January 19, 2002	Saturday	Ziqa'ad 4, 1422

WASHINGTON: The complicated phase of rounding up Al Qaeda leaders and eliminating pockets of resistance has illustrated gaps and limitations in the US antiterror arsenal. It underscores how even the most sophisticated targeting technology is of little use without solid human intelligence for identifying what to strike.

Questions over US weaknesses are important. The cat-and-mouse hunt for scattered Al Qaeda remnants - in contrast to the quick toppling of the Taliban regime - is likely to be better represent the kinds of challenges US forces could face in rooting out terrorists from within other nations, such as the Philippines, Somalia, or Yemen.

Afghanistan revealed technological glitches that remain in data sharing and the limitations of existing sensors and weaponry against hidden underground targets. It’s apparent, too, that there’s much work to be done before the US military is able to fully integrate its sea, land, and ground forces for fighting unconventional enemies such as terrorist groups - as opposed to linear battles.

An innovation of the Afghanistan campaign was the use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) - highly skilled teams of elite Green Berets to guide operations for both US air power and Afghan anti-Taliban forces.

The strategy turned on its head the practice of using air power to back up a large ground force, and instead used dispersed groups of minimally armed ground forces as a spearhead to help guide and direct a large range of firepower from the sky.

Afghanistan also highlighted the skill with which special operations commandos, especially Green Berets who are trained in languages, can cooperate with local forces while keeping a relatively low profile.

Use of a small ground contingent, while reducing both the risk to American lives and political opposition from Afghans, meant US forces lacked adequate manpower of its own to block escape routes and capture fleeing opposition members - a factor that may have helped hundreds of enemy fighters slip away.

The campaign has also demonstrated how the abundance of high-tech US intelligence, from satellite imagery to signals interception, has failed to make up for a shortfall of human intelligence sources. Credible informants are especially needed to help target and root out the pockets of Al Qaeda and Taliban resistance in Afghanistan, a task far more difficult than striking at Taliban troop concentrations. —Dawn/LATS Service (c) Christian Science Monitor.