Will Musharraf swap places?

NO wise man will swap the position of an all-powerful president with that of a helpless prime minister as proposed in the recently released constitutional package.

Since January, when National Reconstruction Bureau chief Tanvir Naqvi announced an increase in the number of seats for the assemblies and the seats for technocrats and women and other rules for elections, including the graduation condition, the nation was eagerly waiting for the proposed amendments on which the NRB had been working ‘round the clock’.

The NRB released its package-I for public comments on June 26, entitled “The establishment of sustainable federal democracy”. It started with the wise words of “When, in the course of a nation’s history, it became necessary to repair the fabric of society, and to restore a just, democratic and efficient government it is the duty of aware citizens and those with responsibility, to define the needs and find ways to meet them”.

While reading the whole package one reaches the conclusion that it is neither federal, nor democratic and, above all not sustainable in the true sense of the words. One is even tempted to question the ‘awareness’ and wisdom of “those with responsibility”, who have prepared this package.

The NRB stated in its ‘Basis for the Proposals’ 19(b), “... the prime minister must remain the chief executive of the country, which is the essence of the parliamentary form of government”, and repeated that in 19(f) as, “The form of government remains entirely parliamentary, with the executive authority of the state unambiguously in the office of the prime minister”. Just a cursory glance at the amendments proposed in the powers of the president and prime minister clearly shows the opposite direction in the intent, stated above, and the execution, stated in the amendments.

The package proposes amendments in five parts that relate to: i. National and Provincial Assemblies; ii. Qualification and disqualification; iii. Elections and byelections; iv. the Senate and v. checks and balances. Everybody agrees that the 1973 Constitution, or for that mater, any law made by human beings is not perfect and can be improved upon.

The Constitution of any country is a document that provides the basis for its smooth functioning. This is more important in a federal structure. The 1973 Constitution was made after the then Bhutto government sought cooperation from all other parties. It was a commendable effort by Bhutto’s law minister Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, who achieved this difficult task within one year starting from August 14, 1972 under the interim constitution of April 1972.

The Supreme Court did enable the present government to amend the Constitution but also restrict it on many grounds. The consensus amongst the provinces for the 1973 Constitution was unprecedented in the constitutional history of Pakistan. That is why one feels that the 1973 constitution cannot be amended arbitrarily. It will open a Pandora box and may weaken the federation. The package has many clauses that may do exactly that.

Part I regarding an increase in the number of seats, allocation of women and technocrats seats, lowering voters’ age from 21 to 18, introducing joint electorate and reducing the tenure of the assembly from five to four years need not be criticized. These are necessary steps for successful holding of October elections and to give legal cover to the delimitation of the constituencies and to the voters’ lists.

Part II with regard to qualification and disqualification and proposed clause in Article 17(4) may be disliked by many parties which were involved in corrupt practices or believed in autocratic rule of their ‘democratic’ leaders. But overall it is a positive step.

Part III dealing with elections and byelections and part IV with the Senate, including enhancements of powers of the Senate, are also necessary to implement the new scheme and will not be resisted by the stakeholders.

It is the Part V in the name of checks and balances that shows the real intention of the government. Implementing this without a change will turn the current parliamentary system into a presidential system in which the president will have the authority but not the responsibility. This will be a diabolical situation and negates the very concept of ‘unity of command’ that General Musharraf has presented repeatedly.

Now let us see what the General Musharraf can do.

In the light of May 12, 2000 Supreme Court decision, he can issue decrees that are implemented immediately. The latest is the rule of barring any person from holding of the office of the prime minister and the chief minister more than twice. After the October elections the prime minister will be the ‘chief executive’ but the checks and balances part has been taken away from his existing normal powers.

In the present Constitution the president has no discretionary power to dismiss the government. It was introduced as part of the 8th amendment by General Zia and was deleted by Nawaz Sharif through the 13th amendment passed unanimously by all parties within few hours by suspending all rules in April 2000. This check is necessary in order to avoid the events of October 12, 1999, or the past military interventions.

In this proposed package, the president has been armed with sweeping powers apart form the 58 2(b). He need not work on the advice of the prime minister and can appoint the governors in his discretion. Governors can appoint chief ministers but for their removal he “may, in his discretion, with the previous approval of the president, relieve the chief minister and the cabinet of their functions ...” (Article 130). It means that in effect every top slot in all five elected assemblies will always remain on the chopping block of the presidential powers. How can then one say the executive authority of the state rests, unambiguously in the office of the prime minister, as stated in the package.

Even more dangerous is the fact that in the case of the removal of the government there is no time bar for the president to hold elections. The previous Article 58 2(b) authorized the head of the state to remove the head of government but restricted him to “fix a date, not later than ninety days from the date of dissolution, for holding a general elections to the Assembly...”. The proposed amendment has no such bar. When president Ghulam Ishaq Khan (twice) and Farooq Leghari dismissed Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto governments, respectively, they followed this constitutional requirement and announced an election date in their dismissal orders.

The NRB wizards have other ideas. They propose a new Article 58 (3) which empowers the president to appoint a caretaker cabinet and prime minister that cannot take part in the impending elections in case of dissolution or completion of the tenure of any assembly. It did not specify the time for which they are to be appointed. That is a very dangerous situation. For all practical purposes the president is to rule for five years from October 2002.

By proposing amendments in Article 52, 59 and 107, the terms of elected houses have been reduced to four years. President Musharraf will have one more year to go even if the new assemblies somehow manage to survive the tensions of next four years. President Musharraf then can appoint persons of his choice who will hold power as caretakers for unspecified periods. All this will be constitutional and legal.

The powers of the prime minister have been reduced drastically. If after the 13th amendment the balance of power was unduly in favour of the prime minister, after the proposed amendment it will be heavily tilted in favour of the President. Instead of devolution of power, a favoured phrase of the NRB, it is leading to concentration of power in one office. The proposed National Security Council will have no constitutional checks on the president.

The only check on him is the impeachment powers of the Senate and the National Assembly. It will require, indeed, a Herculean effort by any prime minister to move a motion of impeachment against the president, who will be ruling under the ‘constitution of 2002’. The prime minister can be removed by the president even if he advises him to dissolve the assembly (article 58 (1)).

Article 47 provided for the removal of the president. Even if the impeachment motion is moved, for the joint sitting of the parliament votes of the Senate are to be counted double, under the proposed Article 47. That means out of a total of 557 available votes of a joint sitting (200 of the Senate and 357 of the NA), 369 votes will be required to remove the president.

Putting it the other way, the president will require the support of about 60 members from each house to defeat the impeachment motion. That will not be difficult for the president. Once he survives such a motion, he can simply remove the prime minister and the cabinet or dissolve the assembly and can rule for a period of his liking through the newly appointed members or caretakers.

What is Operation TIPS?

THE Justice Department is not saying much about the Terrorism Information and Prevention System — otherwise known as Operation TIPS — which is due to begin as a pilot programme later this summer.

Apparently the only public information about the programme, in fact, is on a government website, which describes it as “a nationwide programme giving millions of American truckers, letter carriers, train conductors, ship captains, utility employees, and others a formal way to report suspicious terrorist activity.”

Operation TIPS will, in the pilot stage, involve a million workers, who, “in the daily course of their work, are in a unique position to serve as extra eyes and ears for law enforcement.” It will offer them “training . . . in how to look out for suspicious and potentially terrorist-related activity.” It will also provide “a formal way to report” that activity “through a single and coordinated toll-free number.” This description, which is essentially all we know about the programme, poses more questions than it answers.

Public vigilance is a good thing, and so is encouraging citizens to alert authorities to terrorist activity. It makes sense to educate people who work at places where lethal cargo may be smuggled. But having the government recruit informants among letter carriers and utility workers — people who enter the homes of Americans for reasons unrelated to law enforcement — is an entirely different matter. —The Washington Post

America’s Afghan policy

THE induction of Soviet military forces in Afghanistan in December 1979 was neither a hastily taken decision by the erstwhile Soviet Union nor was it a bolt from the blue for President Carter who pretended to see no evil beyond the obvious.

An article “Secrets from CIA archives in Tehran” claims that five months before the Soviet tanks entered Afghanistan, Moscow had diplomatically conveyed its intention to Washington to test US reaction. The US maintained silence. This was presumably, taken by Moscow as a tacit green signal for military intervention in Afghanistan — a region that fell within the ‘legitimate’ sphere of influence claimed by the Soviet Union. Historians will certainly examine if the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could have been averted.

The rape of Afghanistan pulled President Carter out of the deep slumber of isolation inflicted by the Vietnam syndrome. The US defeat in Vietnam prompted Washington to retreat to its continental safety creating pockets of vacuum in different parts of the globe — Afghanistan included.

The Soviet Union seized the opportunity and filled in the power vacuum. For the power barons in Moscow those who ruled Kabul then were dispensable as they had served their purpose. Chaos gripped Afghanistan. The Soviet-backed puppet rulers were installed, removed and killed in quick succession in the game of musical chairs played in the capital city, Kabul.

The US watched this gory political drama from a safe distance.

The people of America rejected President Carter for a second term in White House. His successor in office vowed to punish the ‘Evil Empire’ that had come one country closer to the strategic Gulf region that met the oil needs of the US and its allies.

Reagan administration patronized Afghan Mujahideen in their war of liberation against the Soviet occupation forces and provided them with generous political, diplomatic, military and media support.

During his presidency, Washington aided, abetted, encouraged, recruited, equipped, trained, financed and transported religious extremists from different Islamic states to fight along with Afghan freedom fighters in Afghanistan to defeat the Soviet Union.

The western media took pains in projecting such zealous fighters as chivalrous ambassadors of peace and freedom. The US allies, along with some Muslim countries, chipped in the war effort to sustain the freedom struggle. ‘Bleed the Soviets white’ was the common goal of all who opposed the Moscow’s misadventure in Afghanistan.

Nine years (1979-1988) of combat exposed the futility of the Soviet military misadventure. In February 1986 Gorbachev conceded that Afghanistan was ‘a bleeding wound’ and the (Soviet) ‘military adventure was a great mistake.’ Under UN-brokered Geneva Accord the Soviet military forces vacated Afghanistan in 1988.

The Soviet Union was humbled. The myth of its invincibility was broken. The US was euphoric on the defeat of its superpower rival. It had avenged the Vietnam insult and secured continued supply of Gulf oil for the west. A bruised and exhausted Soviet Union soon imploded.

The exit of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan neither promoted regional nor brought peace and unity in Afghanistan. The warring Afghan factions hitherto fighting a common enemy started in-fighting between themselves for acquiring power, authority, glory and booty.

Afghanistan was polarized and an interim government comprising different Afghan factions remained a fond hope.

The US perceived that its primary objective — withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan — was achieved. It made a sudden U-turn in its foreign policy for South Asia.

Indo-US relations developed at a rapid pace and US ties with Pakistan and Afghanistan were relegated to the backburner. Washington adopted double standards on the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan. The tone and tenor of the US attitude towards Pakistan — an ally during the decade long Afghan struggle — hardened. The US mood changed and so did its priorities. In this new scenario Washington quickly dropped Afghanistan like a hot potato.

The Afghan Mujahideen were now labelled ‘terrorists’ and jihad was castigated as ‘fundamentalism.’ The US retreated from Afghanistan without restoring peace and stability in this region. This was a grave strategic blunder.

The foreign nationals previously inducted in Afghanistan to participate in Afghan Jihad stayed back in that country. They remained affiliated with different ethnic warring factions. Assessed in retrospect it was an error to let these diehard individuals reside in the sanctuary of Afghanistan and operate from it.

Foreign mercenaries became physically and emotionally involved in the internal power politics of Afghanistan — that became a hotbed of political intrigue and religious extremism. Internal rivalries, maladministration and bad governance led to the political unrest and the emergence of Taliban phenomenon.

The events of 9/11 caused another U-turn in the US foreign policy in and around Afghanistan. Who destroyed the Twin Towers and damaged Pentagon is yet undetermined but as a result the Taliban government was defeated and weak Afghanistan was massively punished with the military might of US-led allied forces that operated in this country.

How many Afghan lives were lost in the one-sided war will perhaps never be accurately known.

All is not over in Afghanistan — yet. A modicum of peace has been restored in this war-ravaged country but a lot more needs to be done. The reconstruction of Afghanistan and rehabilitation of its population (refugees included) are monumental tasks that cannot be achieved without generous and continued financial help from the developed states.

Zahir Shah is too old to play an active role in the complex situation that prevails in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai heads a shaky coalition that has already lost two distinguished members in the cabinet, gunned down by unknown assailants. The fate and whereabouts of Osama bin Laden and Mulla Omar are unknown. Pakistan remains burdened with nearly two million Afghan refugees.

The vast oil and gas reserves in Central Asian Republics are best exported through Afghanistan and Pakistan. This necessitates peace and stability in Afghanistan, besides a large initial investment effort. Afghanistan needs restoration of normality for the flow of oil and gas through pipelines yet to be laid.

There is also the need for ensuring durable peace in South Asia. This can best come about after an amicable settlement of the 54-year old Kashmir dispute.

This dispute is neither a territorial issue nor an emotional outburst. It concerns the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir who have suffered so much for so long under oppressive and illegal foreign occupation. This wrong must be corrected, and soon.

State elections are irrelevant in disputed Kashmir. These are only a gimmick and a subterfuge for affixing a stamp of legitimacy on the fraudulent accession. The people demand, and rightly so, a plebiscite.

South Asia will continue to simmer and boil if the basic cause of unrest remains unsettled. It is naive to assume that the people’s will can be permanently suppressed with torture, bayonets and guns.

It is often debated if the US policies in this region will fluctuate as frequently in the future as these did in the past. Some analysts perceive that the US may sacrifice the rights of the people of Kashmir to strengthen ties with India, a country that provides a large market for trade.

True, national interests dictate state policies. Such fears are not without a basis. But, why should the people of Kashmir become scapegoats for the benefit of others. It is better to die once than to live in perpetual humiliation. At times US writers blame Pakistan for having exaggerated expectations from the US. Let me, therefore end this piece with a quote from Richard Nixon.

Nixon writing in his book ‘In the Arena’ says: “My saddest experience in travelling abroad was the funeral of the Shah of Iran in Cairo, in July 1980. No one was sent from Washington to represent the United States at the funeral for a leader who had been one of our staunchest and most loyal friends. I was reminded of a haunting remark President Ayub Khan of Pakistan made to me in 1964. In commenting on the US complicity in the assassination of president Diem of South Vietnam, he said that event proved that it is dangerous to be a friend of the United States; that it pays to be neutral; and that sometimes it helps to be an enemy.”

It is an observation that again came to mind when I was informed of the mysterious death, in an aircraft crash apparently caused by sabotage, of another staunch friend of the United States, President Ziaul Haq of Pakistan.’ Nixon’s remarks and implied observations provide food for thought to the people of Pakistan and to other friends of America.

The writer is a retired general of Pakistan army.