India’s coercive diplomacy
By Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty
INDIA’S persistence in coercive diplomacy, by maintaining the concentration of its armed forces on Pakistan’s border is beginning to look incongruous to many thinking Indians. Our neighbours have a gift for putting on a mantle of moral superiority even as they violate ethical and political norms in the exercise of power.
While they enact more draconian laws, such as POTO (Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance), to enable the state apparatus to violate the residual human rights of the ordinary people with impunity, they apportion blame for the revolt of the Kashmiris to cross-border incursions.
Mr Vajpayee, who represents the moderate image of the BJP government, has again affirmed India’s desire to develop friendly relations with Pakistan, provided Islamabad gives up resort to cross-border terrorism. In the same statement, he declares that India will never allow Pakistan to take Kashmir. This amounts to a declaration that India will never allow the people of Kashmir to exercise the right of self-determination which is recognized in the UN resolutions, because that is all Pakistan seeks.
The September 11 events that made terrorism the central concern for the international community, were seen as presenting a golden opportunity by India to suppress the freedom movement in Kashmir, which New Delhi thought it had managed to link to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. India stepped up its repression, using the kind of brutal tactics that the Sharon government in Israel has been using against the Palestinians. However, the policy of legitimizing brutal tactics by putting the terrorist label on the Kashmiri freedom struggle is one that has been tried many times, without success. The UN has always accepted the distinction between terrorism and struggles for liberation.
New Delhi continues to believe that it can delude the world into accepting its version, that the people of Kashmir are quite happy to be kept under Indian occupation by a force of 700,000 armed men, and that all the trouble is created by the terrorists sent by Pakistan across the Line of Control. The contradictory impact of the pursuit of paradoxical policies is beginning to worry informed Indian analysts, on the one hand and to confuse foreign observers on the other.
The crisis over Ayodhya brought out the paradox, which is inherent in Prime Minister Vajpayee’s own thought processes, in a stark manner. He is heading the coalition of 23 parties in the NDA, as the leader of the BJP, a party whose roots are in the Sangh Parivar, and its concept of Hindutva. It is significant that the crisis was precipitated by the militant stand adopted by the hardliners in the party after the September 11 events, which were seen as having weakened the world standing of the Muslim community. The stepping up repression in Kashmir was one facet of the new line, and greater assertiveness by the Hindutva forces was the other.
The suspect incident of the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, which India never allowed to be properly investigated, was used to justify the concentration of Indian forces along Pakistan’s borders. President Musharraf not only condemned the incident, but also took strong measures against religious extremists in Pakistan. His address to the nation of January 12 was hailed not only by the world community but even grudgingly conceded to be path-breaking by the BJP leadership. In this, he banned five jihadist groups, arresting their leaders, and committed the country to a policy of opposing terrorism in all its manifestations, and of building a progressive Islamic polity based on moderation, and democracy. He again extended the hand of friendship to India, urging the resumption of a dialogue to resolve all disputes, including those over Kashmir, peacefully.
India has insisted on two conditions before agreeing to the resumption of the dialogue. One is that 20 terrorists it has listed must be handed over to India. The other is an end to cross-border terrorism. More seriously, India has persisted with coercive tactics by keeping the bulk of its forces concentrated on Pakistan’s borders and the Line of Control in Kashmir. This has compelled Pakistan to move its forces also into defensive positions, so that over a million armed men confront each other in an eyeball to eyeball confrontation. That this is a potentially perilous situation is conceded by the whole world, keeping in view the history of tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.
Originally, considering the conciliatory stance adopted by President Musharraf, analysts believed that India would delay the de-escalation process till local elections in four states were over in late February. Those elections are over, without the ruling party reaping any benefits from the military confrontation. The other rationalization for the continuation of the stand-off was that India wanted to keep Pakistan’s economy under pressure, on account of the heavy costs of the stand-off. As it happens, the costs exist for India as well, and the rate of growth in both countries is expected to fall during the current year owing to these costs. Pakistan’s economy is seen as more vulnerable, but the adverse effects on the region as a whole are beyond question.
Since the elections ended in a defeat for the BJP in all the four states, the responsible circles in India have started doubting the benefits of India’s coercive diplomacy. The waters have been muddied by the communal carnage in Gujarat that went on throughout the month of March, and has spread to other states, including Rajasthan and Orissa, with Muslims the main sufferers. The genesis of the tension lies in the resolve of the Hindu extremist organizations allied to the BJP, to start building the Ram temple at Ayodhya, on the site of the demolished Babri Masjid whose future is to be decided by the Supreme Court.
The present series of communal disturbances are traced to the setting on fire of a train carrying young Hindu workers of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad between Ahmadabad and Ayodhya. As the news of the burning of 58 Hindus in the fire at Godhra spread, Hindu mobs went on a rampage and the police and law enforcement authorities of the BJP-ruled state of Gujarat actively colluded with them in setting fire to Muslim residential areas and shops.
Many noted Indian commentators have pointed out the contradiction between the hate and divisiveness the BJP government has not only tolerated but also encouraged.
Swayamsevaks who attacked the Orissa Assembly as a reaction to the criticism of their actions in Gujarat highlighted their contempt for an institution of parliamentary democracy. Mr Vajpayee cannot keep yielding to the RSS-VHP combine, and yet retain his credibility as a liberal and moderate leader.


Political challenges ahead
By Talat Masood
WITH less than seven months remaining for the national and provincial elections and General Musharraf all set to acquire an additional five-year term as an all-powerful president the country is once again heading for a military-dominated government at least in the foreseeable future if not in perpetuity.
As press reports indicate, government’s machinery is busy framing laws to restore powers of the president whereby he could remove the prime minister, dismiss the parliament and appoint chiefs of armed forces and supreme court judges. And through extra-constitutional measures significant changes are being effected to add seats to technocrats and make the parliament more compliant.
There are indications that the government will try to influence the outcome of the election process by creating these additional seats of technocrats and women and by bringing about critical changes in the Constitution. Adding seats of technocrats will also increase bureaucratic influence in the government and dilute the political power base of the parliament.
The decision to establish the National Security Council having a heavy representation from the three services seems to have already been taken. A non-elected supra-body in fact will have the real powers to formulate and oversee major national policies and if necessary, override the parliament and the cabinet. Thus the real authority and power will rest with the military but the responsibility of day to day governance will be vested in the political government.
Apart from the fact that this dispensation is a major departure from the commitment General Musharraf himself made at the time of assumption of office in October ‘99, of establishing a true democracy, there are serious implications in this move for the future stability and development of the country.
Granted that the political parties are in disarray, that they are undemocratic in character and seldom had internal elections and their last eleven-year rule was an unmitigated disaster, yet this cannot form the rationale of depriving the country of democratic governance and of a genuine evolutionary political process. Firstly, as has been repeatedly brought out, the politicians alone cannot be blamed for all the ills of the country when more than half its life it was directly ruled by the military. And for the remaining period it continued to heavily influence major foreign, security and domestic policies, which as subsequent events proved, were a great failure. It is also true that the performance of the present government in many areas has been considerably better compared to the period of the two former civilian prime ministers and that it is more forward looking and professional than the oppressive regime of Gen. Zia. And that General Musharraf has steered the country ably in the aftermath of 9/ 11, is making earnest efforts at countering extremism, and addressing the economic and social woes confronting the country. Indeed, there has been a distinct improvement in the fiscal situation and international accounts, as is evident from the position of the reserves and the value of the rupee.
The forecast of the GDP, however, for the current year is less than 3.5%, exports are slack, foreign and domestic investment is not forthcoming and unemployment is on the rise. Public sector reforms have yet to be fully implemented to show any significant impact. The real shortcoming of the government in the economic field has been its inability to energize the private sector. Nevertheless, the present government deserves credit for showing better economic results under adverse international and domestic situation and for being more progressive and reform-oriented than the previous governments.
The government’s limited achievements, however, does not give it a free licence to adopt extra constitutional measures on the premise that ends justify means.
One basic deficiency that today’s Pakistan suffers from is that it is already over-militarized and turned into a full-blown security state. What is needed is to gradually dismantle the military structures and to promote the growth of a civil society, and not the other way around. Unless, the country develops the normal system of checks and balances within the parliamentary framework the decision-making process, and by implication the national policies, will always remain warped.
There is real opportunity before General Musharraf to build a self-sustaining democratic system by strengthening institutions in which the military acts as a non-partisan umpire rather than becomes a party to any manipulation and manoeuvring. Undoubtedly, there are deep misgivings about the politicians in the light of their past dismal performance and there is a wide spread belief that they cannot be entrusted with the serious business of governance or expected to build sound democratic traditions.
Hence, the military should retain firm control through the president and the National Security Council. Apparently for this reason the military has developed a civilian clientele by giving patronage to only those politicians of the splintered Muslim League and other parties who are willing to play ball and be subservient to the overarching role of the military.
Such concerns are entirely understandable but there is an inherent risk in this policy. When military uses politicians selectively particularly those with a dubious record, to ram through extra-constitutional measures for the election of the President or for legitimizing the role of the armed forces, there are greater chances of compromising its own credibility and that of the nation.
We also need to remind ourselves that the basic failure of political leaders in the past was due to their autocratic rule and blatant undemocratic practices coupled with frequent interference from the military hierarchy and not a consequence of a systemic failure.
For correcting this we need to further strengthen the democratic institutions, de-emphasize the role of individuals, and not move away from democracy. In fact the best role for the Pakistan army at least for some time is to be the custodian of democracy, somewhat similar to the Turkish armed forces which are the guarantors of the secular character of the state.
The future political strategy of the government should therefore aim at building a stable democratic system based on strong institutions and a dynamic political process. Politics even in mature democracies is a messy business in which politicians seek to widen their power and influence through dispensation of favours and patronage but are kept in check through effective institutions. Pakistan too needs a robust parliament with effective committees, an independent judiciary, a strong Election Commission, a fair and forceful Auditor General’s establishment and a free press for democracy to function.
In democratic countries serving presidents, prime ministers and important political figures have been indicted while in power because of strong institutions. In India, Italy or Japan the politicians may not necessarily be more honest than ours but are kept in check by effective democratic institutions and strong traditions gradually evolved over a period of time. The military should therefore set high standards of political conduct and governance otherwise the political leadership will only emulate them to advance their narrow parochial interests when in power.
Prior to the elections there is need to develop a broad consensus on major national issues between the political parties and the military. This should include salient features of the economic revival programme, highest priority to education, measures to improve law and order, Kashmir policy in the changed international environment, curbing of jihadi culture and gradual integration of militant forces in the political and economic mainstream. There has to be a renewed resolve by the political parties and the military to abide by the basic norms of democratic governance and work towards strengthening institutions.
The government should make a clear distinction between the politic religious parties and the radical militant groups. Extremist radical parties, which are fascists in character and want to capture power by force or thrust their agenda on the basis of their ideological manifesto have no place in a democratic state and should be banned. Whereas religious parties like the Jamaat or the JUI should be treated with respect as accorded to any other political party.
On the other hand, political parties which are serious about winning the confidence of the electorate should have their own internal party elections at regular intervals. If every three years a political party would have elections we would have found a new crop of political leaders by now.
General Musharraf has displayed great qualities of leadership in crisis, given a new direction to Pakistan and in many ways is its strongest asset today. It would indeed be tragic if he should use his strength to retain power in a way, which is a challenge to the institutional development of the country and a drift from a true transformation.
The writer is a retired Lieutenant-General of Pakistan army.


Gujarat, as seen by one Indian: PRIVATE VIEW
By Khalid Hasan
A Pakistani diplomat in New York, when asked recently if the Gujarat killings of thousands of Muslims by organised mobs of Hindu zealots on the rampage would be raised by Pakistan at the UN, replied that what happened in Gujarat, though regrettable, was a domestic Indian affair and, as such, it was not for Pakistan to bring it up at the United Nations.
Was the diplomat speaking in what is called the spirit of Shimla, if not of SAARC?
There was a time when Pakistan used to be the first and, nearly always, the only country in the world to invite international attention to such “domestic affairs.” If the killing of Indian Muslims is no longer Pakistan’s concern, then by the same logic, neither is the killing of Kashmiri Muslims any of Pakistan’s business. Does such an approach not nullify the entire concept of human rights which have for some years now been seen as transcending sovereign and geographical boundaries?
If this philosophy were to be accepted, then every government would be free to do what it wished to those who lived in its territories and under its control. Organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch might then as well shut shop and stop speaking on behalf of the world’s oppressed. One wonders what the instructions of Pakistan’s delegation to this year’s meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission will be. If what the New York-based diplomat said reflects official thinking — and there is no reason to suppose otherwise — then it is not difficult to guess what those instructions will be.
Another official, elsewhere, felt differently and wrote about the happenings in Gujarat. What makes this account especially moving is the fact that the writer is a member of the Indian Administrative Service, the Indian counterpart of Pakistan’s DMG-CSP axis.
The name of this courageous Indian is Harsh Mander. ‘Cry the beloved country’, he calls his reportage, a title borrowed from that admirable South African writer, Alan Patton. The 2000-word piece subtitled ‘Reflections on the Gujarat massacre’ was given to me in Vienna by my friend Hayat Mehdi who received it from a friend in Jakarta by e-mail. What Mander wrote deserves to be read widely in Pakistan, as elsewhere.
“Numbed with disgust and horror,” Mander writes, “I return from Gujarat ten days after the terror and massacre that convulsed the state. My heart is sickened, my soul wearied, my shoulders aching with the burdens of guilt and shame.” He speaks of 53,000 women, men and children huddled in 28 temporary settlements. He sees people clutching small bundles of relief materials, their eyes dry and glassy. Some talk in low voices, others busy themselves with humdrum tasks that are necessary to keep body and soul together. Mander writes that the accounts you hear of what happened are “so macabre, that my pen falters.”
The “pitiless brutality” against women and children by organised bands of armed young men has been “more savage than anything witnessed in the riots that have shamed this nation from time to time during the past century.” He narrates stories of such pure horror that one flinches as one reads them. “What can you say about a woman eight months pregnant who begged to be spared; her assailants instead slit open her stomach, pulled out her foetus and slaughtered it before her eyes! What can you say about a family of 19 killed by flooding their house with water and then electrocuting them with high-tension electricity!”
A boy of six sees six of his brothers and sisters battered to death. He survives because he is taken for dead. A young woman with a three-year old is shepherded to “safety” by a policemen and is surrounded by a mob which douses her and the baby with gasoline and sets them on fire.
Mander hears reports everywhere of “gang rape, of young girls and women, often in the presence of members of their families, followed by murder by burning alive, or by bludgeoning with a hammer and, in one case, with a screwdriver.” Women tell appalling stories of how armed men disrobe themselves in front of them to cower them down. Most people he meets in Ahmedabad agree that what happened in Gujarat was “not a riot but a terrorist attack followed by a systematic, planned massacre, a pogrom.” The “pillage and plunder” was organised like a “military operation against an armed enemy.” A truck would arrive broadcasting inflammatory slogans, followed by more trucks which would disgorge young men in khaki shorts and saffron sashes, armed with sophisticated explosive materials, weapons, daggers and tridents.
The leaders spoke constantly on mobile phones to those directing their operations. Some carried computer-generated lists of Muslim homes. “It was not a spontaneous upsurge of mass anger; it was a carefully planned pogrom,” Mander concludes.
Rich Muslim homes and businesses were prime targets, which after being looted would be set on fire. “Mosques and darghas were razed,” according to Mander, “replaced by statues of Hanuman and saffron flags. Some darghas in Ahmedabad city crossings have overnight been demolished and their sites covered with road-building material and bulldozed so efficiently that these spots are indistinguishable from the rest of the road.
Traffic now plies over these former darghas, as though they never existed.” He points out that the “unconscionable failures and active connivance of the state police and administrative machinery is now widely acknowledged.”
The police provided a “protective shield” to pillaging mobs and were “deaf to the pleas of desperate Muslim victims.” There are many reports of police firing directly at gathered Muslims. Most of those arrested are Muslims.
Mander charges that not even one administrative officer fulfilled his duty, whereas he was required by law to “act independently, fearlessly, impartially, decisively, with courage and compassion.”
No riot can continue, he argues, beyond a few hours without the active connivance of the local police and magistracy, adding, “The blood of hundreds of innocents is on the hands of the police and civil authorities of Gujarat and by sharing in the conspiracy of silence, the entire higher bureaucracy of the country.”
Ironically, the gates of the Sabarmati Ashram, founded in honour of Mahatama Gandhi, were closed to protect the property, otherwise some Muslims could have found shelter there. Another “matter of shame” is that the refugee camps are being run entirely by Muslims, the state being nowhere in evidence. “It is as though the monumental pain, loss, betrayal and injustice suffered by the Muslim people is the concern only of other Muslim people, and the rest of us have no share in the responsibility to assuage, to heal and rebuild,” he adds.
Mander ends his poignant account with these words, “There is much that the murdering mobs in Gujarat have robbed me of. One of them is a song I often sang with pride and conviction. ‘Sare jahan se achha, Hindustan hamara.’ It is a song I will never be able to sing again.”


The politics of aid
By Dr Iffat Malik
AID is a political issue. The notion of giving out of pure altruism — simply to relieve the suffering of others — does exist, but is extremely rare. Most aid is given with the expectation of some sort of return. Be it politico-strategic goals, economic returns, image enhancement: there is always some benefit to the donor. The logical implication of this is that where there is no perceived benefit, there is no aid.
There is certainly no dearth of suffering in the world. Three billion people do not have access to adequate sanitation. Two million will die of HIV/AIDS in the next year. As many as 1.3 billion people have to survive on less than $1 a day; 2.8 billion on less than $2 a day. About 800 million people in sub-Saharan Africa are not getting enough food. Staggering figures. Even more staggering is the gap between haves and have-nots. About 80% of the global income goes to the richest fifth of the world’s population, just 1% to the poorest fifth.
The need for aid is thus indisputable. But, with the possible exception of the Scandinavians and Japan, most rich nations have historically only been generous when and where there was some advantage to them. The US aid, for example, was part of the fight against communism: bribes to stay on the right side of the ‘Iron Curtain.’ Many countries attached conditions to their aid that would help their own manufacturers — in effect giving to themselves. Motive-less assistance tended to be given only in response to overwhelming humanitarian crises like earthquakes and famine — that too for as long as the media relayed images of suffering into western drawing rooms.
The dawn of a new millennium seemed to focus minds on the huge lag between the developed and the developing nations. At the UN Millennium Conference in 2000 the former promised (among other things) to halve global poverty, reduce infant mortality by two-thirds and provide universal primary education — all by 2015. The funds required to achieve these goals are not huge. The World Bank estimates an extra $50 billion per year, double the current level of money spent on overseas aid by developed countries. But the absence of a clear benefit to themselves prevented many donor countries from making those extra funds available.
Then came 9/11 and the world changed. The initial response to that day’s terrorism — tightened airport and immigration checks, increased Islamophobia, global realignment, the war against Afghanistan - focused on punishment and prevention through security. Little if no thought was given to what drove the 9/11 hijackers. In their case — bearing in mind their relative affluence - the causes were probably political. But those who study terrorism accept that poverty too breeds it. Six months on from 9/11, policy-makers are finally making the same connection.
The recent UN Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey, Mexico, highlighted the need to eradicate poverty in order to prevent terrorism. ‘We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror’, was President Bush’s message to the conference. Kofi Annan’s had an implicit warning: ‘No one in this world can feel comfortable, or safe, while so many are suffering and deprived’.
The Monterrey Consensus document adopted in Mexico committed developed countries to giving more aid and to promoting trade by cutting tariffs. The EU leaders, meeting earlier this month in Barcelona, raised their development assistance budget from 0.33% of the GNP to 0.36%, i.e. an extra $20 billion by 2006. The Bush administration astonished many when it followed suit and announced a $10 billion increase in overseas aid by 2006.
Impressive as those figures are, they fall far short of the extra $50 billion sought by Kofi Annan. America’s contribution pales further when compared with the $50 billion increase in the defence budget also announced by George Bush. So too when the total $15 billion to be spent on aid by Washington is translated into GNP: a paltry 0.13%. Europe and particularly America could afford to do a lot more for the world’s poor.
Their reluctance indicates that policy-makers have only partially made the connection between poverty and terrorism. It could also indicate a failure to learn from the mistakes of the past. As explained above, development assistance given then always had some ulterior motive: combating communism, promoting exports, etc. Those goals could be achieved even if poverty was not alleviated: Washington and London simply had to give enough to keep Third World governments on side and pliant.
In the fight against terrorism, though, they will have to bring about a genuine reduction in overall poverty. So long as mass deprivation, suffering and frustration persist, so too will terrorists.
The failure of aid given in the past to eradicate poverty (or even diminish it: the rich-poor gap doubled between 1960 and 2000) had a lot to do with poor governance, corruption and mismanagement in recipient countries. Innumerable African dictators accumulated billion-dollar Swiss bank accounts while their people starved. George Bush’s attempt at Monterrey to deflect criticism of American stinginess — ‘For decades, success of development aid was measured only in resources spent, not in results achieved’ — was a cop-out, but also a valid comment. There is no point in pumping funds into corrupt, inefficient regimes.
Which is why, at Monterrey, an equal onus was put on developing countries to promote sound governments, democracy and open markets, i.e. to use what they are given properly and strive for self-sufficiency. George Bush went further by making American aid conditional on political, legal and economic reforms. Only countries working for those, he announced, would qualify for assistance from Washington.
This is a good idea in theory, but likely to run into problems in practice. Who sets the criteria for eligibility? What happens to those that do not fulfil them — will their people be left to starve?
What happens when strategic interests intervene? Too often the West has shown itself willing to sacrifice principles and morality for other priorities. [Democracy, legal process and human rights are just some of the casualties of the current war against terrorism.] And if good behaviour merits assistance and trade opportunities, will developed countries scrap the subsidies that give their manufacturers an unfair advantage, and will they write off Third World debt?

