Rashid Dostum: Afghanistan’s odd man out
By Brig A. R. Siddiqi
IN pre-Taliban Afghanistan, Afghan-Uzbek Commander Gen Abdul Rashid Dostum had been the strongest factor for the forces he had under his direct command. He never identified himself with any of the Mujahideen groups. He concentrated his power entirely in northern Afghanistan to lord it over practically to the exclusion of Kabul.
When I first met him on Sept 28, 1992, at the Qila-i-Jangi, his military headquarters at Shabarghan, north-west of Mazar-i-Sharif, he would use much the same centrifugal idiom as he did while announcing his boycott of the Bonn conference and subsequent rejection of the interim government in Kabul.
The “power-sharing deal”, he said, “did not work out (at Bonn) as I would have liked. But in any event the dividing out (division) of power will not now go on by means of force.” That was more or less what he and his senior generals told me during my day-long stay at Shabarghan.
After the fall of Najibullah in April 1992, and the formation of the Mujahideen government in Kabul under the Peshawar Agreement, there was nothing to stop Dostum’s Gilamijam militia from marching into Kabul. That was deliberately avoided, however, for fear of unnecessary bloodshed. Dostum was then, and claimed to be, in command of ‘one-third’ of Afghanistan — from Badakhshan to Herat. Short of complete independence, he enjoyed full autonomy in his northern and western strongholds.
As for the Kabul government under President Burhanuddin Rabbani, Dostum would let himself to stay “well within the constitutional framework of one united Afghanistan ...” What constitution? For there was hardly anything even remotely approaching a national constitution except for the ISI-brokered Peshawar Agreement (April 24, 1992), the principal source of Rabbani’s legitimacy and interim regime in Kabul.
Dostum’s authority, on the other hand, stemmed from his control and command of the bulk of Afghanistan’s rump (regular) armed forces and his political hold via his Jumbish-i-Milli Islami Afghanistan. He ran his own foreign and information outfits to the exclusion of the central government.
He was visibly touchy, even resentful about his force being described as Gilamijam militia. “We are an army with corps, divisions and brigades. We have an air force. You may go and see it for yourself, if you wish.” He quietly skipped the question about the chain of command and whether he took his orders from the chief of the armed forces, Gen Abdul Rahim Wardak.
Of his working (nominal) relationship with Kabul, he said: “I work for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. I keep in touch with the ministry of defence (under Ahmad Shah Masud)....”
He added: “I wish there were a chain of command. (As it is) everyone has his own force, own militia — be that Sayyaf (Abdul Rasool Sayyaf — of Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen) or Rabbani (President Burhanuddin) or Hekmatyar and so on.
“I do wish there were one command. I represent the northern part of Afghanistan. I obey the orders of the president of the country.”
Gen Dostum and his high command had been bitterly critical of the rival Mujahideen, specially Hekmatyar, due to continued in-feuding. “He (Hekmatyar), for not wanting peace, must always have someone to wage his personal war against; first against the communists, then against Najibullah and now against us.” They claimed that the bulk of Hekmatyar’s men in the north had joined their ranks. Those sitting in Kabul had no power without their support.
As it were, Dostum would rather be the duke of Venice with full powers than the king of England with no power. He chose to stay out of Kabul to be left alone to wield absolute authority in the north rather than partake of an adulterated and fragile power-sharing arrangement in Kabul.
Recognized as the industrial north of Afghanistan, Dostum’s ‘fiefdom’, besides the bulk of sugar and textile industries, cradles the country’s security printing press. Moreover, it enjoys the only rail-road route to the outside world via Uzbekistan. Until the pre-Taliban mid ‘90s, northern Afghanistan, by and large, had been almost a haven for peace compared to Kabul constantly under the barrage of Hekmatyar’s artillery deployed in the east and the southeast.
Starting as a gasfield worker, Dostum climbed up the greasy pole of success with a rare combination of his native shrewdness, and uncanny ability to see which way the wind might be blowing and sail with it. He is nobody’s man when it comes to seizing and protecting his own authority.
A minion of president Najibullah, he ditched him the moment he realized the president was losing his grip on power. He went on admitting that “I wasn’t his real support. I only obeyed his orders to make myself stronger.”
The year of 2001 is not the same as the early or the pre-Taliban mid ‘90s. Dostum may not be as strong as before. He stays on, nevertheless; and that’s what matters.
No matter how one might look at the Dostum factor in Afghanistan’s prevailing situation, it exits and can be ignored much at the cost of one’s sober judgment. How strong or how weak this factor is could be a matter of perception which future alone would either contradict or confirm.

