IN ITS short existence since its promulgation, the 1973 Constitution has twice been put in abeyance by the defenders of our territorial borders. Bereft of such fundamental legal framework of national cohesion, as a federation under prevalent domestic and international realities, we face highly daunting challenges and uncertain future prospects.

Understanding the ethos of a constitution from which emanates an operational democracy is not difficult. After all India, with practically the same historical genesis, has been hailed to do so quite satisfactorily. Such accomplishment in our case came only grudgingly. At present we again face the prospect of not having gained anything at all. The basic reason for this malaise being that we lose repeatedly the vision of the Quaid-i-Azam about the character and significance of such matters.

To comprehend the Quaid’s attitude towards these concepts historians usually cite three elements (i) the character of Pakistan Movement, (ii) the text of the Pakistan Resolution, and (iii) the Objectives Resolution of 1948. As a constitutional lawyer, however, I am convinced that this matter is more emphatically, even conclusively answered, by looking at the basic structure of our state during the year when he lived after the creation of the new country. Why? Because that is the exact format he personally accepted to work with. With his clarity of political thought and knowledge of law, had he thought otherwise, he could have just changed the system of the transitory governmental instruments to conform to his precepts.

The grundnorms of such precepts, to my mind are contained in the following phrase in the Objectives Resolution (now Article 2A), initially reproduced verbatim, in the 1973 Constitution in its Preamble: — “Wherein the state shall exercise its powers and authority through chosen representatives of the people, and wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed.”

This is precisely the combined effect of constitutional instruments under which Pakistan began its existence in 1947 (that is under the Government of India Act, 1935 read with the Indian Independence Act, 1947). In terms of institutions, we had directly elected representatives in the Constituent Assembly and the Federal Legislature, a Prime Minister elected by such an Assembly and a head of State analogous to the constitutional head of the United Kingdom. The Executive authority of the Federation vested in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet and only the Constituent Assembly could make or change the Constitution.

Now the troubling scenario we are confronted with is whether General Musharraf intends to actually restore the Constitution, along with its appurtenant operational formulae, he unlawfully with unceremonious aplomb put aside in October 1999? His latest utterances particularly those given in the US give rise to these concerns. While responding to questions from the media in the US, both in November 2001 and now in February 2002, General Musharraf stated unequivocally that (i) after October elections he would continue as president, and that (ii) even then the actions of the present military set-up would not be disturbed. After seeing the US president on Feb 13, 2002 he further added that (i) he would not create a party for his political agenda, and (ii) that “he was not interested in the ‘dirt’ of the political parties of Pakistan.”

These alarming ideas raise serious doubts about the nature of our about to be restored “democracy” next October. Does the Musharraf visualized format correspond to the Quaid’s vision of these matters that I just articulated? First of all, what Musharraf wants cannot be achieved without the creation of a subservient elected set of bodies. Only such a class of assemblies can accept to work under a head of state but with an ineffective head of government in violation of Articles 41, 43, 46, 90, 91,92, and 94 of the Constitution.

These provisions cater for the elections and powers of a constitutional president, prime minister, their inter se relations and the function of the country’s assemblies in such elections.

It is thus clear that Musharraf wants to create subordinate assemblies on the colonial pattern of the Government of India Act, 1919, giving him the position then occupied by the Governor-General and the Viceroy In sum, instead of making Pakistan as sovereign for the people as it was in 1947, we are now facing the prospect of becoming a “colony” of the domestic variety.

If Musharraf’s views of “democracy” have to be implemented, it is then constitutionally axiomatic that at least he answer the questions raised below.

Do we wish to create a Parliament in October for a sovereign country which has no authority to undo what an admittedly usurper regime has imposed? How can such a parliament be forced to accept an un-elected president who himself engineered the subversion of the nation’s Constitution? Can the armed forces, itself a creature of the Constitution and devised to operate under Article 243-245 thereof under the directions and control of the federal government, take over by a “legal” subterfuge the operations of the government of the federation and that of the provinces? Upon what principle the heads of the armed forces, can enter upon the decision making process of the country, under a pseudonym of an extra-constitutional institution such as “National Security Council” in clear derogation of Chapter 3 of Part 111 of the Constitution which defines the nature and authority of the “federal government”? What purpose will be served by electing a “dummy” Parliament and an ineffective prime minister?

Manifest resort to illegitimate methodology of a referendum, cannot under any circumstances bestow legitimacy to Musharraf, either politically or morally. Legally it is an absurd proposition to contend that presidents today are elected through such patently dishonest and self-serving devices. This scenario is not only impregnated with miserable alterations in the Constitution, they seem to subvert the ideas of the Quaid for an orderly functioning of parliamentary system of governance. No matter how one describes democracy and constitutionalism, it is impossible to justify, in the post-October period, the continued incumbency to the highest civilian positions in the country of a coup leader but still wearing a military uniform.

In terms of constitutional jurisprudence Musharraf cannot possibly bind his successor. His repeated assertions to this effect are thus legally meaningless. Constitutional philosophy on this point is contained in this famous aphorism of Professor Dicey who said: “ it is the hall-mark of a sovereign authority that it cannot bind its successor.” So to bind his successor, Musharraf will have to make the next set of assemblies less than fully sovereign. This is a chilling prospect Furthermore, when the Constitution is restored as directed in Syed Zafar Ali Shah case in May 2000 his present actions, become suo sponte, subject to scrutiny by the next parliament.

Under this judgment and by earlier precedents governing ad interim legality of transitory administrations, Musharraf regime has a constitutional incapacity to affect purported changes. Only para 6 of the Syed Zafar Ali Shah case may be seen to demolish the thesis that Musharraf can freely make the kind of amendments he is currently canvassing in the Constitution. This regime can neither change the structure of the Constitution, nor affect any alteration in the parliamentary system, nor can it adversely affect the judicial independence in the country.

Islamic provisions are just inviolable per se. The ratio decidendi of the Court being clear the impression that far reaching amending powers were given to change the Constitution is entirely fallacious. Indeed, the principle of “constitutional deviation” of Nusrat Bhutto case, 1977, was visibly curtailed.

It is trite knowledge that in third world countries military regimes seldom wish to return to barracks. As the author of a major monograph on this subject, entitled, A Juridical Critique of Successful Treason, published by Stanford in1984, I know this for sure as I examined over a hundred cases of this kind in my research. My work is relied upon in the Syed Zafar Ali case by the Supreme Court to reach the conclusion that while a court can initially do little to remove a successful coup leader, he can still be bound by legal modalities to be effective in the foreseeable future. The Court did so which was accepted by Musharraf. Sadly, however, there is clearly now a change of intent as Musharraf wants to stay on and even harness the future parliament and the Constitution.

It is also beyond doubt that Musharraf cannot legally be even a candidate for the next presidential election as his present status forbids this. The president is elected under Article 41 (3) of the Constitution by the four assemblies of the provinces and the parliament. However, he is ineligible straightaway for this post through any type of election being in the service of Pakistan being the Chief of Army Staff. He retired in the fall of 2001, but by his own orders extended his service.

Referendum is undertaken under Article 48 sub-clause (6) of the Constitution. However, this is only permissible for seeking a response to a “question” and is not designed to replace a mandated electoral formula by the Constitution itself. Some have even suggested that making the Nazims, currently created by this regime, into a presidential electoral college, to “ensure” his “presidency”. This is a farcical idea put forth by the most unlearned in the law.

In sum, the present ideas of General Musharraf on democracy do not correspond at all to even the most rudimentary norms of Constitutionalism and negate the vision for governance of Pakistan that the Quaid had. He would serve Pakistan better by not discarding the wisdom of Law or by forgetting the misfortunes of our own history in which military led innovations of established civilian conventions and institutions have proved most damaging. Equally importantly, such steps howsoever feigned, will be seen though making our future more plight ridden than we can possibly afford.

THERE is one basic problem to the referendum. It is about an electoral issue in that we elect — in the sense of having been allowed a yea or nay — to have President Musharraf, as such, hold office for some more years.

At the same time he has assured us of conducting a scheduled election. Why then should an essentially electoral issue need to be decided before national electoral results are hazarded? President Musharraf has asked for a popular mandate. It would be astonishing if he did not receive it. And this assumption is not because of the positive results yielded in the customized (and thence necessarily varied) precedents of referendums conducted by former military dictators.

President Musharraf is indeed regarded at the very least as well-meaning and less financially rapacious than the two former prime ministers, whose conduct, he, like many other Pakistanis, so deplores. Why then the insistence on denying those two individuals an appeal to the electorate they sorely disappointed or, as severer critics put it, betrayed? The explanation could be that he does not trust the people’s judgment and deems it wiser quite unselfishly to impose his own. And this becomes democratically unobjectionable because the people have said he is required.

In announcing the referendum in a national radio broadcast and telecast, the president explained he felt his remaining on the scene was in the better interests of true democracy and economic independence. The essence of democracy was mentioned. Presumably it can be distilled and infused into a military dictatorship in full sail. True democracy is less portable. It demands its own distinct institutions and norms and conventions.

Above all, it is a spontaneous ongoing process, not just an occasional electoral exercise or ascertainment of the popular verdict on an issue or individual personality. Rather than delegating authority to a chosen few, it actualizes the constant and determining content of the people’s participation in institutionalized collective self-government and national decision-making. In that sense, whatever a dictator’s regime does — laudable and popular as well as culpable and unpopular — is inevitably devoid of the essence of democracy. This includes a referendum. Even though, perhaps because General Musharraf is a convinced democrat in his core, the run-up is being handled like an electoral campaign. The president is on the hustings. Linked with the referendum in the speech was a reference to the agenda the president formulated at the outset of the Nawaz Sharif ouster. This programme of reform, as the referendum argument would have it, is at stake in terms of maintaining its progress towards full realization and continuity.

General Musharraf’s 1999 agenda embodied principles and areas of reform, with the details to be devised. No more could be expected at that stage. Two and a half years later, instead of making the principled points of the agenda a referential yardstick, it would be better to consider the actuality of what is accomplished and operative so far. In other words, the agenda and the reforms must not be equated fallaciously. Everyone supports the agenda.

It is the common agenda of every government we have had and will have. Whether, for instance, present Nazims etcetera really function any differently from the political and administrative adjuncts other regimes and governments bestowed on the people, might get a very different kind of yea and nay than the abstract agenda that motivated the reconstructive programme for their induction.

Any programme of reform, its implementation and adaptation, must always remain open to debate and correction or it turns unhealthy. Thus, Ms Bhutto, Mr Sharif and General Musharraf, as heads of the country’s executive arm, have each in turn rejected, modified and continued with separate schemes, measures and processes from one another’s tenures: Anti-terrorism legislation, accountability laws, flyovers and motorways, power projects, concessions to IMF pressures and public reaction: Each subject offers some examples of adjustment as well as continuity. Of course, the time for recalibrating General Musharraf’s reforms will come, referendum or otherwise.

The referendum should provide General Musharraf with the psychological buttress of a demonstrable popularity graph. He is already self-empowered and essentially self-perpetuating. However, in making the reference, he implicitly concedes that, even with national political parties in disarray and their leaders disgraced, he needs to present himself as deriving power in Pakistan other than from a military or an IMF loan-type strengthened base.

To raise points such as that Ms Bhutto or Mr Sharif ought to be allowed equally transparent recourse to the demonstrability of their popularity graphs as legitimizing political factors is to quibble. The real point, which the General himself places at the core of it all, is what is good and what is bad for the country?

Let us acknowledge as freely, though perhaps not as fully as the General does, that some of what both Ms Bhutto and Mr Nawaz Sharif did during their terms in office was bad for the country. It is still possible to differ as to the remedial measures required. Even though those two former prime ministers may be ‘bad’, other things, personalities and developments could be even more deleterious.

As clearly as the regime’s supporters assert nothing could be worse than the re-admittance of that polarized twosome, others recognize that the suppression of a significant drift of pubic sentiment; the manipulation and distortion of the natural political process, is incalculably more destructive. In a post-electoral context it could be even more dangerous to have those two effective leaders of mainstream political parties artificially sidelined.

Those predisposed to oligarchy and favouring its greater wisdom, appear unable to grasp that leaders with grass roots and actual political substance, do not lose their political chemistry through being excluded from a limp election. Let us devoutly hope that Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif are not as bad and uncaring of the greater national interest as they are labelled, for we will need all their political goodwill and good offices in the volatile days ahead.

We accuse them of having weakened the national fabric. Let us examine some aspects of this weakened fabric we seek to repair. And let us take into due account that other factors also contributed to the decay.

General Musharraf singled out the two prime ministers’ policy in Kashmir and Afghanistan, and economic mismanagement and financial corruption for condemnation. He can dissociate himself from the determining role the army played in the past in influencing policy towards Afghanistan, Kashmir and India. He was the COAS for part of Mr Sharif’s second stint, but the dice had been cast long ago by other chiefs.

However, a certain institutional guilt attaches to the army in that context, just as institutional guilt attaches to the legislature and judiciary in other spheres.

Bribery, nepotism, cronyism, kickbacks and commissions, enormous and inexcusable though they are believed to have been on the part of the prime ministers and others in and outside their spheres of influence, are not the sum total or even the major cause of Pakistan’s economic disarray. The kind of reorientation recommended today, and the factors favouring or inhibiting an assured prospect of economic revival and resuscitation make this quite apparent to every ordinary citizen’s common sense.

Law and order problems, ethnic and sectarian violence, even when under the clear aegis of armed party militants, were not fathered and abetted by the political parties alone. Nor were Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif the pioneers or even the most outstanding practitioners of the art of using intimidation, money and the state apparatus for personalized political ends.

What in fact can Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif be said to represent and typify? In terms of Pakistan’s polity, it is the natural operation of a recognized and familiar two-party system in a parliamentary democracy. We are bringing into question the nationally known and understood constitutional matrix for democracy in the federal, Islamic republic. We should be very aware of the possible repercussions of any rewriting of the Constitution by extra-constitutional scribes, or those who gain credentials by retrospective necessity.

If the referendum eases the way to this end, it must be deprecated.

PERHAPS it is the fate of great men to become the subject of unsubstantiated stories which, more often than not, emanate from those who, in the words of Dr M.D. Taseer, are more keen “to gain immortality” than place facts on record. Such attempts do not necessarily wait for a decent period of time either; they can start as soon as the great man is gone. Allama Muhammad Iqbal has been no exception.

Only one year after his death in 1938, so records his nephew Ijaz Ahmed in his 1985 biography, a Lahore Urdu newspaper and a weekly published articles about Iqbal’s childhood, based on, what they claimed, were the recollections of his “childhood playmate”.

This “playmate” had also supplied the papers with a photograph which ran under the caption ‘Iqbal in the lap of his father’. The picture showed two children, no more than two and a half, one sitting to the left and identified as Iqbal, and the other as his “cousin”, more specifically, his uncle’s son.

The man in the middle was clearly in his early sixties. A moment’s reflection would have shown that if this indeed was Iqbal’s father (as he was), then at the time the picture was taken, Iqbal could not have been two and a half.

The two children, actually, were Ijaz, son of Sheikh Ata Mohammad, Iqbal’s elder brother, and Ijaz’s cousin Aftab, Iqbals eldest son. This photograph continues to appear off an on in special ‘Iqbal Numbers’ brought out on his birthday. It was, therefore, apt that Ijaz called his biography Mazloom Iqbal.

Once, records Ijaz, Iqbal was told about a new commentary of the Quran being done by someone not particularly known for his adherence to Islam. Iqbal, always a man of few words, smiled and said, “There was a time when it was Hussain who was the mazloom. Today, it is the Quran.”

Then he recited a verse from the holy book and added, “Let’s see what he does with this one.” Little did he know that after his death, he would become another mazloom with “friends” galore and stories bearing no relation to truth.

Faiz Ahmed Faiz once said, “In our time, there is no poet who is more mazloom than Iqbal. Every critic and commentator has tried to make him conform to his own views, ideas and beliefs. These gentlemen are always ready with a verse or quote from Iqbal’s writings to prove their point.”

The adoption of Iqbal by state institutions, though well motivated, has practically ensured that he be feared more than read. Radio Pakistan, official organs of information, literary heavyweights, political orators and state academies have collectively managed to put Iqbal, not within, but outside the reach of the common reader.

The younger generation, which Iqbal hoped would instruct the old, knows little about him or what he wrote and even less about the kind of man he was. The young see him as a colossus who is best viewed from a distance.

By projecting him as an unsmiling philosopher and an austere theologian, these institutions have done great disservice to both Iqbal the poet and Iqbal the human being. There are few poets more readable than Iqbal, especially the Iqbal of Bang-i-Dara. It is painful, despite the distance of years, to think that though Iqbal earned barely enough, yet all his life, he continued to help several members of the family who had no one else to turn to.

He never wanted his poetry to be a means of earning money because he believed it to be God’s gift and not a result of his own efforts.

However, so limited remained his income, dependent entirely on his legal practice, that he felt obliged to allow himself some earnings from his books, though they were always negligible.

His heart was not in his legal work, nor was he temperamentally equipped to follow any of the techniques that turn lawyers into money-minting machines.

He would have been happy to be appointed to the Lahore High Court but was denied the position because of the Chief Justice, Sir Shadi Lal, who said, “I know Iqbal as a poet, not a lawyer.” Iqbal also hoped that one of the princely Muslim states, especially Hyderabad, would grant him an annuity or stipend that would free him from day-to-day financial worries and give him time to write and reflect.

Tragically, that was not to be. He made a trip to Hyderabad in 1910 with this in view but returned in some disappointment. What would it have mattered to the richest ruler in the world to set aside a minuscule sum for the greatest poet and seer of his age!

In 1932, the Nawab of Bhopal wrote a personal letter to the Nizam of Hydrabad asking that the state pay a monthly stipend of Rs 1,000 to Iqbal so that he could concentrate on his literary work.

The proposal was examined by one of the Nizam’s ministers who wrote, “That Sir Muhammad Iqbal is a good poet is a matter about which those well versed in the art of poetry disagree. Assuming that he indeed is a good poet, it is still not ground enough to grant him a monthly stipend of Rs. 1,000. Why does the Nawab Sahib of Bhopal who recommends his case, not pay him this stipend himself? In principle, Hyderabad funds should not leave the state, unless there is a real need for this to happen.” Iqbal, obviously, was “no real need”.

Iqbal began legal practice in 1908 and earned only between Rs 20,000 and Rs 25,000 in the next ten years. In a letter to his father he writes, “I have so far not been able to rent a nice house, nor buy proper furniture, nor acquire a horse and carriage.”

In 1916, much as he wanted to escape the heat of Lahore in the summer and spend a few days in the hills, he did not have the money to do so. He waited years to buy a car and when he did, it was a used one which spent more time in the repair shop than on the road.

Iqbal’s will, written in 1935, lists his possessions. His books are willed to the Islamia College, Lahore, his clothes for distribution among the poor, which leaves two carpets, one cotton broadloom, one sofa set, some chairs and a bit of money kept in the bank in the names of his two minor children. That was all.

Iqbal detested Mullaism and considered it a “disgrace to Islam”. However, the Mullas got their revenge when taking advantage of a statement Iqbal had made favouring Sultan Ibne Saud, the Khatib of Lahore’s Wazir Khan mosque, one Syed Deedar Ali Shah, issued a fatwa declaring Iqbal an infidel because of some of his verses. He also said that any Muslim who interacted with Iqbal would be in a state of grave sin.”

Today, no one remembers Syed Deedar Ali Shah, but the “infidel’s” name shines in glorious splendour.

THIS is the first time that military rule has not been accompanied by the declaration of martial law. On October 12, 1999, for all intents and purposes, the Constitution was suspended. It is rather amusing when people start talking about whether such an action is constitutional or not since there is no provision in the Constitution for a military takeover, except for Section 6 which calls for capital punishment.

The reason for not imposing martial law appears to have been a view in the armed forces that the political leadership was not held in esteem by the general public. After all, Mr Nawaz Sharif’s so-called heavy mandate of 1997 was based on the result of a 30% turnout in the elections.

The generals, however, acted fairly quickly by appointing army personnel, serving or retired, to positions where control could be exercised. In addition, army monitoring teams were sent out across the country to investigate the affairs or at least breathe down the necks of the civilians running the central and provincial governments at all relevant levels.

The military takeover was marginally accepted by the international community but there was still an element of formal protest against the removal of elected representatives. While democracy has never prevailed in Pakistan we had to make do with elections instead; but still it was something. This dissatisfaction was expressed by the suspension of Pakistan from the Commonwealth, which still continues.

The IMF and the World Bank, however, did not withdraw their support to Pakistan and continued to prop up its ailing economy and prevent total disaster. On Pakistan’s side, it also tried to live up to its commitments making it easier for them to continue.

Looking back over the last fifteen years, Pakistan’s economy has been during most of this period in a state bordering on recession as the rate of the growth of the GDP has been only slightly higher than the rate of the growth of population. As a result the number of people below the poverty line has increased. The last two and a half years have not seen any improvement in this; although our long term prospects have improved mainly through debt reduction through discounting and swaps, and more generous flows of foreign assistance, following September 11, 2001 and Pakistan’s complete willingness to accommodate the US.

This has been a somewhat contentious issue. It is referred to as complete co-operation, subjugation, surrender of sovereignty and sacrifice of national dignity depending on the feelings of the commentator. But for that 30 minute conversation on the night of September 11/12 this apparent generosity, would not have occurred. The entire credit goes to General Musharraf. As a result prospects for the future appear much better. It is now up to the present government’s economic managers to make full use of the opportunity.

The sad part is that we ourselves have no vision of what we plan to do in the future. The ministry of finance was deprived of its role almost fifteen years ago. Its fortunes have been restored after the military takeover and the most powerful person in the government outside the military is the finance minister. All that the ministry of finance seems to do is carry out the biddings of the Fund and the Bank. This is not enough for the evolution of a good development policy. For instance, the public sector development programme announced by the government did not fill one with great confidence.

The policy requirement of a reduction in the budget deficit and increase in tax revenues is quite sensible. Unfortunately, the problem of tax collection is a very difficult one. the statement attributed to Mr Shahid Hussain who is said to have estimated that 50% of the taxes due to government were never recovered may be correct. But the assumption that it all goes into the pockets of the CBR officials is not so. Out of the taxes evaded the officials probably get around 10-20%, the rest is pocketed by the tax evader. Tax collection can and has to be improved over time but no sudden revolution is possible, unless we send a very large number of business men to prison which is neither practical politics nor economics.

The excessive insistence on the GST will lead to problems. The whole problem of the GST at the retail level is a hornet’s nest. It is possible to some extent in large shops in affluent areas and even there it will be difficult to implement: In poor areas with lots of small shops it will be practically impossible.

For instance, the GST on pesticides and fertilizer is not a good idea. It is against the interest of the poverty-stricken small holder. It would be a better policy to raise the water charges for agriculture progressively for large users by a compensatory amount. Increase in water charges will tend to improve efficiency in water usage.

The GST on medicines will again affect the poor rather than the rich. The ambitious scheme of improving health services through this extra tax may not quite come up to expectations.

WAPDA, KESC and the Pakistan Steel Mills are still millstones round the country’s neck, and we have failed to evolve any coherent policy for export promotion through diversification of export capability. On the political front, local government institutions have been strengthened under the fanfare of “devolution.” My brother CSP officers seem to be very upset about this. In my view this reform was over due. It has faced the usual teething problems, and will continue to face them for some time. Its real test will come, first how to deal with the police and secondly with the introduction of provincial assemblies, the anticipated clash between the MPA and the Nazim.

Currently there is a great deal of discussion on the referendum. One wonders why people keep pointing out the contradictions vis-a-vis our last Constitution. Once there is a military takeover the Constitution ceases to exist. Since some kind of legal framework is required for every day transactions to be carried on,it remains only to the extent convenient to the military ruler. That the present military rulers have left most of it intact is simply a matter of convenience and good sense.

The problem with the referendum is to at least appear to get people to come out and vote. To take care of this problem Mr M.P. Bhandara had suggested that it be held along with the general elections. Capt. (Retd) Ayaz Amir has suggested that soldiers should simply go around to people’s houses and collect their votes. This is similar to the old practice of ‘electing’ — getting the ‘bay’ i.e. oath of allegiance — for Khalifas. The question asked by the Khalifa’s soldiers was almost elegant in its simplicity “your bayt or your head.” People, other than Imam Husain, preferring to keep their heads, chose the bayt. A third method could simply be that only ‘No’ votes would be counted. Those people who stayed at home would be presumed to have no objection to the general staying on as president for another five years after October. That is certainly what Zia-ul-Haq should have done, since hardly anyone came to vote. However, since the present general wants the security blanket of a referendum, he can surely have one. There are two problems. First to get enough people to the booths to make a good showing. Second no matter what the “Yes” result is, a very large number of people will refuse to believe it.

As far as the future Constitution is concerned we are probably going to end up with some sort of a cross between the Turkish and the French models. This is too large an issue to be disposed of in one paragraph.

The last point is exit procedure. How does General Musharraf get off the back of the tiger consuming him? Obviously he could not just leave on October 12, 2002 as per some people’s reading of the supreme court decision. It would have been the equivalent of ‘hara kiri.’

Reviewing the fate of our ex-military rulers. General Iskander Mirza was exiled to London where he lived under rather straitened circumstances. General Zia-ul-Haq was blown out of the air. The only person who retired and lived peacefully at home was Field Marshal Ayub, but that was because Yahya was not vindictive and at least in this matter behaved like an officer and a gentleman. Similarly when and if General Musharraf leaves, his fate will largely depend upon his successor as COAS.