IN last week’s article, I said that there were four hurdles to be crossed before the seven “stans,” including Pakistan, could come together into a workable and sustainable regional economic, political and trading arrangement. One of these hurdles was to improve the quality of governance in the region which has been poor - and for a long time - in all the “stans.”

A good way to start this discussion is to quote from a recent editorial in The Washington Post on “Securing Central Asia.” The Post was troubled by the “manifestly bogus referendum” staged by President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan a few weeks ago that extended his term of office by two years. Mr. Karimov received 92 per cent of the vote, roughly the same proportion he received when he was elected to office a few years ago. No truly democratic leader can have this kind of approval rating and the world knows that Mr. Karimov does not evoke that kind of love in his country. “...the Bush administration must be prepared to link the continuance of the military relationship to democratic change, both in Uzbekistan and in the other states of Central Asia,” advised the newspaper. “As useful as the [military] bases may be for current operations in Afghanistan, a larger US interest lies in acting now to ensure that Central Asia does not become the next Afghanistan.”

But it is not just the American interest that is at stake in this region. Representative forms of government need to be promoted since there is now ample amount of evidence from around the world that, without adequate representation of the people in the institutions of government, economic and social development does not take place. Or, if it takes place, it happens for a relatively short period of time beyond which it cannot be easily sustained.

There are some western analysts who are giving up all hope of getting democracy to work in countries such as the “stans.” Among them is Robert Kaplan, whose books have been read by Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush and who is now advising the American military establishment. According to him, “concepts like democracy, human rights and social order have little meaning in such places. The concept of nationhood itself becomes largely illusory.” This is a negative view of why democracy, based on western liberalism, would not — in fact, could not — work in eastern societies. But there is another view, according to which the East does not need western liberal democracies.

There was a time — and that was not very long ago - when several East Asian leaders believed that the rapid development in their region was the consequence of what they called the “Asian values.” By this they meant a paternalistic form of government which could decide what was good for the citizens and also decide how people should go about attaining it. The break-neck speed at which most of East Asia grew in the seventies and eighties under the watchful eyes of essentially paternalistic states seemed to justify that claim.

The deep Asian crisis of the late nineties was a sobering event from which some countries in the region have still to recover. Those who have recovered — such as Korea — are now much more democratic than they were during the “miracle years” of the seventies and eighties. That Korea recovered more rapidly than other East Asian countries was due in part to its ability to develop more representative democratic institutions than other countries in the region.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s experience points in the other direction. Its economy performed the best when the country was under the rule of the military. The period of Ayub Khan (1958-69) was a golden era of Pakistan’s economic history. The government of General Zia ul-Haq (1977-88) did a number of wrong things including making terribly fuzzy the line between religion and the state. Nonetheless, this period also saw a rapid rate of economic growth.

Conversely, the return of democracy in the 1990s produced a wasted decade of stagnant growth, mounting debt and increasing poverty. In the twenty-eight months General Musharraf has been in power, the rapid economic slide of the nineties has been successfully arrested. Should we conclude from this that democracy has been bad for economic development in Pakistan while the governments led by the military have overseen rapid economic growth?

What is the lesson for the “stans” from the experience of East Asia? What can the “stans” learn from Pakistan’s fitful experiments with democracy? One important lesson to be drawn from these two experiences is to make the institutions of state responsive to the wishes and aspirations of all people. This did not happen during the miracle years in East Asia. It is highly unlikely that the phenomenon of “crony capitalism” that was to send East Asia into a deep crisis would have taken as strong a hold on the regional economies had institutions fully representative of the people been allowed to provide an appropriate check on the policymakers in Bangkok, Jakarta and Seoul. Similarly, Pakistan’s wasted decade was not caused by the return of democracy. It happened because the form the democracy took in the country did not allow true and full representation to the various segments of the population.

The same lessons can be learnt by the “stans” from the experience of East Asia and Pakistan. The type of democracy that is good for economic development results from the careful nurturing of a variety of institutions that must work together to provide full and effective participation to the people. The process takes time, energy, and dedication. It also requires a consensus in society about the direction to be taken.

Democracy can only come to the “stans” if these countries succeed in introducing political systems that not only give voice to the people but also listen and positively react to this voice. But before proceeding forward with this line of thinking, let me step back a little and provide a bit of history of how modern economic thinking eschewed political development; why political science was thoroughly ignored by contemporary development economists.

That economics and politics are closely intertwined has been recognized ever since economics developed into a separate discipline. The pioneers of this science chose to call it political economy since they were trying to understand how human behaviour, often articulated by political institutions, affected economic choices. Nonetheless, as economists moved towards a greater use of mathematics, statistics and econometrics to understand economic behaviour and relationships, they distanced themselves from such softer disciplines as political science, sociology, anthropology and history. This trend is now being corrected in particular by the exponents of a sub-discipline called institutional economics.

There is now increasing understanding among economists that sustained economic development is only possible in societies that have robust institutions in place. By “institutions” the economists not only mean organizations but the rules on the basis of which these organizations are managed. The institutional structure in all Central Asian “stans” is exceedingly weak. Pakistan has the strongest institutional foundation in this group of countries and is also in the process of finding ways to strengthen it.

As such it could lead the way for the countries of the region. Let me, therefore, stay with the case of Pakistan. What are some of the basic principles that need to be followed as Pakistan begins the tasks of providing itself with a strong institutional foundation? I will underscore at least three of them.

First, institutions must fully represent the people they serve. This is as true of sports clubs, labour unions, school systems as it is of such political institutions as political parties and parliaments. Pakistan has failed to achieve that objective. In spite of holding several general elections, it failed to create a body of institutions that represented the people. Political institutions — in particular political parties — continued to be dominated by an individual, or a family, or a small group of people. If political parties are not democratic they cannot lead the society towards democracy. Among the reforms Pakistan must introduce into the political system is the reform of the political party structure.

Second, organizations to become institutions must be governed by a system of rules that is supported by the majority of the people they serve. A game can only be played when those who play in it and those who view it are comfortable with the rules that are followed. There is nothing “absolute” about the rules that are to be observed in playing a particular game. That a one-day cricket match will have each side bowl fifty overs is not something that was ordained by a high authority. It evolved out of an understanding among the sponsors of the game, those who manage it, those who play and those who watch it. Similarly a successful political organization must have a set of rules that are diligently observed after being articulated by those who choose to be its associates.

The third principle behind successful institutions is that the people served by them must have recourse to some authority when something goes terribly wrong. The Americans call this “checks and balances.” If a part of the system goes awry, it can be put back on track by some of the other parts. That is exactly what happened in 2000 when the accepted process of counting votes could not produce a president following the US elections held in November.

The Supreme Court came in to balance the system and restore the disturbed equilibrium. Zia ul-Haq’s eighth amendment of the 1973 Constitution introduced a form of checks and balances in the system the politicians had failed to manage prudently and effectively. The amendment gave the president the authority to dismiss an errant prime minister and the national assembly that supported him. Once the politicians settled down in Islamabad they contrived to rid the Constitution of the 8th amendment. What followed was a period of chaos and anarchy which saw unchecked political power go crazy.

Could Pakistan return to some form of democracy which betters its own record and defies Kaplan’s grim and pessimistic conclusion reached in several articles and books — in particular in the best-selling book titled “The Coming Anarchy” — that much of the Third World’s least functional societies were headed towards a meltdown?

I will answer this question following my recent visit to Pakistan undertaken to present a report I have written together with Professor Muhammad Waseem on what would it take to make Pakistan a then this wouldn’t be odd).

The right-wing Fox News ran a story on Dec 11 that a group of active Israeli military were among those detained, and quoted investigators as saying that some of the detainees failed to polygraph questions when asked about alleged surveillance activities in the United States. “There is no indication that the Israelis were involved in the 9-11 attacks,” Fox News added, “but investigators suspect that the Israelis may have gathered intelligence about the (Sept 11) attacks in advance, and not shared it.

A highly placed investigator said there are ‘tie-ins’. But when asked for details, he flatly refused to describe them, saying, ‘Evidence linking these Israelis to 9/11 is classified. I cannot tell you about evidence that has been gathered. It’s classified information’.”

Now, according to Antiwar.com, over 100 Israeli “art students” selling paintings and handicrafts in Texas and Florida have been deported for visa violations. They were stated to have visited several offices of the Drug Enforcement Agency, and even an alert about them was said to have been issued by the National Counter-intelligence Centre.

It is alleged that these art students all belonged to one particular art school. The Sun-Sentinel is quoted as reporting that some of the students were employed in South Florida by a concern known as Universal Art, with addresses in South Miami and Southrise, but there were no signs of the company after the news about the students broke.

All this is extremely confusing, and since US officials and Israeli sources deny the imputations in such stories and give no information, it is difficult to guess where the truth lies. The basic question raised is whether Israeli operatives knew of the terrorist attacks and did not inform US authorities. If it is accepted that this was so, then the next question is why the US was not informed. Was it because Israel stood to gain politically from the inevitable US reaction to the attack?