STUDENTS of politics believe that the art of organizing men and women for the common good has a long way to go in Pakistan. This may be true of keeping organizations in good health, but it does not hold for initiating them. As many as 129 entities sought recognition of their entitlement to contest the elections, and the election commission has granted charters of eligibility to seventy-one. Fifteen have unfamiliar names that provide no clue to their purposes.

Twenty of the approved parties profess regional and/or ethnic identities and goals. Parties of this nature have always existed in Pakistan, but their sweep has not extended beyond a part of a region or group. The Awami National Party, for instance, does not command the allegiance of all the Pukhtoons, not to speak of the whole of the NWFP. Even then the fact that as many as twenty parties are out there to espouse regional or ethnic agendas does not bode well for our national cohesion and solidarity. The comforting possibility here may be that many of them exist only on paper.

The names of about half a dozen parties suggest a socialist orientation. Such parties have never done well with the partial exception of the PPP and the ANP. In 1974 the PPP began to move away from socialist advocacies, and since the mid-1980s it has been a pragmatic centrist party. The ANP’s popularity in the areas of its strength may have been owed more to its aggressive assertion of Pukhtoon rights than to its socialism. In any case, it would also seem to have shed its socialist professions. Socialism is in retreat almost everywhere in the world, and it is likely that our socialist parties give notice of their existence mostly for the record, and not because they expect to win any assembly seats.

Fifteen of the parties that have registered with the election commission may be designated as pragmatic (essentially non-ideological) and centrist. They include factions of the PML, PPP, and numerous minor parties such as the PDP and Tehreek-i-Insaf. Two of them, namely, the PPPP and the PML (N) are said to be the “mainstream” parties which , if allowed to run unhindered, are expected to win a substantial number of seats in the National Assembly.

These parties, like some of the others, will promise to maintain honesty and integrity in government, protect the citizen’s life and property, provide inexpensive and speedy justice, promote economic development, expand education and employment, supply civic amenities, and they will say all those other things that they believe their listeners would like to hear. They will pay homage to the Quaid-i-Azam’s vision of Pakistan and, as they go along, they will salute Islam for good measure.

Eighteen parties are Islam-related in one way or another. Within that larger fold some of them appear to be specifically sectarian (Shia, Sunni, Ahl-i-Hadith), each concerned with preserving the identity, doctrine, and rights of its adherents. Most of the others stand for Islamizing Pakistani society and polity. Maulana Fazlur Rahman, head of the larger JUI faction, announced the other day that the Islamic parties composing the MMA would work to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan. The presence of Islamic parties in such a large number on the electoral scene raises some interesting issues.

The matter of numbers is complex. Of the older Islamic parties, the JUI and the JUP are split into factions, each of which appears as an independent agent on the list of eligible parties. The same is true of a couple of other Islam-related parties. One may also wonder why some of them have surfaced at all. For instance, the founders of Nizam-i-Mustafa, Islami Siyasi Tehreek, Islami Tehreek-i-Pakistan, Azmat-i-Islam Movement, and Pakistan Muslim Alliance could have joined one of the established parties instead of initiating their own separate organizations.

Their reason is probably the same as that which split the established parties into factions: the so-called personality clashes, domineering dispositions, and differences over operational strategy. These irritants may seem trivial, as compared to any basic doctrinal differences, but they are precisely the kind that have split parties in Pakistan and caused a horrendous civil war among the fundamentalists themselves next door in Afghanistan. In any case, the likelihood is that the Jamaat-i-Islami and the larger factions of the JUI and JUP will be the principal Islamic contenders in the coming election campaign.

What will they say? They will, of course, promise Islamization but this undertaking will not attract voters any more than it has done in previous elections. Recall that even at the best of times the Islamic parties, taken together, have not secured a dozen seats in the National Assembly, and more often even fewer. They are, however, not entirely without some efficacy: the JUI has done reasonably well in the provincial elections in the NWFP and Balochistan and, before the advent of the MQM. JI and JUP did well in Karachi and other urban centres of Sindh.

A new complication may hound them this time. Islamization may be seen by some voters as a promise, and by others (perhaps a larger body of them) as a threat in view of the Taliban example in Afghanistan. In his statement referred to above, Maulana Fazlur Rahman said the Islamic state he and his colleagues envisaged would not replicate the Taliban regime. But this kind of assurance may not put minds at ease: it may be treated merely as an opportunistic tactic calculated to gain more votes.

There is considerable disapproval in Pakistan of American operations in Afghanistan (even among those who reject the Taliban and the Al Qaeda), its pro-Israeli stance in Palestine, and its perceived hostility towards Islam and the Muslim world. The MMA spokesmen have said they will not make our government’s support of America’s war against terrorism an election issue. That may be the current intention of the MMA chiefs. But as the campaign gets going, the temptation to profit from the prevailing anti-American sentiment may become irresistible. .

How will the “pragmatic”, mainstream and other, parties address the issues relating to American policies? Pakistan’s subservience to America puts both its government and many of its politicians in a position commonly stated as “damned if you do, and damned if you don’t.” Terrorism is not only an American concern; it is a grave threat to our own domestic order and stability. Most of the actors in the electoral arena will want to condemn it. But if they do, they will annoy the extremists who engage in it.

The Islamic parties will probably deny that any of their subsidiaries or allies are involved in acts of terrorism within the country. They and others will also make the distinction between terrorists and freedom-fighters, and they will ask the foreign anti-terrorist coalition to probe the underlying “causes” of terrorism. This distinction may not convince outsiders but it will be good enough for Pakistani audiences. The issue of terrorism at home, mixed up with that abroad, will thus remain clouded and muted.

Neither the parties that support General Musharraf nor any of the mainstream parties are likely to go out of their way to denounce America’s warlike rhetoric and plans against Iraq, its indifference toward the miseries of the Palestinians, and its growing unfriendly disposition towards the Muslim world. On other issues of the country’s foreign and domestic policy, most politicians will stick to conventional wisdom, avoid innovation, and remain vague (unless they are forced to be specific) as much as possible — which is the way politicians generally act during election campaigns. Those outside the official camp may also be expected to demand unmixed democracy, oppose a political role for the military, and denounce the constitutional amendments General Musharraf has been sponsoring.

Several parties have made “seat adjustment” agreements, meaning that one will stay out of the other’s way in a constituency where its own best candidate is not good enough, while the other side’s candidate has a substantial prospect of winning. These are not cases of “strangers” jumping into bed together; these are not alliances. The parties concerned will campaign under their own banners and, once the election is over, they will be free to go their own separate ways. The purpose of these “adjustments” is to stop the officially favoured candidates from wining because of the opposition’s default.

The elections, we are told, will be free and fair. How does then one react to the reports that the general has solicited the MMA’s cooperation with the “pro-government” parties to prevent the PPP from coming to power? One hopes these reports are false. He wants to keep Benazir Bhutto out of the election, but he has said often enough that he has nothing against the party itself. If he is building a coalition against the PPP, then he is acting as a partisan, and then the election his agents conduct will not be regarded as free and fair.

If General Musharraf is indeed gathering support for pro-government forces, which “government” does he have in mind? His own will cease to exist soon after October 10. None of us can be sure who will form its successor.

The general cannot know a whole lot more about it unless he is engineering the next government. This would be entirely proper if he were a politician and a serving prime minister. But that he is not. He is the chief of the army, and it is on that basis that he holds the other offices he has chosen to occupy. His position as the army chief — let alone his professions and commitments — requires him to remain neutral and aloof in electoral politics. Partisanship on his part, and moves on that account, will inevitably make for a denial of free and fair elections.

IF Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, chief of the newly forged religious alliance for a political purpose is to be believed, Rs 700 million have been distributed to help some win and others lose in the forthcoming elections. On the dole, the Maulana alleges, are the secular parties and the dolers could be none else but the custodians of the public treasury.

Maulana Noorani is expected to be truthful and responsible in all situations, this one is sensitive and scandalous to boot. The president who, intimidated by the Maulana and other more rugged clerics, beat a hasty retreat from his liberalism, has taken no notice of the accusation nor have his vocal, ever-denying spokesmen — Nisar Memon and Rashid Qureshi. The secular parties — they all claim to be Islamic only less doctrinaire — have also let it pass.

The silence is reminiscent of 1990. Then, it was only on the change of government some years later that the recipients of the largesse came to light through the confessions of its dispensers — the ISI and Mehran Bank. Among the recipients were many who till then were considered sacrosanct and incorruptible. Asghar Khan enshrined them all in his petition to the Supreme Court. The court in its discretion chose to consign it to the archives till reminded by Ardeshir Cowasjee once again. Yet all involved — the givers, receivers and arbiters — remain indifferent for it was public money.

It is in this sleazy background of a past election and on-going preparations for the next one, smacking of sleaze that the president should feel compelled to investigate, Maulana Noorani’s accusation to vindicate his administration. It is too worrisome a matter to be brushed aside — the government should either concede or make the Maulana retract. Both have their credibility at stake.

The parties are now getting together, or splitting apart, not to pursue common programmes but to win seats in the assemblies. The driving force behind this enterprise being opportunism, money must be a crucial factor in it. That has been the life-blood of elections in Pakistan. This time round it would it be no different, perhaps worse.

In the elections conducted by Ziaul Haq bribery touched a new high watermark. That happened after he had made it constitutionally obligatory for every candidate to be “sagacious, righteous and non-profligate and honest and ameen” (trustworthy). Neither Zia nor his election commission invoked this clause. Those elected were “sagacious” enough not to invoke it against each other.

In the 1993 elections, a Lahore Urdu daily now recalls, Nawaz Sharif and Qazi Husain ahmad openly traded bribery charges. Both figure in Asghar Khan’s petition as well. Now they have entered into a mutual electoral adjustment, having first attempted it with the PPP. Both remain the guiding lights of their parties and hope to remain so in the next parliament.

The bribe and opportunism being a part of Pakistan’s electoral politics and both now more rampant than in the previous elections, the controversy over the propriety and legality of constitutional amendments looks more an exercise in form than in substance. That is how every party is divided — not on principles but on the choice of path to power.

The standards of conduct in the personal life and in public service in the new assemblies and cabinets, it looks all but certain, will be lower than in the previous four which suffered dismissals. That is a failure not alone of Pakistan’s politics but also of its military which has repeatedly intervened claiming to cleans it.

The amendments of General Musharraf should have either deleted Article 62(e) of the Constitution, inserted by Zia, which requires the members to be honest, ameen, etc., or barred those from the electoral contest who had not lived up to its exacting requirements in the past.

The irony of the situation is that the politicians whom the president had hounded out and the clerics before whom he himself had reeled have now got together to oppose him and his constitutional scheme. The moral and political values of those among them who support his person or his scheme are no higher than that of the parliament and the cabinet he superseded. It is a kind of catch-22 situation for him — absurd and unwinnable.

The only relieving feature of the constitutional amendments announced on Wednesday is that they are far fewer and, perhaps, less cruel than Musharraf’s closet advisers had proposed. The composition of the dreaded NSC also has a redeeming feature — it has eight elected members against five generals, in fact four, because for the next five years Musharraf will be both the president and chief of army staff. If the civilians (the prime minister, leader of the opposition, chairman of the senate, speaker of NA and four chief ministers) do not want the parliament to be dissolved, the president, even if backed by the generals, should never be able to dissolve it.

Then the politicians have also failed to answer the president’s charge that all of them at one time or the other had invited the army to intervene. Once even the Chief Justice had to ask the army to save the Supreme Court from an assault. the court was put in a state of siege by the hoodlums commissioned by the then prime minister, and the judges had to flee when the army did not come to their rescue.

Since the divided political parties have neither the popular support nor possess the political force to get rid of Musharraf, they had better get reconciled to coexist with him. In the new arrangement the only power the military president has in civil affairs is to dissolve the parliament. If the elections and later the parliament throw up a leadership that performs well, it would be next to impossible for the president to send them packing. If the prime minister and others in the NSC sense an unjust dissolution, they could pre-empt it by going to the electorate themselves for a renewed mandate.

Some tough talk and threats flowing from the president and his men coinciding with the amendments have embittered the atmosphere when it needed to be congenial. How Benazir Bhutto and Shahbaz Sharif should be treated on their return is a question of law for the judges and not the president to decide. The fundamental rights of citizens are above both. The government should assert the rights of the people and parliament rather than its own power. How will Musharraf be able to protect his amendments if the two-thirds majority in the new parliament (NA and Senate) wants to repeal them is difficult to see. The elections release forces which no army can tame unless the political leadership itself falters and falls prey to ambition and greed.

Whether Benazir Bhutto is able to contest elections or not will be decided by the election commission and its appellate authority and not by the president. Again, it will be the courts that should decide whether Shahbaz Sharif can return home or not. It is a question of civil rights above politics. No decree, fatwa or agreement, secret or open, voluntary or coercive, can take away from a human being his fundamental rights which are not just constitutionally guaranteed but universal.

In the past 14 years — ten under prime ministers, one under two presidents and now three under Musharraf — the poverty of citizenry has doubled and safety has altogether vanished. The people may give the born-again military president and the new political government two years but no more to reverse this situation. General Musharraf is deluding himself if he thinks he would be able to continue in office for five more years just because he has replaced the deputy commissioner with a nazim at the district level or given the police a new law. The contending politicians, too, are mistaken if they think their rule is a justification in itself.

In the coming years the powers and terms of the president, the prime minister and the parliament will be determined by the restive people and not by what is written in the Constitution. A lone old man of Hyderabad articulated this sentiment better in a few words than all the harangues. His placard read: Establish Justice — Not Complaint Centres.