THE year 2001 has seen a new and far-reaching change in the district administrative and local bodies systems in Pakistan. Significantly enough, this new process which has been described as a devolution process has been conceived, prepared, introduced and put in place by the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) which is an important extension of the Chief Executive’s secretariat. Consequently, there were high hopes among a lot of people that major improvements would immediately follow from the introduction and functioning of the devolution system.

It was assumed at the time of the formulation of the devolution plan that the NRB (which took nearly two years devising the plan) must have looked into each and every detail and had anticipated and planned for all eventualities that the new system was likely to be confronted with. But first reports about the functioning and the performance of the new system that have appeared in the national press have been far from complimentary. This is indeed a far cry from all the predictions and expectations that the devolution process would straightaway produce the panacea for most of the ills that afflict our society.

There are reports of not enough coordination and understanding existing between the three essential functionaries: the District Nazim(DN), the District Coordination Officer(DCO) and the relevant police officers(DIG or SSP as the case may be). Small issues have unnecessarily been allowed to occupy the centre of attention — issues such as who is going to get what sort of transport facility, what sort of house to live in and what sort of additional frills and perks. These are matters that are wholly unrelated to public welfare and should not have been treated as more than miscellaneous matters understandable at the starting point of any new system. At the same time, it needs to be said that had these prenatal problems merely been limited to the turf battles for more and better perks, it would not have been such a serious matter.

But the situation is a lot more serious because the designers of the devolution programme never really took the trouble of trying out simulation exercises at lab level or local levels in respect of the changes that they tried to introduce in one go for the entire country. If one may say so, they made the serious mistake of going headlong into an ocean full of sharks without taking the trouble of testing the waters before taking the plunge.

The plunge having been taken, there is obviously no going back as such on the devolution process at least for this government which has a very heavy stake in it in terms of public credibility, rising expectations of the electorate/taxpayers and, of course, institutional development. No one in his right mind can expect this government to suddenly say that the devolution scheme was all wrong and that it has consequently decided to do an about-turn on it. But surely there is need for course corrections. No humanly devised system can ever be perfect and it takes some long-haul to arrive at a given point of poise and balance and the same might very much be the case with the current devolution programme.

The weaknesses in the existing devolution system are several and they need to be addressed post-haste if it is to survive and gather the needed momentum. Notwithstanding the initial loss of momentum, things can still be corrected if the NRB opens itself wide enough to considering course corrections and refrains from the temptation of believing that its plan is the last word on the subject of devolution. Most of the District Nazims are by and large suffering from a lack of confidence which emanates from their virtually having had no experience of government. This, coupled with the overall erosion of the erstwhile position of the DCO (the former DC) who was to act as the coordinator, has compounded and complicated matters.

Most of the DCOs hail either from the District Management Group (DMG) or from the Provincial Civil Service (PCS). In the very early stages of its conception and before its launching, it was widely rumoured that the posts of DCOs would be open to officers from all services. But the federal and provincial governments in their wisdom decided to utilize the services of DMG and PCS officers in view of their experience in district management. This was overall a good decision. But the government will now have to seriously consider making some rectifications in the devolution scheme if it wants it to strike roots.

First and foremost, the federal and provincial governments will have to make it crystal clear to all and sundry that there will be a system of collective responsibility for whatever goes on in the districts in respect of all key matters. The District Nazim-in-Council will have to carry with him not only a majority of the elected councillors but also the DCO and the DIG/SP. In the pre-devolution days this was an accepted principle in an informal sort of way for the then district triumvirate — the District Magistrate, the SP and the District and Sessions Judge — to function, and it functioned very well indeed during the British presence in the subcontinent.

Secondly, the DCO — if he has to be of any use to the Nazim, to the federal and provincial governments as well as to the functioning of the machinery of the district government — he will have to be re-given an effective role in the law and order administration of the district. All power to the police is not going to work for the simple reason that this has resulted in a shift of the magisterial and quasi-judicial work relating to the maintenance of law and order to the lower judiciary which is really not designed to handle this sort of work.

This would in essence mean the need for a return to the 1996 formula of the separation of the judiciary from the executive as was laid down and enunciated by the Supreme Court presided over by Justice Sajjad Ali Shah and which was implemented that year by the federal and provincial governments.

Thirdly, all this hype about police reform of the sort that is prevalent in Japan needs to be called off. The notion about law and order commissions at several levels is a paper scheme that is not going to stand the test of the day- to-day rigours of crisis management. All that these commissions will provide is a few more jobs for various functionaries and make way for unelected politicians who would be vying for public importance at the cost of the District Nazims without contributing to any real advances in devolution.

Fourthly, the services as recruited by the five Public Service Commissions in the country must be made to adhere to the original terms and conditions under which they were recruited and related to their respective job descriptions. There should be no abrupt changes in career patterns in mid-life so that there is effective stability in career prospects as originally offered to young men and women at the start of their careers. That would indeed be the surest way of eliminating politicization of the services. The experience of the 1970s when the controversial lateral entry scheme was introduced should be kept in mind in order to preserve the functional purity of the services.

Fifthly, it does not behove well for any government to have a lopsided manning of the NRB which ought to inspire confidence in all the services across the board. Needless to say there is a serious contradiction today between the recruitment policies of the government and its promotion policies. These need to be straightened out and the sooner this is done the better. In recent times, we have seen far too many ‘hop-step and jumpers’ getting into jobs for which they were not trained, and in the process proposing policies for augmenting their otherwise marginal share in the scheme of things.

If the devolution process is to prove its worth, it will have to show a great deal of flexibility and adaptability on its onward journey in the service of the people of this country. It will definitely have to be dynamic as well as resilient. Unfortunately, the NRB in its early take-off period carried with it too much of extra baggage consisting of a large number of novices and pre-opinionated consultants who were probably not best suited to advising the federal and provincial governments on so far-reaching and sensitive a programme as the devolution plan.

In the current disturbed conditions as a consequence of the Afghanistan crisis, the situation offers the government both a challenge and an opportunity of adjusting the devolution plan to the exigencies of national requirements of peace and tranquillity in our region which is going to be turbulent for God knows how long. Essentially the devolution plan is an attempt at doing a productive marriage between the erstwhile general administration units and the local bodies; and for this marriage to be a successful one, there will have to be an evolution towards devolution in which pragmatism and frequent critiques followed by improvements and adjustments must not be precluded at any stage.

THE 21st century went to war against the 11th Century in Afghanistan last week. The 11th century won.

US warplanes cluster-bombed the usual natives, but the intensive air attacks failed to dislodge Taliban tribal warriors from positions north of Kabul.

Osama bin Laden was not found. Hundreds of Afghan civilians were killed by off-target American bombs. The Red Cross in Kabul was hit for a second time. US aircraft attempted to assassinate Mulla Omar, Taliban’s leader, but failed and killed his young son and two brothers. A major, 100-man US commando raid was a failure. Taliban very likely shot down a US helicopter.

Mass defections from Taliban predicted by Washington’s ‘experts, didn’t happen. Afghans flocked to join Taliban. Thousands of Pahtun tribesmen from Pakistan crossed into Afghanistan over the fabled Malakand Pass to fight the American invaders.

In this same region during the early 20th century, British colonial troops battled two notorious Islamic devils, the Osama bin Ladens of their day: the ferocious but elusive Fakir of Ipi, and that scourge of Victorian imperialism, the ‘Mad Mullah,’ who led 20,000 wild Pashtun holy warriors down the Malakand to drive the infidel ‘farangi’ from Peshawar and the lands of Islam. Peshawar was only saved by British warplanes and artillery.

America’s new Afghan allies, the Northern Alliance, a motley, Russian-created force of former communists, opium dealers, bandits, and unwarlike tribesmen, struck ferocious poses for gullible western TV teams, but failed to advance an inch. Meanwhile, the US bombing of Afghanistan’s main cities created many thousands more refugees at a time when four million Afghans are starving.

Not exactly a proud week for American arms. Operation Ultimate Hubris was off to a poor start.

At the Pentagon, spokesman Rear Admiral John Stufflebeem admitted with exasperation that Taliban “are proving to be tough warriors.” Arrogance and ignorance are a deadly combination. Unfortunately, they are often hallmarks of US foreign policy. The Pentagon brass and President George Bush should have read a book about Afghanistan before launching a war against a fierce nation about which few in Washington know anything.

Blinded by rage and the need to avenge the frightful crimes committed on September 11, the US charged into Afghanistan with no plan of action, and no exit strategy. Washington has every right to bring terrorists to justice through police and intelligence operations. But not to launch a general war against Afghans who had nothing to do with attacks on America.

Who will replace Taliban? The Northern Alliance’s Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras are feuding. When Tajik forces last ruled Kabul, they battled Uzbeks and Pashtuns, killed tens of thousands of civilians, and left the city in ruins. The late Tajik warlord, dashing Ahmad Masoud, assassinated on Sept. 9, was fawned on by the western media and hailed as ‘the lion of Panjsher.’ If he was the Lion of Panjsher, then I’m the Lion of Kabul. Masoud was hated by most non-Tajik Afghans as a traitor and long-time collaborator with the Soviets, Russians, and KGB. I recall vividly when he abandoned the jihad and went over to the Soviets.

The Uzbek leader, Rashid Dostum, a former communist warlord, is a blood-thirsty criminal, mass murderer, and Washington’s new best friend. Dostum unleashed his feared Uzbek-Mongol ‘jawzjani’ militia against Kabul in an orgy of slaughter, pillage and mass rape.

Washington’s main Pashtun ally, Abdul Haq, was captured by Taliban last week and promptly executed.

To end the rapine and chaos, Pakistani intelligence helped create a force of religious seminarians, or Talibs, many of them orphans left from the struggle against Soviet occupation that killed 1.5 million Afghans. Taliban defeated the Northern Alliance and brought order — albeit a harsh, medieval order, to Afghanistan — but a traditional tribal order no different from the rest of Afghanistan, and many parts of Iran, Pakistan, and rural India.

Taliban will probably be driven from Kabul. But Taliban represents Pashtuns, half the nation’s population. The Talibs vow to fight from the mountains, and I certainly believe them. Who will keep a pro-US, pro-Russian regime in power in Kabul? American troops will likely be required. How will the American garrison be supplied? Just like the imperial British invaders, who were twice defeated by the Afghans, US forces will have to rely on vulnerable land supply lines at great distances from their depots that cross narrow mountain passes.

The other alternative, air supply of an American garrison in Kabul, is a recipe for a Dienbienphu-like disaster. The Soviet Red Army tried everything from carpet bombing to poison gas and biological warfare to break the Afghans, but failed. Soviet garrisons were isolated and chewed up, one by one. I was in the field with Pashtun warriors who were so poor they could not afford shoes. These Mujahideen walked barefoot ten miles through deep mountain snow with 100 lbs of mortar shells on their backs, fired them at a Soviet base, and trekked back under air attack. I suggest the good Adm. Stuffelbeam go read Kipling’s warning to British troops trying to fight their way through ferocious Afridi tribesmen guarding the Khyber Pass: “Save your last bullet for yourself.”

As it becomes increasingly evident the Sept 11 attacks were planned in Egypt and Germany, and delivered by Saudis, America’s laying of fire and sword on Afghanistan makes less and less sense. The US should declare victory and decamp from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia before it gets stuck in an aimless, endless war. —Copyright Eric S. Margolis 2001

MOHAMMAD Khalid Akhtar I have met only once. And that was way back in 1968 during a fleeting visit he paid one afternoon to the reporters’ room of the old ‘Pakistan Times’ in Lahore. At the time, I hadn’t read anything by him, not even his first novel ‘Bees sau Gyara’.

One can only hope he does not see this because I read the book for the first time last month after it arrived all the way from Karachi, airmailed at great cost by none other than the author and his friend and publisher Ajmal Kamal. ‘Bees sau Gyara’ was first published in 1950 in Lahore, a full fifty-one years ago. Isn’t time frightening when you consider that fifty-one years is half a century, plus one!

The book was reprinted in 1999 and is dedicated to Fahmida Riaz because, according to MKA — which is shorthand for Muhammad Khalid Akhtar — “apart from being a delightful poet and storyteller, she is also an affectionate friend with whom the author shares a love of art and a sense of judgment.” MKA’s crush is not new because when Fahmida Riaz first read the novel, she was just sixteen.

So taken was she with this political fantasy that she wrote to MKA and declared that it was her favourite book and she had read it several times. “And this about a book which I wrote as a young man, with ease and without effort, in a dark and dingy basement of Kharadar, Karachi,” writes MAK, adding, “So I give back this book to my friend who likes it, and because it really is hers, not mine. I am just the copyist.” And there in the last line, in just five words, you have all of Mohammad Khalid Akhtar.

MKA writes to me in 1997, “I was 78, this 23rd January, the year of Grace 1997. Wish to see the dawn of the coming Millennium and then call it a day.” Well, someone up there who obviously likes him brought that particular wish to fulfilment.

We should all feel better for the fact that MKA is very much here - though not in his native Bahawalpur but Karachi - and come 23rd January, the year of Grace 2002, he will be 82 years old, because if my sums are right, that is what being born in 1920 adds up to. Let’s raise our glasses, Qazi Hussain Ahmed or no Qazi Hussain Ahmed, to MKA in anticipation of his birthday.

One is told Gen. Musharraf likes to read, so no doubt he has read MKA. Wouldn’t it be nice, therefore, for the state of Pakistan to honour a man who has brought so much joy and laughter to generations of readers. Let it no longer be said that the man who created the delightful Chacha Abdul Baqi is neglected (which he is).

But before we turn to Chacha Abdul Baqi and his madcap - and somewhat fraudulent — money-making schemes, this is what MKA writes in that 1997 letter (prescient, isn’t he?), “By the end of the new year (1998), the Taliban, the mad Mullahs of Afghanistan, after conquering their country, will turn their hawk eyes to the ‘God-given kingdom’ somewhere in the middle of 1999.” In other words, he for one, could not have been surprised by the events that have the world glued to Ms Christiane Amanpour on TV, reporting from the trenches, though actually standing on the rooftop of Hotel Marriot, Islamabad.

Chacha Abdul Baqi who with nephew Bakhtiar Khilji in tow comes up with a new scheme each week to make a financial killing has tried everything, from trading in leather to selling dried animal bones to speculating on salt to hawking fish but the gods have failed to smile on the duo. Once they set up a poultry farm but in Chacha’s words, “because of the lack of imagination of my partners and the timidity and hesitancy of certain gentlemen with capital to spare, the scheme failed and, in the end, I had to dine on those chickens myself.”

Chacha Abdul Baqi’s most celebrated scheme involved the import of young zebras from Africa which he was going to raise in Karachi and then sell to the city’s victoria and tonga drivers. He was confident that in a few months, instead of the half-starved, bone-bundle, sickly brown horses doing victoria service, the world will see smart, healthy, on-the-run zebras jauntily pulling the city’s victorias.

The day of the horse is done, declared he. Nephew Khilji was to be sent to Nigeria to procure the animals and have them shipped. Chacha Abdul Baqi was convinced that the future of the horse was dark and the dawn of the age of the zebra was at hand. The man who offered to import African zebras for them was one Major A.R. Maskeen, who billed himself as a big game hunter. The major took their money and delivered the first shipment of zebras. All was well except that it rained one night and the zebras turned into the asses they were, their magnificent black and white stripes being washable paint.

Then there was Chacha Abdul Baqi’s fish scheme, introduced to nephew Bakhtiar Khilji in these words, “Dear nephew, my problem at the moment is investors who have the guts to invest. I tell you becoming a business magnate is no big deal. Do you have a cigarette on you?” They are sold a trawler of fresh which turns out to be not so fresh after all.

The fish is loaded onto a camel cart and dumped in Chacha Abdul Baqi’s backyard, but there are no buyers because of the machinations of a character named Maulvi Abdul Hanan a.k.a. Mohammad Ahsan Ashrafi. By the third day, the mountain of unsold fish is smelling to high heaven. The neighbours march in a delegation to Chacha Abdul Baqi and demand that the fish be removed because they can’t even breathe because of the stink.

Chacha Abdul Baqi is cool, as he always is in such situations. “This is my house. If I like, I can turn it into a horse stable, or a goat slaughterhouse. I may even decide to cultivate potatoes in my backyard. As owner of the house, this is my government-ordained right. If you so hate the smell of fish, you are welcome to move out of this neighbourhood. Speaking for myself, I love the smell of fish.”

Chacha Abdul Baqi’s entry into the world of popular entertainment came in the form of the Baqi Bahadur Circus, Jahangir Park, Karachi. Half the animals turned out to be poor performers, including a most scatter-brained lion which may have been something else in a lion’s skin. On top of it all, one night the big tent was burnt down.

Most animals escaped. Some were recaptured and some unburnt pieces of the circus canopy retrieved. According to nephew Khilji, “If you buy some of the tentage, you will get with each purchase eight rabbits, two Australian parrots and three dozen guinea pigs.” There were no takers.

What with the goings on in Afghanistan, I need to bring a smile to MKA’s face. Did he know what Dorothy Parker said of a novel she had been given for review? “This is not a novel to be tossed aside lightly. It should be thrown with full force.”

In the larger national interest, a list of such novels should be drawn up. If Iftikhar Arif was not busy looking so soulful and handing out yet another prize to retired banker Mushtaq Yusufi, one could have asked him to put the Academy of Letters to work.

THE recent statement of the foreign minister that Pakistan has installed comprehensive and foolproof arrangements for the security of nuclear weapons has to be viewed against the backdrop of speculations in the West that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons or fissile material could slip into the hands of militant Islamic elements. The US secretary of state offered training for Pakistani personnel for security and protection of nuclear assets. Pakistan has accepted this offer.

The official circles and the experts of South Asian security in the US are perturbed about the danger of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons or fissile material falling into the hands of the extremist Islamic elements who are currently supporting the Taliban. What worries them is that if the current agitation by the militant Islamic elements intensifies it can destabilize the Musharraf government which may then find it difficult to protect the nuclear assets.

The current speculation about the future of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme can be traced to an article entitled “Watching the Warheads: The Risks of Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal” by a well-known American journalist, Seymour M. Hersh, in the latest issue of the New Yorker (November 5, 2001). The author takes an alarmist view of what can happen to Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Quoting the serving and retired US officials, the author claims that an elite US army unit “under Pentagon with CIA assistance” is getting training along with Israel’s special operation unit, known as Unit 262, for taking control of or destroying Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and installations if there arises a danger of their falling into the hands of extreme religious elements. This eventuality can arise, the article suggests, if Musharraf is dislodged in a coup by a section of the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) which sympathizes with the Taliban. The Musharraf regime may find it difficult to protect the nuclear programme if the on-going street agitation, currently limited to Islamic hard-liners, is joined by other political elements, Hersh maintains.

In such a situation, some elements in the army and especially in the ISI who “have long-standing religious and personal ties” with the Taliban leaders may attempt a seizure of nuclear weapons.

The JUI leader, Hafiz Hussain Ahmad, recently claimed that the Taliban could use nuclear weapons in their defence and that they were close to acquiring nuclear weapons capability. The Taliban ambassador to Pakistan denied this statement but this could not remove western apprehensions.

The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) called upon the nuclear states on November 1 to strengthen the safety of nuclear material in their possession. The IAEA feared that “Pakistan could become a source of hardware for terrorists planning to build a nuclear bomb, while the impoverished scientists from the former Soviet Union could provide the required know-how.”

This is not the first time that speculative and controversial stories about Pakistan’s nuclear programme have surfaced in the media.

The first controversy about its nuclear programme arose when it became known in 1978-79 that Pakistan was pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme was described as the “Islamic bomb”, suggesting that Pakistan could make the bomb or make its technology available to the Arab countries, some of which were said to have provided funds in the initial stages of the programme.

This was bound to alert Israel and pro-Israel groups in the West who felt that any such transfer would undermine Israel’s predominant military position in the Middle East. All Pakistani governments have rejected this insinuation and assured the international community that it would not transfer nuclear weapons technology or the weapon to any state and that its nuclear programme was meant only to strengthen its security vis-a-vis India. However, the issue of the “Islamic bomb” has surfaced from time to time. The latest reference to this was made during US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s visit to New Delhi last month when an Indian journalist asked him a question about the security implications of Pakistan’s “Islamic bomb.”

The second major speculation pertaining to Pakistan’s nuclear programme is the possibility of an Indian attack on Pakistan’s nuclear installations.

The first such stories appeared in 1982-83, against the backdrop of Israel’s air strikes against Iraq’s nuclear installations in 1981. Pakistani media periodically talked of Indo-Israeli collaboration for such an operation.

The Indian official sources have denied such stories but these continue to resurface in the Pakistani and international media from time to time. In December 1988, Pakistan and India signed an agreement for non-attack on each other’s nuclear installations. But, occasional references to this possibility are still made in the press.

The third well-known speculative report about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability was narrated by Seymour Hersh in an article entitled “On the Nuclear Edge” published in the New Yorker, March 29, 1993. He alleged that India and Pakistan were close to nuclear confrontation in the spring of 1990 on the Kashmir issue. He claimed that Pakistan had loaded nuclear warheads on aircraft fearing a pre-emptive Indian nuclear strike.

American intervention saved the situation. The Pakistani authorities, including the then army chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg, vehemently denied this story. India also rejected this report.

The fourth major issue relates to western and Indian fears that religious extremists can take control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

The latest New Yorker article has highlighted what is periodically discussed in western security circles since May 1998, when Pakistan carried out its tests to become an overt nuclear weapon state. Discussions have taken place at seminars and in the security circles in Washington and elsewhere in the US on the possibility of a take-over of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons by militant Islamic groups.

The concerned officials of the Pentagon and the state department have looked into this matter as one of the possibilities if Pakistan’s internal drift continues unabated. In an interview in the CBS news programme “Sixty Minutes” in October 2000, General Anthony Zinni, former commander of US CENTCOM, expressed apprehensions that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons “could wind up in the hands of extremist religious leaders.”

One can talk about the problems of safety of Pakistan’s nuclear material as a worst case scenario. However, a number of factors militate against the possibility of the nuclear weapons falling into the hands of militant Islamic groups.

The Pakistan army has been controlling the nuclear programme since 1977 when it assumed power under General Zia-ul-Haq. This pattern continued after the restoration of civilian government in 1985. This control became firmer when the military returned to power in October 1999 under General Pervez Musharraf. The army, like the navy and the air force, is a highly professional, cohesive and disciplined force and recognizes the responsibility the control of nuclear weapons impose on it. The recent changes in the army and ISI command structure have streamlined the hierarchy to deal with the post-September 11 situation. The desire to protect the nuclear assets is equally shared by the top brass, which ensures the safety of nuclear assets even if there is a change of government.

The nuclear and missiles programmes are under the control of the National Command Authority (NCA) which comprises the Chief Executive, the top brass of the military and some top civilian policy makers. The NCA had set up an Employment Control Committee, a Development Control Committee, and a Strategic Plans Division (SPD). The SPD acts as the secretariat of the NCA and is responsible for, among other things, establishment of command, control, communication, computers and intelligence network for the NCA.

A Strategic Force Command, headed by a serving general, is responsible for deployment of strategic missiles. Such an elaborate command and management system ensures that nuclear and missile arsenal programmes are handled with restraint and responsibility.

The control of nuclear weapons is highly elaborate and centralized to ensure that there is no unauthorized, unintentional or accidental use and their security is fully guaranteed. Available information suggests that the nuclear weapons are not kept in assembled form. Their components are located in different places. Such a strategy enhances the security of the weapon. However, the components can be put together to assemble weapons at short notice.

The ground security of all the nuclear installations has been strengthened since September 11. The air defence of these installations has also been reinforced as a precautionary measure. One can safely conclude that the speculations about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets are exaggerated.