AFTER President Pervez Musharraf’s speech on the Kashmir Solidarity Day, Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir has stiffened. Now that the fundamental contours of the government’s Kashmir policy have been firmly established, it is clear that Pakistan’s old, maximalist position on the issue now stands energized and revived.

According to this stand, Kashmir is not a territorial dispute, but it involves the fundamental political right of the Kashmiris, as enshrined in the Security Council Resolutions to either join India or Pakistan through a UN-administered plebiscite.

This stand also rejects the Indian claim of Kashmir being an integral part of the Indian Union. It does not see Kashmir as a bilateral issue and asserts that it can only be solved through international mediation. President Musharraf has added more weight to this traditional position by calling on India to improve its appalling human rights record in occupied Kashmir and show its sincerity in finding a solution to the problem by means other than state terror and repression.

This means that the appalling human rights situation in occupied Kashmir is not a peripheral concern for Pakistan. President Musharraf’s pronouncement, therefore, was not emotive expression tailored to the requirements of the occasion. It was a policy pronouncement on the issue.

Not surprisingly, the speech has halted the rumour mills feeding speculation that perhaps a back-door, behind-the-scenes arrangement for the division of Kashmir is on the cards. Pakistan, it has been made clear, is not keen on a solution to the Kashmir problem involving key compromises. What was the reason for Gen Musharraf to reintroduce all the elements of Pakistan’s original position on Kashmir after having shown flexibility and adaptability on this score?

The reasons are as much personal as these are strategic. General Musharraf has been remarkably astute in responding to the complex challenges of the new geo-strategic environment in the region. Unlike Afghanistan, where the template of policy change was designed by President George W. Bush’s “either you are with us or against us” statement, on Kashmir, President Musharraf has trodden a difficult stretch, making sensible adjustments in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy and not giving in, at the same time, to the Indian pressure tactics. He has stood firm against the Indian demand of handing over “wanted terrorists”, particularly Pakistanis, and has on the Line of Control. At the same time, by putting curbs on the activities of groups that have been operating in Indian occupied Kashmir using Pakistani soil or resources, and by warning others not to peddle their petty agendas on the issue, Gen Musharraf has shown courage and firmness that no leader before him has.

Moreover, he has taken considerable personal risk by taking on militant outfits with huge financial and organizational support base. The mere fact that his personal security has been enhanced and reinforced is indicative of the kind of personal risks he has taken in moving against the forces of militancy and fanaticism in the country.

There has also been much debate in the close circles of the army as to how much of the change in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy is good for the Kashmiri struggle, and whether India would not exploit to its diplomatic advantage and to the detriment of the resistance struggle in the occupied valley. Another, and a more important point of the debate is what Pakistan gets out of showing flexibility and making gestures of peace and conciliation to India. Being the leader of the armed forces, Gen. Musharraf has been engaged in a process of talks and exchanges to reassure his commanders of the utility of handshakes with Atal Behari Vajpayee and the necessity of tough decisions on militant Kashmiri groups.

However, for all the difficult decisions that Gen Musharraf has taken done in fashioning a new Pakistan position on Kashmir, there has not been any substantive change in the Indian stance on the issue. From its ruthless operations in the valley to its military build-up on Pakistan’s border, New Delhi has done everything to make things worse between India and Pakistan.

The most damaging of all has been a spate of arrogant and spiteful statements from India, reflecting how Pakistan’s current stand on Kashmir is being viewed by Delhi.

Deliberately or out of politically expedient motive, India has been giving the domestic crowd an impression that the conciliatory steps taken by Pakistan were obtained under the threat of war. In fact, India opened a full psy-war against Pakistan which is supposed to have cornered Islamabad on Kashmir.

This is, however, no reason for President Musharraf not to stick to the path of flexibility that he has adopted even in the face of Indian obduracy, believing that this is in the long-term interest of Pakistan and is helpful to the cause of peace and normalization in the subcontinent.

It is disappointing, however, that Washington’s encomium for President Musharraf’s bold speech of January 12 has not been matched by a nudge to India to make some move in the same direction and make it possible for Gen Musharraf to build on the new structure of Kashmir policy.

There has been no censure of Delhi for its military build-up and its persistent war-like posture reinforced by nuclear-capable missile tests and other provocative military moves. A nagging feeling is growing in Pakistan that in major world capitals there is no real appreciation of the causes and effects of tensions in the subcontinent and that while India’s bellicosity is treated with benign indifference and its hostile acts go uncensured, Pakistan gets the rough end of the stick all the time.

Gen Musharraf’s January 12 speech reflected its disappointment, besides a serious concern over the continuing stalemate that could have been broken by some reciprocity from Delhi or a little sensitivity from the big powers to the grim consequences of war-like situation in the subcontinent. A crucial question also is how Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir would evolve beyond what President Musharraf has already stated? There is no easy answer to it.

The point is that Pakistan has gone as far as it could on Kashmir, and even this far it has walked alone. Now only a matching response from India, a genuine change in its conduct and policy can take the process forward. Either that or a concerted attempt by the international community to break the stalemate in a fashion that is manifestly fair and just alone can break the long stalemate. The world’s role has to be more than simple cheerleader for peace.