SINCE the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif dramatic fluctuations in the Taliban fortunes have taken everyone by surprise. Several explanation are being given for the Taliban’s flabbergasting retreat, more so their unceremonious exit from Kabul without even a token resistance to the invading forces. That it has spelled disaster for the ‘Jihadi camp’ in Pakistan is more than obvious.

The self-styled ruler in Kandahar has failed the Islamic warriors. More than a thousand volunteers from Pakistan were reported trapped in the first battle and the majority is feared dead. Nonetheless the diehard fanatics refuse to acknowledge it as a decisive defeat, pinning their hopes in a counter-attack by the Taliban which they believe is on the anvil. However, some defence analysts are also inclined to describe the volatile scenario as a ‘strategic retreat’ by the Taliban, rather than a total disarray in their ranks.

Although some ‘experts’ are claiming credit for predicting the turn of events in Afghanistan, the fact is that no one expected the Taliban regime to crumble like a house of cards, particularly in the wake of its apparent capability to withstand massive US bombing. The most intriguing aspect of the bizarre spectacle was the incredible pace at which things happened, prompting some observers to term it the ‘domino effect’, following the Taliban withdrawal from Mazar-i-Sharif.

The Taliban have since been on the run vacating one city after the other and surrendering more than half of the country to the opposition. Will they stop at some point to put up a fight was the question being asked. A plausible view suggested that they will choose their own turf for a battle and therefore dig themselves in around the Pashtoon majority area where they were assured of popular support. However, nothing of the sort seems to be happening as the Taliban leadership has also to reckon with revolts from within, apart from meeting the threat of liquidation from the Northern Alliance.

When Herat fell, it was reported that the tribal elders had brokered a deal for a peaceful transfer of power, first allowing the Taliban to withdraw from the city and then letting the warlord Ismail Khan to take over. A somewhat similar story was repeated in Jalalabad where the local Pashtoon commanders have secured control of the city from the Taliban. The Taliban are besieged in Kandahar amidst conflicting reports of infighting around the city. How long will they hold out in their power base is anybody’s guess but they are certainly in no position to stage a comeback in the evolving power scenario.

The theory of a strategic retreat is not likely to sell as it becomes more and more evident that the Taliban have suffered a rout much more serious than losing a few battles. Perhaps the only option they can now exercise is to leave the critics altogether, retreat to the mountains and prepare themselves for a long haul of guerilla warfare.

The Northern Alliance was told by the Americans to stop short of entering Kabul, while Islamabad pressed hard for declaring Kabul an open, demilitarized city. Whether Northern Alliance has had the insolence to defy the US bidding, or the Americans themselves have been guilty of double dealing, the Northern Alliance forces have virtually seized control of the capital city and Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani has arrived in Kabul proclaiming himself as the head of the new Afghan government.

There have also been reports that Pakistan is being sounded for a rapprochement with Rabbani. If the Americans do not urgently intervene to stop the Northern Alliance from using Kabul as their seat of government, the entire exercise of putting together a broad-based, multi-ethnic representative coalition under UN auspices will become irrelevant.

If recent history is any guide, the warring Afghan factions are not likely to accept any power-sharing arrangement once they are in control of the governmental apparatus. Rabbani was the villain of the piece’ in the breakdown of the 1992 accord when he refused to step down from the presidency after the expiry of his stipulated six month term and thus wrecked the process which would have paved the way for holding elections and framing a constitution.

The Americans would be guilty of a serious breach of trust if they let the Northern Alliance get away with installing itself as the legitimate successor to the Taliban regime and arrogate to itself the authority to convene negotiations for, what it may call, a broad-based government. Islamabad will have to take serious note of any such possibility and initiate whatever pre-emptive measures are needed to foil the design.

The seizure of Kabul by the Northern Alliance marks the beginning of a new phase of civil war in Afghanistan. No matter what it does to have a foothold in the capital city, or extend its writ to other parts of the country, its political authority will be narrow-based and its ability to forge alliances highly dubious. In any case the military successes being attributed to the Northern Alliance campaign, particularly in the West, is an overstated and one-sided account of what has actually happened. As a matter of fact, the fall of Taliban has facilitated the return of warlords on the power scene each one of whom has grabbed a fiefdom. The situation in Afghanistan is rapidly moving towards the same scenario which was witnessed following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the collapse of Najibullah regime. The looming power vacuum is indeed a recipe for disaster.

Even if one were to discount the Taliban factor who are yet a force to reckon with and could upset the applecart, there is no hope for peace or stability in Afghanistan. The world attention is now focused on the UN peace-keeping role, as the world body is expected to step in and take charge of brokering an intra-afghan accord for the establishment of a broad-based, multi-ethnic representative government in Afghanistan. The Security Council has unanimously approved the action plan, and special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi is on the job working out the logistics. Whether or not the UN intervention, has the capability to deliver is a question that is being debated. Meanwhile, its response to Afghan crises has been under fire for being late and slow. The apprehension is that the UN action may be a little too late to salvage the situation.

The Americans are not likely to commit their troops for the peace-keeping operation, while the participation of Pakistan, Iran and Russia have been ruled out as they have been categorized as interested parties. The proposal to set up an all-Muslim peace-keeping force for which countries like Turkey, Bangladesh and Indonesia were mentioned does not seem to have found favour with the coalition partners. Apart from its composition, several key issues related to the peace-keepers’ mandate and jurisdiction have yet to be finalized. But, above all, the task of cobbling together a sustainable coalition of forces acceptable to all the Afghan factions calls for a herculean effort not likely to produce quick results. Who will, in the intervening period, call the shots in Kabul is a crucial question.

The UN’s first task is to help set up a provisional government in Kabul which can take over the administration from the Northern Alliance and fill the power vacuum till such time a comprehensive accord on a constitutional framework is reached among the Afghan factions. On the face of it, the odds are against a durable settlement. A broad-based power-sharing arrangement, if it is put in place, will always suffer from indecision and inaction, more so if there is no core party to give the coalition a sense of direction, or the squabbling partners hold to ransom the government’s authority.

Afghanistan being a tribal society does not have the tradition of a strong central authority operating from Kabul, not even from the days of absolute monarchy. But the way the things are moving, Afghanistan seems to be heading for a state of political fragmentation to which the central authority in Kabul will have a marginal relevance.

THE collapse of the Taliban has opened up a slew of opportunities for the country’s mainstream, moderate and liberal political forces to reclaim the ground they had been steadily losing to the extremist elements.

The opportunity has presented itself now as the build-up of support for the Taliban in Pakistan has lost steam. The Taliban’s stunning retreat has left their supporters in a state of shock and disbelief.

Only a few weeks ago, some religious parties whose leaders had begun to capitalize on the turbulence in Afghanistan had assumed that by giving the whole controversy a religious twist they would dominate the political scenee. It is this fact, more than anything else, which explains the strong protest push that the Jamaat-i-Islami attempted against General Pervez Musharraf. After Maulana Fazlur Rehman was put under house-arrest the Jamaat saw an open political field, with no one else vying for space.

Up to a point the religious parties did succeed in isolating the mainstream political parties. The sight was indeed bizarre of one of the most avowed supporters of secular democracy, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, also heading the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy sitting comfortably next to Maulana Samiul Haq of the Afghan Defence Council, whose members have no time for western democracy. But more than that it depicted the plight of the mainstream political parties. Instead of dictating the political agenda they were trying to hook up with the religious parties in order to remain politically relevant.

The Nawaz Sharif Muslim League backed the protest campaign of the religious parties out of animosity against the Musharraf government. However some of the local leaders from pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan People’s Party, too were seen in some of these rallies in an effort to stay afloat politically. All this was all happening because most in the political realm calculated that the mood of the public was favourable to rightwing sentiments.

The collapse of the Talibaan however has knocked the bottom out of this calculation. The drubbing the Taliban have got in the battle-field has dampened the high spirits of the rel