THERE is an irony in the troubles besetting the government of Atal Behari Vajpayee. Ayodhya, the issue that brought about its phenomenal rise to power, now poses the biggest threat to that power. It also threatens the very fabric of Indian society and the country’s future development.

When in 1986 the BJP took over the Vishwa Hindu Parishad’s campaign to ‘liberate the birthplace of Lord Rama’ at Ayodhya and construct a temple in his honour, few would have predicted the massive electoral success it would yield. By chance or design, the party had hit on an issue that could unite the infinitely diverse followers of Hinduism, reverse the historical wrong done to Hindus by Muslim invaders, and that exemplified its accusations of ‘minority pampering’.

India’s Hindus responded in their droves: they donated cash and jewellery, made pilgrimages to Ayodhya, collected bricks for a temple, and voted for the BJP. From holding just two seats in the Lok Sabha in 1984, the BJP went up to 88 in 1989, and 182 in 1998 enabling it to form a national government.

Ayodhya got the BJP into power, but it was not enough to keep it there. The party’s seemingly endless upward graph of electoral success, winning in both state and national polls, hit a peak when it failed to deliver on ‘bread and butter’ issues like the economy, health and education, and when it failed to root out corruption and inefficiency. Its recent humiliating rout in four state elections — Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Manipur and Uttaranchal — marked a downward turn in its fortunes. The phenomenon of political Hinduism as a vote-winner appears to be in terminal decline.

But it has left a legacy that will not be so easily discarded: Hindu communalism. This is not a creation of Ayodhya. Hindu communalism predates the Ram temple issue and would have persisted even if the BJP had not raised it. What the BJP’s temple agitation did was to greatly exacerbate it. The BJP fuelled anti-Muslim (indeed anti-minority) sentiment among Hindus, encouraged them to demand a Hindu instead of a secular India, and provoked passions that led to the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992, the killing of more than 2,000 people in riots after that, and the recent carnage in Gujarat. Hindu India has been woken up — and it is not a pretty sight.

Much of the rage and frustration that drives Hindu extremists derives from other socio-economic sources: lack of employment, poverty, the massive rich-poor gulf in Indian society, caste discrimination, etc. But, thanks to the Muslim ‘bulls-eye’ presented by the BJP, it is vented out against that community. To be fair, one should also add that the process of political communalization was shamefully encouraged by supposed guardians of secularism like the Congress. Far from standing up for it, they jumped on to the communal bandwagon. Their vocal condemnation of the BJP now should not be allowed to paper over their complicit role in the past.

The compulsions of coalition government have forced the BJP leadership to moderate their views, and pledge to uphold court verdicts on the Ayodhya dispute. But the BJP’s less pragmatic, more ideological cadres and its hard-line Hindu brothers, the VHP, RSS and others, have not moderated. They remain committed to the construction of a temple to Ram - with or without legal sanction. As head of the national government, it is the responsibility of the BJP to curb its Hindu Frankenstein.

Before assessing the chances of its being able to do so, it is important to stress how vital this is. As the recent slaughter in Ahmedabad and other towns and villages of Gujarat demonstrated, from the Muslim perspective curbing Hindu passions is literally a matter of life and death.

It could also mean life and death for the BJP government, dependent on regional and leftist parties to stay in power at the centre. They have made clear their displeasure at the BJP’s handling of events so far, and implicitly served notice on it to shape up or ship out. The latter is made more likely by the party’s defeat in the vital state of Uttar Pradesh.

Over the last decade India has made huge strides in realizing its ambition and undoubted potential to become a great power. Economic growth has consistently been above 5% of the GDP, conventional arms acquisitions as well as the nuclear tests of 1998 have boosted its military strength, and improved relations with a number of countries (including the US) have given India a more prominent international profile. But there will be no further progress unless it can put its house in order: specifically unless it can make the Hindus behave like citizens of a tolerant democratic state rather than - as is the case now - an extremely intolerant hegemonistic one.

Can the BJP do that? The lack of violence on March 15, the date scheduled by the VHP to perform a puja ceremony at Ayodhya that would mark the beginning of temple construction, shows that it can. There was no violence on Friday because the government stated its resolve to uphold the Supreme Court decision and backed that up with the deployment of thousands of security personnel. Faced with determined governmental opposition the VHP had no choice but to back down. In sharp contrast, the anti-Muslim violence a few weeks earlier in Gujarat was allowed by the state authorities. Had the government wanted to, it could have prevented the deaths of an estimated 700 Muslims. That is the crux of the problem: does the government want to curb Hindu extremism?

So far, despite the very pressing reasons for it to do so - not least pressure from its coalition partners - the BJP appears hesitant to take on the ultra-Hindu partners. It is sending out contradictory signals. Attorney-General Soli Sorabjee told the Supreme Court the government would have no objection to a Hindu ceremony being performed some distance from the proposed temple site - a plea more in line with an advocate for Hindu India, than a defender of secular India. Similarly, Prime Minister Vajpayee upheld the Supreme Court verdict by not allowing the Hindus to worship at Ayodhya, but sent his personal emissary to receive the foundation stone for the Ram temple at a ceremony performed close by. As Congress leader Sonia Gandhi put it, Vajpayee had ‘neither the will nor the capacity to deal with the VHP blackmail’.

Atal Behari Vajpayee has two options before him: to give a free rein to his extremist Hindu cohorts and allow more carnage like that in Gujarat, or to take decisive action against them. The former will lead to the collapse of his government and India’s descent into a communal bloodbath. The latter offers hope for Indian progress and development. The choice should be clear.

THE federal government in Pakistan should be striving to promote the various languages of Pakistan (sometimes called the regional languages, although the speakers don’t like the expression) but, for some reason, it doesn’t. If you were to ask the federal government why, and it could speak, its reply could be, “What have we done for the national language, i.e. Urdu, that we should be expected to waste time, money and attention on half a dozen other languages? For us English is enough.”

This is said facetiously. But speaking seriously, the federal point of view would be that it is up to the provinces to look after the language of their people which is one of the basic expressions of their culture. None of the provinces do that except Sindh. One reason for that is that Sindhi is a well-developed language — developed through long usage — and is officially used in courts (except for the High Court) and in much of government business in the districts. This status it has continued to enjoy ever since the British annexed the province some 160 years ago.

Even otherwise the government and the people of Sindh love their language, are proud of it and patronise it in many ways. There are more than one organizations that nurture it and foster it and aim at getting an international status for it on the strength of the lakhs of Sindhi-speaking Hindus who left for India after Partition. The lack of similar interest on the part of Punjabis, Pukhtoons and Balochs in their respective mother tongues has a number of facets, including psychological, though their examination is not the purpose of this piece. Today I am mainly concerned with what I have read recently about the NWFP government’s welcome concern about Pushto and thoughts arising therefrom.

Some time ago the Frontier governor declared the Pushto academy of Peshawar University as a “language authority.” The occasion was the inauguration of the language laboratory of the academy, which, he hoped, would go a long way in promoting Pushto if full use was made of the latest computer technology. The function was attended by a large number of literary figures of the province.

The Pushto Academy was set up in the early fifties, soon after the creation of Peshawar University. I remember when I was posted to Peshawar in June 1957 that it was a prestigious body, though still not sure what it was expected to do. It was headed by Maulana Abdul Qadir, a highly revered scholar of Pushto, Persian and Urdu, whose association with the academy inspired universal respect for it. Since then it has always had a well-known scholar of Pushto as its Director. The governor did not specify what he meant by language authority, nor did the news report clarify the matter, but obviously it was a significant rise in its stature and responsibilities.

The governor said the traditional disharmony in the thinking of Pukhtoons had given rise to many complications in the evolution of a standard language and a unified dialect for Pushto. He exhorted the Academy to work to strengthen and enrich the language by adopting new words and discovering new vistas.

In order to accord an authoritative status to the Pushto Academy, the governor suggested a committee be formed forthwith to devise the necessary legal status for the Academy as language authority. He lamented that activities for the promotion of Pushto in Afghanistan had come to a standstill, therefore the Academy should take up the unfinished task. The government would extend every possible help in this respect. he announced a grant of one million rupees to start with.

Apparently the governor is culturally a sensitive soul and feels that Pushto has to play a dominant role in publicising the culture of the area. (More about the exact place of Pushto as the people’s language in the NWFP follows in a moment). He regretted that,for the last many years, the Pushto Academy had not been as active as a research organization as it should have been, and hoped this deficiency would be made up now. He particularly wanted the feasibility of introducing Ph.D. and M.Phil in Pushto language and literature be explored.

Pushto is the language of the majority in he NWFP. But those who don’t belong there, or have never lived or worked there, should know the exact position. Let me clarify the situation by naming the exceptions. But for a few tribal tracts, the language of the whole of Hazara, a very populous division, is Hindko, which is a variation of Punjabi, but don’t say that in front of a Hindko-speaker. Because of being administratively a part of the province, and also because racially they are Pukhtoons, they understand Pushto but their own language is Hindko.

A little variation of Hazarawal Hindko and you get the Hindko of Peshawar and Kohat cities. In most of Dera Ismail Khan they speak Seraiki. While all these dialects are mutually understood, the language of Chitral is entirely distinct and different and has no resemblance with any of them. It is somewhat akin to Kashmiri and the Shina of Gilgit. But the language of the majority in the Frontier, including FATA and the provincially administered tribal area is certainly Pushto, the most developed of them all. It may be the most developed but it is also ignored and neglected. There are only two daily papers in Pushto, started not more than ten years ago but most people read the Urdu dailies. With rare exceptions, they write to each other in Urdu. Most educated Pukhtoons in the cities who pride themselves on speaking Pushto cannot read it properly, and of course they can’t write it because a dozen letters of the Pushto alphabet are like nothing in Urdu. A recent bad habit is that, like the Punjabis, many of them have started speaking to their children in Urdu.

It is good therefore that the governor is paying so much attention to the development and promotion of Pushto. If this were not done the vast treasury of Pushto literature might well be lost through sheer neglect and the people lose interest in their mother tongue. You might say this is being done because the governor is from NWF Province. But then, the governor of Punjab is a Punjabi, and the governor of Balochistan is a Baloch. Why aren’t they moved by the desire to do something for their mother tongue? This is where the psychology of some racial types comes in, and calls for a separate analysis, although Dr Tariq Rahman has thrown sufficient light on the issue in his learned articles on Pakistani languages in this newspaper.

THE Bush administration’s response to September 11 has been to threaten attacks against the enemies of Israel. Recently super-hawk Richard Perle, one of the Bush administration’s most influential members, confirmed the US plans to attack Iraq ‘this year’ and may also assail Syria.

Meanwhile, an ardently pro-Israel speechwriter who penned Bush’s incendiary ‘axis of evil’ speech had reportedly listed three nations: Iraq, Iran, and Syria. But Bush dropped Syria and added North Korea so his speech would not seem uniquely focused on ‘evil’ Muslim nations.

Bush must have regretted this decision. His ‘axis of evil’ speech played superbly to yahoos and know-nothings back home, but it ignited a storm of outrage and protest during the president’s trip to Asia.

Japan made polite gesture of support for Bush, but behind the scenes quailed in fear that his aggressive policies might trigger war with North Korea. South Koreans were horrified or insulted by Bush’s belligerent rhetoric. Bush’s axis of evil ran head-on into President Kim Dae Jung’s ‘sunshine policy’ of detente with North Korea. China, Bush’s next stop, growled with displeasure, accusing the US of ‘warmongering.’ Not exactly a diplomatic triumph.

Ironically, instead of a last-minute afterthought, scary North Korea should have been number one on Bush’s Lord High Executioner’s list. While Iraq and Iran may one day possess the means to threaten Israel with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), they have little or no current or medium-term capability today. They certainly have no strategic reason to attack the US, as Pentagon hawks unreasonably claim. Iraq and Iran know they would be vapourized if they staged an attack on North America.

North Korea, however, is a somewhat different story. The North is believed by CIA to possess at least two nuclear warheads and a very large and expanding arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. Its growing missile force can deliver these weapons to the 40,000 US troops based in South Korea, to US bases in Okinawa, Japan, and Guam, and to nearly all of the Japanese home islands. In a few years, North Korea’s ICBM missiles, now under development, may be able to hit the continental US.

North Korea’s regime is weird in the extreme, dangerously unpredictable and highly belligerent. The North has repeatedly threatened to send its million-man army to ‘liberate’ South Korea and attack US ‘occupation’ troops stationed there.

Because of the rumpus Bush’s warlike remarks caused in South Korea and Japan, the president was forced to embarrassingly proclaim the US has no intention of invading North Korea. But the US insists its plans to invade Iraq — and perhaps, later, Iran — are unchanged. In short, the administration contemplates war against Iraq and Iran — neither of whom threatens US troops or North America — but rejects war against North Korea which really does threaten US soldiers with conventional, chemical, biological, and even nuclear attack. The Pentagon estimates a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula would cause 200,000 US casualties.

South Koreans understand that the best way to deal with North Korea is to remain on high military alert while practising patience, quiet diplomacy and bribery. This sensible policy could also work quite well with Iraq, which used to be a close US ally only a decade ago. And even more so with Iran, which sought to improve relations with the US until Bush went on the warpath after September 11.

South Korea’s government is currently much more concerned by the threat of ‘unexpected reunification’ than an invasion from the North. Seoul fears economic and political collapse of North Korea — such as occurred in Eastern Europe and the USSR — would send millions of starving refugees across the border and force economically strapped South Korea to sustain its wrecked northern neighbour. Japan harbours similar fears and does not wish to see the Koreas reunified. So ‘evil’ though he may be, North Korea’s neighbours are united in the desire to see Kim Jong-il remain in power and keep his nation stable. Bush’s crusaders were cordially invited to decamp and go elsewhere.—Copyright Eric S. Margolis

AS the US-led military operation against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan enters sixth month, President Bush has come out with the theory that the world would need many more such wars before the goal of peace, as perceived by him, can be achieved.

He also seems to believe that a peaceful resolution of various conflicts in other parts of the world is linked with a successful outcome of the “war against terrorism” which was launched in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.

At his press conference in Washington the other day President Bush made it clear that his campaign against terrorism would not end with the restoration of peace in Afghanistan. He declared that the US was determined to deal with Al Qaeda in all its forms, particularly its global reach. As he expounded his strategy of dealing with international terrorism, American contingency plans for nuclear attacks on certain countries also came to light.

He argued that the US needed the nuclear deterrence against the countries which could have the potential to harm the US. This, incidentally, is also the basis on which countries like Pakistan justify their own nuclear programmes. However, Washington does not approve of that and arrogates to itself the right to decide who should or should not possess a nuclear weapon.

At his press conference, the US president also spoke of his plan to deal with President Saddam Hussein of Iraq whom he regarded as “a problem.” However, US vice-president, Dick Cheney, who has been talking to the leaders of the Arab countries for about a week, has failed to mobilize support for the US plan for an assault on Iraq. Incidentally, most of these countries gave their full support to the US during the Gulf War against Iraq in 1991.

Inexplicably, the 15-member European Union which earlier seemed opposed to a proposed US-led incursion into Iraq now appears “reconciled” to the possibility of such an attack. Germany apparently would make its support conditional to the US first securing the United Nations mandate for such an initiative. According to reports, Britain and Italy have also let it be known that they would be willing to act like Germany. Even France which has traditionally opposed the US policy in the matter could support the move against Iraq provided it was established that Iraq “had refused” the unconditional application of the various UN resolutions concerning itself, notably those concerning the return of United Nations inspectors to Iraq to check on its programme for production of weapons of mass destruction.

It was not very long ago that the European Union did not appear all that supportive of the American plans. It was said that the US spends more on defence than the next nine biggest powers put together and that this created “a global imbalance without precedence.” It was also argued that the European Union had a larger population and a bigger GDP than the US and that it was capable of being at par with the US if it so chooses. It was speculated that relations between the US and their oldest and “most natural” allies, Europe, were descending to “a Nadir not seen in more than half a century.” However, the relations between the European Union and the US now appear to be taking a U-turn. This may not necessarily be a popular development.

The people in the European countries do not always willingly endorse the policies of their leaders, even though it is only at election time that they have the opportunity to express their differences with the leaders. In Britain, the military establishment appears particularly concerned at the prospect of supporting the US assault on Iraq. There have even been reports suggesting that Britain’s military leadership has warned Prime Minister Tony Blair that “any war against Iraq is doomed to failure” and would lead to “lives being lost for little political gains.”

The British foreign office is also perceived as being apprehensive that the American initiative would not be limited to the UN inspectors being allowed into Iraq and President Bush could seriously be considering carrying out strikes against Iraq, perhaps similar to what has been happening in Afghanistan. As it is, the British troops face the prospect of having to stay on in Afghanistan beyond the deadline of April, there would perhaps be an even greater level of concern at possible British troops deployment in Iraq in support of the US policy.

Significantly, at the recent European Union summit, British prime minister Blair reportedly refused to be drawn into a commitment one way or the other on question of the “war against terrorism” being extended to Iraq. There are reports that apparently, the army feels unhappy at the prospect of becoming embroiled in yet another long-running commitment overseas.

Alongside the problems faced by the US in mobilizing support for its proposed action against Iraq, there are indications that unlike 1990-91 the Arab nations will not be forthcoming in becoming a part of any military operation against Baghdad. Gerald Butt, Gulf editor of the Middle East Economic Survey, generally regarded as an authoritative publication, has been quoted as saying that unlike 1990 Iraq is not seen as culpable since it has not invaded any other country (in 1990 it had invaded Kuwait).

Besides, Arabs generally see Iraq as suffering on account of the UN sanctions which has meant severe deprivation of the Iraqi people, particularly children, in respect of their essential needs. Many Middle Eastern affairs experts also point out that America is guilty of double standards: it insists that Iraq must comply with all UN resolutions while Israel for decades has ignored UN demands for withdrawal from occupied Arab lands. The US also remains “silent on Israel’s nuclear stockpile while focusing solely on Iraq’s suspected pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.”

Moreover, in contrast to his past arrogance towards his neighbours, President Saddam Hussein has this time despatched envoys to several Arab capitals to secure a sympathetic understanding of his country’s predicament. It has also been noted that the Iraqi president is posturing as the champion of Palestinian rights in their struggle against Israel. There is also the view among many Arab countries that an attack on Iraq will only fuel the anti-American sentiment “which is running high because of the America’s failure to curb Israel’s attacks against the Palestinians.”

Nearer home, Pakistanis feel frustrated that even though they have actively supported the US, in their “war against terrorism”, Washington has not been able to persuade India to put an end to the deployment of its forces along the Pakistan border. On the contrary, it has merely looked on while the tensions have escalated.

Pakistan is also not able to understand why the US, in spite of Pakistan’s proactive role in the war against Taliban, at some risk to its own security, and the steps to curb religious extremism, treats Pakistan at par with India.

If the US extends its “war against terrorism” to Iraq, Pakistan will be confronted with the added problem of a most unpopular reaction of its own people. During the Gulf War of 1991, Pakistanis, by and large, viewed the American intrusion with a strong sense of scepticism. Even Gen Aslam Beg, who was the chief of army staff at the time, was suspected of being critical of the government’s support for the American action.

IN yesterday’s article I provided some reasons why I believe that Pakistan’s current situation demands a fairly significant restructuring of the political order. Simple tinkering with the political edifice erected by the Constitution of 1973 will not produce political or economic stability in the country.

If we accept this argument then what should the government of President Pervez Musharraf do? Are there degrees of freedom available to the government he heads which would provide it the opportunity to undertake some radical changes in the political order? I believe that the answer to this question is yes. In that context, I would advocate a three pronged approach that the Musharraf government could adopt.

One, the government should go ahead with another general elections — to be held in October 2002 as ordered by the Supreme Court. To do anything different would invite the criticism that General Musharraf was following in the footsteps of General Zia-ul-Haq, his military predecessor. Zia’s ghost continues to haunt Pakistan’s political house. General Musharraf would do well to stay away from it. However, some changes need to be made before the country should be called back to the polls. These changes will bring better representation to the people General Musharraf has rightly called the silent majority. It will give them some voice.

Two, some mechanism needs to be created to ensure that the people to be placed in positions of power following the October 2002 elections will continue to go on the road that will eventually take the country to political and economic stability. It would be a real disaster for the country if the political system was derailed once again.

Third, a mechanism is also required to determine whether the country should remain locked into a Westminster parliamentary system. I believe some other form of governance would work better for a country in Pakistan’s situation.

The form the new political structure should assume should be determined not only by the members of the parliament to be elected in October 2002. It should be the product of a debate that allows all segments of the population to actively participate in the process of providing Pakistan with another form of political order.

The first prong of the approach I recommend derives from the Waseem-Burki study mentioned by me in yesterday’s article. It will be recalled that the study was carried out with the support from UK’s Department for International Development. In it we made a number of proposals on how the political structure as it stands today could be changed at the margin to make it more meaningful for Pakistan’s conditions.

The changes proposed were relatively minor. They will ensure that the national and provincial assemblies that emerge following the elections of October 2002 are more representative of the people than were the assemblies elected in all previous elections. Of the many proposals we made, the following eight need to be emphasized.

First, we believe that a political system to be completely democratic must have at its base fully democratic political parties. Parties in Pakistan have never been democratic in the sense that their leaders, programmes and manifestos have never been subjected to democratic selection and preparation. All parties must elect their office holders in a transparent manner. They should publish the list of their accounts. They should be required to publish their election manifestos.

Second, we believe that the electoral process needs to be reformed. The present system results in many candidates elected with a minority vote. By adopting run-off elections when no candidate secures the majority would ensure better representation to the constituencies.

Third, we believe that the grip of the small elite on the country’s political system can only be loosened by increasing the size of the National Assembly to 400 and of the Senate to 100. The Musharraf government has already announced its intention to increase the number of seats in the national assembly. This will happen in part by dedicating separate seats for women and technocrats. As discussed below, we believe that women should be brought into the main stream of politics rather than be treated separately.

Fourth, in order to reduce the control of the executive on the political process — a problem that has retarded political development in the country — the Election Commission should be made fully autonomous. As already indicated, it should be made responsible for ensuring that political parties function as organizations fully representative of the people who join them as members.

The only way to ensure full autonomy for the Election Commission is to have the appointment of the commissioners entrusted to an institution with a broad representation rather than to one individual from one part of the government. Also, the commissioners should hold office for long terms (say seven years) and should be subject to removal only by a process of impeachment conducted by the parliament.

Fifth, we believe that some rationalization should be introduced in the administrative structure of the country by merging the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas into the Northwest Frontier Province and renaming the new entity Pakhtunistan. For some reason there is reluctance to rename this province to identify it with one ethnic group. Why should that be the case when we are happy to call another province Balochistan even though the Baloch are only one of the various ethnic groups that inhabit it?

Sixth, we believe that to bring more balance into the federal structure Punjab should be divided into three provinces — Serarki with Multan as its capital, Punjab with Lahore as its capital, and Potohar with Rawalpindi as its capital. This should be done before the October 2002 elections. Further changes in the structure of the federation should be left to the Constitutional Convention.

Seventh, given the size of the country and the differences in the economic and social conditions among its different parts, we believe that the government should be taken as close to the people as possible. A three-tier federal system with well defined powers at each level — the federal, the provincial, and the district — should be developed by providing full autonomy in designated areas to the lower tiers. A beginning has been made but more needs to be done, particularly in the field of finance.

Eighth, women, hitherto largely excluded from the political process, should be brought in through constitutional changes that would allow them to hold one-third of the seats in both the National Assembly and the Senate. Our proposal differs from that adopted by the Musharraf government in the sense that we propose the election of women on the same basis as men but from the seats from which men would be barred. Seats reserved for women should be changed from one election to another.

The second prong in the approach I am recommending is aimed at creating an institution that would oversee the process of political evolution. I believe that for the proper nurturing of democracy in the country, authority should be given to a National Security Council, a broadly representative body of various important interests. The NSC should have full political participation by including the president, the prime minister and the leader of the opposition. It should also draw the military formally into the task of overseeing the process of bringing democracy back to the country. This can be done by making the four service chiefs members of the NSC. The ministers responsible for such strategic areas as finance, foreign affairs, defence and internal security should make up the rest of the council.

The NSC should not be a permanent body. It should be in place to oversee changes in the government, should have a well defined mandate (for instance, accountability, civil service reform and military expenditure) and should have the responsibility during its limited life for making a number of critical appointments (the chief justice, the chief election commissioner and the four service chiefs).

I believe that even after the adoption of the reforms spelled out in the Waseem-Burki report, a great deal will remain to be done to put the new democratic order on a firm foundation. A number of unresolved issues will remain to be settled: among them how to reconstitute the federating provinces in order to have a reasonable amount of balance in them, the role of the armed services in governance, the strengthening of the legislative functions of the parliament, reform of the legal system, a move towards a secular political order.

Consensus will need to be developed among the many groups and segments of society to move in these and many other areas. The best way to move forward is to convene a Constitutional Convention — a body of 100 persons chaired by an individual with no known political affiliation and who has the respect of the people — to debate and advise the parliament on these issues.

One inspiration for this idea came from the decision taken by the members of the European Union to entrust a number of difficult and unresolved issues to a similar convention that has started work under the chairmanship of a former president of France. We should also remember that the American Constitution — the most durable Constitution in the world — was the product of the work of a Constitutional Convention. I strongly believe that the convention idea is worth pursuing in Pakistan.