THERE have been, till 1971, two distinct trends running through military takeovers. The first is the general attitude towards civilians. The other was how to cope with the Bengali majority. The Rawalpindi conspiracy fell in the first category, but it was a sort of preview of things to come. There is also a third element, which cannot be underestimated — that is the joy of exercising power. It’s great fun to be No. 1.

One of the problems with the vision of Pakistan held by Chaudhry Rahmat Ali and Allama Iqbal was that they, more or less, automatically conceived of it in terms of the West and North where people were larger and of lighter hue. In actual fact, when Pakistan was formed, the majority of its people were short and dark and furthermore, lived in the East. The resolution of this conflict was played out in three-acts.

Act I — Immediately after Mr Jinnah passed away power went into the hands of Liaquat Ali Khan. Although from East Punjab, he was fluent in the ‘wrong’ language and was not acceptable to Punjab. The central unstated issue was ‘how to provide Punjab control over Pakistan.’ After the failure or abandonment of the ‘Rawalpindi conspiracy’, the failure of the Khatm-i-Nabuwat movement in Lahore, engineered by the chief minister of Punjab, there was an impasse. This problem was finally resolved by Liaquat’s physical removal from the scene.

Act II — Nazimuddin, a mild and gentlemanly individual, steps down from the high office of governor-general and becomes prime minister, Mr Ghulam Mohamed becomes governor-general. In the cabinet there were differences of opinion over policy. The issue was the constant assertion by Bengal in the formulation of policy, which became a continuing source of friction.

Act III — I am not aware as to what exactly precipitated the crisis but one would guess that after consulting the Chief Justice of Pakistan, who, in all probability, believed in strong central control, exercised by people of greater ability who naturally came from Punjab, Ghulam Mohamed sacked the prime minister and dissolved the Constituent Assembly. This coup was carried out with the assistance of the army. The result was the famous Tamizuddin Khan case. The Sindh High Court decided against the governor-general, but the Supreme Court upheld the governor-general’s action.

A new and rather more divided Constituent Assembly was elected by the provincial legislatures. This permitted the GG/President to play around with various permutations and combinations of its members. A successor prime minister, Mohamed Ali, from the Bengal town of Bogra was duly installed. To distinguish him from the clever (Chaudhry) Mohamed Ali, the people, more or less as a lark, added Bogra to his name. He remained Bogra to his dying day. He was more of a joke than a prime minister.

He was succeeded in fairly quick succession by Chaudhry Mohamed Ali (the clever), Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy (the experienced), I.I. Chundrigar and Feroz Khan Noon as prime ministers. In one of these Cabinets, General Ayub was also appointed as defence minister. The army had officially surfaced. In the meantime, Ghulam Mohamed who was becoming increasingly senile and incoherent, had to be replaced. The mantle was arranged to fall on Iskander Mirza, the secretary ministry of defence, who had already promoted himself to the rank of major-general. As far as one can gather, he simply walked in one day with a group of people, bodily bundled Ghulam Mohamed out of the governor-general’s residence and announced himself as the incumbent in office and the occupant of the house. The new Constituent Assembly enabled this process to be accomplished fairly smoothly.

In the meantime, the politicians had been working on a constitution. By 1956, an agreed draft was produced based on the principle of parity of seats between East and West Pakistan. In preparation for this event, the provinces of the western wing of the country were superseded and combined under one unit with its capital at Lahore. The face of the government, namely the governor-general, and now president, had been replaced by a man with the rank of major-general. Pressure for elections began to mount once the constitution had been adopted. The ruse of changing prime ministers, one after another prolonged the period of waiting, but by 1958, the moment of truth had arrived. Punjab could not continue to rule without bringing in the army.

On October 7, having passed the usual number of adverse comments on politicians, the army formally took over and the country was placed under martial law. This was a combined military and bureaucratic coup.

One of the nicer peculiarities of Pakistani coups is that there is no immediate bloodshed. Ayub streamlined this particular coup by removing Iskander Mirza after three weeks and sending him into exile. There were no charges, no cases and no involvement of the courts — it was a neat surgical operation. There are rumours that they also took away his Swiss bank account. Iskander Mirza certainly did not live a life of luxury in exile.

Young army officers were let loose on civil society to “clean up the mess.” Their major contribution appears to have been the arbitrary fixing of “fair prices” of various items. People rushed to buy things before they disappeared either through purchase or removal to safe places. Within a few months it was recognized that the young officers were a bit of a nuisance and they were withdrawn from martial law duties. At the top, martial law administrators remained. As a matter of fact, a senior civil servant was designated as deputy chief martial law administrator. In about a year’s time, differences of opinion occurred and he was sent off as an ambassador.

The two most important immediate acts of the new government were the shifting of the capital from Karachi to Islamabad and secondly, creating a precedent for cleaning up the administration of the so-called corrupt and inefficient officers through an extra-judicial process called screening. In all, about a hundred or so people were affected. Ayub Khan ran his government mainly with civilians. There were two army officers who, however, played an important role: Lt. General K.M. Shaikh, and Brigadier F.R. Khan. Later Lt. Gen. Azam Khan was added to this list as governor of East Pakistan.

Ayub Khan had the following objectives: (a) Economic development of the country. (b) Continued rule by him for an indefinite period. (c) A feeling that he was popular with the public. (d) To make Pakistan a modern progressive state.

The last three objectives were supposed to be organized by the Bureau of National Reconstruction and the Ministry of Information. When the BNR/Ministry lost its clout after the resignation of Brig. F.R. Khan, we had a fairly rapid turnover of secretaries. Ayub’s major weakness was his aversion to reading anything critical of his government in the press. Stability at the top in the ministry of information only came with the appointment of Altaf Gauhar who, as a very competent civil servant, provided the necessary service. Nothing that would annoy the president and spoil his breakfast any longer appeared in the papers. As a matter of fact, this state of affairs continued for the next twenty-five years until a much less competent secretary information persuaded the interim government of 1988 to repeal the Press and Publications Ordinance.

A suitable administrative structure for progressing economic development was set up under the auspices of the Harvard Advisory Group for the flow of external resources which arrived both in the form of military equipment and support of the Pakistan economy largely provided by the US and the World Bank. Under US leadership, other developed countries also played a part. The Pakistan economy floated on a flood of dollars towards prosperity. Ayub Khan also had the advantage of having the best finance minister that Pakistan has so far had. Unfortunately, the 1965 war with India halted this process. No one has calculated its cost, but in economic terms, it was very high.

It weakened Ayub’s hold on power and towards the end of 1968, Yahya Khan, then commander-in-chief of the army, thought that it was his turn to enjoy ruling the country. Yahya Khan’s martial law saw a further intrusion of the military into civilian affairs. Lt. Gen. Pirzada was the virtual prime minister. The heads of the other two services, Admiral Ahsan and Air Marshal Nur Khan, divided the rest of the ministries between them.

THE other day Mr Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Senior advocate Supreme Court and a former federal law minister who can rightly claim to be the author of the 1973 Constitution, appeared on television defending a referendum by a military ruler of Pakistan.

He spoke about the Seventh amendment introduced in the Constitution in the shape of Article 96-A, which was gazetted on May 16, 1977. It provides for obtaining a vote of confidence from the people by the prime minister by a separate referendum commission. The prime minister would stay in power if he secured a majority of the total votes, otherwise, he would be deemed to have tendered his resignation.

Mr Pirzada also stated that there were special circumstances as the prime minister lacked moral authority for the reason that the opposition had en bloc rejected the results of the elections of the National Assembly and did not attend its sessions. The PNA had also boycotted the provincial assemblies’ elections. In fact, there was a dispute between the government of Mr Z.A. Bhutto and the combined opposition which had formed the Pakistan National Alliance alleging rigging in the elections, and in consequence, thee was a serious law and order situation. But at the same time a dialogue also continued between the government and the opposition.

This reminded me of a very chequered phase of the history of Pakistan and brought back old memories, when democracy which was functioning smoothly received severe jolts caused by the political leaders. The 1973 Constitution was made and enacted after the separation of East Pakistan to save and unite the remainder Pakistan. Full credit should be given to the framers of the 1973 Constitution, which was made with the consensus of all political parties represented in the National Assembly settling the irritating issue of provincial autonomy and closing down the door on military intervention by inserting Article 6 in the Constitution.

I still remember a procession of the members of parliament taking draft Constitution of 1973 to the president for assent declaring in a loud voice for everybody to hear that hereafter there will be no martial law in the country. The Supreme Court decided in Asma Jilani’s case that General Yahya Khan was a usurper and the abrogation of the Constitution can not be justified on the basis of the doctrine of necessity. Article 6 of the Constitution provides that abrogation or subversion of the Constitution or any such attempt amounts to treason punishable with death.

Going back to the question of the referendum in the Seventh amendment to the Constitution, it is pertinent to note that Mr Bhutto as prime minister, before the completion of his term of office, decided to hold fresh elections as he was confident that he would win the elections hands-down. The opposition parties did not like his policies and decisions in spite of the fact that Mr Bhutto as prime minister declared the Ahmadis as non-Muslim minority by making amendment in the Constitution, imposed prohibition on consumption of alcohol in public and declared Friday as weekly holiday instead of Sunday.

His negative points were that out of seven amendments made in the Constitution, the majority related to the curtailment of the powers of the judiciary. The members of the opposition felt that they were being victimized and were being prevented from getting justice in the Courts. All the opposition parties including religious parties got united and made an alliance to oppose Mr Bhutto in the elections of 1977. Incidentally, Mr Bhutto allowed the PNA to have one single election symbol of plough although the parties had different manifestoes and had nothing in common. This was done because Mr Bhutto was optimistic about winning the elections.

Mr Bhutto filed his nomination paper from Larkana. Maulana Jan Mohammad Abassi of Jamaat-i-Islami also wanted to contest election against him and file his nomination-paper. But he was not allowed to do so and was kidnapped and taken away to some place. As a result, he was physically prevented from filing the nomination paper. Mr Bhutto was declared to have won the election unopposed. this act was severely criticized by political circles and the print media as not befitting to the prime minister who was a champion of democracy.

One view in a section of the PPP was that it was done without the knowledge of Mr Bhutto. It was also being stated that if Maulana Jan Mohammad Abbasi was allowed to file his nomination paper and contest the election against the sitting prime minister, it would have enhanced the stature of Mr Bhutto as a promoter and defender of democracy. Any way, the end-result was that the PPP captured 155 out of 200 seats in the National Assembly and won 19 seats unopposed including that of the prime minister.

The PNA rejected the results, alleged rigging and refused to participate in the elections of the provincial assemblies. In consequence there was law and order situation. The authority of the government was challenged and Mr Bhutto called upon the armed forces to act in aid of the civil power in Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad as required under Article 245 of the Constitution.

In the meantime parleys started between the government and the PNA. The government delegation was led by Mr A.H. Pirzada and the PNA delegation was headed by Prof Ghafoor Ahmed. There was confusion and lack of sense of security all around. Since the army was involved in aid of civil power, General Zia-ul-Haq was also pressing hard for a peaceful solution of the impasse. Mr Bhutto was also very eager to find a way out.

The PNA refused to recognize the government, which according to them was the outcome of rigged elections and insisted on fresh elections. Mr Bhutto took the stand that he was an elected prime minister and would remain in power. But he offered that the dispute be resolved through a referendum and since there was no opposition, the Seventh amendment was passed as Act No. 23/1977 providing that the dispute be referred to the people to answer the question whether they accepted Mr Bhutto as prime minister and if the majority replied in ‘yes’ then he would continue, and if the majority did not respond positively, he would be deemed to have resigned and would step down.

The opposition did not participate in the passage of the Act and did not accept the proposal right from the beginning. So Article 96-A was inserted but was not acted upon and meanwhile parleys failed and General Zia-ul-Haq intervened and imposed martial law.

Now, it is crystal clear that the Seventh amendment was unnecessary and unilateral and was an offer to solve a particular problem. But it was not accepted by the other side, which claimed that the whole exercise of election was a fraud and the government formed on such a premise was not legitimate. Hence the problem could be solved only when the results of the elections were set aside and new elections were held. Referendum under Article 48(6) was already available in which the question of national importance could be asked from the people with answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’, then why the need was felt for a fresh referendum to be inserted as Article 96-A.

The only reason, which is possible in favour of such an amendment is that Mr Bhutto thought that, he was rightfully elected prime minister but since the dispute was raised by the PNA that the elections were rigged, such disputes could be settled if people answered the question in a referendum and the majority favoured the continuation of the prime minister. It was directed that the referendum would be supervised by a special commission and its decision could not be challenged in any court or tribunal, making it absolutely final.

Article 96 is not part of the Constitution now and is repealed. Article 96 related to the vote of no confidence against the prime minister and that’s why Mr Bhutto agreed to insert Article 96-A for referendum as he thought that the dispute pertained to the confidence in the duly elected prime minister while the opposition maintained that the whole government was illegitimate as it was product of rigged elections.

I think Article 96-A (Seventh amendment), which even otherwise is repealed and is not part of the Constitution does not help the contention that General Pervez Musharraf wants to be president for five years if the people endorsed his reforms, when the Constitutional method of election of the president is available under Article 41 by the electoral college of Senate, National Assembly and provincial assemblies and elections are going to be held under the orders of the Supreme Court in October this year.

Election means that there should be a panel of several candidates, and electors should have a choice. This constitutional method must be accepted and not deviated on any pretext. Any deviation would amount to fraud not only with the people but also with the Constitution which is to be interpreted for the benefit of the people and not an individual.

The writer is a retired chief justice of Pakistan.

THE coming referendum for confirming Gen. Pervez Musharraf as president for five years from October has become controversial politically and, for the same reason, one can expect a soft budget. The budget is to come in May and the referendum will take place on April 30, well before the budget.

The general elections, as promised by Gen. Musharraf, are to be held in October, and he would not like to take any step in the economic sector that can make the people vote against candidates supporting him. He certainly would not like to take any risk in this respect as he wants a parliament and a prime minister who would work in harmony with him.

While the new budget may not come up with major tax relief measures, he certainly does not want to add to the tax burdens of the people, particularly by extending the heavy 15 per cent general sales tax to new areas and to sensitive goods and services despite his government’s binding commitments to the IMF.

The IMF understands the predicament or compulsions of Gen. Musharraf and is ready to give him a reasonably long rope for a while tactically to let him overcome his political challenges. The donor governments are alive to the political difficulties of Gen Musharraf and want to accommodate him as much as they can. They hold him in high esteem and want to be helpful to him, particularly when that does not cost much to them financially. And when the major donors like the US want it the IMF can be truly flexible. And so are the other international aid agencies like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank which is now committed to provide a billion dollars a year for three years.

But if the increase in taxes or their extension to new areas and rise in prices of power or POL are put off until after October elections, will the elected leaders be asked to levy them soon after they assume office? In that case they can become unpopular. And they would like to avoid annoying the people. Will the IMF and other agencies give them too a long rope and wait for those unpopular measures to be implemented later?

Meanwhile, Gen Musharraf has been saying he is seeking an extension of his term so that he could implement all the reforms he is committed to, and that includes the fiscal reforms. And those reforms comprise doing away with tax exemptions and fiscal subsidies, which means making life expensive for most people in the medium term, and not short term as the IMF claims?

So the elected leaders are likely to face a tough situation soon after they come into office and they may argue that if Gen. Musharraf and his ministers could put off the taxes and price hikes in their turn during the referendum and after, the newly elected ones should also be given time to levy the agreed taxes and increase the prices of POL, electric power etc. What kind of settlement will be reached after the elections between the various stakeholders remains to be seen.

The fact is that with foreign exchange reserves of 5.23 billion dollars Pakistan can do without the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility programme of 1.3 billion dollars spread over three years with its quarterly tranches of a 100 million dollars. But the country needs the IMF’s “seal of approval” to receive aid from other agencies and major donor states and attract large foreign investment and to borrow large sums from abroad when needed.

Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz has said this is the last time Pakistan would be seeking IMF’s financial assistance as the lender of last resort because of its exceedingly tough and even humiliating conditionalities. And yet the country would need the IMF’s chit of good financial health to negotiate fair deals with others.

The government began soft pedalling on the tax and price increases even before Gen. Musharraf announced he is opting for a referendum. Having announced spreading the 15 per cent general sales tax to all medicines the government quickly withdrew the same from life saving drugs and medical supplies to federal and provincial hospitals and military establishments. It also withdrew the 5.5 paisa rise in the cost of electric power, although that was much less than what WAPDA had asked for.

The government did not allow the oil marketing companies to raise the prices of POL during the current fortnight despite the sharp increase in world price of oil, which has hit 28 dollars a barrel. In addition, it has put off the proposed 15 per cent GST levy on vegetable ghee and edible oil and agricultural inputs. I presume the levy on tractors and components of computers has also been suspended. However GST has been made applicable to the distributors and sales points of fertilisers which will raise prices of fertilisers marginally.

In a grossly under-nourished country in which over 40 per cent of the people live below the poverty line a 15 per cent levy on several agricultural inputs and edible oil would be too burdensome, but the IMF insisted on that to get the maximum out of sales tax revenues. Costlier food and expensive medicines is not way to fight poverty, but that is not what the IMF thinks. When the government cannot slash its expenditure or cut its large budget deficit.

The IMF and the World Bank want Pakistan to collect more tax revenues from every possible source, including through reduction of corruption and a radical reform of the Central Board of Revenue. If that is not possible they want the existing tax-payers pay far more taxes, heedless of their incapacity.

As a result a high tax revenue target of Rs 457.8 billion was fixed for the current year against last year’s revenues of Rs 406 billion, which itself was Rs 29 billion below the targeted. But since then that target has been revised downward three times and brought down to Rs 415 billion with IMF approval. But now it is estimated the net tax revenues may not be more than Rs 400 billion — about the same as last year’s revenues.

And yet high tax revenue target are fixed year after year to goad the tax-collectors to collect far more than last year. There is also the hope the people could be made to pay more and corruption in the taxation services would be reduced. Not much happens in each of these areas, but the sales tax revenues have been increasing through the stern steps taken by the CBR.

If the tax revenues this year will be low there are good reasons for that. There is a real downturn in the economy. Imports have fallen and along with that the price of imports which means lower taxes on them per unit. The fall in the rupee cost of the imports following the dollar coming around to Rs 60 has also reduced the import taxes. There is in addition the global recession which has brought down the prices of our textiles sharply. All these factors cannot be wished away nor attributed to faulty policies. The IMF has clearly taken all these factors into account in the post-September 11 world before becoming lenient towards the government.

Meanwhile, commerce minister Razak Dawood says the value-added textile exports have risen from 35 per cent of the total exports to 52 per cent, and that is a welcome development. And despite the fall in exports the trade balance has improved by 38 per cent in the first nine months of this financial year because of the fall in imports, including the value of the imports. And the prospects of far larger trade with Iraq and Syria are encouraging.

Meanwhile, it is interesting to see the IMF undertaking an independent evaluation of its performance in an effort to improve it and make it more effective. David Goldbrough, Evaluation Officer of the Independent Evaluation Office has been in Pakistan and meeting a large number of people, seeking their opinion about the performance of the IMF and the means to improve it. He is doing that completely independent of the IMF.

Its strategy of short term pain for the low income groups in return for long term gains has not really worked in many countries. Instead in countries like Pakistan the pain of the poor or low income groups has been increasing. As a result poverty has doubled within ten years in the 1999s. But the IMF may argue that poverty has increased as Pakistan did not follow the IMF prescription earnestly or fully, and instead breached too many arguments with it.

Most of the countries seek IMF assistance when they are in serious financial trouble and are plagued by large budgetary deficits and balance of trade and balance of payments deficits, along with a very poor foreign exchange reserve. And the IMF prescription in such a situation makes the lot of the people far worse while the rich gain by it.

Its policy of more and more devaluation of the rupee to boost exports has been a failure. A large dose of devaluation helps the accumulated exports to be cleared within the following few months.

THE possible amalgam of a seminar on ‘Jihad for Knowledge’ and a theatre festival seemed at first sight odd. But after attending both in the charming Kentucky city of Louisville last week, a common point appeared to emerge — a striving to understand the complexities of the human spirit and of the human condition and a search for values that can unite people for peace.

The seminar was organized by the Cathedral Heritage Foundation, the Kentucky Humanities Council and the Islamic Society of North America, and it was supported by the Actors Theatre, Louisville’s avant-garde theatre group that for 26 years has been holding an annual festival of contemporary American plays. Journalists were invited from Washington and New York by the Foreign Press Centre to attend the two events, and the trip marked a welcome break from the monotony of the regular press briefings at the State Department and the Pentagon as well as the sameness of many of the gatherings at Washington’s think-tanks.

There was, on the sidelines of the seminar and in the lobbies of the Actors Theatre’s hospitable complex and its basement bar and in the parties held to celebrate the theatre festival, a refreshing openness of views about the brutal Israeli aggression against Palestinians, and you encountered a significant readiness to accept the distortions in US foreign policy that have led to many of the world’s current problems.

True, the seminar on ‘Jihad for Education’ skimmed the surface of the issues involved and seemed in the end to be more like a cliched inter-faith meeting, but for many Americans in the audience it should have marked an effort to stimulate thinking on questions that have been precipitated by the September 11 attacks and subsequent developments and thus perhaps in a small way met its objective of promoting knowledge. One speaker said how the 300,000 tons of debris at the site of the New York Trade Centre Towers had turned into 300,000 tons of hate: the seminar was an indication that many concerned individuals and organizations were making an attempt to help clear away some of the debris of hate.

Dr Jean-Paul Charnay, president of Sorbonne University’s Centre de la Philosophie de la Strategie, said there had been a kind of comport between Islam and Christianity, but he questioned whether it was enough to emphasize the commonalities of the two religions, and ignore the differences. The professor suggested that there were irreconcilable differences between the two faiths, and these should be recognized, discussed and addressed rather than swept aside. There should be readiness on both sides to engage in a dialogue, forgetting past mutual lapses and with the objective of lessening human suffering and struggling against evil.

The stumbling blocks in the way should first be recognized, Prof Charnay appeared to be arguing, before we could hope to get past them.

Dr Sayyid M Sayeed, secretary-general of the Islamic Society of North America, a fairly conservative group, said the Muslim presence in America was not a byproduct of colonialism like the Muslim presence in France or Britain. Most of the early Muslim immigrants here were students who had chosen to stay on, and the effort of the community was largely directed at combining their Islamic heritage with being good Americans.

Dr Sayeed, in a speech that was described as politically correct from the American point of view, praised the US commitment to plurality, diversity and freedom of religion that had enabled the Muslim community to grow and flourish. Someone in the audience, probably conscious of the problems faced by American Muslims in the wake of the Sept 11 attacks, wondered aloud whether Dr Sayeed spoke on behalf of the silent majority in the community as opposed to community leaders. Dr Sayeed holds your interest as a speaker, but has an unsettling habit of interspersing his comments with a kind of catechism directed at the audience.

Dr Riffat Hassan, who has worked on feminist theology and is professor of religious studies and humanities at the University of Louisville, said she had great reservations on how the US handled the situation arising from 9/11, and particularly the way it had been articulated by the American media. The media had politicized the issue of Muslim women and, among other instances, created the impression as if the US and the coalition had gone into Afghanistan to liberate Afghan women. The liberation of Afghan women was only a byproduct of the military campaign, and even that had not really happened as a general rule.

Dr Hassan, who put the discussion into some kind of a political context, said most laws relating to Islamization had affected women in one way or the other, and wondered why in Muslim countries that were otherwise so full of corruption and other problems, governments were so obsessed with women.

Dr Philip Jenkins, Distinguished Professor of History and Religious Studies at Pennsylvania University, referred to the phenomenal growth of Christianity in Africa, and offered the fact of Islam and Christianity competing from converts from each other as one of the main reasons for the feud between “these two sister religions”.

A former State Department official, Kenneth Stammerman, who was consul-general in Dhahran during the Gulf war, spoke from notes that seemed freshly sent from the department, so closely they followed the party line, although at a dinner the previous evening he had appeared fairly rational and receptive to suggestions.

The Cathedral Heritage Foundation and groups associated with it hope to develop their initiative and in time carry the dialogue to other countries, including Pakistan.