SINCE the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif dramatic fluctuations in the Taliban fortunes have taken everyone by surprise. Several explanation are being given for the Taliban’s flabbergasting retreat, more so their unceremonious exit from Kabul without even a token resistance to the invading forces. That it has spelled disaster for the ‘Jihadi camp’ in Pakistan is more than obvious.

The self-styled ruler in Kandahar has failed the Islamic warriors. More than a thousand volunteers from Pakistan were reported trapped in the first battle and the majority is feared dead. Nonetheless the diehard fanatics refuse to acknowledge it as a decisive defeat, pinning their hopes in a counter-attack by the Taliban which they believe is on the anvil. However, some defence analysts are also inclined to describe the volatile scenario as a ‘strategic retreat’ by the Taliban, rather than a total disarray in their ranks.

Although some ‘experts’ are claiming credit for predicting the turn of events in Afghanistan, the fact is that no one expected the Taliban regime to crumble like a house of cards, particularly in the wake of its apparent capability to withstand massive US bombing. The most intriguing aspect of the bizarre spectacle was the incredible pace at which things happened, prompting some observers to term it the ‘domino effect’, following the Taliban withdrawal from Mazar-i-Sharif.

The Taliban have since been on the run vacating one city after the other and surrendering more than half of the country to the opposition. Will they stop at some point to put up a fight was the question being asked. A plausible view suggested that they will choose their own turf for a battle and therefore dig themselves in around the Pashtoon majority area where they were assured of popular support. However, nothing of the sort seems to be happening as the Taliban leadership has also to reckon with revolts from within, apart from meeting the threat of liquidation from the Northern Alliance.

When Herat fell, it was reported that the tribal elders had brokered a deal for a peaceful transfer of power, first allowing the Taliban to withdraw from the city and then letting the warlord Ismail Khan to take over. A somewhat similar story was repeated in Jalalabad where the local Pashtoon commanders have secured control of the city from the Taliban. The Taliban are besieged in Kandahar amidst conflicting reports of infighting around the city. How long will they hold out in their power base is anybody’s guess but they are certainly in no position to stage a comeback in the evolving power scenario.

The theory of a strategic retreat is not likely to sell as it becomes more and more evident that the Taliban have suffered a rout much more serious than losing a few battles. Perhaps the only option they can now exercise is to leave the critics altogether, retreat to the mountains and prepare themselves for a long haul of guerilla warfare.

The Northern Alliance was told by the Americans to stop short of entering Kabul, while Islamabad pressed hard for declaring Kabul an open, demilitarized city. Whether Northern Alliance has had the insolence to defy the US bidding, or the Americans themselves have been guilty of double dealing, the Northern Alliance forces have virtually seized control of the capital city and Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani has arrived in Kabul proclaiming himself as the head of the new Afghan government.

There have also been reports that Pakistan is being sounded for a rapprochement with Rabbani. If the Americans do not urgently intervene to stop the Northern Alliance from using Kabul as their seat of government, the entire exercise of putting together a broad-based, multi-ethnic representative coalition under UN auspices will become irrelevant.

If recent history is any guide, the warring Afghan factions are not likely to accept any power-sharing arrangement once they are in control of the governmental apparatus. Rabbani was the villain of the piece’ in the breakdown of the 1992 accord when he refused to step down from the presidency after the expiry of his stipulated six month term and thus wrecked the process which would have paved the way for holding elections and framing a constitution.

The Americans would be guilty of a serious breach of trust if they let the Northern Alliance get away with installing itself as the legitimate successor to the Taliban regime and arrogate to itself the authority to convene negotiations for, what it may call, a broad-based government. Islamabad will have to take serious note of any such possibility and initiate whatever pre-emptive measures are needed to foil the design.

The seizure of Kabul by the Northern Alliance marks the beginning of a new phase of civil war in Afghanistan. No matter what it does to have a foothold in the capital city, or extend its writ to other parts of the country, its political authority will be narrow-based and its ability to forge alliances highly dubious. In any case the military successes being attributed to the Northern Alliance campaign, particularly in the West, is an overstated and one-sided account of what has actually happened. As a matter of fact, the fall of Taliban has facilitated the return of warlords on the power scene each one of whom has grabbed a fiefdom. The situation in Afghanistan is rapidly moving towards the same scenario which was witnessed following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the collapse of Najibullah regime. The looming power vacuum is indeed a recipe for disaster.

Even if one were to discount the Taliban factor who are yet a force to reckon with and could upset the applecart, there is no hope for peace or stability in Afghanistan. The world attention is now focused on the UN peace-keeping role, as the world body is expected to step in and take charge of brokering an intra-afghan accord for the establishment of a broad-based, multi-ethnic representative government in Afghanistan. The Security Council has unanimously approved the action plan, and special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi is on the job working out the logistics. Whether or not the UN intervention, has the capability to deliver is a question that is being debated. Meanwhile, its response to Afghan crises has been under fire for being late and slow. The apprehension is that the UN action may be a little too late to salvage the situation.

The Americans are not likely to commit their troops for the peace-keeping operation, while the participation of Pakistan, Iran and Russia have been ruled out as they have been categorized as interested parties. The proposal to set up an all-Muslim peace-keeping force for which countries like Turkey, Bangladesh and Indonesia were mentioned does not seem to have found favour with the coalition partners. Apart from its composition, several key issues related to the peace-keepers’ mandate and jurisdiction have yet to be finalized. But, above all, the task of cobbling together a sustainable coalition of forces acceptable to all the Afghan factions calls for a herculean effort not likely to produce quick results. Who will, in the intervening period, call the shots in Kabul is a crucial question.

The UN’s first task is to help set up a provisional government in Kabul which can take over the administration from the Northern Alliance and fill the power vacuum till such time a comprehensive accord on a constitutional framework is reached among the Afghan factions. On the face of it, the odds are against a durable settlement. A broad-based power-sharing arrangement, if it is put in place, will always suffer from indecision and inaction, more so if there is no core party to give the coalition a sense of direction, or the squabbling partners hold to ransom the government’s authority.

Afghanistan being a tribal society does not have the tradition of a strong central authority operating from Kabul, not even from the days of absolute monarchy. But the way the things are moving, Afghanistan seems to be heading for a state of political fragmentation to which the central authority in Kabul will have a marginal relevance.

THE collapse of the Taliban has opened up a slew of opportunities for the country’s mainstream, moderate and liberal political forces to reclaim the ground they had been steadily losing to the extremist elements.

The opportunity has presented itself now as the build-up of support for the Taliban in Pakistan has lost steam. The Taliban’s stunning retreat has left their supporters in a state of shock and disbelief.

Only a few weeks ago, some religious parties whose leaders had begun to capitalize on the turbulence in Afghanistan had assumed that by giving the whole controversy a religious twist they would dominate the political scenee. It is this fact, more than anything else, which explains the strong protest push that the Jamaat-i-Islami attempted against General Pervez Musharraf. After Maulana Fazlur Rehman was put under house-arrest the Jamaat saw an open political field, with no one else vying for space.

Up to a point the religious parties did succeed in isolating the mainstream political parties. The sight was indeed bizarre of one of the most avowed supporters of secular democracy, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, also heading the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy sitting comfortably next to Maulana Samiul Haq of the Afghan Defence Council, whose members have no time for western democracy. But more than that it depicted the plight of the mainstream political parties. Instead of dictating the political agenda they were trying to hook up with the religious parties in order to remain politically relevant.

The Nawaz Sharif Muslim League backed the protest campaign of the religious parties out of animosity against the Musharraf government. However some of the local leaders from pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan People’s Party, too were seen in some of these rallies in an effort to stay afloat politically. All this was all happening because most in the political realm calculated that the mood of the public was favourable to rightwing sentiments.

The collapse of the Talibaan however has knocked the bottom out of this calculation. The drubbing the Taliban have got in the battle-field has dampened the high spirits of the religious right. For years most of them had held the Taliban as a model militia, who had divine mandate to cleanse the society of all vices and to promote real virtue.

Even some of the most accomplished persons of Pakistan had started projecting the Taliban-led Afghanistan as a near-equivalent of an ideal Islamic state. For instance, much of the work that the welfare organization of Sultan Bashiruddin Mehmood, the decorated scientist of the Pakistan Energy Commission, did in Afghanistan was based on the belief that Afghanistan under the Taliban, if assisted properly, could become a fortress of Islam. This perpetuated the myth of the Taliban as some sort of super beings, and their style of government as a perfect system to be replicated, eventually, also in Pakistan.

This myth-making about the Taliban continued right up to their fall, and even days after the great rout. When the military campaign started, and, for weeks, in spite of the bombings Taliban seem to be holding on to Kabul there was incessant propaganda about their fighting abilities and about their mighty resources. They were projected as the winning side. Even their most complete defeat was dubbed as a “strategic retreat”, crediting them with a fighting genius that comes only from decades of professional training and in-depth knowledge of modern warfare.

These myths survived, and acquired credence only because the Taliban were in power. Their physical control of Afghanistan made all the folklore and legends about them looked true.

Now the reality is surfacing. The sad spectacle of the cities deserted by the Taliban in a trail of death and destruction is hardly the sight of the promised land Afghanistan was supposed to be under the Taliban.

All of this has levelled the political playing field in Pakistan. With the hub of the extremist ideology now gone, and the votaries of the Taliban faith rendered rudderless, the mainstream political parties can stage a comeback and re-float moderate political sentiment in the country.

These parties have been on the margin for years, and have been pandering to the interests of the extremists in order to win votes. Now they have an opportunity to go back to their original roots. The immediate fear of the ‘Talibanization’ of Pakistan now looks a bit distant because of the disappearance of the Taliban hold in Afghanistan. Now political expediency does not have to define the preferences of the politicians.

Further facilitating this return to the moderate roots of national politics is a totally recast military establishment in Pakistan. The events subsequent to the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington have forced Pakistan’s military establishment to look afresh at the political needs of the times.

The military establishment had discovered that courting the religious right as a political option for Pakistan in the future is nothing less than courting an unmitigated disaster. The new military leadership and the moderate political parties are natural allies in the collective struggle to refashion Pakistan’s political base. The Taliban experience in Afghanistan, and the mess they have left behind, is clear pointer to the neighbouring Pakistan towards the political path it needs to take.

Most of Pakistan’s political parties are tainted with charges of corruption and are infested with incompetent leaders. Their public image is far from complimentary. For them to stage a political comeback and create a moderate political climate easing extremist tendencies, they will have to rediscover themselves and purge their ranks of corrupt elements. The military establishment too will have to show flexibility in dealing with mainstream political parties. The requirements of accountability must not be allowed to kill the spirit of accommodation.

THE prolonged military operation in Afghanistan is likely to add several dimensions to the threat faced by Pakistan. In this respect, General Musharraf was not wrong when he equated the present situation with that of 1971.

In fact, the situation is graver than what the country encountered in 1965 and 1971 put together. The new threats would be in the form of an increase in Pakistan’s internal security problems, its long-term association with China and the nuclear programme.

Interestingly, today General Pervez Musharraf is making all out efforts to keep the country’s security intact and striving to balance a highly unbalanced situation. Serious pressures are being exerted on Pakistan from both internal and external sources. Internally, certain elements in the civil society appear to be threatening the country. One could argue that these elements were created by the establishment itself, but in fact the street demonstrations by a certain category of people are projecting abroad a negative image of Pakistan. The country is rapidly being equated with Afghanistan.

No matter what statements are made by the Bush administration regarding Islamabad’s commitment to American military operations, the truth is that the images relayed out of Pakistan by the international media present a picture of a highly volatile society consisting only of ‘mullahs’ out to challenge America’s power. Added to this are stories of Christians being killed or members of the nuclear bureaucracy aiding the Taliban.

At present, three broad assumptions are being made about Pakistan: (a) the success of American military operations depend upon General Musharraf’s survival in Islamabad who is deemed as the only friend that Washington has in the country, (b) policy makers, media and people are getting extremely sceptical of the Pakistani General’s prospects of political survival and (c) Pakistan is being increasingly projected as a state on the verge of collapse.

Given such projection, it was not surprising when majority of American participants in a recently held conference organized by the primary research institute of the US Navy Pacific Command voiced their apprehension about the stability of Pervez Musharraf’s government. Of course, such fears put dampers on the future of American assistance to Islamabad, especially military aid. Washington does not want to find itself in a situation like it did in Somalia or Sudan where friendly regimes had crumbled taking down millions of dollars of American investment with them.

Unfortunately, there is a lobby in the US that is trying hard to project Pakistan as a failed state. It would be dangerous to disregard its ability to create a negative image. What goes without saying is that the more Islamabad is projected in a negative light the more would be the American inclination to strengthen its forces in South Asia in order to fight any unfriendly element that might replace Musharraf‘s government. However, the longer the US forces stay in Afghanistan, more dangerous it would become for Pakistan internally and externally.

So far, there are no signs of the elimination of bin Laden, Mullah Omar or the hard-line Taliban. In many ways, the situation is similar to what had happened in Somalia where the US forces had firmly believed in their ability to win and came out disillusioned. The only difference between Somalia and Afghanistan is that this time it is directly the American military power which is being challenged by the Taliban and it is believed in the US that the situation calls for an immediate and forceful response.

American policy makers are of the view that they would continue their war as long as it takes them to find bin Laden. It should be clear that a lot, including President Bush’s political survival, depends on American force’s ability to capture bin Laden and install an alternative political set-up in Kabul. Already, there is talk of rebuilding Afghanistan that could take years to achieve. But it also means that the US may prolong its stay in Afghanistan in some form beyond the imagination of the analysts in Pakistan.

Indubitably, this recipe would be extremely costly for Islamabad. For one, it would lead to further problems of internal insecurity and might create tensions with friendly China. Internally, one can already feel tremors of internal irritation and unrest owing to precarious economic conditions. The government may get some funds for survival, but the economy will continue to remain under deep clouds because of the general instability caused by the war. It would be difficult to conceive a scenario where under the present circumstances the international private sector would invest and establish huge projects in Pakistan. This situation is likely to continue for a few years. More economic insecurity would lead to more crime, intolerance and extremism. In short, a prolonged stay and the continuation of war would prove extremely counterproductive for American objectives and Pakistan’s security.

Geopolitically, America’s prolonged stay might add to China‘s concerns. Beijing would certainly not like the US to establish bases in South or Central Asia. A US base in Uzbekistan, for instance, would not be in China’s strategic interests.

In any case, the Chinese leadership would be extremely sceptical of American presence in Pakistan even if it is for a short period. Beijing would not want the US to get hold of information regarding Pakistan’s nuclear programme that may lead to information regarding China’s own nuclear programme and the extent of help provided by Beijing to Islamabad. Convincing Washington to withdraw its forces without achieving its objectives is something that General Musharraf does not seem to be in a position to do. In this case, there could be a bickering within Pakistan’s establishment between those keen to support China and those who are in favour of the US. This would be a most unfortunate development making Pakistan even more suspicious in the eyes of the West.

Referring to domestic political turmoil, a negative image of Pakistan would increase the threats to Pakistan’s nuclear programme. At this juncture, the threat is not imminent, but this is likely to increase as political turbulence in Pakistan and especially its key establishment intensifies. Currently, there is strong evidence of an anti-Pakistan nuclear programme lobby developing in America. The people that subscribe to this idea can be found in the US Department of Defence, think tanks and community of defence contractors. The general idea is that it would be unsafe to allow nuclear weapons to remain in a country that could fail at any time without notice.

According to recently published reports, a special team is being prepared in the US to take out Islamabad’s nuclear programme in case of any emergency. The issue is not that any one doubts the fact that the nuclear assets are strictly controlled by the military, but the fear is that some elements within it might try to get control of nuclear weapons and command and control. Unfortunately, there is no effective lobby in the US to convince the Americans about the stability of the Musharraf government or the safety of these weapons.

There is no one to strongly present Pakistan‘s case in Washington . What is even more unfortunate is that the image of a group of fundamentalist officers was drawn by Pakistan’s establishment itself. It had used such arguments to draw American support for the present regime not too long ago. However, this was done at a time when September 11 had not happened. The top leadership in Pakistan did not realize at that time the mistake it was making. The earlier impressions provided by Islamabad added with violent and extremist images of demonstrations flashed by international media are gradually presenting a highly problematic picture of Pakistan that cannot be trusted to keep secure its arsenal of nuclear weapons.

There is a possibility that India might be encouraged covertly to damage Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Such an action would create more confusion, anger and chaos in Pakistan that would not serve America‘s long-term interests. What must not be doubted is that this would motivate a larger number of people to target Americans or any westerner. While the demonstrators in Pakistan must realize what they are risking by protesting in the streets, Washington must take into account the reality that the security of Islamabad’s strategic interests is vital for peace and harmony in the region.

THE World Bank continues to pinpoint the weaknesses in Pakistan’s economy, social system and bureaucratic order, and underscore the urgency for early remedies. Its officials say such remedial action is imperative not only to qualify for larger external assistance but also to make the best use of that and accelerate the pace of its sluggish economic growth.

Among its senior officials who know Pakistan best is Ms Mieko Nishimzu, vice president, who has negotiated several aid packages over the years. When she met President Pervez Musharraf last week she was restrained in her criticism of Pakistan’s economic policies and practices and appreciative of its success with some reforms, particularly in the banking sector. But when she met the Press day earlier she was very candid in her views on the weaknesses of our economy and forthright in voicing them.

She made it clear that although Pakistan had suffered substantially following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US and the Afghan war, the earlier World Bank commitment of 600 million dollars for the current financial year would not be increased. The hundred million dollars of that has already been distributed under the concessional IDA lending. Pakistan has now to show “strong performance” to qualify for the balance of 300 million dollars due before the end of the financial year.

The forthright Japanese lady, however, assured Pakistan that further assistance would be coming forth through the three-year Country Assistance Strategy and more funds would be provided under the Poverty Reduction Support Credit.

She urged the government to improve governance and remove corruption in order to lessen the negative impact of the September 11 events, which she conceded was of “substantial magnitude.”

She projected economic growth this year would be far below the targeted 4 per cent, and would, in fact, be less than 3 per cent. If it is around 2.6 per cent that would be on the same low level as last year instead of the target of 5 per cent. As a result of such low growth the revenue collection in the first four months of this financial year is 2.16 per cent lower than in the same period last year, and six per cent below the targeted revenues for the same period this year.

That could be made up through the 600 million dollar grant from the US for budgetary support as a part of the over billion dollar package. The package also includes 73 million dollars for border security, 300 million dollar for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and 17.4 million dollars in refugee assistance.

The amount of assistance to be received through the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), a three-year programme, appears to be uncertain. Earlier it appeared the amount would be between 2 to 2.5 billion dollars. US officials recently raised the hope it could be 3 billion dollars. The figure then slipped to two billion dollars. The IMF managing director Horst Kohler last week spoke of giving larger assistance. Now the amount seems to be coming down to 1.5 billion dollars — just about 100 per cent of Pakistan’s IMF quota.

Meanwhile the UN Development Programme has doubled its development assistance for Pakistan to 168 million dollars. This aid is to be in the form of grant and will be used for various projects with top priority for poverty reduction. Compared to this large figure, the UNDP grant for Pakistan for the last five years was only 84 million dollars. A good part of this aid will also go to the NGOs doing excellent community work.

Even as more aid is coming Ms Nishimizu calls for expenditure cuts and more tightening of the belt. But there should be no reduction in social spending, she has stressed.

She focused on the Central Board or Revenue as the villain of the piece, or as the spring board of many of our economic problems and financial constraints. She holds “Pakistan is presently a riskier place for foreign investment.” She says that the government projects foreign direct investment of 2.4 billion dollars in 2002-2004 but has a target of 600 million for the current year and actually expects 200 million dollars.

She says there is no investment because of the “harassment factor” and the government must make sure the tax collectors did not harass and create problems for the investors and businessmen. “One of the main reasons for low investment is that the CBR suppressed the investors and tax payers.”

She also stressed that without making the CBR an efficient organization there was no hope to have increased funds for poverty reduction, education and health. “If further economic growth is required, there has to be fundamental improvements in the CBR and it will have to be made a modern tax service agency” she says.

“I cannot imagine Pakistan having a bright future without reforms in the CBR. There are not many options for Pakistan to improve its economy” she says. She also admitted bringing about any change in the CBR, police, audit and account offices was a tough task. But changes she demands, beginning with the CBR.

Two days after she spoke to the press and a day after she met the President the government did announce about significant reforms in the CBR which finance minister Shaukat Aziz hoped would bring about “a sea change in the taxation system.” Will they? we have to wait for three years when the total reforms would be completed to know the final answer.

Ms Mieko wanted the package of reforms suggested by the Task Force headed by Shahid Husain, former vice-president of the World Bank, to be implemented. The CBR reforms announced now are based on the recommendations of that Task Force, says Shaukat Aziz, but only a part of the reforms suggested have to be carried out now. The CBR has been given autonomy in the areas of recruitment, spending and payment of compensation for efficient performance.

The chairman CBR will now have all budgetary controls and be entitled to carve out his own administrative policy including induction of new staff from the public and enhanced salaries. “But the necessary checks and balances would remain to ensure smooth functioning of the CBR,” says the finance minister.

He says everything in the CBR is being redesigned. The changes would be painful but are aimed at increasing the revenues and removing corruption.

A separate tax office is to be set up in Karachi which will deal with the top 150 tax-payers who pay Rs 100 billion annually. Chairman of CBR Riaz Malik says the status quo will be completely revamped to make it a tax payer friendly organization. And the next six months will be crucial as the new tax system is to take shape then.

Mr Malik says the universal self-assessment scheme would be encouraged. The real purpose is to make “the whole system faceless” through the use of information technology.

The CBR may be able to reduce the need for contacts between the tax payers and the taxation officers. That has already taken place to an extent; but instead of tax-payers meeting the taxation officers the tax consultants or tax advisers now met the taxation officers. In fact, the income declarations filed by many of the tax payers, besides the salaried class, are drafted by the tax consultants as that has been made too complex and the average small tax payers feel helpless without such expert assistance.

In fact the new scandal is senior taxation officers acting as consultants to the tax consultant and helping the tax-payers file income statement which are heavily doctored on their advance advice. The CBR is now to take action against some of these colluding taxation officials.

There appears to be hundreds of such erring officials and the CBR is to take stringent action against them which could include dismissals. But between what the CBR promises in this regard and what it finally does there is a vast gap. When officials are sacked there is the usual complaint that innocent or the less corrupt officials had been sacked, while the more corrupt or the big fish had been saved.

Of course, the revenues collected by the CBR can be increased, by 40 to 50 per cent, according to Shahid Husain, that can happen if all the money collected in the name of tax goes into the treasury and not only a part of that, as has been happening now. Will the faceless system to be evolved with the help of IT really help in that?