| April 3, 2002 | Wednesday | Muharram 19,1423 |
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Not the European model
An ideal profession: OF MICE AND MEN
A mickey mouse solution
A dangerous stand-off
ALTHOUGH a formal announcement will probably not be made until later this week, all indications are that President, Gen Pervez Musharraf, will hold a referendum on the question whether he should stay on as head of state for another five years. Several foreign media believe that the president has already decided to opt in favour of a referendum. From what interior minister Gen Moinuddin Haider told journalists on his arrival in Kuala Lumpur also on Sunday, it appears that a referendum is on the cards.
STANDING at the window of a friend’s upper storey flat in Islamabad’s Sector F-10, I saw a unique sight. Well, not unique really in these days of unabashed ostentation which is at its most garish in this area, but certainly unmatched in what I have seen of the federal capital. The entire long drive of the house next door, from one gate to the other, and passing through the ornate colonnaded porch, was paved with white marble.
IT is now nearly two months that India ordered its defence forces to take up battle positions with the express intention of waging a war if its demands were not met by Pakistan. The Indian military deployment assumed such an offensive posture that the international community had to take a serious note of it.
IT IS difficult to disagree with those who suggest that Pakistan is relatively fortunate to have had Pervez Musharraf — rather than Nawaz Sharif or Benazir Bhutto — at the helm in the aftermath of September 11. Yet this ought not to be taken as a compliment by either the general or the armed forces. If anything, it’s an indictment of the state of the nation 55 years after independence.
After all, the argument hinges not on the fiscal imprudence and levels of corruption associated with the post-1988 PPP and PML administrations, but on the ability of elected governments to exercise control over the army. Even Musharraf has had a tough time curbing military factions overtly sympathetic to Islamists of the Taliban variety — and it is much too soon to determine the extent to which his efforts have been successful. A civilian head of government in his stead would have faced a next-to-impossible task: in other words, if a coup d’etat had not occurred in October 1999, it would have been carried out in October 2001 — with indeterminate, but inevitably dangerous, consequences.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the dramatic putsch against the second Nawaz Sharif government ought to be celebrated as an ideal form of deliverance from a pathetically inept administration. Institutionalized democracy would have offered less drastic routes to change. It is singularly unfortunate that hardly any regime in Pakistan’s history displayed great interest in building up or consolidating democratic institutions. This tendency is particularly unforgivable in the case of civilian administrations, given that military governments have a vested interest in limiting the extent of popular involvement in choosing the nation’s rulers.
It is therefore not particularly surprising that the signposts on Musharraf’s roadmap leave much to be desired, and the shape of things to come is rendered hazier still by purported plans for a referendum intended to lend the occupant of the presidential office a modicum of legitimacy. Nor is it strange that the concept of a referendum should carry echoes of the attempted fraud perpetrated by Musharraf’s predecessor as military ruler. General Zia-ul-Haq’s 1984 exercise was an attempt to perpetuate his misrule by seeking popular endorsement for an Islamic form of government.
The absurdly manipulated official figures notwithstanding, the record shows that most people were not fooled by Zia’s manoeuvre. The example may yet prevent Musharraf from perpetrating a comparable folly. It is nonetheless somewhat disingenuous to argue, as several political parties have been doing, that such a referendum would be unconstitutional. It undoubtedly would be — but not any more so than the very concept of military rule. A government headed by a serving general clearly cannot help violating the Constitution.
Whereas Musharraf’s actions and policies may well be worthy of criticism, it is at least equally pertinent to point out that the politicians have hardly distinguished themselves in any way since October 1999. It is probably just as well that the Sharif clan has been silenced by the conditions of its exile, but Benazir Bhutto’s periodic forays into the limelight — be it in India or the United States — suggest that the lessons of her failures remain unlearned. Not only does she remain in denial about her maladministration and the economic crimes committed during the PPP’s tenure, she is also determined to prove once again that the path to power in Islamabad passes through Washington DC.
That may indeed be the case — but, if so, it’s a national disgrace that needs to be remedied rather than a circumstance that deserves to be celebrated, let alone exploited by anyone who claims popular support. Besides, although Benazir may be slow to realize it, it’s fairly obvious that the Bush administration is keen to have Musharraf remain at the helm for the time being. In fact, it is widely being rumoured that the General has offered guarantees to the US and other western well-wishers that he ain’t going nowhere.
If that is true, Musharraf would be well-advised to take the nation into confidence. He has tried, with some success, to establish a reputation for plain speaking. It would be extremely unfortunate were he to fail the nation in this respect when it comes to the crunch. He has been less than forthcoming about the true nature of the ISI, even as he has been trying to curb the excesses of the extremists who populate it.
The kidnapping and murder of the journalist Daniel Pearl, who was investigating links between the ISI and the extremist organizations, and last month’s massacre at a Protestant church in Islamabad’s well-protected diplomatic enclave suggest that a change of personnel at the top and minor restructuring might not be enough. It may well be necessary to disband the out-of-control organization and rebuild military intelligence (if that is not a contradiction in terms) more or less from scratch.
It is equally important to keep a sharp eye on the activities of former ISI stalwarts such as generals Hameed Gul and Mehmood. One must also hope there are good reasons why arrests made in connection with the crackdown on fundamentalism have in many cases been remarkably brief. Individuals should not, of course, be detained solely on account of their opinions or beliefs.
At the same time, evidence or reasonable suspicion of involvement, directly or otherwise, in acts of violence — whether in Afghanistan, Kashmir or Pakistan — ought not to be overlooked on account of what may be described as inter-services considerations. If Musharraf can undo to a substantial degree the harm done to the army as an institution in recent decades, particularly during Zia’s tenure, he will have proved himself worthy of the nation’s gratitude.
That could prove harder, though, than earning American kudos. There is an intriguing parallel between how Afghanistan offered a way out of international isolation to both Zia and Musharraf. The execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto — 23 years ago this week — had the inevitable effect of transforming Zia into something of a pariah, until the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan enabled him to offer his services to the Carter administration. It wasn’t long before he was able to rival Augusto Pinochet as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher’s favourite general.
In those days the West was noticeably less reticent about overtly throwing its weight behind military dictators — and it’s worth recalling that his uniformed predecessors were also well-liked in their time. Ayub Khan was hailed as the Asian de Gaulle (which was intended as a compliment), and the Nixon administration’s support for Yahya Khan continued well after the massacres in East Pakistan had started.
As for Zia, the US would, of course, have found a way of interfering in Afghan affairs even without his assistance, but it would have found it much harder to transform its role into the largest CIA covert operation since Vietnam. Some of Zia’s cohorts creamed off substantial amounts of the virtually unlimited US aid intended for the murderous Mujahideen — which makes it particularly unfortunate that Musharraf has deemed it fit not to extend his accountability campaign to the armed forces.
But rampant corruption isn’t the worst legacy of Zia’s calculated decision to bend over backwards to appease Uncle Sam. Pakistan continues to pay a price for the attendant proliferation of drugs, weaponry and the exploitation of religion for impiously violent ends. The phenomenon would not have disturbed the US had it not unexpectedly found itself paying a high price for its extreme irresponsibility in the recent past.
It must be hoped that Musharraf harbours no illusions about the international status he has acquired in the wake of September 11. He may, by and large, have distinguished himself by words and actions considerably more sensible than those of previous military rulers, but he is nonetheless a dictator. Furthermore, he is a dictator who is seen to be seeking avenues of perpetuating his power, possibly by cloaking himself in a veneer of legitimacy. Zia failed in a similar attempt — and came to a fiery end once his services were no longer required by his sponsors in Washington DC. Musharraf does not deserve that sort of fate. But he must remember that, notwithstanding the democratic disasters of the 1988-99 period, Pakistan must learn to do without would-be saviours in khaki. Yet another parliamentary facade, with ultimate power residing with the GHQ, will do nothing to build up the democratic institutions Pakistan so desperately requires, nor enhance the self-esteem of its citizens. Politicians have, indeed, failed the nation time and again — and there is thus far little evidence that they have learned from their mistakes. However, much the same could be said about the army. The difference, of course, is that politicians can eventually be voted out of power.
One political system that Pakistan is yet to experience is popular rule with no military interference whatsoever, indirect or otherwise. Isn’t it high time we gave it a try?
However, there has been nothing to suggest that elections scheduled for October could be put off. The return of the country to a democratic dispensation after it has been ruled by the army for almost three years is bound to be a complex operation that modalities of which will need to be worked out with due circumspection. However, it has to be said to the credit of the general that he did not place the country under martial law.
If the purpose of the referendum will actually be to ensure continuity of the political and economic reforms that he has undertaken, this should not become a matter of any serious concern for the people. By and large, the rhythm of daily life has continued to be the same as it was when the army deposed Mr Nawaz Sharif’s government in October 1999.
In all of his consultations with the political leaders, the president has unequivocally reiterated his government’s resolve to hold “free and fair elections” in October, the deadline set by the Supreme Court. Nothing that he has said suggests that he finds the 1973 Constitution inadequate for the purpose of helping to restore democracy. Whenever he speaks of the Constitution he has the 1973 Constitution in mind.
When a three-member delegation of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) called on him the other day, the president assured them that there would be no change in the system of democracy “as envisaged in the Constitution.” He has also had meetings with Imran Khan and retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan and reaffirmed that his government did not intend to bring about any change in the basic structure and spirit of the 1973 Constitution as “it is a document framed and approved by national consensus.”
It is therefore surprising that an eminent Pakistani political analyst, Shahid Javed Burki, should call for the “beginning of a process that may “give Pakistan a political structure totally different from the one embodied in the Constitution of 1973.” His proposal could well mean postponing the elections for the time being. He has proposed what he calls a “Constitutional convention approach” a la what the European Council is doing.
As proposed by him, a Council comprising 100 members should be set up, fifty per cent of whom would be named by the general before the country is called upon to elect another parliament. The rest 50 per cent would be nominated by the assemblies which would be in place in a few months’ time. Together they would constitute a Constitutional Convention similar to what the foreign ministers of the 15 member states of European Council set up last December after they failed to arrive at a consensus on the future shape of the European continent with the likely induction of a number of other European states into the Union. The Convention would “bring citizens, primarily the young, closer to the European design.”
Under the approach proposed by Mr Burki, the 50 per cent members of the Council to be nominated by the president should be drawn from among the segments of society “who have been poorly represented in the political system given by the 1973 Constitution.” What that specifically means can only be conjectured. Apparently, the intention is to include in the political system a larger number of women, as well as professionals such as economists, bankers, engineers and teachers. In the 1973 Constitution, this segment is represented in the upper house of the parliament.
However, the European Union (EU) can hardly be regarded as a role model for a developing country like Pakistan. The members of the EU are vastly more sophisticated and educated, politically mature and capable of adapting themselves to changes and innovations in the system of governance. They are also all independent states, each with a full-fledged political system of its own. There are also not very glaring differences in the value systems, lifestyles and cultures of the various states which have acceded to the European Union and they do not have any reason to fear that these value systems, lifestyles and cultures would be compromised by virtue of their being components of a larger political Union.
Unfortunately, the component units of Pakistan do not have the same degree of commonality of value systems and lifestyles, and even their respective cultures while being similar are not quite the same. Unlike Europe, there is also a much greater emphasis on ethnic and linguistic identity.
While one cannot dispute Mr Burki’s contention that the 1973 Constitution should not be treated as a document embodying some “divine revelation”, it is not fair to suggest that it was a document that was “hammered out in the backrooms of the parliament by a small group of self-serving politicians.” After the separation of what was once East Pakistan and the convening of a national assembly comprising members who were elected in the 1970 general elections (minus of course the members elected from the erstwhile eastern wing), Pakistan was for about four months governed under martial law and later under an interim Constitution. On April 12, 1972 the assembly appointed a committee consisting of representatives of all major parties with the mandate to draft a new Constitution. The committee after much debate and discussion finalized a draft by December 1972 which was then presented to the national assembly for more debate and discussion.
It was ultimately approved by consensus and passed unanimously. It was presented to the president for his approval which was granted on April 12, 1973 and was inaugurated as the country’s Constitution on August 14, 1973 — a day marking Pakistan’s independence. It is not fair to refer to it as a document hatched by a group of “conspirators” sitting in some backroom. That the Constitution was deprived of some of the political wisdom which had gone into its drafting and enactment because of any shortcoming of the Constitution itself. It was so because of the way it was treated by its own founding father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
Subsequently, a great deal more damage was done to the 1973 Constitution by Gen Zia-ul-Haq who deposed Bhutto in a coup and later used the Constitution to indemnify himself against a whole lot of the excesses that he had committed before he handed over power to a handpicked prime minister. This does not mean that the Constitution itself was faulty in some way. Zia’s attitude about the Constitution was evident from his boast that it was no more than a mere sheaf of papers which he could tear up any time at his will.
The 1973 Constitution would still meet Pakistan’s needs, provided it is purged of the distortions which it has suffered over the years by way of arbitrary amendments. Instead of scrapping the Constitution and putting the clock back for postponing the ‘H-Hour’ for the restoration of democracy, it should of course be restored to its original form by submitting it to a thorough cleansing by a committee of constitutional and legal experts. There are nearly six months available for such a cleansing job and it could be entrusted to a group of serving or retired chief justices so that the elections could be held in October.
It has to be said even at the risk of repetition that the Constitution is as good or as bad as the people who work it. After all the traumas that Pakistan has gone through, the 1973 Constitution deserves to be given a chance so that elections could be held as scheduled in October.
The army takeover and the dismal end of the prime ministership of Mr Nawaz Sharif had nothing to do with the 1973 Constitution; it was only the result of his own clumsy handling of the responsibilities of his office. He should have remembered that the army had developed into an important factor in the governance of Pakistan regardless of what the Constitution did or did not stipulate. He should also have remembered that on the whole the army had helped the growth of democracy after 1995. However, Mr Nawaz Sharif chose to work in a way which totally exposed his utter incapacity to comprehend the complexity of his office. He should have known that he could not exploit the army for strengthening his political position, like he had been able to exploit some other institutions of the state.
I have seen the facades of numerous houses in Islamabad and Lahore with a facing in marble. I have seen many on which not an inch of brick or cement is visible in the profusion of marble. (One such “mansion” was that of a former Chairman of the Capital Development Authority, now unhappily — or happily? — in jail. My wife and daughters had got into the habit of calling it the Marble Monstrosity). But this was the first time I had seen the driveway of a residence done up entirely in marble.
And by deft use of the imagination and stretching the popular metaphor could you say that, in a spiritual sense, each marble slab was really a piece of good intention paving the way to you know where, since the luxurious mansion belongs to a Pir Sahib of Kohat area with a wide and influential following?
The institution of ‘piri-mureedi’ in the subcontinent has always held a fascination for me. When I was a callow youth and couldn’t yet decide what I was going to be when I entered man’s estate, I was left spellbound by the charmed life led by a pal’s pir father and I made up my mind to follow in his pseudo-spiritual footsteps.
Once when the Pir Sahib had to go on his annual “tax-collecting” trip, i.e. providing spiritual sustenance on payment of a charge to followers at their doorstep, my friend took me along. Even as an officer in the federal government I was not so fawned upon as I was on that journey when, along with my friend, I too came to be known as ‘Chhote Shah Sahib’ without being a Syed. I came back in raptures.
It took all my innate aversion for ‘piri-mureedi’ and mazar-worship and a heavy dose of rationality laced with western humanism and liberalism imbibed at an early age, to get over the momentary obsession that this was an easy and pleasant way to make a living, apart from earning for the practitioner the fealty and fidelity of countless innocent, well-meaning men and women who can only be likened to sheep, if not to mindless morons.
About six years ago a strange thing happened. For the first time in our parliamentary history the question of pirs paying (or not paying) income tax came up for discussion in the senate. Since the entire manner in which the issue was treated was facetious it earned little attention.
But for the first time an elected representative (I don’t recall his name now) had the temerity to ask that when pirs openly made uncounted collections and owned sprawling mansions and fleets of expensive cars, why were they not subjected to income tax like other citizens. Or did their claim of being nearer to the Almighty than us ordinary mortals give them exemption in this regard?
Naturally there were no answers to these questions. The trouble is that there is no system whereby anyone in the Income tax Department can compute the earnings of pirs. It is just not possible, unless a pir himself confesses as to how much in taxable income he makes every year. Ad since he is too much of a materialist to speak the truth in this regard, why make the poor man tell lies? Only a pir who was also a fool would do that. I suppose his followers would abandon him at once and attach themselves spiritually to some other pir if they came to know that their holy mentor was subjecting their votive offerings to such a mundane exercise as income tax.
If I were the federal finance minister (and given the present official trend to be secular in religious matters) I would, just for the heck of it, award a contract to a reputed foreign firm to study the piri system and advise on how to bring it within the ambit of taxation. I think it wouldn’t take the consultants a month to go into a spin and unable to advise at all. And the possibility of one of them rejecting accountancy and taking to piri-mureedi cannot be ruled out. Where else in the whole world would they find hundreds of thousands of poor willing victims offering their savings to spiritual conmanship? And with no book-keeping to boot?
By the way, pirs were not the only profession who were made the topic of discussion in the senate that day. The incomes of ulema, religious scholars and heads of deeni madressahs were also commented upon. I remember that Qazi Husain Ahmed, not a senator himself, was quick to defend this vast brotherhood and said that religious scholarship was not a profession, and that anyone engaged in any other vocation could become a scholar of Islam. But he did not explain how and why such persons with claims to learning, started feeling that, in respect of their worldly activities, they were not amenable to the exactions of the state like other Muslims.
Prof K.K. Aziz, the eminent historian, has written a most revealing book on the practice, custom and prevalence of professional piri in this country, which was reviewed and excerpted recently in Dawn weekly feature “Books & Authors.” While he gave estimates of the earnings of some of the pirs, whom he described as parasites, and also recounted some of their unsavoury non-spiritual acts, he did not touch on the aspect of income tax. If he did I missed the reference.
With persistent nagging from a daughter playing housewife who is valiantly fighting high prices with all her wits and her capacity for improvisation, and myself having to write day and night to supplement a pension which can only be described as a pittance, I find myself succumbing to that old adolescent ambition of becoming a pir in order to escape penury.
Looking in the mirror this morning I was trying to imagine myself in a flowing white beard, suitably dyed for effect. Not bad at all. So if you find my name gradually disappearing from the columns of newspapers in the near future, you can take it that I have at last joined the (un)holy fraternity!
THERE was no doubt ABC was in trouble. The Nielsen numbers were lousy and there was a jihad between the entertainment and news departments.
Michael Eisner told his programming people they had to come up with one good idea if they ever hoped to stay in business.
The big shots nervously gathered to find a way to save the network. On one side of the table were the news people, who were told the entertainment people were going to chop Ted Koppel’s head off and replace him with a puppet show or a rock band and male models.
No idea was too dumb. An entertainment vice president (everyone in television is a VP) said, “Who needs news? No one under 34 watches it.”
“The people who tune in Ted Koppel,” a news VP said, “are the educated and informed audience. They want to know what is happening in the world. Besides, we need news for prestige. The public must feel the airwaves belong to everyone.”
“That’s a bunch of sawdust,” the entertainment side of the table said. “We own the airwaves and we can give them anything we want to. We’re talking about advertising, and that’s not free. Let me ask you a question. How many people over 34 can buy a BMW?”
“A lot more than you think. Except for the people who had their pensions wiped away by the Enron bankruptcy, the older generation can buy anything the 18- to 34-year-old crowd can.”
“OK, so let’s get down to it. We’re talking Nielsen numbers. On a good night, what does Koppel draw if we’re bombing the hell out of Afghanistan?”
“A four or a five.”
“And how much does David Letterman draw?”
“Seven or eight million. That’s not what you get with a Ted Koppel town hall in Iowa.”
Finally, a VP who had not said a thing spoke up. “Gentlemen, I think I have a compromise. We will have Ted Koppel introduce the ‘Mickey Mouse Hour.”’
“What are you talking about?”
“I say we bring back the ‘Mickey Mouse Club’ at 11:30 every night. The Mouseketeers were the greatest thing on television. Of course, Koppel would have to wear Mickey Mouse ears. He could announce the news at the beginning of the show and then the rest would be Mickey and his family.” “Do you think Cubby and Karen would come back?” an entertainment programmer asked.
“They will if we pay them as much as we do Barbara Walters.”
Another entertainment programmer said, “What a great idea. We’ll not only have the 18 to 34s, but also the 5- to 18-year-old audience, which has money to burn.”
“Do you think parents will let their kids stay up that late?”
“They will refuse to go to sleep. Mickey has that effect on people.” He looked at the news side of the room. “What do you say? How do you news people feel about it?”
“How much time will Ted have to give the news?”
“Three minutes.”
“We want five.”
“We’ll give him four.”
At that moment Eisner, the head honcho, walked into the room. “What have you come up with?”
No one spoke, but they put on their Mickey Mouse hats and sang the Mouseketeers song. Eisner smiled, “I think my job has been saved.”—Dawn/ Tribune Media Services
It posed a danger not only to the region but also to international peace. The coercive diplomacy employed by India created a situation where political problems were sought to be solved through military measures.
The Indian government blamed Pakistan for the attack on Indian parliament on December 13, without bothering to conduct an inquiry, refusing the help by Pakistan for a joint inquiry and also rejecting the offer of the FIA in this regard. The Indian high commissioner in Islamabad was recalled, staff restrictions were imposed on Pakistani diplomatic personnel and overflight facility for Pakistan’s national airline was withdrawn. Even the “Samjhota Express” was suspended.
President R.K. Narayanan, opening the Indian budget session a day after the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party was declared routed in the state polls, said that the massive troop deployment on India’s western borders was to stay and that there could be no talks with Pakistan until Islamabad met some key conditions.
The verdict in state elections which indicated that the electorate had refused to be carried away by jingoism that marked the campaign speeches by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and his defence minister, George Fernandes, had been ignored. That the people of India, by and large, are indifferent to the war-mongering that Mr Vajpayee and his colleagues indulged in during the campaign, was not given any importance. How could the rulers of India fail to understand that there was no place for war or even war-mongering in international relations?
Consequent to the Indian military build-up against its borders, Pakistan was compelled to take appropriate defensive measures. Whatever the Indian intention in carrying out the military moves, Pakistan had to take into consideration, the opponents’ capability rather then their intention.
While doing so, the President of Pakistan gave a call to India to come to the negotiating table, with a view to discussing and finding solution to whatever problems existed between the two countries. President Musharraf also expressed his willingness to negotiate on the pull-back of the forces deployed in a war posture.
Gen Pervez Musharraf’s January 12 address was acknowledged by the Indian political leadership as path-breaking. Pakistan banned the two key Pakistan-based organizations, the Jaish-i-Mohammad and Lashkar-i-Taiba, both ‘jihadi’ outfits which had been implicated in the attack on the Indian Parliament. Yet the war posture continues to this date. President Musharraf made it quite clear that the action taken by Pakistan had been solely in its self-interest and had nothing to do with any external pressure from either the US or India.
Mr Vajpayee has, however, decided to adopt the path of incremental militarism by continuing the rhetoric which adds to the existing tension. He has not hesitated to say that New Delhi has the capability of fomenting “internal trouble” for Pakistan, as if India has not been doing so in the past. The Indian Home Minister, L.K. Advani, is on record having said that thee was not enough reason to foresee a resumption of talks with Pakistan. His remarks included even a threat of going to war with Pakistan when he said, “War may become inevitable.” The Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes remarked at a news conference recently that India had no plan to pull back its troops from the Pakistan border.
Of late, the Indian Air Force had begun a new round of exercises that were to be followed by fresh army manoeuvres. One wonders if this calibrated activism by the armed forces of India was to counter media assertion that India might encourage de-escalation following elections in some Indian states.
It was about two years back that the Indian government had announced that it was prepared to fight a limited war with Pakistan. Even though the possibility of low intensity conflicts between two nuclear powers cannot be completely eliminated, one cannot even think of a war, even though limited, in a situation that prevails between India and Pakistan. Such a war will involve a risk of escalating into to a nuclear stand-off, if not nuclear exchange.
Let us therefore rule out any type of war, limited or otherwise. If a war is ruled out, which it must be, the continuation of the military stand-off cannot be justified any longer. Apart from the steps that Pakistan has already taken, what more does India expect, realistically to accrue from continuation of the present situation? India has created a crisis of war, now it needs to control and defuse the situation.
If that is not done, the military provocation will affect not only the region but also international polity. It is difficult to comprehend that, even when it does not have any convincing reason for continuing the current tension, it cannot find a way to de-escalate the situation. Mr Vajpayee and his senior colleagues continue anti-Pakistan rhetoric to scale up the temperature on the bilateral front.
They have so far ignored all sensible calls (even from within India) for a pull-back of the Indian forces deployed against Pakistan. The military deployment has continued as a negative and aggressive posture — it has not led to military action, nor to a lowering of the tension for nearly two months. If New Delhi’s intention to avoid war with Pakistan, is genuine, it is high time to prove it by de-escalation. As a first step it would be a constructive initiative to stop firing across the line of control. This could be done through a dialogue process between the two military outfits, using the channel already available between directors-general of military operations of India and Pakistan. This could pave the way for a dialogue at other levels as well.
It is incumbent upon India to take such an initiative since it was the first to amass the troops. As the armed forces of the two countries face each other, how is it possible that they take the road to sanctuary of peace giving up the path fraught with danger and destruction?
The writer is a retired major-general of Pakistan army.