Come September: likely hypotheses!
By A. R. Siddiqi
A HYPOTHESIS is not a prophecy, it’s only a perception. Dictionarywise, it is a supposition; a proposition assumed for the sake of argument; a theory to be proved or disproved by reference to facts; a provisional explanation of everything.
What happens in the traumatic month of September, 2002, must remain veiled in the mist of time. For a sample, however, what can be foretold definitely and without any contradiction is that the 6th of the fateful month would see the 37th anniversary of our own first ‘total’ war with India; the 11th, the 54th anniversary of the Quaid’s death and the fall of Hyderabad, Deccan, pre-partition India’s largest Muslim state, together with the first anniversary of the first-ever aerial invasion of the American mainland. The single event that shook the world.
In any military planning, considerable space and thought are given to the so-called ‘enemy or adverse hypotheses’. These, in simple language, happen to be assumptions and perceptions, logically argued about the likely counter-moves of the enemy against ‘own’ planned tactics and strategy. It is not just an academic exercise, but an integral part of a war plan deliberated at the highest staff level.
Success in war would depend largely on the ability of the staff planners to foresee and hypothesize about the enemy moves and counter-moves to offset such material superiority as our eastern neighbour enjoys over us. For as long as India remains in a state of conflict, actual or perceived (specially the ominously impending one since the beginning of the year), Pakistan’s one major task would remain: how well to hypothesize about India’s likely moves to contain and beat them off.
Whether September would see a sudden war-like major flare-up along the LoC and the international borders should best be wished away. Hypothetically, however, the likelihood of an odd accident, or something as little as a stray match setting the whole barn ablaze cannot be ruled out.
India’s Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishan Advani would not hesitate to declare, in a press statement from London, that ‘India is at war with Pakistan’. Even if essentially rhetorical, its hypothetical challenge stands out, nevertheless. Defence Minister George Fernandes makes no bones about the existing massive troop deployment going well beyond October. There is more of hard talk than an empty verbiage in the threat of Fernandes.
“India threatens to take further steps”, loudly proclaims a front-page headline. The text contains a warning by Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha of ‘further steps, short of going to war to get Islamabad to act ...’ and stop cross-border terrorism once and for all.
“The classical theory is that war is the last resort of diplomacy. Sinha goes on to theorize. In fact, it is just the reverse. For effective diplomacy should rule out war altogether even as a weapon of the last resort.
As recently as the fourth week of August, India mounted a land-air effort along and may beyond the LoC. The director-general of the ISPR, Maj-Gen Qureshi, called it a highly escalatory act.
It was the first time ever since Kargil (May-August 1999) that India had pressed the IAF into service. A matching Pakistan riposte would have led to a virtual cliffhanger. India had ‘dozens’ of its military personnel killed and wounded in the armed encounter. Yet another one or two such aggressive aberrations may well get the two sides trapped in a so-called limited conflict with an unlimited potential to escalate.
On Sept 11 (or thereabouts) President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee are expected to be in New York, maybe in the same hotel, for the UN General Assembly session. This coincides with the first anniversary of the 9.11.2001 Armaggedon vapourizing the stately twin towers symbolizing America’s economic predominance worldwide. The prospect of the two leaders going beyond a formal exchange of greetings and a lukewarm handshake remain bleak. However, this is not to rule out chances of a miracle, happening beyond the scope of an adverse hypothesis. Even against one’s better judgment, one could at least hope for the best.
On the global scale, the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld lethal tirade is out to go for a ‘regime change’ in Baghdad. They remain callously unmindful of the horrendous loss of lives and property that the innocent Iraqi civilians must suffer.
That America can repeat as choreographed and widely, even universally-supported military campaign as operation Desert Storm (1990-91) I am tempted to rule out firmly. The UN stays out of it; and the European Union (less UK), Japan and the rest of the world together stand on the wrong side of America.
Nevertheless, there is little hope or prospect of America being wiser before the event and make a re-appraisal of its gung- ho tactics. Concerted naval/air bombings of Baghdad would appear to be very much on the cards. Having gone so far on the road to war, it would not be easy for America to retrace its steps and let Saddam get away with a moral victory. It must force a showdown if only to save its face.
Back home, the election campaign train would hopefully roll on towards its final station - October 10. However, the journey may not be as smooth one as one might wish.
The adverse hypothesis, in this case, may be traced back to two principal roadblocks. First, the emerging problems along our western border and the likely escalation on our eastern border and the LoC. US General Tommy Frank’s hypothesis regarding a possible extension of his coalition forces’ operation beyond Afghanistan, even if impromptu, could not have been just impulsive. He said: “The relationship that we have with surrounding states around Afghanistan will permit us overtime to do the work that all of us recognize needs to be done .....”
Although Gen Franks wouldn’t name Pakistan (or any of the other neighbouring Central Asian states), our foreign office was the first to react. A foreign office spokesman said Islamabad was not in favour of a ‘large-scale’ presence of foreign troops. The expression ‘large scale’ used for the presence of foreign forces is noteworthy. There would be little objection (or option) to their stay, as such, within permissible and mutually agreed limits. Hardly a promising prospect.
Regarding the law and order situation, there is a presidential hypothesis and another of a field commander. Speaking at 25th Export Trophy Award function, President Musharraf said the law and order situation in the country could not be improved ‘overnight’. A ‘long-term’ strategy, however, had been put in place to overcome the situation.
Maj-Gen Salahuddin, commander of the Pakistan Rangers, said he had credible information that angered militants might launch attacks in Karachi on Sept 11. Yet another adverse hypothesis. A safe exit strategy out of the historically crucial month is yet to be devised.
The writer in a retired brigadier.

