to go by all the advertisements the government splashed in the print media about its literacy goals, shouldn’t we feel hopeful about turning the corner? According to the much touted ESR (education sector reforms), literacy should jump to 60 per cent in another two years. In the absence of any visible changes in the field - the efforts of dedicated individuals at the micro level notwithstanding - it is difficult to expect the performance of this sector to improve dramatically.

Even if we put aside our scepticism about the increase in the literacy rate, there is much else to cause us serious concern. In a recent BBC programme, President Pervez Musharraf appeared quite complacent about his government ‘s efforts to promote education. But not everyone feels that way. One cannot even be certain that all those listed as literates can actually read, write and make simple calculations. Even assuming that they are “readates”, “writeates” and “numerates” (to borrow the terms coined by literacy experts), it is important that people are taught to put their literacy skills to practical use.

It is at this stage that primary education acquires great importance. In fact, it is a more effective way of spreading literacy among the younger generations. A country which has enrolled all its children in school does not need adult literacy programmes, after some time.

If primary education is to make an impact on literacy, it must keep in view three imperatives, namely, accessibility, quality and equity. The three are closely interrelated and have a lot to do with the private sector versus public sector debate that now rages in every area of the country’s economic and social life.

Over the decades, all these factors have not ranked equally among the priorities of the policy makers in the education sector. Accessibility of education was the first consideration in the seventies under the first People’s Party government. The thrust was towards nationalization of schools which ensured affordability since fees were kept low. But the government failed to mobilize sufficient resources to fund the massive nationalization programme, as a result of which there was a rapid slide in the standards from which the government schools have failed since to recover.

The quality factor came to the fore when General Ziaul Haq inducted the private sector into education in a big way and also denationalized some institutions. This helped raise the academic standards somewhat — albeit in a very small section of the education infrastructure. In the public sector, not only did the standards continue to decline, the expansion of the education system also slowed down, thus affecting the accessibility factor.

Since the nineties, there has been a loosening of economic and social controls as part of the trend towards deregulation and globalization. This has made education not only less accessible and less affordable but also highly uneven in terms of the quality of pedagogy, textbooks and classroom management.

The massive induction of the private sector in education has, as could be expected, made education expensive. Although the government schools in many provinces have abolished their already low fees, this has not created the desired impact. The private schools (about 15,000 of them) account for over 20 per cent of the primary school students. This will not promote the spread of education because the fees of the private schools are beyond the reach of most people, 44 per cent of whom are said to be living below the poverty line now.

It is a pity that the government schools which can offer subsidized education to the poor are not playing the role which should be theirs. Since the military government assumed power three years ago, on an average only 3,000 primary schools have been opened in the country every year. The enrolment has at best inched up. Besides, these schools do not have much to offer by way of academic standards in education. Hence the dropout rate is alarmingly high — at one time it was said to be 50 per cent. Now the official documents do not even take note of it, while enrolment in these institutions has declined.

A disconcerting aspect of the education scenario is the stratification it is actively promoting in Pakistani society. If a person is rich, he can send his children to the best private schools and universities to receive the best available education. That would ensure their qualifying for the best jobs available in the country.

A parent from the low-income class cannot afford the facilities available in the private sector. Hence his children have to study in the government schools — that is if they study at all. Here the teachers (mostly unqualified) are quite often absent, good textbooks are not available and the education is quite irrelevant to the employment market. These children, when they grow up, can never hope to get well-paid jobs and they would never make enough money to provide their own children the education they were themselves denied. True, there are freeships and scholarships which the elitist institutions never tire of boasting of. But will a deprived child from an impoverished family ever hope to move up sufficiently to qualify for these scholarships?

Given the state of the education sector, the gap between the haves and the have-nots will continue to widen. In the absence of good education, which is the first requisite for a coveted job in a market-driven economy, the poor can never hope to improve their status in any walk of life. Thus, education will become a stratifying factor instead of a force for the uplift of the people.

The only solution to this paradox lies in adopting a policy which is education-oriented. A government which provides a reasonably good quality education to all the citizens can ensure their entry into the job market in competitive conditions and open new opportunities for them. Quality education which is accessible to all will also offer competition to the private sector and thus force it to reduce its fees.

This is possible only if the government is prepared to enhance the education budget considerably and practise sound principles of financial management to prevent leakage and squandering of scarce funds. It will also have to ensure the efficient funding of its schools. Regrettably, the unstinting induction of the private sector into education has provided a pretext for the government to gradually disengage itself from the education sector.

As a result, the education budget is not growing in proportion to the rapidly growing population. The government has allocated Rs 77.7 billion for education for 2002-2003. This works out to two per cent of the GNP — quite a fall from the 2.7 per cent of the mid-nineties. If the government is serious about changing the dismal literacy scene it will have to address the primary education sector more earnestly.

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A year later


By Eric S. Margolis

A YEAR after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, we know remarkably little about the attackers, or about who really organized the complex operation that seems well beyond the capabilities of amateur terrorists. Among the major questions are those that are discussed below.

The suicide attackers were apparently middle-class Saudis, though some identities are still in question. They were quiet, well-educated, ‘westernized’ technical students living in Hamburg, Germany, whose links to Osama bin Laden’s Afghan-based Al Qaeda remain uncertain. Part of the attack planning was done in Spain.

The men who piloted the doomed aircraft were trained at American flying schools. Some may have briefly visited Afghanistan, but none resided there or were known Al Qaeda members. Were they sent by Osama bin Laden? Osama lauded the attacks that murdered 3,000 civilians, but denied involvement, though a trail of circumstantial evidence leads to him.

Al Qaeda is portrayed by the US government and media as an octopoid, world-wide conspiracy with thousands of members. In fact, Al Qaeda - which began as a guest-house for holy warriors during the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan in the 1980s, never numbered more than 1,000 men, and usually much less.

Today, there are probably only 300 or so hardline Qaeda members, scattered mainly in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Europe. But there are numerous other underground, militant Islamic groups that align themselves from time to time with Qaeda, or draw inspiration from Osama bin Laden’s fiery preachings. Such fighting groups as Egyptian Jihad, Gamma Islamiya, and Algeria’s Armed Islamic Groups, have formed a loose anti-American/anti-Israel alliance of convenience.

But other Islamic groups, notably Lebanon’s Hizbollah, have nothing to do with Al Qaeda. Nor do Iraq and Syria, whose rulers have been targets of Osama bin Laden’s wrath for a decade.

The Taliban and a variety of Muslim resistance groups - Kashmiri independence fighters, anti-communist insurgents from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Filipino Moros, and Uighurs fighting China’s ethnic absorption of Eastern Turkestan (Chinese Xinjiang), have all been lumped together as ‘Al Qaeda.’ Some of these Islamic international brigades were trained in old Afghan camps originally funded by CIA.

Others went through two service support and commando training camps run by Al Qaeda — a sort of Islamic version of Ft. Bragg, home of the US Green Berets. The biggest camps were not run by Al Qaeda, but by ISI — Pakistani intelligence outfit — preparing holy warriors, or ‘jihadis.’ Many of the 1,000 prisoners captured and murdered by Uzbek forces of Gen. Rashid Dostam — assisted by US Special Forces — were from the international brigades.

President George Bush claimed America was attacked because the assailants ‘hated’ democracy and America’s way of life. He describes terrorism as pure evil, unrelated to any specific political events. This is nonsense. The US was attacked because of its deep involvement in Mideast affairs, and total backing for Israel’s iron-fisted repression of the Palestinians.

In July, Washington agreed to Israel’s request to replenish huge amounts of heavy munitions used in crushing the Palestinian intifada. These included $80 million worth of TOW heavy anti-tank missiles to be fired at buildings, tank shells packed with thousands of razor-sharp flechettes, and Hellfire air-to-ground missiles. Israel reportedly used more heavy munitions against Palestinians in one week last April than it expended in the previous 20 years. American money and weapons kill Arabs, Arabs kill Americans.

Osama bin Laden arrogated to himself the right to champion revenge against the United States for the bloodbath in Palestine. “There will be no peace in America,” Osama warned, “until there is peace in Palestine.” These frightening words were never widely reported in the North American media, which is filled with uninformed commentators explaining why Muslims are inherently bloodthirsty or anti-western.

America’s virtual military occupation of Saudi Arabia, its punishment of Iraq that caused at least 500,000 civilian deaths, and Bush’s planned jihad against Iraq have enraged the entire Islamic world against the United States. There is little doubt more attacks against American targets will be coming. Such is the cost of empire.

Did the 9/11 perpetrators foresee the immense damage they would inflict on the United States? Besides the 3,000 Americans murdered, $70 billion in property losses; $10 billion so far of airline losses; insurance rates across the US soaring by up to 300 per cent.

September 11 suicide bombing helped puncture the stock market tech bubble that brought $3 trillion in equity losses that cost 160,000 jobs. The next attack on the US may be designed to cause more economic mayhem rather than kill people, targeting telecommunications nodes, power systems, and airports.

The 9/11 attack triggered a psychotic episode in the Bush administration, producing a futile invasion of Afghanistan; plans for war against Iraq, and possibly Iran, spurred by the embarrassing failure to find Osama bin Laden or crush Al Qaeda.—Copyright Eric S. Margolis -2002

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To lose one’s centre


ON Sept. 11, 2001, I lost my centre. That is, the world as I knew it crashed in on me, as it did for everyone else in America.

Before that day I had dreams for my children and grandchildren. I felt safe. Anything bad that happened was in the movies. Hollywood provided me with all my thrills and fears.

After 9/11, it took me a week to deal with the shock. I knew that I wasn’t watching a movie. This was the real thing. The TV screen became my information centre.

Over and over they played the hijacked planes crashing into the Twin Towers on Wall Street, the Pentagon and somewhere in Pennsylvania. I saw frightened people running in the streets. I heard the wild guesses on how many victims were killed and how many were injured.

At that time no one knew who the terrorists were and no one had the answer as to how four aeroplanes could be hijacked at the same time.

I didn’t know where Afghanistan was and I had never heard of al-Qaeda or the Taliban. For the first time, Osama bin Laden came into my life as the super villain of 9/11. He filled me with rage. The television screen showed old films of him and kept switching back to the World Trade Centre.

I was sure we would find him and kill him. That was the Special Forces’ job. If they want war, we’ll give them war. We’ll bomb them in the cities and in the caves. That is what Donald Rumsfeld was saying when he came on the screen.

I thought about what Attorney General Ashcroft would do to protect us from the enemy. How many constitutional rights would he have to take away from us to guarantee our safety?

The president said we were at war. This wasn’t a movie.

First we grieved for the victims of 9/11. Then a wave of patriotism swept the country. We were told to go about our business but remain vigilant and alert.

As the year went by, things happened. I had lost my centre, but Wall Street had lost its moral compass. We couldn’t trust anybody any more. The major institutions that I believed in were found to be driven by greed. We no longer trust accountants, brokers, banks and what the CEOs tell us.

People’s pensions were wiped out. Executives were arrested. Coming on the heels of 9/11, I didn’t know whom to trust anymore.

We carpet-bombed Afghanistan but we never found Osama bin Laden. We won the war but the peace is still to come. I tried to go about my business as I had before, but it wasn’t the same and never would be. I tried to make plans for the future but my heart wasn’t in it.

I was told by the president we have to invade Iraq, but he didn’t tell me how to do it. For the first time I knew there was somebody out there who wanted to kill me.

In the past I thought terrorists were people far away. After 9/11 I felt they were right next door.

My world was no longer what I wanted it to be. It was not a movie.—Dawn/Tribune Media Services

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How to fill non-Muslim reserved seats?


THANKS to a prolonged struggle by non-Muslim organizations and human rights activists, the system of joint electorate, which was arbitrarily discontinued by General Ziaul Haq in 1985, has been revived. Non-Muslims can now vote for any candidate for a general seat they wish to support and, in theory at least, there is no bar to their contesting any general seat, a seat reserved for women or technocrats in elections to the Senate, National Assembly or a provincial assembly.

They have also been allotted 10 reserved seats in the National Assembly and 23 reserved seats in the four provincial assemblies. The manner in which these seats will be filled has given rise to some questions that need to be discussed.

To be eligible for election to the National Assembly or a provincial assembly a non-Muslim candidate has to figure on a list submitted by a political party. These political parties’ lists are to be published for public information. A political party may put as many names on its list for non-Muslim reserved seats as it wishes.

At the same time, each candidate is required to file his nomination papers and fulfil the conditions applicable to general seats.

The names on a list should be given in order of priority. If a candidate’s nomination papers are rejected or if a candidate gets disqualified before election or after being elected or his seat in legislature falls vacant upon his death or removal, his place will be taken by the next candidate on the list.

The candidates to be elected to non-Muslims’ reserved seats in the National Assembly will be chosen from lists given by political parties in proportion to the number of the general seats in the NA won by these parties. In each provincial assembly a political party will win these seats in proportion to the number of general seats won by it in that assembly.

As observed in the case of women’s reserved seats, the allocation of non-Muslims’ reserved seats on the proposed basis is a more indirect ascertainment of the electorate’s will than would have been the case if the basis of election had been the number of votes polled by a political party in the designated constituency (the country or a province).

Two objections have been raised to this procedure.

First, it is contended that under the discarded system, Hindus elected Hindus and Christians elected Christians. Under the present system the total electorate will elect non-Muslims to their reserved seats and it is possible that major non-Muslim groups get more seats than their population may justify or that smaller groups (Parsis, Sikhs, Buddhists) may not be represented at all.

This objection betrays lack of understanding of the joint electorate system, and its repetition will only provide grist to the mills of advocates of separate electorates.

Under joint electorate members of legislatures will represent the general body of the electorate and not this community or that.

The second objection is that the non-Muslim candidates elected on party lists will be representatives of Muslim dominated political parties (as no non-Muslim party can hope to win five per cent of the seats in any assembly) and not of their communities.

It has been argued that this system will place non-Muslim candidates at the mercy of political parties and they may become pawns in the on-going polarization.

Former federal minister, J. Salik, claims that representatives of minority communities had suggested to General Pervez Musharraf that while reintroducing reserved seats for non-Muslims the mode of their election as provided in the 1973 Constitution should be revived.

It may be recalled that in the original 1973 Constitution no seats had been reserved for non-Muslims. However, before the first general election (in 1977) under this Constitution, a provision was made in 1975 for six reserved seats for non-Muslims in the National Assembly and nine in the provincial assemblies.

All these seats were to be filled through election by the members of the assembly concerned. In 1985, General Ziaul Haq raised the number of reserved seats for non-Muslims to 10 in the National Assembly and 23 in the provincial assemblies. These seats were to be filled on the basis of separate electoral lists for different religious denominations (Christians, Hindus, etc).

The Zia system was assailed, among other things, on the ground that it not only separated non-Muslims from Muslims, it also divided the non-Muslim population; that while it gave non-Muslims reserved seats they were deprived of the right to vote for Muslim candidates who represented the areas where they lived. These objections have now been removed.

However, Muslim and non-Muslim populations both have lived under communal politics for such a long time that they have difficulty in thinking in terms of a single nation in political terms and the tendency to look at their interests in communal terms persists. Both have to learn a great deal before the objectives of having joint electorate are realized.

Unfortunately, the method of filling non-Muslims’ reserved seats has not figured prominently in public discourse. Some years ago, a proposal was made that the non-Muslims be allowed to vote for general (Muslim) seats and also cast votes for their co-religionists on different lists.

The main flaw in this suggestion was that it would have kept the pernicious system of separate electorates in place.

However, the Muslim clerics chose another ground to attack it — that it amounted to giving the minorities two votes per head while members of the majority community had only one vote each.

The mode of election now in place may be construed as election of non-Muslims to reserved seats by members elected to general seats. A political party will get a share of reserved seats in proportion to the number of general seats won by it in the respective assembly, and to an extent this means election by the assemblies.

But it has its drawback. The fixation of priorities on political parties’ lists could be arbitrary, whimsical and might not take into consideration the need for an equitable representation of non-Muslim communities in different regions of the country.

The system of non-Muslim members’ election by assemblies comprising holders of general seats offers safeguards against this danger.

Political parties will know how to respect plurality of non-Muslim communities. Besides, it will be possible for parties securing less than five per cent seats in the respective assemblies to contribute to the election of non-Muslim members. However, the party-list system has one significant advantage over the system of filling reserved seats (for both women and non-Muslims) through election by assembly members.

In the latter system the candidates did not have to participate in the election process. Now they have to do this. They have to campaign for themselves and their parties, they have to go to voters, and they have to understand the mechanics of the electoral process. All this forms part of necessary political education.

The peculiar distribution of non-Muslim voters across the country limits the options to provide for direct election of their representatives.

It might also be argued that the present scheme is designed to strengthen the party system. But this objective will only be realized in future when non-Muslim citizens have been fully integrated into party ranks and leadership structures. Political parties will not be strengthened by any fiat; they will acquire strength only through an uninterrupted political process.

At present there is no requirement that non-Muslims candidates who are put on a party list should also be that party’s members. And yet they will be members of that political outfit’s parliamentary party, subject to its discipline and to the defection provision.

A situation may arise where just as Muslim religious parties have reconciled themselves to women’s reserved seats, in the hope of enlarging their strength in assemblies, they may also begin to put up non-Muslim candidates on their party lists. How a non-Muslim elected on a Muslim religious party’s list will adjust himself to that party’s communal fervour may not be amusing.

The on-going electoral process may invite attention to some more aspects of the new system. This is an inevitable result of the nature of the regime.

Since some of the far-reaching changes in the election system are being introduced without a thorough debate in public or at representative forums, and perhaps without due deliberation, they cannot provide answers to all the relevant issues.

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