| October 28, 2001 | Sunday | Shaba'an 10, 1422 |
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Justice Taliban-style
Will ‘17’ ever work?
ONE must welcome the unanimity of views reached between Turkey and Pakistan on a number of vital issues during President Necdet Sezer’s two-day visit here. On Kashmir, the Turkish president maintained his country’s consistent support to Pakistan and called for a solution in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir and on the basis of international law. Similarly, President Musharraf reiterated the need for a solution of the Cyprus issue by peaceful means. On Afghanistan, as the Turkish president told a press conference in Islamabad, he agreed with President Musharraf that the country should have a broad-based government representing all sections of the population. While he was evasive on the question of accommodating the moderate Taliban in the new set-up, the Turkish President affirmed that, as the largest ethnic group, the Pakhtoons must obviously be there along with the ethnic minorities.
The meeting of Turkish and Pakistani minds on the Afghan question comes at a crucial time. As the American aerial strikes on Afghanistan enter the fourth week, there is no sign yet of any progress in the direction of a viable post-Taliban government. While both Pakistan and the United States have agreed that there should be a broad-based government, neither is clear about how to bring it about. The situation is complicated by the fact that Afghanistan is in the grip of acute polarization. The Taliban are Pakhtoon, while their opponents belong to other ethnic communities. The Alliance has, no doubt, shown an ability to fight back and keep the northern pocket under their control, but the fact that they do not have any Pakhtoons in their ranks restricts their chances of forming an acceptable government. On the other hand, whether all the Pakhtoons are with the Taliban or if there are anti-Taliban elements among them is difficult to say under the present circumstances. The Taliban have weathered the aerial strikes so far, and there is nothing to suggest that they are about to collapse as a ruling entity.
Clearly, if there are any dissident elements among the Taliban, they have chosen to lie low for the moment. The execution of commander Abdul Haq and some of his men also contains a lesson. Tribal loyalties, during times such as these, are lukewarm and open to fear, temptations and manipulation. One does not know what made Abdul Haq go into the Taliban heartland and suffer the fate that he did. His fate should serve to warn the US-led coalition of the minefield that Afghanistan’s politics is.
While the unanimity between Turkey and Pakistan is reassuring, they should not underrate the task ahead. The failure of the Peshawar moot serves to underline the hazards of initiating a political process that is not rooted in ground realities. The Peshawar moot lacked a representative character because it had no representation from the Northern Alliance, the royalty and moderate Taliban — if there are any. This makes the forthcoming Istanbul conference on Afghanistan of vital importance, because nominees of Zahir Shah and the Northern Alliance are also to attend it. One hopes that this moot is able to start the process of convening the Loya Jirga with a view to forming a broad-based government. Pakistan and Turkey should, therefore, help the Istanbul meeting succeed in reaching a consensus. Any attempt to impose a government from the outside will not only fail; it could lead to a new round of civil war with its inevitable fallout on the neighbouring countries.
WHEN the end came for Commander Abdul Haq, it was swift and ruthless. Within hours of being captured by the Taliban, the former Mujahideen commander and two of his associates were tried and executed for ‘treason’. Abdul Haq was accused of spying and working in tandem with the US to oust the Taliban from power, an act punishable by death according to an edict issued by the ulema a few days ago. This was justice Afghanistan-style, an example of the kind of rough justice that has prevailed among the warring factions in the country since it plunged into anarchy during and after the anti-Soviet jihad. The tradition has ancient roots in this region and its rules are known to all combatants: being captured invariably amounts to a death warrant, particularly if one is a prominent figure, as Abdul Haq was. The formalities of a fair trial and respect for the rights of prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention are alien concepts in this war-torn, anarchic tribal society. In fact, soon after Abdul Haq’s summary execution, five captured commanders of the opposition Northern Alliance met with a similar fate.
Abdul Haq was back in his country after spending many years in exile. He had been working tirelessly to forge an alliance comprising numerous anti-Taliban elements, including those close to former king Zahir Shah. His current mission to Afghanistan was believed to be exploratory, aimed at sending out feelers to potential defectors. Apart from his eloquence and bravery, Abdul Haq had two major advantages that made him the ideal candidate for this bridge-building role: he was a Pakhtoon who was vehemently opposed to the Taliban, and his reputation was relatively unblemished in the period following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Unlike many other former commanders, Abdul Haq did not get involved in the fierce factional fighting and the bloodletting that followed the departure of the Soviets — events that discredited the Mujahideen in the people’s eyes. Instead, he simply withdrew from the scene and went into exile where he worked for the ouster of the Taliban. This made him an ideal candidate for a key position in any future post-Taliban dispensation. His summary execution is not only a terrible indictment of the system of justice under the Taliban but also represents a severe setback to the behind-the-scenes attempts to put together a credible broad-based set-up for Afghanistan.
KARACHI’s 800,000 telephone subscribers seem to get the services they pay for. If it is not a problem with the directories — yet to be distributed despite a gap of five years — it is directory assistance, which has never really worked properly. Most people who use the ‘17’ service to ask for a number do not even get through to an operator. According to a report, the PTCL authorities say that the reason for this is that the city has many more telephone users than the staff at directory assistance can possibly handle. As a way of solving this problem, two years back it was decided to privatize this service. Apparently, bureaucratic red tape and a lack of initiative by the PTCL have delayed the intended privatization. Clearly, one reason for this complacent attitude by the telephone utility has to do with its monopoly status because a lack of competition allows the corporation to do whatever it wants.
All this comes at the expense of subscribers without whom PTCL would never make the sort of profits it does. Since the utility has not kept its promise of providing telephone directories to its subscribers, the least it can do is to get ‘17’ up and running. Contractual or procedural hiccups that seem to be cropping up every now and then, preventing the service from being privatized, should be promptly removed. PTCL bosses have repeatedly said that the corporation must work on establishing a consumer-friendly image. For a change, it would be good if they acted on this promise.