CERTAIN phrases lose their first tartness — phrases such as ‘Turn the other cheek’ or ‘Love thy neighbour as thyself ‘. Certain others jolt us back into a new awareness — ‘Let us not negotiate out of fear, but let us not fear to negotiate’.

One that needs to be recalled is the commitment made by what remained of the civilized world in November 1945, when UNESCO was formed. The preamble to its constitution (to which both India and Pakistan have bound themselves voluntarily as member states) reads: ‘When wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.’

Could anything be more apposite or a timelier reminder of what the governments of India and Pakistan should be doing now that, instead of going to war, they are retreating behind the defences of peace?

Claiming credit for this unexpected victory of reason over rhetoric, there will be as many fathers as there will be tongues and published memoirs. The true credit goes to the two most to blame — Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf — and to the placatory referees, including Colin Powell, Tony Blair, Jiang Zemin and Mrs. Kumaratunga. No one can deny that both Vajpayee and Musharraf have shown rare courage in extraordinary circumstances. It is never easy for any leader to order his people to mobilize for war; it requires even greater moral prowess to reconcile them afterwards to peace, especially when it is a ‘peace without victory’.

Had war broken out, Prime Minister Vajpayee would not have been the first poet to have witnessed war first-hand. The graveyard of history is full of poets who had died in bunkers, leaving behind stanzas pining for peace. Had he given that first order to fire, though, the poet in Vajpayee would have disobeyed his own muse, for who does not remember the lines of his haunting poem recited by him during his visit to Lahore — “ We will never let there be another war/We will never allow earth to be stained with the colour of blood”.

If one had to etch a portrait of Prime Minister Vajpayee today, it would not be of a middle-aged dilettante mulling over his own poetry, but that of a slightly rotund raja depicted as rulers were in Indian miniatures — seated with his sword and shield at the ready and a hawk perched on his right hand. In Mr. Vajpayee’s case, that hawk is his unhooded, watchful Home Minister Mr. L.K. Advani, for it is inconceivable that Mr. Vajpayee could have taken any of the steps forward that he did without Mr. Advani’s concurrence, just as he would not have dared take any step backwards without the same right-wing support.

Now that the tension (on the surface at least) between the two countries has abated, both leaders must, like any combatant returning home from the front, once again face the mundane demands of domestic life. Income has to be earned, children educated, households fed, the budget balanced, and squabbles within the family resolved.

For Mr. Vajpayee, the demands of such domesticity have never been far from his mind, even during the recent crisis. Democratically elected leaders, badgered constantly by an opposition and answerable more often than they would wish to an unforgiving electorate, rarely escape such obligations — not even bachelor prime ministers.

By comparison, for President Musharraf the trials of domestic governance have only just begun. Except for a brief period during the early months of his present rule, his focus has been understandably absorbed by external affairs. With the Afghan situation now under the control of the United States, his foray into the heady world of international super-politics may well be over. It is time for him to stand down and deliver locally what is expected of him.

Inevitably, the first plateau he has to reach will be a conclusive stage of understanding with India. Musharraf knows that he has to talk to the Indians; the Indians know that they cannot talk around him (a meetings between Vajpayee and Benazir Bhutto and a private dinner between her and Advani in New Delhi notwithstanding). Musharraf recognizes that Pakistan cannot maintain indefinitely a state of war preparedness against India. He has conceded that no Pakistani agency — overt or covert — will be permitted by him or allowed by the international community to pursue a campaign of disruptive intervention in Kashmir. Only yesterday’s communists can recognize the kind of gauntlet today’s terrorists should expect to go through.

The style, content, and the procedure for Musharraf’s prospective negotiations with India remain to be revealed. It is possible, considering the extraordinary high level of intervention by interested powers, that the elements of the intended outcome have already been designed and fabricated abroad (as the Afghan plan was in Bonn), and conveyed to President Musharraf for assembly and sale locally. It is conceivable that the United States and India have common perceptions about the Line of Control in Kashmir.

It is equally possible that a timetable for a return to democracy in Pakistan has already been formulated. If not full adult franchise, then perhaps some cosmetic form of representative government that filters the muddied waters of party politics and allows a more potable leadership to rise, leaving the sediment below.

The only choice left open to President Musharraf therefore may not be whether, but when and how. The timing as to when he chooses to market the ideas put to him will depend on how quickly the Pakistani public, both civilian and military, can be persuaded to accept his decisions. Selling any peace process with India, for example, to his Corps Commanders may be easier than many civilians suspect. It is significant that when US Secretary of State Colin Powell came to Pakistan, the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff General Aziz had been dispatched to China on a week-long visit. It is equally significant that the only reshuffle that Musharraf has conducted during the past two years of his administration has been among his inner cabal of Corps Commanders, rather than in his ornamental civilian cabinet.

In early 2000, a former finance minister of Punjab told a visiting British diplomat: “The only justification we can have for staying in power is performance. The day we cannot deliver what the public expects, we should resign.” To his credit, he did. Few of his colleagues in the provinces and even fewer in Islamabad have emulated his gesture of self-sacrifice. The few now choosing to quit the cabinet probably feel that they have outgrown this costly day-care centre for aspiring politicians.

As President Musharraf slowly readjusts his bifocals to the near distance of the economy, he will detect a hundred reasons why federal ministries and provincial departments have failed to meet their targets — if, that is, they had set themselves any. He will be made to swallow a thousand excuses for being unable to achieve the economic miracle they had promised. They will cite the increase in foreign exchange reserves as the compensatory sweet plum.

As everyone knows, there is more foreign exchange in the coffers of the State Bank not because we have earned more, but because we are not paying back what we owe. Debt relief, even if it comes without strings, does not make us a rich country. It merely keeps us poor for a longer time. We remain indigent and inefficient.

Go to any government office — federal or provincial — and you will notice each occupant busy not with his or her work but with a personal axe to grind. Perhaps it is time, now that President Musharraf has sheathed his sword, for him to wield on his cabinet and its administration the same axe that he was made to use on his fellow officers. It is the least that this long-suffering nation deserves. After all, if its population was prepared to shed blood at his behest, he should be prepared to let some blood for them. That is not an unfair expectation. What the country needs is a cohesive viable economic policy, not some quick-fix bandages and pick-me-up shots in a perforated arm. President Musharraf has demonstrated that he has succeeded on our nation’s borders. He could achieve a similar success on the home front. Let him be guided by the expectations of the people. I must follow them, someone once said. Am I not their leader?

THIS week George W. Bush began his second year as president of the United States. When he was sworn into office on January 20, 2001, few could have predicted the huge challenges he would face in the year ahead. Fewer still would have predicted the way he would handle those challenges.

The second Bush presidency did not have an easy birth. Mired in squabbles over chads and dimples, court verdicts and partisan officials, the election result was eventually decided by the Supreme Court — probably incorrectly — in favour of George W. Bush. ‘Winning’ with fewer votes than Al Gore, many felt the new president would face a constant struggle for legitimacy. Remarkably though, once the inauguration (on a miserable wet day, held up by a security scare) was over and Gore had gone into bearded obscurity, the issue of legitimacy disappeared. Inauguration corresponded to closure for the American public: from then on they accepted Bush as their president.

Expectations of the new president were low. His interest in politics developed relatively late for White House hopefuls. Many attributed his rapid success to family background, wealth and oil connections rather than to any great charisma or appeal he possessed. [The fact that his opponent was the ultra-wooden Al Gore definitely helped his cause.] Intellectually, he was a self-confessed featherweight. Numerous verbal gaffes during the campaign demonstrated his limited command of the English language, while an interview in which he could name neither Pervez Musharraf nor the prime minister of India, painfully exposed his limited grasp of international affairs. Expectations about America’s second President Bush were definitely not high.

Similarities between the two Bush presidencies did not stop at the family connection. Bush Junior resurrected many key figures from his father’s administration, Dick Cheney and Colin Powell being the most obvious. His appointment of two African-Americans (Powell and Condoleeza Rice) to powerful positions was highly commendable. Another strong point of the new Bush regime that became clear relatively early was his ability to delegate. Not for him the poring over policy details and minutiae that characterized his intellectual predecessor. George W. was happy to set the course and leave others to work out how to get there.

The course George Bush set was radically different from that of Bill Clinton. Divergence was greatest in the area of international affairs. American foreign policy underwent seismic shifts. The main casualty was multilateralism, indeed international engagement generally. Unilateralism became the new byword. Recall the administration’s blunt refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, its total rejection of an international criminal court, its obstructionism at the UN conference to curb small arms, and its ‘head in the sand’ pursuit of the National Missile Defence (NMD). The message being sent to the international community was clear: as the sole superpower, America did not need to work with the rest of the world; it could and would do as it pleased to promote its own interests.

On the domestic front there was a noticeable shift to conservatism. In May federal aid to international organizations that advocated abortion rights was cut off, and in June the president pushed a massive $1.35 trillion tax cut through Congress. The latter led to accusations of profligacy and squandering money that could have been used on social welfare programmes. Both contributed to Senator Jim Jeffords of Vermont’s defection from the Republican Party, thereby handing control of the Senate to the Democrats. Jeffords complained that the Republican party had become more conservative than him. His defection was the result of a big blunder by the new administration, one that could seriously hamber its legislative agenda.

But then came September 11, 2001. That date will (barring anything as immense taking place) go down in history as the pivotal moment in the Bush presidency. His initial response to the crisis — a disappearing act — is probably something he wishes to forget. But his subsequent response has elements that deserve praise, as well as many that raise concern.

On the plus side, Bush was quick to articulate a clear American agenda — finding and punishing those responsible for September 11 events, and preventing such attacks happening again. True, the nitty-gritty of this agenda tended to change with conditions on the ground (get Osama bin Laden, get the Taliban too, extension of War on terrorism, etc.). But overall it has remained sharply focused against terrorism.

Plus point two, George Bush established a domestic and international consensus before taking action against Afghanistan. Realizing that this time the US would not be able to go it alone, the president returned to multilateralism. His efforts to prevent an anti-Muslim pogrom within America, and keep the wider Muslim world on his side were also commendable.

Plus point three, Bush proved a good leader for Americans. He showed his common touch. His performance at Ground Zero meeting firefighters was excellent. So too the simple direct manner in which he articulated his people’s emotions and feelings. Phrases like ‘dead or alive’ and ‘smoke ‘em out’ struck a chord with ordinary Americans. Likewise the pledge: ‘Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or justice to our enemies, justice will be done.’ Simple, clear, determined.

On the minus side, the consensus established by Bush, at least internationally, was more by coercion than persuasion: ‘Nations are either with us, or they are against us’. Furthermore, it was a consensus to back decisions made in Washington: there was no consultation on how terrorism should be tackled. The nominal nature of the ‘international’ coalition was made clear by American refusal to accept military aid from any country other than Britain.

Initially, few in the international community had the courage to question the manner in which America waged its war, e.g. the strategy of aerial bombardment, for instance. But later, as criticism of the US conduct mounted, rather than take note of it the Bush administration went ahead with its policies regardless. Thus, for example, it held up the deployment of desperately needed international peacekeeping forces (to which the U