FOLLOWING the events of September 11, President George Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell told General Musharraf that they needed Pakistan’s “cooperation” in finding and punishing Osama bin Laden and in penalizing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that harboured him. The general’s recent address to the nation makes it obvious that the American demands were accompanied by threats of punitive action that would result to Pakistan in case it chose to reject them.

The Americans have demanded access to Pakistan’s intelligence resources concerning Osama bin Laden and his organization, and the Taliban-supported terrorist camps. In addition they have demanded the use of Pakistan’s airspace and logistical support for air and land-based raids on Afghan territory. Sharing of information poses no serious problem. Use of airspace may or may not involve use of Pakistani air bases. But what does logistical support include?

Ordinarily, logistics refer to the procurement, placement, maintenance, and transportation of military material and personnel for warlike purposes. According to official Pakistani spokesmen, the United States has not so far specified the logistical help it will require, but Pakistan’s agreement to provide whatever may be needed would cover several types of facilities, including military bases from which raids on Afghanistan may be launched.

As a first reaction, it does seem weird that we have agreed to aid a foreign power in hitting Afghanistan, a brotherly Islamic country, bound to us with historical, ethnic, and cultural ties that go back hundreds of years. No wonder then that the Islamic parties and “Jihadi” groups in the country are agitated at the prospect of our government aiding any American military operation directed at Osama bin Laden and the Taliban regime. Qazi Hussain Ahmad (JI), Maulana Fazlur Rahman (JUI), Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani (JUP), and their counterparts in other Islamic organizations are threatening a mass movement to overthrow the present government if it aids America’s design.

Not unexpectedly, the government is worried. Even though its response to the United States appears to have had the support of the great majority of the Pakistani people, the ulema in opposition do have the ability to disrupt further the already fragile state of public order. They could conceivably bring about a civil war. As compared to the sanctity of their own version of Islam, the integrity of Pakistan means little to them.

General Musharraf, his foreign minister, and other spokesmen have been trying to dilute the domestic impact of their assurances to the United States. They are trying to assure all concerned that they do not want Afghan interests to be hurt, that they will not support any campaign to overthrow the Taliban (even whil