| November 30, 2001 | Friday | Ramazan 14, 1422 |
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Things have changed, but not a great deal
Backdating the recession
THE recent politico-military developments have given rise to a number of issues including the future of non-state actors. In the context of South and Central Asia the one important and relevant question is what would happen to the ideological warriors that were involved in pursuing conflict on their own or on behalf of state actors.
The Afghan crisis of the 1980s had resulted in a new formulation of jihad and created thousands of jihadis whose existence may come under question in the new strategic framework being designed by the United States.
The issues that different national governments and the international community will have to deal with are: (a) can non-state actors still afford to struggle in the present circumstances, and if not, (b) will there be a fall-out effect on the societies where hundreds of these men are roaming with weapons, and (c) what are the ways for re-integrating these self-acclaimed warriors into the civil society. The US may have won its war, but unless a solution is found to the aforementioned problem, the state of peace and stability in Central and South Asia, the Middle East or the world will remain doubtful.
The current situation in Afghanistan or other fronts is reflective of the problem. The states had conveniently created hoards of religious-ideological-fighters willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause. Be it Afghanistan, Kashmir, Bosnia or Chechnya, these militants were willing to fight and die for a cause that was created by state actors but with the ownership seemingly shared by the jihadis. The availability of such actors provided some states with an inexpensive option to pursue their political objectives. In that respect, these jihadis were expendable. They would fight a war without increasing the immediate financial cost for any state.
However, all of this seems to have changed or is likely to change with the current state of affairs in Afghanistan. The international community, especially the US, appears to have little appetite for jihadis or freedom fighters. One may question the viability of the American definition of terrorism, but the fact remains that it would be difficult for any state to encourage insurgency movements, proxy wars or freedom struggles. This particularly pertains to South Asia where there is an additional problem of India continuously trying to raise its voice against the militant struggle in Kashmir. The current direction of the international political environment indicates that there could be greater pressure on Islamabad if it were to continue with any form of diplomatic or other support of the jihadis.
So far, Pakistan has not managed to distance itself from its moral, diplomatic or other kind of support to the jihadis fighting for the Kashmir cause. The major actors (jihadi organizations) involved in the Kashmir struggle remain intact and have not been affected by the government’s de-weaponization drive. In fact, the statements coming out of Islamabad indicate that the de-weaponization drive has failed. Is it due to the government’s inability or lack of will to disarm the jihadis?
Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that there has been any substantial change in the plans or thinking of the jihadi organizations. Perhaps, Islamabad could have some clarity in its thinking if it were to evaluate the situation and assess whether the international political conditions would allow a continuation of Jihad. New Delhi has been vehemently trying to draw American attention towards the situation in Kashmir.
Although Pakistani analysts claim that India has been embarrassed sufficiently through not being given a role in the present drive against terrorism, it would be equally unwise to think that New Delhi has completely failed to convince Washington of its plight in Kashmir. The Bush administration has been extremely vocal in condemning international terrorism. It would not be proper to jump to a conclusion that America is totally unwilling to listen to its newly found strategic ally, India. According to some recent reports, India has been asked to join America in policing the Arabian Sea to apprehend hijackers and terrorists.
Curbing the power of the jihadis is also one of the objectives of the Musharraf government. In fact, reducing their strength is what would increase the Pakistani general’s credibility, internationally. However, this goal is not easy to achieve. At a strategic level, Pervez Musharraf would have to convince the rank and file of his forces about the need to change the policy. At the operational level he would have to introduce policies of de-weaponization and de-militarization of the society.
These two objectives, it must be pointed out, are not easy to achieve. More than just an issue of a mental transformation of the military, there is the question of confronting the militants to give up arms. Furthermore, there is the issue of introducing tolerance in society in general and teaching the masses about peaceful co-existence with other communities within the country itself. The rise in sectarian violence was an indirect offshoot of rising militancy.
The inability to obtain these goals, nonetheless, is going to create more problems. For instance, these ideology-driven warriors could create domestic instability. One is reminded of the threat of the head of Jaish-i-Mohmmad early this year when he had threatened the Bahawalpur administration and Islamabad of spilling blood on the streets of Pakistan if his men were not released. He had also warned the government of not provoking his commandos lest they divert attention from Kashmir to Pakistan itself. Thirty-five of his men had been arrested by the local police in Bahawalpur for molesting and terrorizing a group of local transporters.
The networks of the local jihadi groups in Pakistan or the Middle East remain intact. The governments, on the other hand, are caught between the problem of dealing with these groups and the threat of American reprisal if they continue to support such elements. Interestingly, the jihadis tend not to draw a line between the fight against the imperialist forces in the immediate areas of conflict and the US.
The linkage is possibly understood by the US administration that has urged Islamabad to change its system of education. This was a message conveyed directly and publicly by Colin Powell during his visit to Islamabad. Clearly, his apprehension was that the continuation of madressah education in Pakistan would continue to produce jihadis. However, his message regarding the change in the education system relates to Islamabad’s will to invest more resources in the social sector versus defence, an issue that cannot be decided without sufficient political will and inclusion of all important stakeholders. Moreover, it is also an issue of improving governance of state management. All of this would require resources, a concerted effort and political will that are still non-existent.
What should be clearly understood by the government is that it would soon have to devise a policy on how to deal with the jihadis and jihadi networks. If there is no future of militancy, then these people would have to be disarmed and re-integrated into civil society. Prior to September 11, even the jihadi organizations had not thought of the issue of re-integration.
In a question put to one of the key officials of Lashkar-i-e Taiba about what would be the fate of the youngsters, who were being trained to fight if they managed to get Kashmir, the response was that they would be mobilized to other fronts. In the post- September 11 environment, it seems pretty unlikely that these people would be allowed to operate at will. However, leaving them alone is equally unaffordable. Losing an ideological battle would create frustration that could spill over into civil society.
Thus, programmes would have to be tailored to turn these people into useful citizens that can exist without the power of the gun. Until now, the concept of re-integration was limited to the African continent where it was used for ex-combatants. Understandably, a re-integration programme designed for militants would be markedly different from the one used in Africa. In most cases, the ex-combatants were people indulging in violence for economic survival.
The group of people under discussion, however, is a different breed fired by ideological motives. The primary issue would also involve educating them about the peaceful dimensions of religion.
NOT long after the World Trade Centre in New York was reduced to a smouldering ruin, US trade representative Robert Zoellick cited the terrorist attacks as a valid reason for accelerating trade liberalisation via the World Trade Organisation and other institutions. There is nothing particularly novel about the idea of free trade as a panacea for the world’s ills, although the concept can readily be disputed — not least on the grounds that its lopsided interpretation perpetuates the global imbalance of wealth.
This month’s WTO ministerial conference in Doha has done little to alleviate this concern, even though developing nations received a better hearing than on previous occasions and won a significant concession in terms of the right to mass-produce patented drugs in the event of national health emergencies. This measure can potentially save millions of lives by making vital medicines affordable for governments as well as individuals in the Third World, and one of its first effects should be a sharp decline in the mortality rate of HIV-Aids patients in Africa.
African ministers and a handful of non-government organisations lobbied long and hard to bring about this result, and it represents a defeat for the pharmaceutical giants that devote themselves, like all multinational corporations, more or less exclusively to the pursuit of profits. There is little room for compassion in their company policies, and a refusal by the developed nations to budge on this score would correctly have been perceived as rather too blatant a defence of monopolistic greed. The US and Switzerland did try to drum up support for a weaker deal, but their stance proved hard to sustain — particularly in view of the fact that the US had lately suggested that it might decide to override the patent on Cipro, the chief remedy against anthrax.
It is also worth remembering that the main purpose of the WTO conclave, which was to secure agreement on a new round of trade negotiations, would have been jeopardised without Third World support. Nearly two years after a similar effort floundered in Seattle (amid, although not because of, some of the most concerted civil disobedience on American soil since the Vietnam War), it is doubtful whether the WTO could have survived another serious blow. In the event, after India threatened to walk out of the talks, a compromise was eventually struck whereby negotiations on competition and investment policy — which the US and the European Union are particularly keen on — can begin after the fifth ministerial round two years hence, but only after the WTO issues a “written consensus decision”. This effectively empowers each of the organisation’s members with a veto.
It is only natural for developing states to be wary of Western attempts to dictate an agenda, given that many of the concessions achieved by the Third World — at a considerable cost — during the so-called Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations remain unimplemented. The US has maintained its textile quotas and the EU its export subsidies to farmers. These markets are vital for producers in developing countries, yet they are effectively locked out of them, notwithstanding all the Western rhetoric against protectionism. The US remains adamant on textiles. The phasing out of agricultural subsidies has been placed on the WTO agenda, but “without prejudging the outcome” — a face-saving phrase for Europe, and a nod to French sensitivities in particular.
Issues such as agriculture and textiles may lose votes in the US and Europe, Tanzanian representative Iddi Mohammed Simba pointed out in Doha, but “they are matters of life and death for us”. He added: “We need the WTO far more than the US and the EU do.” That’s debatable — and would certainly have made Julius Nyerere wince — although there is some truth in what the economist Joan Robinson once noted: that under capitalism, “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all”.
The trouble with the WTO is that the structure of the 142-member organization — the latest addition being China — remains undemocratic. For example, the draft under discussion in Doha was agreed via what is known as the “green room process”, which entails meetings attended by up to 25 WTO members; and the mechanism for winning an invitation to one of these exclusive gatherings remains shrouded in mystery.
Following the collapse of the Seattle talks in December 1999, both the US and Britain conceded the need to reform the WTO’s non-transparent and inequitable decision-making procedure. That rhetoric was soon forgotten, however. Just two months later, WTO director-general Michael Moore described the green room process and the so-called “consensus system” as “non-negotiable”. Which is not particularly surprising, since democratisation would undermine the developed countries’ dominance of the organisation.
At the start of the Doha session, about 100 protesters, with tape on their mouths, held up signs saying “No voice at the WTO”; once the 5000 delegates had filed in, the tape came off for the chant: “What do we want? Democracy!” Ironically for the EU, the most prominent protester was a French farmer — Jose Bove, who has become one of the few instantly recognisable faces of the anti-globalisation movement since being jailed for laying siege to a McDonald’s outlet in rural France.
Equally ironically, Qatar proved to be much more civilised in its treatment of the activists than Western democracies such as the US, Italy and Switzerland. It did, of course, have much fewer numbers to contend with, largely because of extremely strict security precautions (the US delegation, reduced in the wake of September 11 to 50 from about 300, was ensconced at the Ritz Carlton, which became a veritable armed camp, with logistical connections to warships in the Gulf in case evacuation was called for).
The tiny Gulf state’s ability to keep out potential “trouble-makers” no doubt played a role in its choice as a venue. But the protesters, too, have been preoccupied with more immediate tasks. Thousands of them congregated at a peace rally in London on November 18, for instance, where they lustily cheered speakers who linked the war in Afghanistan to the instruments for Western economic domination — such as the WTO, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
It is hardly startling that opponents of corporate power should also be riled by the war. After all, both ultimately serve the purpose of sustaining Western supremacy. It is open to question whether the Bretton Woods system, which engendered the IMF and the World Bank towards the end of the Second World War, was intended primarily as a mechanism empowering creditor nations with the means to police their debts. It’s worth remembering, though, that it was the result of a collaborative effort between Britain and the US, and the substantially fairer proposal tabled by John Maynard Keynes for an international clearing union was overruled by American insistence on the system the world continues to struggle with.
As George Monbiot recently put it in The Guardian, “If the men who had planned the Bretton Woods conference knew that in 2001 we would be arguing about how much aid we should give to poor nations, they would have packed up and gone home. The stated purpose of their meeting was to render generosity redundant.
“There is no point,” he goes on, “in tinkering with this system. It will destroy the lives of the poor until it is itself destroyed, and replaced with benign institutions of the kind that Keynes envisaged.”
Even those who believe that the existing institutions for international finance and commerce can be rendered fairer through reform would not be surprised to find the road beyond Doha signposted with “Slippery path — proceed with caution”. It could be some time before a sufficient number of travellers are able to develop the acuity of vision required to decipher the smaller print alongside: “Wrong way — go back and turn left”.
THE panel that has become the recognized arbiter of when recessions start and stop has declared that the U.S. economy has been in recession since March.
The administration seized on the pronouncement, saying it made it all the more urgent that Congress pass an acceptable stimulus bill before going home for Christmas. But in fact the declaration weakens the case for the kind of stimulus bill the administration wants.
The average recession since World War II has lasted 11 months.
If the National Bureau of Economic Research committee is right, this one has already lasted eight or nine. It could, of course, last many months longer, but it could also be over early next year. — The Washington Post